AF 447 Search to resume
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ACARS - I-am-alive
NigelOnDraft
"That's a long step from "mandating" a standard across all airlines / types a data stream and protocol that is used for "flight monitoring". For starters, not all types/airlines will use Satcom for ACARS, and it is not cheap. I work for a large UK company, and one of our LH types only has ACARS via VHF (or did when I flew it). If the ACARS is in VHF comms, then so generally will the crew...
For those using the various ACARS systems, they frequently go to standby, or someone retunes / uses VHF3 etc. To call out the full SAR system for a mid ocean rescue everytime the ACARS / Satcom goes on the blink will keep them well occupied
Accidents / incidents such as this are relatively rare, and the cost of uploading effectively FDR type information via satellite will not be trivial across the whole world's fleets. Far rarer will be the occasion it makes 1 jot of difference to survivability."
_____________________________________________
Nigel, all good points, but you have missed my point.
Where available (e.g. narrow band satcom) a once a minute message could be used.
All long haul overwater aircraft are still required, are they not, to be HF equipped, hence, if ACARS equipped, an Alive message could be sent, say, every 10 mins.
The ground based computer auto triggering could be set quite wide in the case of HF to say something like, trigger an alarm after 4 messages missed (ie. alert after 40 minutes which is usually longer than mandatory ops normal radio calls).
What the ground does with the triggered alert is not unlike what happens with SAR phases, ie. uncertainty phase, distress phase, search phase etc. Obviously, there would be protocols around this.
Purpose is to cut wait times for positive determination of a lost aircraft from hours (elapsed time from last contact to ETA), down to an hour or half an hour or less, depending on comms methods implemented.
Again, these are all rules-based decisions that can be programmed into the ground based computers to make allowances for variations in comms used.
As to "standard message protocol", ACARS implementations incorporate many industry standards anyway. There probably exist message structures/protocols defined by ARINC standards. The value of defining a standard protocol to an I-am-alive message is, particularly where noisy open channels are used like HF, that a possibility exists someone else may hear a message that is missed by the "owner" airline's ACARS ops system. Hence, an opportunity is created for any airline's ACARS ground system to automatically reroute a heard message destined for another airline. The owner airline's system can automatically determine if received re-routed messages are copies of an already received message, or replacements of unheard messages.
I am not suggesting this is necessarily simplistic, or without cost, but it appears to be technically well within the capabilities of currently installed hardware requiring only additional software functionality.
It doesn't even have to be implemented by all airlines ... it can start with one and grow from there.
Given that the likely total incurred costs of AF-447's loss will run into hundreds of millions of dollars, the industry incurring a few tens of millions to implement R&D for a software change would appear to be well worthwhile if it could trigger a faster initiation of a search phase, increasing potential for rescue of lives or earlier retrieval of recorders.
"That's a long step from "mandating" a standard across all airlines / types a data stream and protocol that is used for "flight monitoring". For starters, not all types/airlines will use Satcom for ACARS, and it is not cheap. I work for a large UK company, and one of our LH types only has ACARS via VHF (or did when I flew it). If the ACARS is in VHF comms, then so generally will the crew...
For those using the various ACARS systems, they frequently go to standby, or someone retunes / uses VHF3 etc. To call out the full SAR system for a mid ocean rescue everytime the ACARS / Satcom goes on the blink will keep them well occupied
Accidents / incidents such as this are relatively rare, and the cost of uploading effectively FDR type information via satellite will not be trivial across the whole world's fleets. Far rarer will be the occasion it makes 1 jot of difference to survivability."
_____________________________________________
Nigel, all good points, but you have missed my point.
Where available (e.g. narrow band satcom) a once a minute message could be used.
All long haul overwater aircraft are still required, are they not, to be HF equipped, hence, if ACARS equipped, an Alive message could be sent, say, every 10 mins.
The ground based computer auto triggering could be set quite wide in the case of HF to say something like, trigger an alarm after 4 messages missed (ie. alert after 40 minutes which is usually longer than mandatory ops normal radio calls).
What the ground does with the triggered alert is not unlike what happens with SAR phases, ie. uncertainty phase, distress phase, search phase etc. Obviously, there would be protocols around this.
