AF 447 Search to resume
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Lonewolf_50, I'm sure you also remember from earlier discussions that the FOs had equivalent experience or better as compared to the Captain. All three were very experienced and capable. I'd not denigrate that in the least.
(That said, I was starting to entertain a scenario in which both had fallen asleep until the bouncing from the storm and the warnings for the iced pitots woke them up to pandemonium. But I don't think 15 minutes is a long enough time for BOTH of them to fall asleep at the same time unless there was a severe cabin air problem - say lack of O2 or some CO got into the mix. And even that does not work because at least one of them has an O2 mask on, I believe. So much for that concept.
(I've even entertained the thought that the WX radar had somehow malfunctioned. But that would have to take place in such a way that the equipment itself would not notice and report it to ACARS for replacement at the next stop. There aren't many places that kind of failure can take place if even rudimentary monitoring is included in the design. It's another low probability thing. But it would explain their flying peacefully into disaster.)
(That said, I was starting to entertain a scenario in which both had fallen asleep until the bouncing from the storm and the warnings for the iced pitots woke them up to pandemonium. But I don't think 15 minutes is a long enough time for BOTH of them to fall asleep at the same time unless there was a severe cabin air problem - say lack of O2 or some CO got into the mix. And even that does not work because at least one of them has an O2 mask on, I believe. So much for that concept.
(I've even entertained the thought that the WX radar had somehow malfunctioned. But that would have to take place in such a way that the equipment itself would not notice and report it to ACARS for replacement at the next stop. There aren't many places that kind of failure can take place if even rudimentary monitoring is included in the design. It's another low probability thing. But it would explain their flying peacefully into disaster.)
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JD-EE (I've even entertained the thought that the WX radar had somehow malfunctioned. But that would have to take place in such a way that the equipment itself would not notice and report it to ACARS for replacement at the next stop. There aren't many places that kind of failure can take place if even rudimentary monitoring is included in the design. It's another low probability thing. But it would explain their flying peacefully into disaster.)
Good scanning technique is to adjust tilt so ground/sea return fills the outer half of the display, and any target that grows out of the grass is a storm.
There have been reported cases of heavy icing on the radome causing the radar display to go all red, which won't trigger a fault.
In this case, we just don't know if a pilot was using the Wx radar at all.
GB
I missed the earlier threads which discussed the weather radar. From the recent posts it appears that the installation on this aircraft required manual tilt setting. Some aircraft in our fleet have manual tilt setting and the normal setting is about 5 degrees up for takeoff reducing throughout the climb to a setting of 1-2 degrees down in the cruise. Unless a top of climb routine or scan is carefully done to include the radar tilt setting, it is all too easy to leave the tilt at the takeoff setting and see nothing but clear sky on the radar display. A CB penetration would therefore come as a complete surprise, with no pre preparation such as reducing to turbulence speed and ensuring everyone was seated and belted. Maybe a simple omission such as that could have been the trigger for the whole accident sequence. Only speculation, not accusation.
Lonewolf_50, I'm sure you also remember from earlier discussions that the FOs had equivalent experience or better as compared to the Captain. All three were very experienced and capable. I'd not denigrate that in the least.
That they were all experienced supports the point I was making to Thermaller about it being a valid practice to have two perfectly capable pilots on the flight deck, and the Captain at rest in certain phases, and then fresh for when the higher/highest risk evolutions are underway.
(That said, I was starting to entertain a scenario in which both had fallen asleep until the bouncing from the storm and the warnings for the iced pitots woke them up to pandemonium. But I don't think 15 minutes is a long enough time for BOTH of them to fall asleep at the same time unless there was a severe cabin air problem - say lack of O2 or some CO got into the mix. And even that does not work because at least one of them has an O2 mask on, I believe. So much for that concept.
(I've even entertained the thought that the WX radar had somehow malfunctioned. ... But it would explain their flying peacefully into disaster.)
There have been reported cases of heavy icing on the radome causing the radar display to go all red, which won't trigger a fault.
In this case, we just don't know if a pilot was using the Wx radar at all.
In this case, we just don't know if a pilot was using the Wx radar at all.
Quote from 777fly:
Unless a top of climb routine or scan is carefully done to include the radar tilt setting, it is all too easy to leave the tilt at the takeoff setting and see nothing but clear sky on the radar display.
