Simulator re-current training - what is important to you?
Thread Starter
AirRabbit. Thanks for excellent reply - points taken. There is a fine line between "playing" in the simulator and purposeful practice at sequences such as max crosswind landings on slippery runways or approach sequences involving dark night low visibility manual handling. The latter is where pilot-induced-oscillation (PIO) has been known to occur.
Seldom are these exercises seen in an airline syllabus of training. It would a pity if pilots were discouraged from practicing them simply because of lack priority based on available time left in the session.
In addition, crews rarely have easily understood technical information available for them to decide the acceptable limits of simulator fidelity. Commonsense must prevail here.
Seldom are these exercises seen in an airline syllabus of training. It would a pity if pilots were discouraged from practicing them simply because of lack priority based on available time left in the session.
In addition, crews rarely have easily understood technical information available for them to decide the acceptable limits of simulator fidelity. Commonsense must prevail here.
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You have an excellent thread running here Centaurus, 10 out of 10 for a good effort.
I know that I'm echoing a good deal of what has already been said here, but there is a good case for recurrent training in set-piece scenarios, e.g. Engine Fire upon rotation, Instrument failures etc. These give the trainee confidence in managing the more serious events that can take place. What concerns me, both as an instructor and a student, is when the entire simulator detail is to a pre-written script. Much book bashing precedes the Sim detail, and the detail then becomes a test of how well the student can recall what he/she has read, with little opportunity to exercise situation management in unexpected situations (all abnormalities on real flights are unexpected, and out of left field).
I would consider that an ideal recurrent detail would be split into 3 portions, the first being for practice at the important 'set-piece' manoeuvres.
The second portion could be addressed to requests from the trainee for practice at various manoeuvres / situations. Obviously the student has requested these because of his/her perceived need to experience and manage particular situations that they feel a lack of confidence / understanding for.
The third portion could be at the instructor's discretion, giving a number of problems 'out of left field'. In my experience as an Instructor and a Student, I find the most value in these. Generally (but not always) they serve as great confidence builders for the student, in developing and exercising their management of unexpected situations. These may even be injected into the 'set-piece' exercises, such as engine failure, instead of the 'expected' flame-out a bird strike / compresser stall / excessive EGT may be substituted as the cause. How many instructors initiate an RTO with a below target N1/EPR instead of the expected flame-out? (Are you still on line greybeard, Yup, you were good at that). I tend to disagree with greybeard in his assertion that Asian students didn't like stepping out of the box of the set-piece routine. Certainly, in a very 'boxed' culture, there was a fundamental resistance, but, given the opportunity to 'free-range', most accepted it with great gusto.
My most memorable student was a Command trainee who insisted that I keep loading him up until he could handle no more. I was running out of simultaneous failures to a ridiculous level, but he continued to handle it well, very well in fact. It raised quite a sweat, but at the end of the detail stepped out with the words; "Now I know that I'm ready for command". It was a great confidence booster for him, and he did inded become a very good Captain, Instructor, Check Airman, and Management pilot.
Regards,
Old Smokey
I know that I'm echoing a good deal of what has already been said here, but there is a good case for recurrent training in set-piece scenarios, e.g. Engine Fire upon rotation, Instrument failures etc. These give the trainee confidence in managing the more serious events that can take place. What concerns me, both as an instructor and a student, is when the entire simulator detail is to a pre-written script. Much book bashing precedes the Sim detail, and the detail then becomes a test of how well the student can recall what he/she has read, with little opportunity to exercise situation management in unexpected situations (all abnormalities on real flights are unexpected, and out of left field).
I would consider that an ideal recurrent detail would be split into 3 portions, the first being for practice at the important 'set-piece' manoeuvres.
The second portion could be addressed to requests from the trainee for practice at various manoeuvres / situations. Obviously the student has requested these because of his/her perceived need to experience and manage particular situations that they feel a lack of confidence / understanding for.
The third portion could be at the instructor's discretion, giving a number of problems 'out of left field'. In my experience as an Instructor and a Student, I find the most value in these. Generally (but not always) they serve as great confidence builders for the student, in developing and exercising their management of unexpected situations. These may even be injected into the 'set-piece' exercises, such as engine failure, instead of the 'expected' flame-out a bird strike / compresser stall / excessive EGT may be substituted as the cause. How many instructors initiate an RTO with a below target N1/EPR instead of the expected flame-out? (Are you still on line greybeard, Yup, you were good at that). I tend to disagree with greybeard in his assertion that Asian students didn't like stepping out of the box of the set-piece routine. Certainly, in a very 'boxed' culture, there was a fundamental resistance, but, given the opportunity to 'free-range', most accepted it with great gusto.
