Silent checklist items
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Silent checklist items
Hi all,
Question
I am investigating whether we should/can do the reading of (part of) the normal checklist in silence. I have been trying to find guidance material on this subject but it's awfully undocumented or i've been looking in the wrong places.
Background
The idea is that some checklists will be performed by the PM (or PNF if you like) as a scan/flow first (setting the switches/controls), followed by reading the checklist. Part of the reading of the checklist would be done in silence like the non-configuration items such as seatbelts, landing lights. We're even considering reading the entire after take-off checklist in silence as everything would already have been set. The ultimate goal of the technique is to create a cockpit atmosphere that is only 'disturbed' by the most necessary calls.
I know some 3-man cockpits have/had the FE or S/O reading parts of checklists in silence. How would that cross over to a 2-man cockpit, would it take the PF too much out of the loop?
Anyone with reference material on this technique? Opinions will probably come all by themselves but are welcome too....
Thank you for reading the post and any consideration you may have, PD
Question
I am investigating whether we should/can do the reading of (part of) the normal checklist in silence. I have been trying to find guidance material on this subject but it's awfully undocumented or i've been looking in the wrong places.
Background
The idea is that some checklists will be performed by the PM (or PNF if you like) as a scan/flow first (setting the switches/controls), followed by reading the checklist. Part of the reading of the checklist would be done in silence like the non-configuration items such as seatbelts, landing lights. We're even considering reading the entire after take-off checklist in silence as everything would already have been set. The ultimate goal of the technique is to create a cockpit atmosphere that is only 'disturbed' by the most necessary calls.
I know some 3-man cockpits have/had the FE or S/O reading parts of checklists in silence. How would that cross over to a 2-man cockpit, would it take the PF too much out of the loop?
Anyone with reference material on this technique? Opinions will probably come all by themselves but are welcome too....
Thank you for reading the post and any consideration you may have, PD
Last edited by Plain Driver; 1st Dec 2007 at 11:59. Reason: clarity, editorial
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This is a normal Boeing procedure. It helps to have specific trigger items that sets the procedures in motion at specific times. For example, PF cancelling speedbrake after landing sets in flow the PNF raising flaps, depressurising cabin, turning off A/T, switching off ILS indications on standby horizon, landing lights. Most Boeing procedures are do it silently, then follow through with checklist to clear up.
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And this
would then be silent, or would the PM call every item out loud?
(If i didn't make that clear in the original question: sorry.)
Thanks, PD.
follow through with checklist
(If i didn't make that clear in the original question: sorry.)
Thanks, PD.
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I have flown types from many manufacturers but not Boeing (if you accept that the ATR is an Airbus-with-props), from memory most of them do it as follows - because it works best:
On ground ... with a specific trigger (event/action/call), LHS & RHS independent flows followed by RHS (or PNF) reading the Read-&-Check list. Response required from other seat for critical items.
In flight ... All config-related items are called as required by PF, which usually triggers the associated Check. This is completed in Read-&-Do manner, with critical items requiring response from PF (confirmation of set-as-req'd or checked). No flows associated with airborne checks (although the known required actions are sometimes done as a flow immediately before picking up the checklist).
On ground ... with a specific trigger (event/action/call), LHS & RHS independent flows followed by RHS (or PNF) reading the Read-&-Check list. Response required from other seat for critical items.
In flight ... All config-related items are called as required by PF, which usually triggers the associated Check. This is completed in Read-&-Do manner, with critical items requiring response from PF (confirmation of set-as-req'd or checked). No flows associated with airborne checks (although the known required actions are sometimes done as a flow immediately before picking up the checklist).
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Question: Don't you have silent items yet in your checklist now? That would surprise me. Because every operator I know does it.
What type are we talking about? I would recommend that you would take your OM-B/AOM out of your drawer, every aircraft manufactor has it's own set of checklists. What do they say?
Dani
What type are we talking about? I would recommend that you would take your OM-B/AOM out of your drawer, every aircraft manufactor has it's own set of checklists. What do they say?
Dani
How the wheel has turned throughout the years. Initially all drills were memorised and people were killed because they forgot something or other like trim and flaps. So the Yanks brought in written checklists based on one pilot challenges while the other bloke responds. Then they found out it was possible to actually miss one line in the written checklist and someone gets killed. Interestingly you got to be so familiar with the written checklist and correct response that occasionally someone would miss an item and the other bloke would think - there is something missing here, mate, and pick him up. So they invented those funny little flick over checklists like on the early F28 and even put them on radar screens as well. But still some retained a card checklist like the old 737 series and even Boeing designed their checklist and placed it on the pilots' control wheel. It didn't cover the full gambit pre-flight etc but mainly the essentials.
And suddenly up comes a new concept of area of responsibility and don't you touch that switch because that is MY switch and I'll dobya. And now we are in the era of silent checklists where no one knows if the bloke next to you is sleeping on the job or humming a silent checklist to himself like Winnie the Pooh hums when he is thinking.
That's what I call technical progress.
And talking about areas of responsibility. Read about the A310 that crashed in Russia when the captain apparently pushed open one throttle during the landing run while simultaneously applying reverse on the other engine.
Seems criticism was levelled at the first officer (deceased) for not cutting the power to the high power forward thrust engine. The CVR heard the captain calling for both engines to be cut when it was apparent a tragedy was on the cards. Well the cards were right - but then I wondered if the F/O was confused about whose area of responsibity was the fuel shut off levers (start levers in the Boeing) - his or the captains and did that depend on whether the aircraft was stopped or taxiing? Areas of responsibilities are fine but when the chips are down with a vengeance and death stares you in the face, memories can grind to a stop, leaving vital airmanship drills ignored.
And suddenly up comes a new concept of area of responsibility and don't you touch that switch because that is MY switch and I'll dobya. And now we are in the era of silent checklists where no one knows if the bloke next to you is sleeping on the job or humming a silent checklist to himself like Winnie the Pooh hums when he is thinking.
That's what I call technical progress.
And talking about areas of responsibility. Read about the A310 that crashed in Russia when the captain apparently pushed open one throttle during the landing run while simultaneously applying reverse on the other engine.
Seems criticism was levelled at the first officer (deceased) for not cutting the power to the high power forward thrust engine. The CVR heard the captain calling for both engines to be cut when it was apparent a tragedy was on the cards. Well the cards were right - but then I wondered if the F/O was confused about whose area of responsibity was the fuel shut off levers (start levers in the Boeing) - his or the captains and did that depend on whether the aircraft was stopped or taxiing? Areas of responsibilities are fine but when the chips are down with a vengeance and death stares you in the face, memories can grind to a stop, leaving vital airmanship drills ignored.