Can't see any experienced (on-type) crew making such a fundamental mistake, even if more than one spec. of radar was installed on the fleet. You always check frequently for surface returns, adjusting the tilt to suit. If there are none (smooth water), you will be on your guard. These guys knew where the "F.I.T." was, and they had presumably flown southbound a couple of days earlier.
Chris
Unless a top of climb routine or scan is carefully done to include the radar tilt setting, it is all too easy to leave the tilt at the takeoff setting and see nothing but clear sky on the radar display.
Can't see any experienced (on-type) crew making such a fundamental mistake, even if more than one spec. of radar was installed on the fleet. You always check frequently for surface returns, adjusting the tilt to suit. If there are none (smooth water), you will be on your guard. These guys knew where the "F.I.T." was, and they had presumably flown southbound a couple of days earlier.
Chris
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Excuse this novice posting, but with literally thousands of posts to trawl, and this thread throwing up more possibilites such as rudder seperation in flight, aircrew being asleep, I thought (at least for my own sake) it may make sense to pop some sort of 'simple' overview in - with that in mind can anyone answer the following:
Do we know if the ACARS was giving information which can absolutely point to specific causes (IE not some fault causing another) in other words are they diagnostic enough to pin anything down? - yes or no
Is it possible to ascertain the 'event duration' - is there ANY certainty over it being a progressive or sudden event? Yes or No?
As for the Aircraft itself: without wanting to discuss possibilites - is it a fact that the aircraft could have been in an 'insipid' or 'creeping situation' whereby the crew would be unaware of any deviation of flight level until too late? Yes or no?
Is a situation possible where no control input 'works'? Yes or no?
and two final ones:
If any flight deck crew were asleep could anyone remain so assuming the seemingly severe turbulence?
Assuming anything less than catastrophic damage a altitude or an irrecoverable flight path, etc, IF a semi gradual descent was underway would there be ANY potential for system recovery/ and or any icing to ease off? Yes or no?
Do we know if the ACARS was giving information which can absolutely point to specific causes (IE not some fault causing another) in other words are they diagnostic enough to pin anything down? - yes or no
Is it possible to ascertain the 'event duration' - is there ANY certainty over it being a progressive or sudden event? Yes or No?
As for the Aircraft itself: without wanting to discuss possibilites - is it a fact that the aircraft could have been in an 'insipid' or 'creeping situation' whereby the crew would be unaware of any deviation of flight level until too late? Yes or no?
Is a situation possible where no control input 'works'? Yes or no?
and two final ones:
If any flight deck crew were asleep could anyone remain so assuming the seemingly severe turbulence?
Assuming anything less than catastrophic damage a altitude or an irrecoverable flight path, etc, IF a semi gradual descent was underway would there be ANY potential for system recovery/ and or any icing to ease off? Yes or no?
cuddieheadrigg,
Yes.
No.
No.
10^-10?
No, but if they only woke up due to severe turbulence and a plethora of warnings, they might have been poorly placed. (Highly unlikely that both asleep: let's wait for the CVR...)
Yes, but gentle descent seems unlikely in this case.
Chris
Yes.
No.
No.
10^-10?
No, but if they only woke up due to severe turbulence and a plethora of warnings, they might have been poorly placed. (Highly unlikely that both asleep: let's wait for the CVR...)
Yes, but gentle descent seems unlikely in this case.
Chris
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The comms issue has always left me wondering about diverting. I am not aware of oceanic track procedures when it comes to diverting off the flight plan.
Presumably, ATC authorization would normally be needed for a deviation. Were the pilots trying to contact Dakar for a deviation clearance around wx?
Was the inability to reach them and obtain clearance the reason they tried to penetrate the wx with minimual off-track or no deviation.
Obviously, most if not all pilots will aviate before navigating and will go off-track with or without clearance to avoid dangerous wx. But, I have wondered about this crew.
Ether way, they were trying to contact Dakar several times before the ACARS sequence began. Just a routine login for handover, position reporting, or a deviation request?
Presumably, ATC authorization would normally be needed for a deviation. Were the pilots trying to contact Dakar for a deviation clearance around wx?
Was the inability to reach them and obtain clearance the reason they tried to penetrate the wx with minimual off-track or no deviation.
