AF 447 Thread No. 7
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Originally Posted by Lyman
BEA say the a/c rolled right to 8 degrees, they do not mention trend, and therefore people assume it stopped at 8 degrees, right?
If PF had been accustomed to flying smoothly at altitude in normal law, he would have just had to fly even a little smoother than usual in Alt 2. As it was, he was completely clueless in that environment.
PJ2 describes the proper effort as little more than a light squeeze on the stick if I remember correctly, although he also indicates that the aircraft is a bit goosey in roll in Alt 2 (my words, not his). I expect he will jump in if I have misinterpreted his intent.
Anyone who thinks an airliner needs an AOA gage is not going to get an argument from me. It is an excellent performance indicator. Just don't hide it away in some corner of the panel. It belongs right in front. You want it where you can incorporate it into your scan easily should a problem arise.
Last edited by Machinbird; 20th Mar 2012 at 04:51. Reason: ADD A MISSING 'LITTLE'
Machinbird;
re, "PJ2 describes the proper effort as little more than a light squeeze on the stick if I remember correctly, although he also indicates that the aircraft is a bit goosey in roll in Alt 2 (my words, not his)."
That's just how I described it: light squeeze, if anything at all, and that's how the sim performed. Taking one's hand off the stick would have been by far the best decision and then gently correct the right roll with one small motion. Tough to do? You betcha. This is just hindsight.
Really, this initial roll and the few back-and-forths were entirely a non-event...in the sim one rolled back and forth a bit just like we see in the data, primarily because it is sensitive, but as Owain Glyndwr has stated and I completely agree based upon experience with hand-flying the airplane at cruise altitudes (in Normal Law), the PF learned quickly and got this bit of roll under control quite nicely.
The rolling response of the airplane is all but inconsequential to any of this including the initial, instant pitch-up. This pitch-up was instant, steady (uncorrected, unchallenged) and held for a relatively long time. It went from what may have been perceived as the "correct" response (to the UAS) to an urgent pull-up to arrest either the descent, or what may have been later assessed as an overspeed, (I think that notion is difficult to support). The lateral stick forces which produce the minor rolling we see in the data (+/- 8deg) are tiny but the half-pull (10deg NU IIRC) to produce such pitch-up requires a much stronger force - I don't think it is a result of 'being distracted'.
The eight degrees is nothing to be concerned over, nor are the back-and-forths; such minor gyrations don't lead to a complete loss of control, and he got it under control. Now, over thirty-five degrees bank at that point would be something to comment upon.
I've never understood the fascination with this initial roll and subsequent minor PIO. There's just nothing in it - it's what the airplane would do with just a bit of lateral stick and he very quickly got it right. But it doesn't stall the airplane.
While it has generally been agreed that the sim cannot - does not reproduce aircraft behaviour at and post stall, nor does it behave wildly and unexpectedly in the stall and subsequent descent if one keeps the stick back. The stall is however quite recoverable, taking about 20,000ft or so. The positive lift from the THS even at 13deg NU and the elevators 30deg UP has been acknowledged as contributing to a ND tendency which, if full ND stick is applied AND HELD, with pitch at 15-18deg ND until the airplane is clearly flying again, (rapid increase in CAS, disappearance of buffet, increasing wind noise), the stall is exited before FL200. That's the sim, (Level D). I am not an engineer but my pilot instincts tell me that below FL200, opportunity for a successful recovery rapidly reduces, mitigated only by the thicker air. It would take very aggressive action on the controls to do so and we're just not trained to do that. That means the guy at the controls at that very late point in the event would be of a mindset that recognizes only one way out with seconds to decide..., "15deg nose down, 15,000ft away from earth doing 18,000fpm down is my only chance" and that capacity to think and do that is, I expect, rare.
After all situational awareness was lost and reassessing what had occurred just prior to the apogee, (meaning, why the airplane couldn't be in a high-speed condition given its initial pitch up after stable flight), the loss of energy & post-stall entry became extremely difficult to assess and respond to. there just isn't the instrumentation to tell you that and I firmly believe that an AoA indicator would not have saved this flight at that point. It may have up to the apogee but the psychology of perception/assessment/agreement rapidly changed after the descent began.