Purpose is to cut wait times for positive determination of a lost aircraft from hours (elapsed time from last contact to ETA), down to an hour or half an hour or less, depending on comms methods implemented.
Again, these are all rules-based decisions that can be programmed into the ground based computers to make allowances for variations in comms used.
As to "standard message protocol", ACARS implementations incorporate many industry standards anyway. There probably exist message structures/protocols defined by ARINC standards. The value of defining a standard protocol to an I-am-alive message is, particularly where noisy open channels are used like HF, that a possibility exists someone else may hear a message that is missed by the "owner" airline's ACARS ops system. Hence, an opportunity is created for any airline's ACARS ground system to automatically reroute a heard message destined for another airline. The owner airline's system can automatically determine if received re-routed messages are copies of an already received message, or replacements of unheard messages.
I am not suggesting this is necessarily simplistic, or without cost, but it appears to be technically well within the capabilities of currently installed hardware requiring only additional software functionality.
It doesn't even have to be implemented by all airlines ... it can start with one and grow from there.
Given that the likely total incurred costs of AF-447's loss will run into hundreds of millions of dollars, the industry incurring a few tens of millions to implement R&D for a software change would appear to be well worthwhile if it could trigger a faster initiation of a search phase, increasing potential for rescue of lives or earlier retrieval of recorders.
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Pilots wakefulness
Gentlemen,
there are at least two reliable, solid indications that the guys up front were active right in the middle of the ACARS message stream, that is between 0210 and 0214.
First is the pair of FLAG ON CPT FPV and FLAG ON F/O FPV.
FPV is not selected ON as normal cruise operation. Someone had to turn it ON, about one minute into the sequence. Read again the timings, they are public domain as part of the first BEA report.
Second, is this highly interesting item :
02:14:20 - .1/FLR/FR0906010213 22833406AFS 1,,,,,,,FMGEC1(1CA1),INTERMITTENT
The failure has AFS (Auto Flight System) as its identifiers. AFS is Airbusese for Autopilot. But wasn't that A/P OFF at the beginning of the sequence ? And it was turned OFF by the aircraft itself, following Pitot probes failure. And now we find it as the identifier in an FMGEC fault, which means AFS detected a fault in FMGEC1. Who turned the A/P back ON and reactivated it ?
This last message was acquired at about 02:13...
Isn't that somehow correlated with the Airworthiness Directive issued this winter regarding A/P reengagement after an UAS condition ?
Of course, everything would be much better for those surviving highly interested parties if the pilots were asleep from 01:35...
Who are the interested parties ?
Think More (I should perhaps make it a trademark)
there are at least two reliable, solid indications that the guys up front were active right in the middle of the ACARS message stream, that is between 0210 and 0214.
First is the pair of FLAG ON CPT FPV and FLAG ON F/O FPV.
FPV is not selected ON as normal cruise operation. Someone had to turn it ON, about one minute into the sequence. Read again the timings, they are public domain as part of the first BEA report.
Second, is this highly interesting item :
02:14:20 - .1/FLR/FR0906010213 22833406AFS 1,,,,,,,FMGEC1(1CA1),INTERMITTENT
The failure has AFS (Auto Flight System) as its identifiers. AFS is Airbusese for Autopilot. But wasn't that A/P OFF at the beginning of the sequence ? And it was turned OFF by the aircraft itself, following Pitot probes failure. And now we find it as the identifier in an FMGEC fault, which means AFS detected a fault in FMGEC1. Who turned the A/P back ON and reactivated it ?
This last message was acquired at about 02:13...
Isn't that somehow correlated with the Airworthiness Directive issued this winter regarding A/P reengagement after an UAS condition ?
Of course, everything would be much better for those surviving highly interested parties if the pilots were asleep from 01:35...
Who are the interested parties ?
Think More (I should perhaps make it a trademark)
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All long haul overwater aircraft are still required, are they not, to be HF equipped, hence, if ACARS equipped, an Alive message could be sent, say, every 10 mins.
AFAIK ACARS works over VHF (los) or Satcom (when VHF unavailable).