My most memorable student was a Command trainee who insisted that I keep loading him up until he could handle no more. I was running out of simultaneous failures to a ridiculous level, but he continued to handle it well, very well in fact. It raised quite a sweat, but at the end of the detail stepped out with the words; "Now I know that I'm ready for command". It was a great confidence booster for him, and he did inded become a very good Captain, Instructor, Check Airman, and Management pilot.
Regards,
Old Smokey
Moderator
.. and, likewise, I recall with some fondness a particular upgrade crew (74 F/O to initial 73 command and 74 S/O to 73 F/O). We thrashed engine failures to death during one extended session with the result that both could comfortably and competently address critical handling failures (min weight, aft CG, minV1, seizure or similar during the rotate, and backtrack the opposite localiser - try it sometime .. even allowing for sim fidelity problems, it presents a bit of a handful for the first few attempts).
The command upgrade student had been a little defensive in several earlier sessions but he unwound completely after this one ... I recall quite clearly his comment along the lines of "I was always a bit frightened by failures but now, too easy ...". This pair, in a later session leading up to their low vis quals, had similar views about overtraining when they got to the stage of being quite comfortable (if a bit sweaty) on handflown raw data 0/0 ILS to a full stop.
A number of these crews had serious I/F problems due to too much time on the widebody without enough concern to the next endorsement ... it was VERY satisfying seeing the sort of standards that the small group of contract instructors (of which I was a part) pulled out of these folk ... took a lot of good will and hard work on both sides but it was great fun....
At the end of the day, it is really a case of trying to scrounge some extra time for confidence and skills building in the face of the Great God Dollar.
Likewise, as a young FO on my first jet, I can recall sitting right seat to one of our old checkies ... one of his mates was playing the panel and all sorts of interesting things were thrown at him. As I recall he was able to handle multiple wings falling off and the like with grace and dexterity... although, at one stage when everything imaginable was happening (and I remember this as clear as ..) he turned to the FE, who was playing the Wurlitzer with much skill, and said words to the effect of .. "I say, old son, when you have a spare moment, could you possibly do XYZ".
I would have dearly loved to have had the seniority to fly the line with this guy to learn a bit at the feet of a Master.
The command upgrade student had been a little defensive in several earlier sessions but he unwound completely after this one ... I recall quite clearly his comment along the lines of "I was always a bit frightened by failures but now, too easy ...". This pair, in a later session leading up to their low vis quals, had similar views about overtraining when they got to the stage of being quite comfortable (if a bit sweaty) on handflown raw data 0/0 ILS to a full stop.
A number of these crews had serious I/F problems due to too much time on the widebody without enough concern to the next endorsement ... it was VERY satisfying seeing the sort of standards that the small group of contract instructors (of which I was a part) pulled out of these folk ... took a lot of good will and hard work on both sides but it was great fun....
At the end of the day, it is really a case of trying to scrounge some extra time for confidence and skills building in the face of the Great God Dollar.
Likewise, as a young FO on my first jet, I can recall sitting right seat to one of our old checkies ... one of his mates was playing the panel and all sorts of interesting things were thrown at him. As I recall he was able to handle multiple wings falling off and the like with grace and dexterity... although, at one stage when everything imaginable was happening (and I remember this as clear as ..) he turned to the FE, who was playing the Wurlitzer with much skill, and said words to the effect of .. "I say, old son, when you have a spare moment, could you possibly do XYZ".
I would have dearly loved to have had the seniority to fly the line with this guy to learn a bit at the feet of a Master.
Last edited by john_tullamarine; 4th Nov 2005 at 22:52.
Thread Starter
J at T. "Playing the Wurlitzer" I love that. I wonder how many of the younger set would know what the Wurlitzer really was?
Old Smokey. A little gimmick that I occasionally introduced during "playtime" at the end of a session had a surprising ending once upon a time. This was to leave the simulator and take one student with me for a cup of coffee, leaving the other pilot to carry out a solo circuit with no one else in the simulator. Of course, the simulator was placed on no motion while we were away.