The recurring stall warning was a sad happening in an extremely complex and impossible-to-assess set of circumstances but that occurred very late into the descent, (about FL200 to 180) where recovery was rapidly becoming impossible even with extremely aggressive actions.
re, "PJ2 describes the proper effort as little more than a light squeeze on the stick if I remember correctly, although he also indicates that the aircraft is a bit goosey in roll in Alt 2 (my words, not his)."
That's just how I described it: light squeeze, if anything at all, and that's how the sim performed. Taking one's hand off the stick would have been by far the best decision and then gently correct the right roll with one small motion. Tough to do? You betcha. This is just hindsight.
Really, this initial roll and the few back-and-forths were entirely a non-event...in the sim one rolled back and forth a bit just like we see in the data, primarily because it is sensitive, but as Owain Glyndwr has stated and I completely agree based upon experience with hand-flying the airplane at cruise altitudes (in Normal Law), the PF learned quickly and got this bit of roll under control quite nicely.
The rolling response of the airplane is all but inconsequential to any of this including the initial, instant pitch-up. This pitch-up was instant, steady (uncorrected, unchallenged) and held for a relatively long time. It went from what may have been perceived as the "correct" response (to the UAS) to an urgent pull-up to arrest either the descent, or what may have been later assessed as an overspeed, (I think that notion is difficult to support). The lateral stick forces which produce the minor rolling we see in the data (+/- 8deg) are tiny but the half-pull (10deg NU IIRC) to produce such pitch-up requires a much stronger force - I don't think it is a result of 'being distracted'.
The eight degrees is nothing to be concerned over, nor are the back-and-forths; such minor gyrations don't lead to a complete loss of control, and he got it under control. Now, over thirty-five degrees bank at that point would be something to comment upon.
I've never understood the fascination with this initial roll and subsequent minor PIO. There's just nothing in it - it's what the airplane would do with just a bit of lateral stick and he very quickly got it right. But it doesn't stall the airplane.
While it has generally been agreed that the sim cannot - does not reproduce aircraft behaviour at and post stall, nor does it behave wildly and unexpectedly in the stall and subsequent descent if one keeps the stick back. The stall is however quite recoverable, taking about 20,000ft or so. The positive lift from the THS even at 13deg NU and the elevators 30deg UP has been acknowledged as contributing to a ND tendency which, if full ND stick is applied AND HELD, with pitch at 15-18deg ND until the airplane is clearly flying again, (rapid increase in CAS, disappearance of buffet, increasing wind noise), the stall is exited before FL200. That's the sim, (Level D). I am not an engineer but my pilot instincts tell me that below FL200, opportunity for a successful recovery rapidly reduces, mitigated only by the thicker air. It would take very aggressive action on the controls to do so and we're just not trained to do that. That means the guy at the controls at that very late point in the event would be of a mindset that recognizes only one way out with seconds to decide..., "15deg nose down, 15,000ft away from earth doing 18,000fpm down is my only chance" and that capacity to think and do that is, I expect, rare.
After all situational awareness was lost and reassessing what had occurred just prior to the apogee, (meaning, why the airplane couldn't be in a high-speed condition given its initial pitch up after stable flight), the loss of energy & post-stall entry became extremely difficult to assess and respond to. there just isn't the instrumentation to tell you that and I firmly believe that an AoA indicator would not have saved this flight at that point. It may have up to the apogee but the psychology of perception/assessment/agreement rapidly changed after the descent began.
The recurring stall warning was a sad happening in an extremely complex and impossible-to-assess set of circumstances but that occurred very late into the descent, (about FL200 to 180) where recovery was rapidly becoming impossible even with extremely aggressive actions.
Last edited by PJ2; 20th Mar 2012 at 06:10.
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Something learned?
The video highlights a new addition to the airline's flight-analysis protocol, which Air France implemented in 1974 and today analyzes operational data from the carrier's 1,500 daily flights.
