AF447 wreckage found
For those who have flown the A330:
How many key strokes (steps) does it take to call up the F/CTL ECAM System Page on the SD. This screen shows where the rudder and THS are, and what the spoilers are doing, what spd brks are or aren't doing, and a prim/sec status. It also looks to tell you which hyd system is up or down as related to a given flight control.
Does this screen get auotmatically pre-empted by rising ECAM alerts, or does is stay active once selected?
Background thinking to my question:
About 20 years ago, something as simple as switching Radio Freqs went from a simple manual task of turning a button here or there, to a process which requires opening a screen and typing in freqs. (This was in the SH-60F). As I had never had trouble with switching radios by hand, I looked into this and noticed that it takes MORE time and steps to switch radios via software. From a pilot task loading perspective, this was idiotic. It appeared to me one of many "solutions" looking for a problem. On that aircraft, the sole FBW control surface was the horizontal stabilizer. (Sorta like the THS in A330, but different). A single, small gauge in the lower center of the instrument panel told you where the stab was at all times. (It was mostly controlled by an auto trim feature). This gauge was a cross check instrument, not a primary scan instrument. You only needed it if things were a bit wrong with the electronics. There was also a manual control that overrode the electro-trim and allowed you to fix its position as needed.
Back to THS on an A330.
I don't know if the crew in AF447 would have thought to look at where their THS was ... but ... if the PNF had wanted to, how many steps in sequence would it take to discover where that control surface was positioned?
How many key strokes (steps) does it take to call up the F/CTL ECAM System Page on the SD. This screen shows where the rudder and THS are, and what the spoilers are doing, what spd brks are or aren't doing, and a prim/sec status. It also looks to tell you which hyd system is up or down as related to a given flight control.
Does this screen get auotmatically pre-empted by rising ECAM alerts, or does is stay active once selected?
Background thinking to my question:
About 20 years ago, something as simple as switching Radio Freqs went from a simple manual task of turning a button here or there, to a process which requires opening a screen and typing in freqs. (This was in the SH-60F). As I had never had trouble with switching radios by hand, I looked into this and noticed that it takes MORE time and steps to switch radios via software. From a pilot task loading perspective, this was idiotic. It appeared to me one of many "solutions" looking for a problem. On that aircraft, the sole FBW control surface was the horizontal stabilizer. (Sorta like the THS in A330, but different). A single, small gauge in the lower center of the instrument panel told you where the stab was at all times. (It was mostly controlled by an auto trim feature). This gauge was a cross check instrument, not a primary scan instrument. You only needed it if things were a bit wrong with the electronics. There was also a manual control that overrode the electro-trim and allowed you to fix its position as needed.
Back to THS on an A330.
I don't know if the crew in AF447 would have thought to look at where their THS was ... but ... if the PNF had wanted to, how many steps in sequence would it take to discover where that control surface was positioned?
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 5th Aug 2011 at 13:05.
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mm43, HazelNuts39, thanks so much for the informative replies.
Quoting HazelNuts39:-
I read the BEA's Perpignan report (on a accident back in 2008) but missed the point you very kindly brought up. To quote part of the report:-
So, as I read that, in order to get the THS even to start moving back to a sensible angle, the Perpignan pilots (and later the AF447 ones) would have needed to shove the stick full forward and hold it there for quite a while, until the THS 'accepted the situation' and started moving back from 'full up.'
But, of course, on AF447, every time they attempted that, the airspeed increased and they got another 'stall warning.' And presumably thought they were 'doing it wrong' (what, apart from an engine falling off, can be more serious than an impending stall?) and instinctively relaxed the stick pressure.......
It'd be interesting to know whether Airbus, Air France, or the BEA had warned pilots that this sort of 'impasse' could occur; and indeed had occurred, as far back as Perpignan in 2008? I very much doubt it........
Anyway, thanks again - I now know, to my own satisfaction, the primary causes of this latest accident. And, in my view, they weren't entirely, and possibly weren't even mainly, 'pilot error.'
Quoting HazelNuts39:-
My understanding from the Perpignan report is that, with autotrim in operation, the THS only moves when the elevator goes past the neutral position: nose down elevator will command the THS to move more nose down. The elevator follows the (g-driven) SS orders. So a small nose-down command from the SS that causes the elevator to move from nose-up to less nose-up without going to nose-down will not cause the THS to move.
