Calling Malfunctions on Takeoff
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Calling Malfunctions on Takeoff
I am interested in gathering some information on what various operators policy is on calling malfunctions on takeoff, particularly for non-EICAS installations such as my current type, the B737NG.
For some background, the QRH has the following to say about abnormalities on the takeoff:
Rejected Takeoff
The decision to reject a takeoff rests solely with the Captain. The Captain must make the decision so stopping action can begin by V1. If the decision is to reject the takeoff, the Captain should clearly announce "Reject", commence the stopping action, and assume control of the airplane. If the First Officer is making the takeoff, the First Officer should not abandon control of the airplane until the Captain makes a positive input on the controls.
Prior to 80 knots, the takeoff should be rejected for system failures(s), unusual noise or vibration, tire failure, abnormally slow acceleration, engine failure, engine fire, unsafe takeoff configuration warning, predictive windshear, or if the airplane is unsafe to fly.
Above 80 kts, reject for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning, or if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly
During the takeoff, the crew member recognizing the malfunction will call it clearly and precisely
Some questions:
1. How exactly do you call a system failure below 80 kts?
2. Do you call all malfunctions above 80 kts, or just the problems to reject for (some aircraft inhibit non-abort system failures above 80 kts)?
3. When a failure does occur, are key words used or is it left up to the individual?
4. Do any operators allow for the First Officer to make the reject decision?
For some background, the QRH has the following to say about abnormalities on the takeoff:
Rejected Takeoff
The decision to reject a takeoff rests solely with the Captain. The Captain must make the decision so stopping action can begin by V1. If the decision is to reject the takeoff, the Captain should clearly announce "Reject", commence the stopping action, and assume control of the airplane. If the First Officer is making the takeoff, the First Officer should not abandon control of the airplane until the Captain makes a positive input on the controls.
Prior to 80 knots, the takeoff should be rejected for system failures(s), unusual noise or vibration, tire failure, abnormally slow acceleration, engine failure, engine fire, unsafe takeoff configuration warning, predictive windshear, or if the airplane is unsafe to fly.
Above 80 kts, reject for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning, or if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly
During the takeoff, the crew member recognizing the malfunction will call it clearly and precisely
Some questions:
1. How exactly do you call a system failure below 80 kts?
2. Do you call all malfunctions above 80 kts, or just the problems to reject for (some aircraft inhibit non-abort system failures above 80 kts)?
3. When a failure does occur, are key words used or is it left up to the individual?
4. Do any operators allow for the First Officer to make the reject decision?
One airline I worked with would use, for example, the words "Master Caution - door warning light" at any speed on take off - because it was felt that any event that caused a Master Caution light to come on should immediately be brought to the attention of the captain. What the captain did about it is another subject altogether.
Another example was if an engine overheat detection light illuminated at any time during take off or in flight. The person first seeing the light would cancel the Master Caution light and call "Master Caution - engine overheat light". The captain would then come into the act and decide what to do next.
On a slightly different slant on the subject, a problem that exists in some simulators is that if a fire warning was inserted by the instructor, the engine overheat light would illuminate first, followed several seconds later by the fire bell and fire warning light on the chosen engine. It left the crew with a tricky decision because no one wants to take an engine fire into the air because they have no idea of the severity of the fire.
Assuming the engine overheat light (and Master Caution) came on at 100 knots when there was ample opportunity to abort below V1, some might prefer to abort immediately.
Another operator might direct its crews to ignore any Master Caution above 80 knots and continue the take off. In fact that is what the Boeing 737 FCTM implies.
Some operators direct that there should be no call made for any malfunction which occurs between V1 and gear up selection. Presumably this is because the weakest link might get a fright and do the wrong thing.
Yet another operator might require the PNF to call positive rate of climb before the PF calls for gear up. The latest version of the Boeing 737 FCTM simply states that when the PF observes a positive rate of climb indication he calls "Gear UP", and continues rotation to take off pitch attitude. Nothing about the PNF coming into the act verbally - he just verifies the positive rate. Presumably if he sees that there is no postive rate of climb he simply doesn't retract the gear until it is safe.
Often seen in the simulator, especially if an engine failure has occurred and there is lots of noises and drama, the PNF gets distracted and forgets to call "positive rate" and the PF then forgets to call "Gear UP", because he it has been drilled into him that he must wait for the call by the PNF (who has forgotten!). The aircraft then staggers away clawing for speed and altitude because of a crew cock-up.
It seems to me that in the matter of a problem on take off, SOP's as originated by the operator are often so rigid, that the captain is left with has no discretionary powers. Blind rote actions are not necessarily a safe and reliable policy.