Each flight records some 100 different data points, including altitude, speed and trajectory. The new feature is expected to reduce the time necessary to identify and address areas of operational safety concern.
Air France employees, called gatekeepers, will provide pilots with faster access to flight-analysis data.
"With the gatekeepers," explains Gilles Laurent, vice president of Air France's flight safety division, in the same video, "we can question the crew about contextual elements just a few days later and not a few weeks later."
Gatekeepers' duties range from simple discussions with pilots about safety concerns to recommendations of extra flight training where warranted.
While pilots normally cringe at the idea of flight-data gathering, fearing possible disciplinary actions, this new Air France safety protocol was established with the full agreement of the SNPL, the French arm of the Air Line Pilots Association.
Data gathered in the program will also be reviewed on a bi-monthly basis by an Air France committee with a mandate to suggest improvements to operational procedures, equipment, infrastructure, crew training and aircraft maintenance programs.
While Air France's overall safety record is quite good, the airline has suffered two high-profile fatal crashes in the past 12 years: the Concorde crash in Paris in 2000 and the 2009 loss of an Airbus A330 in the South Atlantic.
Source: AINSAFETY
Each flight records some 100 different data points, including altitude, speed and trajectory. The new feature is expected to reduce the time necessary to identify and address areas of operational safety concern.
Air France employees, called gatekeepers, will provide pilots with faster access to flight-analysis data.
"With the gatekeepers," explains Gilles Laurent, vice president of Air France's flight safety division, in the same video, "we can question the crew about contextual elements just a few days later and not a few weeks later."
Gatekeepers' duties range from simple discussions with pilots about safety concerns to recommendations of extra flight training where warranted.
While pilots normally cringe at the idea of flight-data gathering, fearing possible disciplinary actions, this new Air France safety protocol was established with the full agreement of the SNPL, the French arm of the Air Line Pilots Association.
Data gathered in the program will also be reviewed on a bi-monthly basis by an Air France committee with a mandate to suggest improvements to operational procedures, equipment, infrastructure, crew training and aircraft maintenance programs.
While Air France's overall safety record is quite good, the airline has suffered two high-profile fatal crashes in the past 12 years: the Concorde crash in Paris in 2000 and the 2009 loss of an Airbus A330 in the South Atlantic.
Source: AINSAFETY
Last edited by A33Zab; 20th Mar 2012 at 12:23.
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Rich and dense post (HF as the key)
Hi,
PJ2:
HF, as the "key" to/of/from, this accident.
PS
Excellent post
PS2
On how a inadequate behavior may led to "non manageable" situations:
PJ2:
...out with seconds to decide...
...psychology of perception/assessment/agreement rapidly changed after the descent began.
HF, as the "key" to/of/from, this accident.
PS
Excellent post
PS2
On how a inadequate behavior may led to "non manageable" situations:
and it appears he never did begin to fly cooly and deliberately. He continued to beat snakes with the stick all the way down.
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Fast feedback to crew
Hi,
A33Zab,
Excellent approach:
"Air France is the first airline to have implemented a prevention system based on the analysis of recorded flight data." 
This was published in carrier corporate site. And it sounds like a phrase generated by marketing personnel perhaps without enough info. on what was done also by other carriers many decades ago. And applied by competitors with similar objectives.
A33Zab,
Good question.
PS
Thanks PJ2 for "limiting the time" duration of the incorrect info. in my post.
A33Zab,
Excellent approach:
Air France employees, called gatekeepers, will provide pilots with faster access to flight-analysis data.
This was published in carrier corporate site. And it sounds like a phrase generated by marketing personnel perhaps without enough info. on what was done also by other carriers many decades ago. And applied by competitors with similar objectives.
Something learned?
A33Zab,
Good question. PS
Thanks PJ2 for "limiting the time" duration of the incorrect info. in my post.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 21st Mar 2012 at 23:15.
RR_NDB;
Re, "Air France is the first airline to have implemented a prevention system based on the analysis of recorded flight data."
