Quality control at GE
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Quality control at GE
Just came across this NTSB report (probable cause issued in November 2006) which suggest pretty shoddy QC at GE:
On August 11, 2004, 777 G-VIID, powered by two GE90-85B engines, experienced an engine failure upon takeoff from George Bush Houston Intercontinental Airport. The flightcrew declared an emergency and returned to Houston where an emergency evacuation was conducted.
"As the airplane rotated, the crew received a cockpit warning of LH Eng Vibration - Level 5. As the airplane reached 1,500 feet AGL, the crew observed smoke and haze in the cockpit. The flight was leveled off at 4,000 AGL, and the crew donned oxygen masks. At that time, the cabin crew advised that they had heard a loud noise from the left side of the airplane and that the cabin was filling with smoke. The flightcrew reduced thrust on the left engine and decided to make an immediate overweight landing back at Houston. They declared an emergency and coordinated with ATC for an immediate landing. The airplane touched down safely and the captain ordered an emergency evacuation. All doors were used in the evacuation except the L4 door, which was not used due to the firefighting activity at the left engine."
"The investigation revealed that the stage 2 HPT blade in Position 35 had been manufactured from on obsolete P/N 1708M21P13 casting, yet was marked as a P/N 1708M21P19 blade."
"Due to the mis-marking of the P/N 1708M21P13 accident blade with P/N 1708M21P19, it was not removed from service when it accumulated 1,100 cycles. At the time of the accident, the blade had accumulated 3,333 cycles."
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
the failure of a high pressure turbine blade which damaged an oil seal and allowed smoke to enter the cabin. Contributing to the blade failure was the mis-labeling of the blade's part number by the manufacturer, which allowed the blade to remain in service far in excess of it's life limit.
On August 11, 2004, 777 G-VIID, powered by two GE90-85B engines, experienced an engine failure upon takeoff from George Bush Houston Intercontinental Airport. The flightcrew declared an emergency and returned to Houston where an emergency evacuation was conducted.
"As the airplane rotated, the crew received a cockpit warning of LH Eng Vibration - Level 5. As the airplane reached 1,500 feet AGL, the crew observed smoke and haze in the cockpit. The flight was leveled off at 4,000 AGL, and the crew donned oxygen masks. At that time, the cabin crew advised that they had heard a loud noise from the left side of the airplane and that the cabin was filling with smoke. The flightcrew reduced thrust on the left engine and decided to make an immediate overweight landing back at Houston. They declared an emergency and coordinated with ATC for an immediate landing. The airplane touched down safely and the captain ordered an emergency evacuation. All doors were used in the evacuation except the L4 door, which was not used due to the firefighting activity at the left engine."
"The investigation revealed that the stage 2 HPT blade in Position 35 had been manufactured from on obsolete P/N 1708M21P13 casting, yet was marked as a P/N 1708M21P19 blade."
"Due to the mis-marking of the P/N 1708M21P13 accident blade with P/N 1708M21P19, it was not removed from service when it accumulated 1,100 cycles. At the time of the accident, the blade had accumulated 3,333 cycles."
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
the failure of a high pressure turbine blade which damaged an oil seal and allowed smoke to enter the cabin. Contributing to the blade failure was the mis-labeling of the blade's part number by the manufacturer, which allowed the blade to remain in service far in excess of it's life limit.