Another example was if an engine overheat detection light illuminated at any time during take off or in flight. The person first seeing the light would cancel the Master Caution light and call "Master Caution - engine overheat light". The captain would then come into the act and decide what to do next.
On a slightly different slant on the subject, a problem that exists in some simulators is that if a fire warning was inserted by the instructor, the engine overheat light would illuminate first, followed several seconds later by the fire bell and fire warning light on the chosen engine. It left the crew with a tricky decision because no one wants to take an engine fire into the air because they have no idea of the severity of the fire.
Assuming the engine overheat light (and Master Caution) came on at 100 knots when there was ample opportunity to abort below V1, some might prefer to abort immediately.
Another operator might direct its crews to ignore any Master Caution above 80 knots and continue the take off. In fact that is what the Boeing 737 FCTM implies.
Some operators direct that there should be no call made for any malfunction which occurs between V1 and gear up selection. Presumably this is because the weakest link might get a fright and do the wrong thing.
Yet another operator might require the PNF to call positive rate of climb before the PF calls for gear up. The latest version of the Boeing 737 FCTM simply states that when the PF observes a positive rate of climb indication he calls "Gear UP", and continues rotation to take off pitch attitude. Nothing about the PNF coming into the act verbally - he just verifies the positive rate. Presumably if he sees that there is no postive rate of climb he simply doesn't retract the gear until it is safe.
Often seen in the simulator, especially if an engine failure has occurred and there is lots of noises and drama, the PNF gets distracted and forgets to call "positive rate" and the PF then forgets to call "Gear UP", because he it has been drilled into him that he must wait for the call by the PNF (who has forgotten!). The aircraft then staggers away clawing for speed and altitude because of a crew cock-up.
It seems to me that in the matter of a problem on take off, SOP's as originated by the operator are often so rigid, that the captain is left with has no discretionary powers. Blind rote actions are not necessarily a safe and reliable policy.
We used to brief that only certain warnings would be the reason for calling an abort. Those could be called by either PF, PNF or FE at any speed up to V1. Thus the only call (other than the usual airspeed calls) would be 'ABORT'. No 'Oil Pressure No 3', 'Oh look, an orange light' or anything else.
Most failures would be known by 80 kts, but we didn't have any 'above or below 80 kt (or 100 kt)' criteria. Critical failure up to V1 = ABORT!!, critical failure above V1 = FULL POWER!!
The Captain would confirm the rejected take-off by closing the throttles fully and quickly. PF just braked and steered, PNF selected spoilers and full reverse. When the ac stopped, the Captain would then call "I have control" and put the parking brake on (even if he/she'd been PF) - this triggered the co-pilot to retract the spoilers and select flap to approach, in case an overwing immediate evacuation was needed. Then "Reason for abort?". That's when the 'Engine failure no 3' or whatever was advised, confirmed and appropriate immediate actions drills ordered. Subsequently the ac was taxiied clear if safe to do so and further actions completed as appropriate.
This was practised roughly twice per month for each and every pilot in the simulator, both as PF and as PNF. It has stood the test of time (nearly 30 years) and it works.
Most failures would be known by 80 kts, but we didn't have any 'above or below 80 kt (or 100 kt)' criteria. Critical failure up to V1 = ABORT!!, critical failure above V1 = FULL POWER!!
The Captain would confirm the rejected take-off by closing the throttles fully and quickly. PF just braked and steered, PNF selected spoilers and full reverse. When the ac stopped, the Captain would then call "I have control" and put the parking brake on (even if he/she'd been PF) - this triggered the co-pilot to retract the spoilers and select flap to approach, in case an overwing immediate evacuation was needed. Then "Reason for abort?". That's when the 'Engine failure no 3' or whatever was advised, confirmed and appropriate immediate actions drills ordered. Subsequently the ac was taxiied clear if safe to do so and further actions completed as appropriate.
This was practised roughly twice per month for each and every pilot in the simulator, both as PF and as PNF. It has stood the test of time (nearly 30 years) and it works.
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Our standard briefing (744) goes something like:
Captain will make all Reject decisions.
Any Crewmember call out EICAS warning or caution when he sees it: below 80 knots, any warning or caution; between 80 knots and V1, engine failure, fire, or configuration warning. After V1, we'll take it flying and handle it airborne. At 500' and with the airplane under control, Pilot Flying call for autopilot, then handle communications and airplane. Pilot Not Flying [and First Observer] run the checklist after airplane is cleaned up.
[If the FO is Pilot Flying]: In case of rejected takeoff, Pilot Flying will maintain control of the airplane until and unless the Captain positively takes control ("I have the airplane." ... "You have the airplane.").
Captain will make all Reject decisions.