Obviously, most if not all pilots will aviate before navigating and will go off-track with or without clearance to avoid dangerous wx. But, I have wondered about this crew.
Ether way, they were trying to contact Dakar several times before the ACARS sequence began. Just a routine login for handover, position reporting, or a deviation request?
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Crew number up front
"not lucky enough to have five brains in the cockpit as in the QFA A380 last November...."
Surely only one of them makes the final decision, and that is the Captain no matter how many? The idea of having so many flight crew is only for relieving purposes, so what is the relevance to that comment?
Surely only one of them makes the final decision, and that is the Captain no matter how many? The idea of having so many flight crew is only for relieving purposes, so what is the relevance to that comment?
promani
The relevance is in the notion that more people (professionals) present to provide input during any unexpcected or untoward event is clearly a good thing. That exact situation has, in several well-known incidents or accidents, proven to be a real lifesaver.
And your notion of the Captain's role is a tad out of step with current thinking and practice (the past 25 years or so) with regard to decision making and CRM.
The relevance is in the notion that more people (professionals) present to provide input during any unexpcected or untoward event is clearly a good thing. That exact situation has, in several well-known incidents or accidents, proven to be a real lifesaver.
And your notion of the Captain's role is a tad out of step with current thinking and practice (the past 25 years or so) with regard to decision making and CRM.
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Active Pilots during event
Gentlemen,
please remember both ACARS messages :
02:12:10 FLAG ON CPT PFD FPV
02:12:16 FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
This means both left and right pilots clicked their FPVs ON and found them failed. By the way, FPVs would be useless in the middle of an upset and no pilot would try using that element of information then.
So : both pilots awake and active, aircraft in stable flight at the time these ACARS messages were sent, which is 02:12:02 approximately (3 seconds for CMC acquisition plus 5 seconds for sending by ACARS).
Please, to some people here, get down to real work if you wish to understand anything at all regarding this topic.
please remember both ACARS messages :
02:12:10 FLAG ON CPT PFD FPV
02:12:16 FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
This means both left and right pilots clicked their FPVs ON and found them failed. By the way, FPVs would be useless in the middle of an upset and no pilot would try using that element of information then.
So : both pilots awake and active, aircraft in stable flight at the time these ACARS messages were sent, which is 02:12:02 approximately (3 seconds for CMC acquisition plus 5 seconds for sending by ACARS).
Please, to some people here, get down to real work if you wish to understand anything at all regarding this topic.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by JD-EE #post 3375
And even that does not work because at least one of them has an O2 mask on, I believe.
Originally Posted by
Svarin
Svarin
02:12:16 FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
This means both left and right pilots clicked their FPVs ON and found them failed.
This means both left and right pilots clicked their FPVs ON and found them failed.
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The composites did fail, at the join, Fin to Pin. If I have my pairs correct this time, the middle joint has broken (ruptured) in a fashion to suggest aftward stress, the third (aft) pair shows a similar failure from forward stress.
My continued assumption is that the Fin member(s) are of resin matrix construction, and carry the pin (of six total) that bears the stress of all dynamic stresses on the join to the fuselage. The failure appears to have propagated from the pin area outward, in each case. This would suggest a failure of similar description resulting from two opposing forces. Since the fracture is not complete, it is reasonable to assume that these cracks developed while the Fin was restrained in the airframe by the brackets and hoops. I think no one has postulated that the Fin (VS) "simply flew off", but that the failure was continuous, and resulted from several different loadings to include airloads.
If the VS was 'broken' in situ, sufficient movement may have been available to corrupt the sweep of the Rudder (or its attenuation) such that the RTL may have been 'lost', but only in the performance sense.
The depression on the LE of the Fin could be explained by its water entry from free fall as well as a "roll" across the dorsal fin. The damage looks casually like a blunt, rather than a sharp impact.
My continued assumption is that the Fin member(s) are of resin matrix construction, and carry the pin (of six total) that bears the stress of all dynamic stresses on the join to the fuselage. The failure appears to have propagated from the pin area outward, in each case. This would suggest a failure of similar description resulting from two opposing forces. Since the fracture is not complete, it is reasonable to assume that these cracks developed while the Fin was restrained in the airframe by the brackets and hoops. I think no one has postulated that the Fin (VS) "simply flew off", but that the failure was continuous, and resulted from several different loadings to include airloads.