Outside the simulator it was easy to hear the sound of the gear being extended downwind and to hear the sound of reverse thrust after touch-down. We would open the door to the simulator in time to see the solo student applying the parking brake on completion of the landing run.
We (the second student and I) would give the solo student a hearty round of applause and a hard copy of the track on the instructor's panel would be printed and given to the solo student as proof of "First Solo".
The reaction of Asian students to this was quite heart warming as their normal impassive reserve broke into smiles all around.
And then one day I was running this little show again (it takes all of ten minutes and is worth every second in confidence building as a pilot incapacitation exercise) with a couple of highly experienced former Bae 146 pilots, one of whom was a tough looking bloke and seemingly quite cocky during his type rating.
Off he went on his first 737 solo while his F/O and I had our cuppa outside and listened for the landing. That done, we changed over and sent his mate on his first solo. As the tough bloke and I walked to the coffee room with the printed copy of his solo circuit in his hand, he turned to me and shook my hand which caught me completely by surprise, and said "Thanks for that solo - you have completely restored my love of flying with that experience of flying by myself."
He explained that he had been slaughtered in the 146 simulator in his previous company and was dreading failing the 737 type rating. In fact he had flown the 737 quite well during our sessions leading to the solo playing - but apparently underneath a gruff exterior he had been all nerves.
Maybe there is a moral to this tale, but one thing is for sure - and that is the solo circuit was never in any syllabus of training - but it was worth it for one bloke, anyway.
Old Smokey. A little gimmick that I occasionally introduced during "playtime" at the end of a session had a surprising ending once upon a time. This was to leave the simulator and take one student with me for a cup of coffee, leaving the other pilot to carry out a solo circuit with no one else in the simulator. Of course, the simulator was placed on no motion while we were away.
Outside the simulator it was easy to hear the sound of the gear being extended downwind and to hear the sound of reverse thrust after touch-down. We would open the door to the simulator in time to see the solo student applying the parking brake on completion of the landing run.
We (the second student and I) would give the solo student a hearty round of applause and a hard copy of the track on the instructor's panel would be printed and given to the solo student as proof of "First Solo".
The reaction of Asian students to this was quite heart warming as their normal impassive reserve broke into smiles all around.
And then one day I was running this little show again (it takes all of ten minutes and is worth every second in confidence building as a pilot incapacitation exercise) with a couple of highly experienced former Bae 146 pilots, one of whom was a tough looking bloke and seemingly quite cocky during his type rating.
Off he went on his first 737 solo while his F/O and I had our cuppa outside and listened for the landing. That done, we changed over and sent his mate on his first solo. As the tough bloke and I walked to the coffee room with the printed copy of his solo circuit in his hand, he turned to me and shook my hand which caught me completely by surprise, and said "Thanks for that solo - you have completely restored my love of flying with that experience of flying by myself."
He explained that he had been slaughtered in the 146 simulator in his previous company and was dreading failing the 737 type rating. In fact he had flown the 737 quite well during our sessions leading to the solo playing - but apparently underneath a gruff exterior he had been all nerves.
Maybe there is a moral to this tale, but one thing is for sure - and that is the solo circuit was never in any syllabus of training - but it was worth it for one bloke, anyway.
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ZFT wrote:
A very nice analysis of the limitations of FFSs.
One point – There seems to be a popular misconception the Level ‘D’ sims have better handling characteristics than Level ‘C’ sims.
In reality (dependant upon the certifying authority) the only real difference in handling between the two will be will objectively matched motion buffets and some specific aero effects, but nothing to the basic handling qualities.
I agree with you 100%, sir. In addition to the objectively matched buffets and some specific aero effects, there are also objectively measured sounds (the specificity of which is about to be set out and be a bit more germane to the flight tasks at hand) and I feel relatively confident of more highly favorable “Cooper-Harper” ratings with the wider field-of-view visual systems that are going to be required of Level D. We’ve come a very long way – but a simulator is still not the airplane.
I am really impressed with the breadth and depth of the comments here. Hopefully some of this will make its way into the halls of the training gurus around the world – and anointed by the relevant regulators – of course they’re never irrelevant, right?
________
AirRabbit
A very nice analysis of the limitations of FFSs.
One point – There seems to be a popular misconception the Level ‘D’ sims have better handling characteristics than Level ‘C’ sims.
In reality (dependant upon the certifying authority) the only real difference in handling between the two will be will objectively matched motion buffets and some specific aero effects, but nothing to the basic handling qualities.