Any Crewmember call out EICAS warning or caution when he sees it: below 80 knots, any warning or caution; between 80 knots and V1, engine failure, fire, or configuration warning. After V1, we'll take it flying and handle it airborne. At 500' and with the airplane under control, Pilot Flying call for autopilot, then handle communications and airplane. Pilot Not Flying [and First Observer] run the checklist after airplane is cleaned up.
[If the FO is Pilot Flying]: In case of rejected takeoff, Pilot Flying will maintain control of the airplane until and unless the Captain positively takes control ("I have the airplane." ... "You have the airplane.").
‘What and when to call’ is an interesting topic.
FlareArmed uses a fairly standard procedure - Above 80 kts, reject for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning, or if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly, but this includes a human factors oversight. All of the parameters other than ‘the airplane is unsafe’ are self evident and do not require judgment, even when the 'airplane is unable to fly', it is self evident. The wording of procedures requires careful thought to minimize ambiguity and ease the crew decision making; procedures should avoid any call that depends on judgment. I recognize that many RTOs are judgment calls, but the decision is usually made after establishing the what the problem is (from the alerting call).
Centaurus, Beagle, and Intruder get closer to the root of the problem. Below 80 kts the handling pilot (head up) should be aware of a master caution, thus the information that he requires is whether the alert warrants a reject; not restating that there has been a master caution alert. In most modern aircraft with good a MWS design philosophy a master caution should always result in a reject; thus the next most valuable information are facts that may effect the RTO i.e. HYD failure (brakes/spoilers?), engine fire (which side). The call should give this information.
The difficult calls are for those factors that are not alerted by MWS and those requiring interpretation, particularly sounds, vibration, or smells.
The procedure for a call following a master caution above 80 kts, or even after lift off could follow a similar philosophy. The NFP passes information to the FP – sometimes the failure may affect handling or systems selection. Thus, whilst procedures are very powerful safety tools they depend on well thoughtout wording.
ALF
FlareArmed uses a fairly standard procedure - Above 80 kts, reject for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning, or if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly, but this includes a human factors oversight. All of the parameters other than ‘the airplane is unsafe’ are self evident and do not require judgment, even when the 'airplane is unable to fly', it is self evident. The wording of procedures requires careful thought to minimize ambiguity and ease the crew decision making; procedures should avoid any call that depends on judgment. I recognize that many RTOs are judgment calls, but the decision is usually made after establishing the what the problem is (from the alerting call).
Centaurus, Beagle, and Intruder get closer to the root of the problem. Below 80 kts the handling pilot (head up) should be aware of a master caution, thus the information that he requires is whether the alert warrants a reject; not restating that there has been a master caution alert. In most modern aircraft with good a MWS design philosophy a master caution should always result in a reject; thus the next most valuable information are facts that may effect the RTO i.e. HYD failure (brakes/spoilers?), engine fire (which side). The call should give this information.
The difficult calls are for those factors that are not alerted by MWS and those requiring interpretation, particularly sounds, vibration, or smells.
The procedure for a call following a master caution above 80 kts, or even after lift off could follow a similar philosophy. The NFP passes information to the FP – sometimes the failure may affect handling or systems selection. Thus, whilst procedures are very powerful safety tools they depend on well thoughtout wording.
ALF
Unsafe to fly
Things like multiple bird strike, abnormal control response, ASI major disagreement, collision with something etc. It really is impossible to define evrything which renders your a/c unable/unsafe to fly. That's one of the things captains are paid to decide.
Things like multiple bird strike, abnormal control response, ASI major disagreement, collision with something etc. It really is impossible to define evrything which renders your a/c unable/unsafe to fly. That's one of the things captains are paid to decide.
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The less said, the better.
Verbal nonsense while rolling down the runway, can cause problems.
Engine failure, for example.
Needs to be confirmed by at least two perameters...which are often mis-read by new guys.
So, a simple 'engine failure' will do, not ...'ah, failure number three, I think...', or, heard on one sim detail, ...'oh cr@p, it just died."
Or, rolling down the runway at DEL one foggy night, the Flight Engineer starts yelling like a banshee...because one of the red EGT lights has illuminated. Sort of a 'aaahhhhhhhhh!!!!"
Looked thru the book, could not find this terminology anywhere...
Verbal nonsense while rolling down the runway, can cause problems.
Engine failure, for example.
Needs to be confirmed by at least two perameters...which are often mis-read by new guys.
So, a simple 'engine failure' will do, not ...'ah, failure number three, I think...', or, heard on one sim detail, ...'oh cr@p, it just died."
Or, rolling down the runway at DEL one foggy night, the Flight Engineer starts yelling like a banshee...because one of the red EGT lights has illuminated. Sort of a 'aaahhhhhhhhh!!!!"
Looked thru the book, could not find this terminology anywhere...
Agree with you on this 411A!
We never called the actual cause for calling an abort - just the word "ABORT"!