If the VS was 'broken' in situ, sufficient movement may have been available to corrupt the sweep of the Rudder (or its attenuation) such that the RTL may have been 'lost', but only in the performance sense.
The depression on the LE of the Fin could be explained by its water entry from free fall as well as a "roll" across the dorsal fin. The damage looks casually like a blunt, rather than a sharp impact.
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Second or thrid hand info claims location of tail section
In this article:
Air France Crash-Search Closer to
Is the following quote:
This is what many of us have assumed to be the case, after the Alucia completed its work and left for port. I had not seen this reported before.
Air France Crash-Search Closer to
Is the following quote:
The tail from the Airbus SAS A330-200 jetliner has been discovered, Nelson Marinho, president of an association for families of the crash victims, said today in a phone interview from Paris after meeting yesterday with Jean-Paul Troadec, director of the BEA, France’s air-accident investigator.
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Regarding FPV FLAGs
From BOAC
- is this true? Would the flag ONLY appear when the FPV is cycled 'ON'?
Yes, Sir. Read again the relevant BEA report parts. They say these messages mean FPV function is selected ON and failed. This selection is consistent with AF SOPs at the time (again, BEA report).
Regards
- is this true? Would the flag ONLY appear when the FPV is cycled 'ON'?
Regards
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grizzled
"...that more people (professionals) present to provide input during any unexpcected or untoward event is clearly a good thing. That exact situation has, in several well-known incidents or accidents, proven to be a real lifesaver."
I am not sure if they had the time to discuss and agree what to do in the AF447 situation, even if they had five on the FD, unless the problems started much earlier than we have calculated. We have the luxury of discussing, and not agree, for two years what may have happened. How long did they have to agree....~two minutes?
".......
your notion of the Captain's role is a tad out of step with current thinking and practice (the past 25 years or so) with regard to decision making and CRM"
Thank you for correcting me on this point. I appreciate it.
"...that more people (professionals) present to provide input during any unexpcected or untoward event is clearly a good thing. That exact situation has, in several well-known incidents or accidents, proven to be a real lifesaver."
I am not sure if they had the time to discuss and agree what to do in the AF447 situation, even if they had five on the FD, unless the problems started much earlier than we have calculated. We have the luxury of discussing, and not agree, for two years what may have happened. How long did they have to agree....~two minutes?
".......
your notion of the Captain's role is a tad out of step with current thinking and practice (the past 25 years or so) with regard to decision making and CRM"
Thank you for correcting me on this point. I appreciate it.
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Flight Controls
Gentlemen,
please consider these :
02:13:45 F/CTL PRIM1 FAULT
02:13:51 F/CTL SEC1 FAULT
First, this describes a simultaneous failure of PRIM1 and SEC1, which greatly reduces the likelyhood of a manual shutdown or reset.
Second, this has a fascinating consequence, which can only be found when looking carefully at the flight controls reconfiguration schematic in the FCOM: PRIM2 becomes Master of pitch, through both elevator halves and the THS (trim) because PRIM1 and SEC1 have given up.
Third, it is interesting to relate this mastery over pitch by PRIM2 with another event affecting the same computer in a strange way :
02:11:55 WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2, HARD
(FCPC2 is PRIM2)
What the heck does this message mean ?
One interpretation is PRIM2 loses connection with ADR1 (part of ADIRU1) through a failed bus. BEA exlained it away with "PRIM2 rejects ADR1"... However, this particular failure does not seem to have anything to do with unreliable airspeed and ADR comparison, it is quite obviously an electronics connectivity issue : WRG means wiring, gentlemen. Airbusese for "warning" is WRN.
How strange is it that such an event, electr(on)ical in nature, would be simultaneous with the failed probes, which has external causes (icing) :
02:11:49 PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA), HARD
How strange is it that this PRIM2 computer would find itself in the middle of an erroneous air data situation while at the same time suffering a connection failure with one of its three sources ? How would it react in this condition ? How would it compute its flight controls commands ? Has this been tested or even considered during design ?
Comments ?
please consider these :
02:13:45 F/CTL PRIM1 FAULT
02:13:51 F/CTL SEC1 FAULT
First, this describes a simultaneous failure of PRIM1 and SEC1, which greatly reduces the likelyhood of a manual shutdown or reset.