What the ground does with the triggered alert is not unlike what happens with SAR phases, ie. uncertainty phase, distress phase, search phase etc. Obviously, there would be protocols around this.
It is clearly "possible". But you are needing to upgrade the aircraft systems, the comms systems, the airline systems to robust / reliable, not just "nice to have features".
If you really want such systems, why aren't you looking at, say, CPDLC? Since this is used for ATC Comms, it has a safety basis, it is "new" technology, it is being mandated effectively over the next X years, it already interacts with ATC rather than the airlines? It is a universal standard, rather then airline specific. Surely better than a system which is really using a ZX81 type audio stream to a tape recorder to transfer data
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BOAC
Rolls of course does "Total Care", an ambitious real time engine monitoring program for those carriers who have selected it as part of leasing power from Rolls. I have seen a vid that showed a "control center" where many dozens of people were monitoring their engines on wing while various clients were flying.
It is not inexpensive, one is certain, however the application could certainly be modified to apply to other flight parameters, especially in long haul, or ETOPS??
slats
There was a long discussion re: Captain duBois and his actions, possibly to include the time of the accident. I recall that FC rest is directly behind the cockpit, and Starboard? Also, Captain launched and climbed to cruise in the first hour, then took his planned rest, RP sliding into the LS. At 0200, Captain's rest period was over, he should have either been in the cockpit, or a little late, on his way. We think he was unrestrained because of his later recovery in the water. There are many potential theories, but I believe he would have re-assumed command from his own chair, the RP then replacing F/O in RS and the original RS would rest. There is much potential for chilling theory, for it is astonishing to me at least that this happened at all, and one has to believe that it had to have taken a devilishly and star crossed sequence to upset and destroy this flight.
Rolls of course does "Total Care", an ambitious real time engine monitoring program for those carriers who have selected it as part of leasing power from Rolls. I have seen a vid that showed a "control center" where many dozens of people were monitoring their engines on wing while various clients were flying.
It is not inexpensive, one is certain, however the application could certainly be modified to apply to other flight parameters, especially in long haul, or ETOPS??
slats
There was a long discussion re: Captain duBois and his actions, possibly to include the time of the accident. I recall that FC rest is directly behind the cockpit, and Starboard? Also, Captain launched and climbed to cruise in the first hour, then took his planned rest, RP sliding into the LS. At 0200, Captain's rest period was over, he should have either been in the cockpit, or a little late, on his way. We think he was unrestrained because of his later recovery in the water. There are many potential theories, but I believe he would have re-assumed command from his own chair, the RP then replacing F/O in RS and the original RS would rest. There is much potential for chilling theory, for it is astonishing to me at least that this happened at all, and one has to believe that it had to have taken a devilishly and star crossed sequence to upset and destroy this flight.
there are at least two reliable, solid indications that the guys up front were active right in the middle of the ACARS message stream, that is between 0210 and 0214.
So I agree with you. However to me this does not shed any light on what was happening immediately prior to upset.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that these guys were caught out somehow. Despite a significant weather system in their path. And despite (I presume) a degree of radio traffic that other aircraft were diverging from their track.
I don't have an ax to grind. I really don't. I am merely trying to keep an open mind and consider all the facts.
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slats11
From the lack of sparks, I for one can see you are not grinding an axe.
Isn't UAS sufficient explanation for "caught out" ?? There is ample precedent, the conditions were prime for a disastrous bout of "catch up" after loss of airdata, etc.?? Sleep occupies a distant position, imho. Here are seasoned professionals, familiar, flying a first rate ship for a Flag carrier. It was not mundane, whatever it was, notwithstanding msr. Gourgeon's accusations of "Lack of good fortune with the Radars."
From the lack of sparks, I for one can see you are not grinding an axe.
Isn't UAS sufficient explanation for "caught out" ?? There is ample precedent, the conditions were prime for a disastrous bout of "catch up" after loss of airdata, etc.?? Sleep occupies a distant position, imho. Here are seasoned professionals, familiar, flying a first rate ship for a Flag carrier. It was not mundane, whatever it was, notwithstanding msr. Gourgeon's accusations of "Lack of good fortune with the Radars."