"From 15 h 44 min 30 the automatic trim function displaced the stabiliser as far as the electric nose-up thrust stop (- 11 degrees). The stall warning sounded at 15 h 45 min 05. The nose down commands applied by the Captain on the sidestick brought the elevators, due to the load factor, to the neutral position, without however pushing them to the stops. Consequently, the trimmable stabilizer did not move even though the flight control law was normal. From 15 h 45 min 15 until the end of the flight, the automatic trim function remained unavailable. In fact, the direct law was active from 15 h 45 min 15 to 15 h 45 min 40 and the Abnormal attitude law phase 1 (without auto-trim) remained active till the end of the flight.
"Footnote:- The elevators must go beyond the neutral position before the auto trim function adjusts the position of the stabilizer.
"When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures.
"The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration."
"Footnote:- The elevators must go beyond the neutral position before the auto trim function adjusts the position of the stabilizer.
"When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures.
"The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration."
But, of course, on AF447, every time they attempted that, the airspeed increased and they got another 'stall warning.' And presumably thought they were 'doing it wrong' (what, apart from an engine falling off, can be more serious than an impending stall?) and instinctively relaxed the stick pressure.......
It'd be interesting to know whether Airbus, Air France, or the BEA had warned pilots that this sort of 'impasse' could occur; and indeed had occurred, as far back as Perpignan in 2008? I very much doubt it........
Anyway, thanks again - I now know, to my own satisfaction, the primary causes of this latest accident. And, in my view, they weren't entirely, and possibly weren't even mainly, 'pilot error.'
Last edited by RWA; 5th Aug 2011 at 15:14.
Have the investigators (BEA) stated that the zoom climb was commanded by the pilot (stick) or is the jury still out considering that a computer function did it unrecognized by the pilot?
I focus on this early event as a possible critical causal factor needed to take a benign failure condition (temporary lack of reliable airspeed) to a severe condition.
To me this is a critical finding, because we can'y elliminate all failure conditions (ala loss of airspeed) etc. We are left with strengthening a minimization factor like pilot training. If there is another critical area that can be worked on in this causal chain that would greatly minimize a repeat of the event chain leading to a fatal accident.
I focus on this early event as a possible critical causal factor needed to take a benign failure condition (temporary lack of reliable airspeed) to a severe condition.
To me this is a critical finding, because we can'y elliminate all failure conditions (ala loss of airspeed) etc. We are left with strengthening a minimization factor like pilot training. If there is another critical area that can be worked on in this causal chain that would greatly minimize a repeat of the event chain leading to a fatal accident.
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Unfortunately, this was an Airbus accident and this thread will no doubt go on for another One Hundred Thirty plus pages ! Had it been a "real" airplane, "case would've been solved" a Hundred pages ago. Naturally, IMHO. 
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The causes are independent of the plane
IMHO The causes are :
1 The decision of the PF to climb, yet the PNF has told him the temp. was to high;
2 The decision of the PF to re take control from the PNF without annoucement and to climb again yet the PNF has urged him to nose down.
These two decisions of the PF are not a reaction to any information from the plane.
They came from his will and only his will.
The first decision leads directly and logically to a stall;
The latter decision prevented the PNF from recovering the plane.
None of these decision should have come from a Professional Pilot.
These decision had nothing to do with training nor CRM, design etc.
Furthermore, the Captain had a nasty feeling proved by his odd question : "Do you have your licence ?" to somebody that had made the journey with him from Paris.
I really think that it should be investigated to understand in which psychological or physical conditions he was.
I believe that the very short time between the entering of the Captain and the level 100, barely allowed him the time to understand that the PF was climbing against all skills. When this was established, then the PNF could took the control again under the Capt. authority. But it was to late.
I believe that tço many people here and in the press don't make the distinction between the period before teh PF re take control of the plane and the short sequence after.
The BEA should have divided the time around this KEY action:
- Because the PNF needed the authority of the Capt to take control except if he were Rambo.
- Because when the Capt. enters, he doesn't see the end of the stall caused by the first decision of the PF. He lives a NEW sequence just after the PF had RE taken the control and that he climbed again, entering in a new stall.
Too short for the Capt to understand.
1 The decision of the PF to climb, yet the PNF has told him the temp. was to high;
2 The decision of the PF to re take control from the PNF without annoucement and to climb again yet the PNF has urged him to nose down.
These two decisions of the PF are not a reaction to any information from the plane.
They came from his will and only his will.
The first decision leads directly and logically to a stall;
The latter decision prevented the PNF from recovering the plane.
None of these decision should have come from a Professional Pilot.
These decision had nothing to do with training nor CRM, design etc.
Furthermore, the Captain had a nasty feeling proved by his odd question : "Do you have your licence ?" to somebody that had made the journey with him from Paris.
I really think that it should be investigated to understand in which psychological or physical conditions he was.