Second, this has a fascinating consequence, which can only be found when looking carefully at the flight controls reconfiguration schematic in the FCOM: PRIM2 becomes Master of pitch, through both elevator halves and the THS (trim) because PRIM1 and SEC1 have given up.
Third, it is interesting to relate this mastery over pitch by PRIM2 with another event affecting the same computer in a strange way :
02:11:55 WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2, HARD
(FCPC2 is PRIM2)
What the heck does this message mean ?
One interpretation is PRIM2 loses connection with ADR1 (part of ADIRU1) through a failed bus. BEA exlained it away with "PRIM2 rejects ADR1"... However, this particular failure does not seem to have anything to do with unreliable airspeed and ADR comparison, it is quite obviously an electronics connectivity issue : WRG means wiring, gentlemen. Airbusese for "warning" is WRN.
How strange is it that such an event, electr(on)ical in nature, would be simultaneous with the failed probes, which has external causes (icing) :
02:11:49 PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA), HARD
How strange is it that this PRIM2 computer would find itself in the middle of an erroneous air data situation while at the same time suffering a connection failure with one of its three sources ? How would it react in this condition ? How would it compute its flight controls commands ? Has this been tested or even considered during design ?
Comments ?
Svarin
In an attempt to follow the bouncing ball
From your previous
02:12:10 FLAG ON CPT PFD FPV
02:12:16 FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
This was preceded by (among other things)
02:11:49 PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA), HARD
02:11:55 WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2, HARD
With the six second stand-in-line-for-next-message protocol, these are either roughly simultaneous events, or events in immediate sequence.
(Is that the point you were trying to make?)
Around ten seconds later, both pilots had tried and failed to get the FPV restored, and failed to do so. (In my mind's eye, I see the conversation "Mine doesn't work, does yours?" "No" and so they try to troubleshoot via other means ... and must resort to other indications for basic flight information)
The above followed a bit later by
02:13:45 F/CTL PRIM1 FAULT
02:13:51 F/CTL SEC1 FAULT
From what you presented, it appears that PRIM 2 had already failed before it was called upon to act as the back up, as you described above.
It appears that is has now been encountered once in the field, which perhaps provided the two gents on the flight deck the dubious honor of becoming test pilots ... without a test plan, with a load of pax, and with no briefing for the data points to be collected. 
In an attempt to follow the bouncing ball
From your previous
02:12:10 FLAG ON CPT PFD FPV
02:12:16 FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
This was preceded by (among other things)
02:11:49 PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA), HARD
02:11:55 WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2, HARD
With the six second stand-in-line-for-next-message protocol, these are either roughly simultaneous events, or events in immediate sequence.
(Is that the point you were trying to make?)
Around ten seconds later, both pilots had tried and failed to get the FPV restored, and failed to do so. (In my mind's eye, I see the conversation "Mine doesn't work, does yours?" "No" and so they try to troubleshoot via other means ... and must resort to other indications for basic flight information)
The above followed a bit later by
02:13:45 F/CTL PRIM1 FAULT
02:13:51 F/CTL SEC1 FAULT
First, this describes a simultaneous failure of PRIM1 and SEC1, which greatly reduces the likelyhood of a manual shutdown or reset.
Second, this has a fascinating consequence, which can only be found when looking carefully at the flight controls reconfiguration schematic in the FCOM: PRIM2 becomes Master of pitch, through both elevator halves and the THS (trim) because PRIM1 and SEC1 have given up.
Second, this has a fascinating consequence, which can only be found when looking carefully at the flight controls reconfiguration schematic in the FCOM: PRIM2 becomes Master of pitch, through both elevator halves and the THS (trim) because PRIM1 and SEC1 have given up.
Third, it is interesting to relate this mastery over pitch by PRIM2 with another event affecting the same computer in a strange way :
02:11:55 WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2, HARD
(FCPC2 is PRIM2)
What the heck does this message mean?
(snip your most excellent exposition on that question)
02:11:55 WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2, HARD
(FCPC2 is PRIM2)
What the heck does this message mean?
(snip your most excellent exposition on that question)
How strange is it that this PRIM2 computer would find itself in the middle of an erroneous air data situation while at the same time suffering a connection failure with one of its three sources ? How would it react in this condition? How would it compute its flight controls commands ? Has this been tested or even considered during design ?