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A/P ON
Gentlemen,
it is obviously difficult for most internet-age people to read beyond a few lines of text with any effectiveness. Please sweat a little with me.
Autopilot was turned back ON by 02:13 as attested by a late maintenance message where AutoFlight System (the Autopilot) detected a fault in FMGEC1.
A/P cannot be reengaged in the middle of an upset.
Which means no upset before that time 0213Z.
The UAS was apparently over by then, at least for the pilots, but perhaps not for the system. Remember the Airworthiness Directive regarding A/P reengagement after an UAS : "Unsafe Condition", "unwanted pitch commands"... It cannot be clearer than that, short of an outright confession.
And how caught up would anyone be, right after reengaging the A/P after a 3 minute nasty bout of night-time UAS live training in the ITCZ, if the aircraft suddenly went pitch-wild ?
Think More...
it is obviously difficult for most internet-age people to read beyond a few lines of text with any effectiveness. Please sweat a little with me.
Autopilot was turned back ON by 02:13 as attested by a late maintenance message where AutoFlight System (the Autopilot) detected a fault in FMGEC1.
A/P cannot be reengaged in the middle of an upset.
Which means no upset before that time 0213Z.
The UAS was apparently over by then, at least for the pilots, but perhaps not for the system. Remember the Airworthiness Directive regarding A/P reengagement after an UAS : "Unsafe Condition", "unwanted pitch commands"... It cannot be clearer than that, short of an outright confession.
And how caught up would anyone be, right after reengaging the A/P after a 3 minute nasty bout of night-time UAS live training in the ITCZ, if the aircraft suddenly went pitch-wild ?
Think More...
I was confused before but now............A few pages back there was lots of discussion about whether the pilots were awake at 2:00, now they have dealt with some sort of upset pt1 by 2:13. How is it this AFS message is being discussed for the first time at this late stage ?
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So ACARS is transmitted by either of two antennas (systems). One in the VS, one the Satcom, on the dorsal Fuselage, flush. Did all Tx (ACARS) arrivee via FIN?? Or was the last one, the Cabin Speed, tx by the Fuselage, after the famous gap in ACARS, the loss of the Fin causing the Bus to switch to SATCOM?? If so, that explains the gap in tx, and would explain the possible loss of the Fin at altitude, coinciding with a depressurization, a hull rupture, and the possible loss of some cabin contents, explaining the lack of damage to the Galley structure, when the recovered cabin liner right next to it was utterly destroyed.
Trajectory?? if some bits were lost prior to impact, that would explain a disparate debris field of surface items, and a concentration of heavier debris. There were two debris fields, one containing everything that impacted at the as yet unknown impact zone, and the rest, the discovered things, spread due currents and wind. Where was the VS by interpolation relative to the field on the bottom??
The dramatic differences in damage evident on discovery suggests a trajectory of at least two descriptions.
lomapaseo.
Trajectory?? if some bits were lost prior to impact, that would explain a disparate debris field of surface items, and a concentration of heavier debris. There were two debris fields, one containing everything that impacted at the as yet unknown impact zone, and the rest, the discovered things, spread due currents and wind. Where was the VS by interpolation relative to the field on the bottom??
The dramatic differences in damage evident on discovery suggests a trajectory of at least two descriptions.
lomapaseo.
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Engine Monitoring
bearfoil & BOAC
Like Rolls Royce, GE has a real time engine monitoring program called "On Point." The CF6-80E engines on AF447 were being monitored with data being fed to both GE & AF. As the BEA Interim Report states:
This data is another part of the mosaic. I would suspect the BEA has more relevant data from this source beyond their disclosed comment. For example, they may know the power settings at the time of the incident, how they may have changed by input from the A/P or pilots and exactly when the settings changed. They probably have overlaid this data overtop of the ACARS to gain insight as to what was happening and when.
Like Rolls Royce, GE has a real time engine monitoring program called "On Point." The CF6-80E engines on AF447 were being monitored with data being fed to both GE & AF. As the BEA Interim Report states:
The engines were subject to real-time monitoring in the framework of the engine condition monitoring program. Examination of the data recorded, including the data transmitted on the day of the accident, shows that both engines were functioning normally.