No, it isn't. Their statement on the page to which the link is provided is incorrect and misleading and is spin. BOAC/BA was doing flight data analysis in the late fifites and pioneered the entire field and remains a leader today. BA today has the most enlightened and advanced FDM Program in the industry. I know some of the people involved in their work and we took many lessons from them and from QANTAS when developing our own program in 2000.
Many airlines are doing FDM/FDA/FOQA especially in the United States where FOQA is regulated and privacy of data supported in law.
It seems they are implementing one of the most important learning processes which is using pilot gatekeepers to contact crews to learn more about the circumstances of the events being seen. As may be imagined, such processes require a mature, trusting relationship which guarantees that recorded flight data will not be used against individual pilots for disciplinary or legal proceedings. Except for Asia, these enlightened approaches seem to be the norm in FDM Programs.
Management never does this work and do not have access to actual data due to conflicting priorites and trust, again except at BA where, I understand, FDM data is even shared with the regulator, (de-identified).
Perhaps BOAC or another PPRuNer can tell us more, but I wouldn't consider an implementation date of 1974 "late".
PJ2
Re, "Air France is the first airline to have implemented a prevention system based on the analysis of recorded flight data."
No, it isn't. Their statement on the page to which the link is provided is incorrect and misleading and is spin. BOAC/BA was doing flight data analysis in the late fifites and pioneered the entire field and remains a leader today. BA today has the most enlightened and advanced FDM Program in the industry. I know some of the people involved in their work and we took many lessons from them and from QANTAS when developing our own program in 2000.
Many airlines are doing FDM/FDA/FOQA especially in the United States where FOQA is regulated and privacy of data supported in law.
It seems they are implementing one of the most important learning processes which is using pilot gatekeepers to contact crews to learn more about the circumstances of the events being seen. As may be imagined, such processes require a mature, trusting relationship which guarantees that recorded flight data will not be used against individual pilots for disciplinary or legal proceedings. Except for Asia, these enlightened approaches seem to be the norm in FDM Programs.
Management never does this work and do not have access to actual data due to conflicting priorites and trust, again except at BA where, I understand, FDM data is even shared with the regulator, (de-identified).
Perhaps BOAC or another PPRuNer can tell us more, but I wouldn't consider an implementation date of 1974 "late".
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 20th Mar 2012 at 17:45.
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Hi,
PJ2
Indeed ... and is to remember that in all the cases of a Airbus stall identified (Toulouse-Perpignan and AF447) the result was a crash ...
Coincidences ?
PJ2
The recurring stall warning was a sad happening in an extremely complex and impossible-to-assess set of circumstances but that occurred very late into the descent, (about FL200 to 180) where recovery was rapidly becoming impossible even with extremely aggressive actions.
Coincidences ?
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When they (AF) started the program?
Hi,
Bear:
Let's hope the results of the program to be much better than the way they are doing the marketing of this "basic feedback tool" as PJ2 mentioned being used since long time ago.
Or much worse.
Bear:
Let's hope the results of the program to be much better than the way they are doing the marketing of this "basic feedback tool" as PJ2 mentioned being used since long time ago.
It makes one look foolish.
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Lyman and RR,
I don't give a fig if they're "looking for applause." If it serves to improve flying skills and safety for the public (as I have no doubt it will) then it is a Good Thing. Let's not condemn, out of cynicism, what looks like a good effort.
Back to flying my armchair.
I don't give a fig if they're "looking for applause." If it serves to improve flying skills and safety for the public (as I have no doubt it will) then it is a Good Thing. Let's not condemn, out of cynicism, what looks like a good effort.
Back to flying my armchair.
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Howdy.
Safety is like humility. If you splash it about, you don't have it. Real time monitoring of a/c is done extensively, and doesn't need a Jeanne come lately to validate it.
Clueless.
Safety is like humility. If you splash it about, you don't have it. Real time monitoring of a/c is done extensively, and doesn't need a Jeanne come lately to validate it.
Clueless.
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Hierarchy of this Feedback mechanism
Hi,
PJ2:
And the issue (Quality) is Rich! Addressing what is most important to "accomplish the mission". In "search of Excellence" as i understand it.
I personally had a great opportunity in my career to understand the importance of this (type of) feedback. May represent the "differential" of a good Company.