I believe that the very short time between the entering of the Captain and the level 100, barely allowed him the time to understand that the PF was climbing against all skills. When this was established, then the PNF could took the control again under the Capt. authority. But it was to late.
I believe that tço many people here and in the press don't make the distinction between the period before teh PF re take control of the plane and the short sequence after.
The BEA should have divided the time around this KEY action:
- Because the PNF needed the authority of the Capt to take control except if he were Rambo.
- Because when the Capt. enters, he doesn't see the end of the stall caused by the first decision of the PF. He lives a NEW sequence just after the PF had RE taken the control and that he climbed again, entering in a new stall.
Too short for the Capt to understand.
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Hi,
Can anyone explain me this (it's extracted from the BEA report french edition page 23)
JJFFC
Can anyone explain me this (it's extracted from the BEA report french edition page 23)
Enregistreur de paramètres - FDR
Marque : Honeywell
Modèle : 4700
Numéro de type (P/N) : 980-4700-042
Numéro de série (S/N) : 11469
Marque : Honeywell
Modèle : 4700
Numéro de type (P/N) : 980-4700-042
Numéro de série (S/N) : 11469
JJFFC
Last edited by jcjeant; 5th Aug 2011 at 15:36.
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The more and more I read the more concrete it seems that the "zoom" was initiated by PF input to the SS not as a result of AP disconnect (which was a point of confusion to me). This is a significant deviation from the previous theory that the AP "wound out" until it reached the end of it's capabilities and handed the plane off in an entirely unstable condition.
Am I correct in my understanding that the climb was in fact initiated by proactive input and that the subsequent trim changes are a result of the auto trim responding to the SS inputs?
Given the very serious issues involved in approaching max altitude even with full instrumentation (let alone under the circumstances involved) any decision to gain altitude would appear to be fundamentally incorrect and display a complete lack of basic airmanship. What pilot would knowingly fly an airplane with degraded systems closer to coffin corner? Did not the senior pilot on the flight deck have a clear responsibility to forcibly (in the verbal sense) take command if required?
I have been unable to find reference to the captain questioning the PF's credentials (was this before the upset? before the flight?). If the captain had enough concerns to actually make a comment then how does he allow this individual to actually be the PF when he retires from the cockpit????
Am I correct in my understanding that the climb was in fact initiated by proactive input and that the subsequent trim changes are a result of the auto trim responding to the SS inputs?
Given the very serious issues involved in approaching max altitude even with full instrumentation (let alone under the circumstances involved) any decision to gain altitude would appear to be fundamentally incorrect and display a complete lack of basic airmanship. What pilot would knowingly fly an airplane with degraded systems closer to coffin corner? Did not the senior pilot on the flight deck have a clear responsibility to forcibly (in the verbal sense) take command if required?
I have been unable to find reference to the captain questioning the PF's credentials (was this before the upset? before the flight?). If the captain had enough concerns to actually make a comment then how does he allow this individual to actually be the PF when he retires from the cockpit????
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Quoting Lonewolf50:-
Looked it up (can't find the photos again) and the conventional (non-electronic) A330 setup looks pretty good. Big trimwheels either side of the central console, and (I checked 
) they're servo-assisted, and actually move!
However, the wheels don't give you the pitch angle; they just have the 'usual' setup, white marks every 15 degrees or so. Apparently there are gauges beside the wheels that give you the angle - how well illuminated they are, and how easily you could read them at night, I just don't know.
Point that occurs to me, though, is that the autotrim was still operating? So, even if the pilots had thought to check the trim settings and maybe wind the wheels forward a bit, presumably the 'systems' would just have wound the things back to 'full up' again?
Back to THS on an A330.
I don't know if the crew in AF447 would have thought to look at where their THS was ... but ... if the PNF had wanted to, how many steps in sequence would it take to discover where that control surface was positioned?
I don't know if the crew in AF447 would have thought to look at where their THS was ... but ... if the PNF had wanted to, how many steps in sequence would it take to discover where that control surface was positioned?
) they're servo-assisted, and actually move! However, the wheels don't give you the pitch angle; they just have the 'usual' setup, white marks every 15 degrees or so. Apparently there are gauges beside the wheels that give you the angle - how well illuminated they are, and how easily you could read them at night, I just don't know.
Point that occurs to me, though, is that the autotrim was still operating? So, even if the pilots had thought to check the trim settings and maybe wind the wheels forward a bit, presumably the 'systems' would just have wound the things back to 'full up' again?
Last edited by RWA; 5th Aug 2011 at 16:41.