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TurbineD
BEA know a vast amount that is not disclosed. The engines would be a virtual second by second log of the events right up to loss of antenna, no?? BPR (a/c attitude), vibration (airloads). What do you think could be known other than "The engines were functioning" ??
BEA know a vast amount that is not disclosed. The engines would be a virtual second by second log of the events right up to loss of antenna, no?? BPR (a/c attitude), vibration (airloads). What do you think could be known other than "The engines were functioning" ??
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bizman, in the case in front of us or anything similar there is not much that would have gotten searching started much sooner. The area was enveloped in a heavy storm. And that's very likely one of the conditions necessary to have made this plane fall out of the sky.
It is also probably coincidence that the plane dropped out of the air with as many ACARS messages as we see. And there seems to be nothing in the ACARS messages to prompt a person to assume the plane hit the surface except the cryptic cabin pressure message. You'd have to have some VERY expensive software involved to get maybe a 20% to 40% detection ratio. You'd have to have a very well trained and analytically minded person sitting feeling his brain ooze out from between his ears from boredom scanning the incoming ACARS messages and trying to guess which one means plane prematurely contacted horizontal surface. (You don't have enough money to get me to do that more than one day. An airline might be able to find enough money to pay me for maybe three weeks. (It would be broke afterwards.) I might do it for four weeks if I came out of it as unquestioned dictator for the entire world. So I don't see it happening.)
There is a practicality gap here. There is an effectiveness gap here. There is a huge cost benefit gap here.
It is also probably coincidence that the plane dropped out of the air with as many ACARS messages as we see. And there seems to be nothing in the ACARS messages to prompt a person to assume the plane hit the surface except the cryptic cabin pressure message. You'd have to have some VERY expensive software involved to get maybe a 20% to 40% detection ratio. You'd have to have a very well trained and analytically minded person sitting feeling his brain ooze out from between his ears from boredom scanning the incoming ACARS messages and trying to guess which one means plane prematurely contacted horizontal surface. (You don't have enough money to get me to do that more than one day. An airline might be able to find enough money to pay me for maybe three weeks. (It would be broke afterwards.) I might do it for four weeks if I came out of it as unquestioned dictator for the entire world. So I don't see it happening.)
There is a practicality gap here. There is an effectiveness gap here. There is a huge cost benefit gap here.
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Confusion
Mr Optimistic wrote :
Why ? Because people who want to know without access to all necessary, proprietary, well-hidden documents, with a job to do besides, against all "obvious" theorizing, will need time to think through a paradoxical and heavily interest-loaded issue.
I was confused before but now............A few pages back there was lots of discussion about whether the pilots were awake at 2:00, now they have dealt with some sort of upset pt1 by 2:13. How is it this AFS message is being discussed for the first time at this late stage ?
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Mr. Optimiistic
This is not the first time that the pilots' actions have been discussed. FPV, Flight Path Visualization, was selected well into ACARS, an act that requires volition of a conscious and attentive pilot. My guess at the time was to suggest that in addition to flying Pitch and Power due to loss of Pitch cueing, the Pilot Flying wanted the "bird", an object on the screen that can cue flight data in real time. At the time, there was argument whether there should should even be back up Attitude display, even with known episodes of UAS.
This is not the first time that the pilots' actions have been discussed. FPV, Flight Path Visualization, was selected well into ACARS, an act that requires volition of a conscious and attentive pilot. My guess at the time was to suggest that in addition to flying Pitch and Power due to loss of Pitch cueing, the Pilot Flying wanted the "bird", an object on the screen that can cue flight data in real time. At the time, there was argument whether there should should even be back up Attitude display, even with known episodes of UAS.
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NoD
"Ummm, have you ever used HF? It's hard to enough to talk over, passing data I would think impossible. Just listen to the bandwidth of SELCAL for data transfer - maybe 1 or 2 chs /sec AFAIK ACARS works over VHF (los) or Satcom (when VHF unavailable)."
HF ACARS is possible, works, and is still in use, I just received this message.