As relevant and "capable to correct" as any well designed feedback. In this case with hierarchy to almost everything in the carrier ops.
PJ2:
And the issue (Quality) is Rich! Addressing what is most important to "accomplish the mission". In "search of Excellence" as i understand it.
I personally had a great opportunity in my career to understand the importance of this (type of) feedback. May represent the "differential" of a good Company.
As relevant and "capable to correct" as any well designed feedback. In this case with hierarchy to almost everything in the carrier ops.
Last edited by RR_NDB; 20th Mar 2012 at 22:56. Reason: Box missing, clarifying concepts
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This type of feedback mechanism is much more than a basic tool: IS A VALUE
Hi,
Bear,
Safety is like humility.
An intrinsic value.. That acts silently.
Organfreak, my position was clear:
Let's hope the results of the program to be much better than the way they are doing the marketing of this "basic feedback tool" ...
Bear,
Safety is like humility.
An intrinsic value.. That acts silently.
Organfreak, my position was clear:
Let's hope the results of the program to be much better than the way they are doing the marketing of this "basic feedback tool" ...
Last edited by RR_NDB; 20th Mar 2012 at 18:10. Reason: Title impvmt
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Safety is like humility. If you splash it about, you don't have it. Real time monitoring of a/c is done extensively, and doesn't need a Jeanne come lately to validate it.
Clueless.
Clueless.
Who is clueless? Was that aimed at me? We disagree; does that make me clueless?
Safety is not at all like humility. So what if real-time monitoring of a/c is done extensively? What really matters is what is done with that info.
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Organfreak. Forgive me, of course I did not mean that for you. For Air France.
"We are missing an a/c....", "Fortes Turbulences.." "Wait, no, Lightning, yep lightning..." "No, it was the Radars, the poor pilots were not lucky..." "They flew into a Storm, right, it was the Storm..." "Whatever, Non?......" "Pitots?" "Certainement, the Pitots..." "Oh, we were to have replaced the Pitots?" "Then certainly not the pitots, it was Airbus..."
et plus la meme chose.
Air France is so used to hiding, they have forgotten how to "get in front".
Hence, clueless.
I value your postings, and would never insult. You are well informed, and articulate. Again, please excuse.
"We are missing an a/c....", "Fortes Turbulences.." "Wait, no, Lightning, yep lightning..." "No, it was the Radars, the poor pilots were not lucky..." "They flew into a Storm, right, it was the Storm..." "Whatever, Non?......" "Pitots?" "Certainement, the Pitots..." "Oh, we were to have replaced the Pitots?" "Then certainly not the pitots, it was Airbus..."
et plus la meme chose.
Air France is so used to hiding, they have forgotten how to "get in front".
Hence, clueless.
I value your postings, and would never insult. You are well informed, and articulate. Again, please excuse.
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Premature to comment. Sounds very good.
Hi,
Looking to what A33Zab post (#904) i think this is a potentially powerful "mechanism" being introduced by the carrier.
If well applied with absolutely essential aspects mentioned by PJ2 like:
It could represent a "very good answer" to the question put in the title of A33Zab post.
In my opinion this came in time to show AF probably learned important lessons and seems committed to a "process of change".
PS
The concept using "pilot gatekeepers" is new?
PS2
PJ2:
Sure, is not.
Looking to what A33Zab post (#904) i think this is a potentially powerful "mechanism" being introduced by the carrier.
If well applied with absolutely essential aspects mentioned by PJ2 like:
It could represent a "very good answer" to the question put in the title of A33Zab post.
In my opinion this came in time to show AF probably learned important lessons and seems committed to a "process of change".
PS
The concept using "pilot gatekeepers" is new?
PS2
PJ2:
Perhaps BOAC or another PPRuNer can tell us more, but I wouldn't consider an implementation date of 1974 "late".