I agree with you 100%, sir. In addition to the objectively matched buffets and some specific aero effects, there are also objectively measured sounds (the specificity of which is about to be set out and be a bit more germane to the flight tasks at hand) and I feel relatively confident of more highly favorable “Cooper-Harper” ratings with the wider field-of-view visual systems that are going to be required of Level D. We’ve come a very long way – but a simulator is still not the airplane.
I am really impressed with the breadth and depth of the comments here. Hopefully some of this will make its way into the halls of the training gurus around the world – and anointed by the relevant regulators – of course they’re never irrelevant, right?
________
AirRabbit
You all have excellent ideas, which I can not surpass.
Practicing PRMs (closely-spaced parallel approaches, possibly ILS and an LDA) might not be worth the time spent on them, at least not each year.
As for engine failures, we (most of us) all need practice on V1 cuts.
How about already coming down the glideslope with a quick flameout, or better yet, descending from the FAF at 1200'/min. on a non-precision? This could be excellent training for a rare but possible problem-maybe best not as checking item, but to make us much better pilots. For the laymen out there, a non-precison is a misnomer, and requires much more work than a precision, because there is no glidepath indicator (except on some new aircraft which have an artificial glideslope for all database approaches), and the descent rate must be managed with our hands and changing the power settings and various descent rates: we extend landing gear with full flaps before the final approach fix. It is very hard to remember how to figure out where a visual descent point should be (no DME, especially on the NDB). I forgot a year ago.
Already at the MDA with Maximum Drag and an engine goes bang?
You need lots of power when fully configured for level flight-how about level with all this drag and trying to push up the good engine as you think what flap setting you need to AVOID a descent into the cloud/fog-covered ground, but not risk a stall?
Memorize this life-saving "technique", along with about how much extra rudder input you need, before it is too late. We have NO automation (just altitude hold), but might have 122 passengers in the longest stretched series.
As for a random flight control failure, try one with a stuck (up) spoiler panel. This is quite awkward and challenging-you might roll up to 75-80* bank (in the simulator) before you recover.
Practicing PRMs (closely-spaced parallel approaches, possibly ILS and an LDA) might not be worth the time spent on them, at least not each year.
As for engine failures, we (most of us) all need practice on V1 cuts.
How about already coming down the glideslope with a quick flameout, or better yet, descending from the FAF at 1200'/min. on a non-precision? This could be excellent training for a rare but possible problem-maybe best not as checking item, but to make us much better pilots. For the laymen out there, a non-precison is a misnomer, and requires much more work than a precision, because there is no glidepath indicator (except on some new aircraft which have an artificial glideslope for all database approaches), and the descent rate must be managed with our hands and changing the power settings and various descent rates: we extend landing gear with full flaps before the final approach fix. It is very hard to remember how to figure out where a visual descent point should be (no DME, especially on the NDB). I forgot a year ago.
Already at the MDA with Maximum Drag and an engine goes bang?
You need lots of power when fully configured for level flight-how about level with all this drag and trying to push up the good engine as you think what flap setting you need to AVOID a descent into the cloud/fog-covered ground, but not risk a stall? Memorize this life-saving "technique", along with about how much extra rudder input you need, before it is too late. We have NO automation (just altitude hold), but might have 122 passengers in the longest stretched series.
As for a random flight control failure, try one with a stuck (up) spoiler panel. This is quite awkward and challenging-you might roll up to 75-80* bank (in the simulator) before you recover.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 11th Nov 2005 at 04:34.
Thread Starter
If anyone has doubts about the safety value of keeping in regular simulator practice at basic hand flying raw data flying skills, then suggest you read the Pprune Rumours and News continuing thread on the Eygptian Flash-Air B737-300 accident that occurred under CAVOK dark night conditions in January 2004 at Sharm-el-Sheikh killing 140 people.
The CVR transcript makes for chilling reading especially the repeated calls by the panicking captain as PF for the autopilot to be engaged as he lost the plot trying to hand fly a normal climbing turn. The aircraft went into the ocean at 406 knots with the pilot still trying to engage the autopilot. I recall a similar tragedy involving an totally incompetent crew of an A320 that hit the water at similar speeds somewhere in the Middle East a few years ago.
It is clear that regulatory authorities in UK and other parts of the world need to do more than just just show "concern" at the lip service paid by operators to maintenance of basic handling skills.