[MPDU 17:41:04 AIR CO1495 SLOT 4 300 BPS ]
Nr LPDUs = 1 Ground station ID SAN FRANCISCO - CALIFORNIA NOT SYNCHED
Aircraft ID AC
Slots Requested medium = 0 Low = 0
Max Bit rate 600 bps U(R) = 0 UR(R)vect = 0
[LPDU UNNUMBERED DATA FM AIR CO1495 TO GND]
[HFNPDU PERFORMANCE]
17:41:02 UTC Flight ID = CO1495 LAT 33 58 59 N LON 117 55 27 W
Performance version 138
Flight Leg 76
GS SAN FRANCISCO - CALIFORNIA
While ACARS is effective the tracking functions might be better served by a version of ADS-B Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia which brings as a side effect such sites as http://www.flightradar24.com/
I was hoping some of the pilots here could comment on how/when HF ACARS is used as at least in my area it seems a minority of planes use it.
"Ummm, have you ever used HF? It's hard to enough to talk over, passing data I would think impossible. Just listen to the bandwidth of SELCAL for data transfer - maybe 1 or 2 chs /sec
AFAIK ACARS works over VHF (los) or Satcom (when VHF unavailable)."HF ACARS is possible, works, and is still in use, I just received this message.
[MPDU 17:41:04 AIR CO1495 SLOT 4 300 BPS ]
Nr LPDUs = 1 Ground station ID SAN FRANCISCO - CALIFORNIA NOT SYNCHED
Aircraft ID AC
Slots Requested medium = 0 Low = 0
Max Bit rate 600 bps U(R) = 0 UR(R)vect = 0
[LPDU UNNUMBERED DATA FM AIR CO1495 TO GND]
[HFNPDU PERFORMANCE]
17:41:02 UTC Flight ID = CO1495 LAT 33 58 59 N LON 117 55 27 W
Performance version 138
Flight Leg 76
GS SAN FRANCISCO - CALIFORNIA
While ACARS is effective the tracking functions might be better served by a version of ADS-B Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia which brings as a side effect such sites as http://www.flightradar24.com/
I was hoping some of the pilots here could comment on how/when HF ACARS is used as at least in my area it seems a minority of planes use it.
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Gringobr, are we ready for this, yet?
One thing that comes out of the AF447 ACARS messages suggests that planes at least of the A330-200 vintage are absolutely not ready without a total electronics refit and some really exciting new developments. And even then it would not be guaranteed to be ready.
The one event is the involuntary handover from autopilot to meatpilot when the going got rough and airspeed went unknown. This is an especially poignant detail considering Thales is one of the sponsors of the cited initiative and their probes were the ones that delivered bad data for whatever reason.
That means the autopilot system would have to be made over dramatically. Or we'd have to accept much higher levels of fatal failures of flight hardware.
One exciting development in this regard is the Rockwell Collins work on recoverable flight control. They demonstrated it on a model aircraft by setting off a charge that broke an entire wing off the model. It performed the expected spiral dive and then managed to recover stable flight. I temper my enthusiasm because it was a model not a real aircraft. Models are in the "with enough power I can fly a brick" regime. They have the power to weight ratio to fly things as unaerodynamic as lawnmowers.
Thales - really? No thanks.
One thing that comes out of the AF447 ACARS messages suggests that planes at least of the A330-200 vintage are absolutely not ready without a total electronics refit and some really exciting new developments. And even then it would not be guaranteed to be ready.
The one event is the involuntary handover from autopilot to meatpilot when the going got rough and airspeed went unknown. This is an especially poignant detail considering Thales is one of the sponsors of the cited initiative and their probes were the ones that delivered bad data for whatever reason.
That means the autopilot system would have to be made over dramatically. Or we'd have to accept much higher levels of fatal failures of flight hardware.
One exciting development in this regard is the Rockwell Collins work on recoverable flight control. They demonstrated it on a model aircraft by setting off a charge that broke an entire wing off the model. It performed the expected spiral dive and then managed to recover stable flight. I temper my enthusiasm because it was a model not a real aircraft. Models are in the "with enough power I can fly a brick" regime. They have the power to weight ratio to fly things as unaerodynamic as lawnmowers.
Thales - really? No thanks.
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BOAC, my memory insists that in the case of AF447 the nominal captain was not necessarily the most experienced member of the cockpit crew. Does this change your assessment?