Last edited by RR_NDB; 20th Mar 2012 at 23:14. Reason: Text impvmt
Hi RR_NDB;
None of this is "new". Flight data analysis and monitoring has been around for fifty to sixty years at BOAC/BA. The rest of the industry began getting on board in the '70's. Some just don't get it and don't implement it for some strange reason but in this day and age of cheap equipment, massive processing and storage capacity and the ability to "know" vice "not know" and the notion of the accountable executive, there simply is no excuse for a major carrier to resist or ignore such programs. But believe me, it happens and all kinds of excuses are given. It is complex, takes a very long time to design, create and implement and for those who like to think that their operation is "pretty good" it is an unwelcome and difficult wake-up call to accept. No carrier is immune and no management has the right to think that they don't have such events occurring on a regular basis.
Air France was a very early entrant and user of FDM and they run a good program from the information and presentations I have seen them create.
The notion of the "gatekeeper" is equally not new. The data process tells us "what", but not "why" something out of the ordinary occurred on a particular flight.
FDM data is trended, graphed and presented to Flight Ops managements, (de-identified) and other stakeholders including the pilots' association.
Gatekeeper contact, once established and trusted, is an extremely valuable process which puts pilot association member, the pilot(s) and the data together in a confidential private process of discussion. Such discussions may be straightforward or may be quite detailed depending upon the event. In almost all initial contacts the captain is contacted first. Very often the response is relief and a willingness to be a partner in finding out what occurred and trying to improve those areas which were felt to be contributing factors.
It may be appreciated that this is no ordinary conversation. It requires great comprehension on the part of the pilot association FDM representative and also requires great confidence in such a system by those so contacted, and it further challenges the Operations people to trust that such a process is being done and is providing through appropriate channels the necessary and timely feedback to address problems where they may have emerged in the data. This involves the training/checking process as well as the SOP and policy documents.
FDM people also keep an eye on the industry. Sometimes an occurrence is not monitored such as "split thrust levers at landing", (a result of the TAM accident), and a new FDM "event" is created; all of a sudden an airline learns something new about its operation where it was "blind" before.
For those who want to know more about this safety tool, try CAP 739, FAA FOQA, and the Flight Safety Foundation for starters.
None of this is "new". Flight data analysis and monitoring has been around for fifty to sixty years at BOAC/BA. The rest of the industry began getting on board in the '70's. Some just don't get it and don't implement it for some strange reason but in this day and age of cheap equipment, massive processing and storage capacity and the ability to "know" vice "not know" and the notion of the accountable executive, there simply is no excuse for a major carrier to resist or ignore such programs. But believe me, it happens and all kinds of excuses are given. It is complex, takes a very long time to design, create and implement and for those who like to think that their operation is "pretty good" it is an unwelcome and difficult wake-up call to accept. No carrier is immune and no management has the right to think that they don't have such events occurring on a regular basis.
Air France was a very early entrant and user of FDM and they run a good program from the information and presentations I have seen them create.
The notion of the "gatekeeper" is equally not new. The data process tells us "what", but not "why" something out of the ordinary occurred on a particular flight.
FDM data is trended, graphed and presented to Flight Ops managements, (de-identified) and other stakeholders including the pilots' association.
Gatekeeper contact, once established and trusted, is an extremely valuable process which puts pilot association member, the pilot(s) and the data together in a confidential private process of discussion. Such discussions may be straightforward or may be quite detailed depending upon the event. In almost all initial contacts the captain is contacted first. Very often the response is relief and a willingness to be a partner in finding out what occurred and trying to improve those areas which were felt to be contributing factors.
It may be appreciated that this is no ordinary conversation. It requires great comprehension on the part of the pilot association FDM representative and also requires great confidence in such a system by those so contacted, and it further challenges the Operations people to trust that such a process is being done and is providing through appropriate channels the necessary and timely feedback to address problems where they may have emerged in the data. This involves the training/checking process as well as the SOP and policy documents.
FDM people also keep an eye on the industry. Sometimes an occurrence is not monitored such as "split thrust levers at landing", (a result of the TAM accident), and a new FDM "event" is created; all of a sudden an airline learns something new about its operation where it was "blind" before.
For those who want to know more about this safety tool, try CAP 739, FAA FOQA, and the Flight Safety Foundation for starters.