While the Flash Air crash is an extreme case (in more ways than one it seems) of total pilot reliance on automatics to the exclusion of all else, there is no doubt in my mind that a similar mind-set exists in the flight operations management of most airlines.
When the switching off of a flight director is perceived as a potential heart attack event, what hope is there for those pilots who wish to maintain raw data skills both in the air and in a simulator? Government Examiners of Airmen must step in and stop this rot of now dangerously diminishing basic flying skills caused by airline management insistence of use of one hundred percent automatics from lift off to near touch-down.
The CVR transcript makes for chilling reading especially the repeated calls by the panicking captain as PF for the autopilot to be engaged as he lost the plot trying to hand fly a normal climbing turn. The aircraft went into the ocean at 406 knots with the pilot still trying to engage the autopilot. I recall a similar tragedy involving an totally incompetent crew of an A320 that hit the water at similar speeds somewhere in the Middle East a few years ago.
It is clear that regulatory authorities in UK and other parts of the world need to do more than just just show "concern" at the lip service paid by operators to maintenance of basic handling skills.
While the Flash Air crash is an extreme case (in more ways than one it seems) of total pilot reliance on automatics to the exclusion of all else, there is no doubt in my mind that a similar mind-set exists in the flight operations management of most airlines.
When the switching off of a flight director is perceived as a potential heart attack event, what hope is there for those pilots who wish to maintain raw data skills both in the air and in a simulator? Government Examiners of Airmen must step in and stop this rot of now dangerously diminishing basic flying skills caused by airline management insistence of use of one hundred percent automatics from lift off to near touch-down.
Last edited by Centaurus; 8th Nov 2005 at 00:17.
Moderator
I think that the best explanation came from an older colleague some years ago .. and one who would be known to Centaurus in earlier days ..
Said colleague had a million or so hours on large piston (DC3) and turboprop (with some dated military jet) and was in the process of doing his first civil airliner twinjet endorsement ..... ie he was more than used to having to work out what the AH etc was telling him ...
Lad was having a hard time of it, what with flight directors and similar nonsense, and the normally high levels of self-confidence were settling progressively into the depths of the mud and silt .....
THEN ... came the standby power session in the box ...
.... lad came out walking on the clouds ..... "hey, mate, they turned off the winking and blinking lights and the other geezus boxes .... it's just like a REAL aeroplane ..."
Said colleague had a million or so hours on large piston (DC3) and turboprop (with some dated military jet) and was in the process of doing his first civil airliner twinjet endorsement ..... ie he was more than used to having to work out what the AH etc was telling him ...
Lad was having a hard time of it, what with flight directors and similar nonsense, and the normally high levels of self-confidence were settling progressively into the depths of the mud and silt .....
THEN ... came the standby power session in the box ...
.... lad came out walking on the clouds ..... "hey, mate, they turned off the winking and blinking lights and the other geezus boxes .... it's just like a REAL aeroplane ..."
Centaurus and John The Moderator:
A very advanced airliner had a very close call with the ground near Las Vegas not too long ago, at night!. Something to do with hand-flying and the TOGA detent required for full go-around power?
The pilot who is familiar said that he also had an interesting problem when hand-flying a go-around. Don't know whether the flight director was on or off.
Coming from other planes and about 15-25 years flying experience, many pilots find it very difficult to slam the throttles up to the firewall (to find the TOGA detent), unless training for stall or windshear recovery; this happens only once per year. But this is normal for a go-around/missed approach on many new aircraft, or only when hand-flying?
A very advanced airliner had a very close call with the ground near Las Vegas not too long ago, at night!. Something to do with hand-flying and the TOGA detent required for full go-around power?
The pilot who is familiar said that he also had an interesting problem when hand-flying a go-around. Don't know whether the flight director was on or off.
Coming from other planes and about 15-25 years flying experience, many pilots find it very difficult to slam the throttles up to the firewall (to find the TOGA detent), unless training for stall or windshear recovery; this happens only once per year. But this is normal for a go-around/missed approach on many new aircraft, or only when hand-flying?
Thread Starter
Dunno about that as I haven't personally "slammed" the throttles to firewall thrust or TOGA thrust, either. I think it was a CRJ or similar that crashed during a very late IMC go-around in France last year killing some of the pax. He was way off the ILS centreline in fog and despite calls from the F/O to GA, he left it very late. He failed to rotate to the GA attitude and hit the deck in level attitude.
