Update on Helios
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Joined: Jun 2001
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From: US
Update on Helios
The marathon thread on Helios seems to have sunk, but rather than add to its unwieldy 150+ pages, I thought it might be better to start a new thread.
Here's the latest update on Helios in Flight, which is very much along the line that many here have supposed: failure of pressurization, and apparent crew confusion in recognizing this until it was too late. Nothing really new in this sense, but a recognition that there have been many similar cases, which fortunately had better outcomes.
Here's the latest update on Helios in Flight, which is very much along the line that many here have supposed: failure of pressurization, and apparent crew confusion in recognizing this until it was too late. Nothing really new in this sense, but a recognition that there have been many similar cases, which fortunately had better outcomes.
Joined: Jul 2002
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From: On a park bench near an airport
2 similar incidents to EI reg B737's in recent years:
Aer Lingus
Note in particular points 3.1, 3.6, 3.8 and 3.9 in the conclusions section of the above report:
3.1 The aircraft pressurisation system was fully serviceable at the time of the incident.
3.6 The F/O recognized the possible on-set of incapacitation and as a result used his oxygen mask. The Captain did not go on his oxygen at any stage during the flight, nor did he feel a personal need to do so.
3.8 With the F/O partially on oxygen and the Captain not choosing to go on oxygen, the possibility existed, whereby the Captain could have become incapacitated, as the aircraft continued its un-pressurised climb.
3.9 The continued persistence of the SCCM in keeping the flight crew informed of the cabin situation was a major factor in ensuring the safe outcome of this serious incident.
also
RyanAir
.... and still the B737 flies around without any visual or tactile warning of an excessive cabin altitude......
Aer Lingus
Note in particular points 3.1, 3.6, 3.8 and 3.9 in the conclusions section of the above report:
3.1 The aircraft pressurisation system was fully serviceable at the time of the incident.
3.6 The F/O recognized the possible on-set of incapacitation and as a result used his oxygen mask. The Captain did not go on his oxygen at any stage during the flight, nor did he feel a personal need to do so.
3.8 With the F/O partially on oxygen and the Captain not choosing to go on oxygen, the possibility existed, whereby the Captain could have become incapacitated, as the aircraft continued its un-pressurised climb.
3.9 The continued persistence of the SCCM in keeping the flight crew informed of the cabin situation was a major factor in ensuring the safe outcome of this serious incident.
also
RyanAir
.... and still the B737 flies around without any visual or tactile warning of an excessive cabin altitude......