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@SLFinAZ
Page 73 of the BEA Interim report:
I have been unable to find reference to the captain questioning the PF's credentials (was this before the upset? before the flight?). If the captain had enough concerns to actually make a comment then how does he allow this individual to actually be the PF when he retires from the cockpit????
A little after 1 h 52, the turbulence stopped. The copilot drew the Captain’s attention to the value of REC MAX, which then reached FL 375. The Captain made no comment and, a few moments later, he woke the second copilot, said he was taking his place, and asked the copilot in the right seat if he had a commercial pilot license. He thus ensured that he was qualified to act as relief and implicitly designated him as relief pilot. This question to the copilot probably meant that the issue of the relief pilot for the Captain had not been raised during the briefing before the flight.
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It's the Honeywell part number and serial number of the FDR memory module.
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EDITED
Cross posting
English report N°3 page 73
Cross posting
I have been unable to find reference to the captain questioning the PF's credentials (was this before the upset? before the flight?). If the captain had enough concerns to actually make a comment then how does he allow this individual to actually be the PF when he retires from the cockpit????
A little after 1 h 52, the turbulence stopped. The copilot drew the Captain’s attention to the
value of REC MAX, which then reached FL 375. The Captain made no comment and, a few
moments later, he woke the second copilot, said he was taking his place, and asked the
copilot in the right seat if he had a commercial pilot license. He thus ensured that he was
qualified to act as relief and implicitly designated him as relief pilot. This question to the
copilot probably meant that the issue of the relief pilot for the Captain had not been raised
during the briefing before the flight.
value of REC MAX, which then reached FL 375. The Captain made no comment and, a few
moments later, he woke the second copilot, said he was taking his place, and asked the
copilot in the right seat if he had a commercial pilot license. He thus ensured that he was
qualified to act as relief and implicitly designated him as relief pilot. This question to the
copilot probably meant that the issue of the relief pilot for the Captain had not been raised
during the briefing before the flight.
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Hi,
Well ... put your spectacles again on your nose (or use binoculars) 
The SN number of image and txt report are not corresponding (different !!)
Page 23
What do you want "explained" ?
It's the Honeywell part number and serial number of the FDR memory module.
It's the Honeywell part number and serial number of the FDR memory module.
The SN number of image and txt report are not corresponding (different !!)
Page 23
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Originally Posted by jcjeant
The SN number of image and txt report are not corresponding (different !!)
The image is of the CSMU, the memory module. The 'text' P/N and S/N is from the FDR chassis on which the CSMU was mounted.
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Of course they are not.
The image is of the CSMU, the memory module. The 'text' P/N and S/N is from the FDR chassis on which the CSMU was mounted.
The image is of the CSMU, the memory module. The 'text' P/N and S/N is from the FDR chassis on which the CSMU was mounted.
That's not serious ...
EDITED
And you no right !
For the FDR, only the protected unit (CSMU or memory module) was present. The CVR was
complete.
Flight Data Recorder - FDR
Manufacturer: Honeywell
Model: 4700
Part number (P/N): 980-4700-042
Serial number (S/N): 11469
complete.
Flight Data Recorder - FDR
Manufacturer: Honeywell
Model: 4700
Part number (P/N): 980-4700-042
Serial number (S/N): 11469
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Thanks KBPsen, I thought it was a genuine question, not another effort at a conspiracy theory 'à la Asseline'. I should have known better....
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Originally Posted by jcjeant
That's not serious ...
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Do we know whether the FDR chassis was retrieved, or only the memory module?
Identifying a part that they didn't recover is confusing. If the identification is really based on an integrated component (the memory module), then additionally reporting the part /serial numbers of the memory module would seem sensible.
Identifying a part that they didn't recover is confusing. If the identification is really based on an integrated component (the memory module), then additionally reporting the part /serial numbers of the memory module would seem sensible.
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So they should have published a picture of the FDR chassis that was neither found nor recovered? Who is it that is not being serious here?
Or you don't understand .. or you are blind ..
They published a picture of a module .. and this with the legend FDR
This module on the picture have a plate with a SN
This SN is not 11469
And after they give the specifications (N°) of the FDR module (they have not the chassis)
The serial N° is 11469
For the FDR, only the protected unit (CSMU or memory module) was present. The CVR was
complete.
Flight Data Recorder - FDR
Manufacturer: Honeywell
Model: 4700
Part number (P/N): 980-4700-042
Serial number (S/N): 11469
complete.
Flight Data Recorder - FDR
Manufacturer: Honeywell
Model: 4700
Part number (P/N): 980-4700-042
Serial number (S/N): 11469
This no rereading (verification) before the report release (no peers reviewed .. as it must be from a serious agency)
Last edited by jcjeant; 5th Aug 2011 at 19:01.