The investigation criticised the operator for not conducting proper low level GA training of its pilots and not making efficient use of the simulator for this purpose. That is not uncommon for numerous airline operators.
It is quite common to see runway level GA botched up during simulator training - if it is done at all. Mainly due to failure to rotate to GA attitude.
Also have seen people press TOGA and if for some reason the throttles do not advance, they keep on frantically pressing TOGA instead of over-riding and pushing the throttles open manually. Couple that with poor attitude control and the scene is set for a hit runway go around.
If low level IMC GA are done it is usually on automatics where all the crew does is to press TOGA and make the appropriate flap and gear selections. All too easy when compared to the basic handling skills needed to conduct a manual IMC GA. Example loss of all forward vision due heavy rain at the flare.
The investigation criticised the operator for not conducting proper low level GA training of its pilots and not making efficient use of the simulator for this purpose. That is not uncommon for numerous airline operators.
It is quite common to see runway level GA botched up during simulator training - if it is done at all. Mainly due to failure to rotate to GA attitude.
Also have seen people press TOGA and if for some reason the throttles do not advance, they keep on frantically pressing TOGA instead of over-riding and pushing the throttles open manually. Couple that with poor attitude control and the scene is set for a hit runway go around.
If low level IMC GA are done it is usually on automatics where all the crew does is to press TOGA and make the appropriate flap and gear selections. All too easy when compared to the basic handling skills needed to conduct a manual IMC GA. Example loss of all forward vision due heavy rain at the flare.
Moderator
Another two thoughts
(a) V1 cut is easy-peasy ... try the cut during the rotation flare immediately after liftoff instead where it all gets interesting due to being a much more dynamic situation .. especially at low weight/speed schedule. Pilot has to control both yaw and roll rates, both of which get a bit interesting. If this is OK, then the V1 cut can be done with a cup of coffee in one hand ...
(b) slam accel on multis has another risk - directional control problems if OEI, if the failure occurs during the slam, or if the accelerations are grossly asymmetric for some reason. Keep in mind that many engines are not mechanically limited and can run up above their rated thrust without too much effort. I can recall one accident investigation where we ended up putting the probable cause to a confusing (to the crew) asymmetric thrust situation (without a failure) where it was very likely that a mishandled power increase caused a Vmc style departure during the early airborne takeoff phase... crash, burn, many die.
Centaurus' observations about automation-centric pilots persevering with the buttons when the stick and throttles etc are right in front of them is seen regularly in high workload sim situations .. a bit like the parachutist who perserveres with a hard pull main instead of going for the reserve ... not generally a successful strategy. This presumes that basic I/F stick and rudder skills have not be allowed to atrophy, of course.
Guess I was fortunate when I went onto my first exposure to whizz bang technology .. the operator went through a short-lived flirtation with "must do it with the buttons" and then moderated to a "know both ways, use the most appropriate at the time, just don't screw up and embarrass the boss".
(a) V1 cut is easy-peasy ... try the cut during the rotation flare immediately after liftoff instead where it all gets interesting due to being a much more dynamic situation .. especially at low weight/speed schedule. Pilot has to control both yaw and roll rates, both of which get a bit interesting. If this is OK, then the V1 cut can be done with a cup of coffee in one hand ...
(b) slam accel on multis has another risk - directional control problems if OEI, if the failure occurs during the slam, or if the accelerations are grossly asymmetric for some reason. Keep in mind that many engines are not mechanically limited and can run up above their rated thrust without too much effort. I can recall one accident investigation where we ended up putting the probable cause to a confusing (to the crew) asymmetric thrust situation (without a failure) where it was very likely that a mishandled power increase caused a Vmc style departure during the early airborne takeoff phase... crash, burn, many die.
Centaurus' observations about automation-centric pilots persevering with the buttons when the stick and throttles etc are right in front of them is seen regularly in high workload sim situations .. a bit like the parachutist who perserveres with a hard pull main instead of going for the reserve ... not generally a successful strategy. This presumes that basic I/F stick and rudder skills have not be allowed to atrophy, of course.
Guess I was fortunate when I went onto my first exposure to whizz bang technology .. the operator went through a short-lived flirtation with "must do it with the buttons" and then moderated to a "know both ways, use the most appropriate at the time, just don't screw up and embarrass the boss".