Personally I think the Boeing ideas are too verbose - and as for handing over control before the ac has been stopped.....what a crazy notion!
We never called the actual cause for calling an abort - just the word "ABORT"!
Personally I think the Boeing ideas are too verbose - and as for handing over control before the ac has been stopped.....what a crazy notion!
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After 80 knots - Unsafe to fly???
After 80 I am go minded and have programmed myself to abort if:
I hear the fire bell
The aircraft pulls unmistakably to the side (engine failure)
Wind shear warning
As far as unsafe to fly I can only think of two other causes:
Runway excursion (vehicle or plane on the takeoff roll)
One engine goes into reverse (this will pull to the side like an engine failure)
I would not abort for bird strikes, even multiple – only if the engine fails.
It is the Capt. that should make the RTO decision. If he/she is the first to notice a problem than he/she can just call RTO. The co-pilot should, in my opinion, give useful information, that is - various words describing the problems at slow speed. After 80 it should be restricted to engine failure or runway excursions unless it is an extremely urgent problem.
After 80 I am go minded and have programmed myself to abort if:
I hear the fire bell
The aircraft pulls unmistakably to the side (engine failure)
Wind shear warning
As far as unsafe to fly I can only think of two other causes:
Runway excursion (vehicle or plane on the takeoff roll)
One engine goes into reverse (this will pull to the side like an engine failure)
I would not abort for bird strikes, even multiple – only if the engine fails.
It is the Capt. that should make the RTO decision. If he/she is the first to notice a problem than he/she can just call RTO. The co-pilot should, in my opinion, give useful information, that is - various words describing the problems at slow speed. After 80 it should be restricted to engine failure or runway excursions unless it is an extremely urgent problem.
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Being in a hurry now, I'd only like to ask intruder more details about " Tire blowout at 90 knots."...
Does that make the airplane unable to fly?
Looking forward to come back on this excellent thread.
Does that make the airplane unable to fly?
Looking forward to come back on this excellent thread.
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Tire blowing at 90 kts?
It is recommended to continue if you have a high speed tire problem.
Leave the gear down and come back and land with the entire runway available to stop is generally better than to try to stop with a poor RTO braking condition at high speed.
It is recommended to continue if you have a high speed tire problem.
Leave the gear down and come back and land with the entire runway available to stop is generally better than to try to stop with a poor RTO braking condition at high speed.
The tire burst itself, before or after 80 kts should not cause the aircraft to be unflyable. The problems in this scenario are the detection of a particular failure and the risks associated with that failure.
Detecting a tire burst has been notoriously difficult; some errors in detection have resulted in accidents due to late aborts (after V1). An unusual sound or vibration without confirmation is just unusual, the aircraft will still fly. A bang could be a tire or an engine; if it is a serious engine malfunction then alerts will be given. If it's just a bang then it’s not a bomb, statistically at least. It is unlikely (in my experience) that the crew will hear a tire blowing. Vibration is equally fraught with ambiguity; an engine could vibrate as much as an unbalance wheel, although (in my experience) the wheel / tire is more disconcerting. In one event during landing the vibration in the cabin from a blown tire dropped the O2 masks and popped the bins open.
The safety of our industry is largely based on statistics of risk. Where crews do not have these numbers to hand then both the knowledge of the basis of the risk and the balance of that risk by certification is important. A blow out before 80 kts, if confirmed beyond reasonable doubt, may warrant a stop, the event being less safe than continuing the takeoff. A tire blowout after 80 kts or the subsequent gear retraction after takeoff is not a significant risk, not enough to stop for i.e. the risk of stopping in this case is higher due to the unknowns about the braking capability as opposed to the lower risk of flying – ‘go-minded after 80 kts’
However there are many other statistically higher risks that need prompt RTO action and require both clear communications and understanding for the correct decision to be taken. Well defined procedures and clear calls are very necessary in time constrained events, but take care not to overstate the risk of apparently hazardous circumstances.
ALF
Detecting a tire burst has been notoriously difficult; some errors in detection have resulted in accidents due to late aborts (after V1). An unusual sound or vibration without confirmation is just unusual, the aircraft will still fly. A bang could be a tire or an engine; if it is a serious engine malfunction then alerts will be given. If it's just a bang then it’s not a bomb, statistically at least. It is unlikely (in my experience) that the crew will hear a tire blowing. Vibration is equally fraught with ambiguity; an engine could vibrate as much as an unbalance wheel, although (in my experience) the wheel / tire is more disconcerting. In one event during landing the vibration in the cabin from a blown tire dropped the O2 masks and popped the bins open.
The safety of our industry is largely based on statistics of risk. Where crews do not have these numbers to hand then both the knowledge of the basis of the risk and the balance of that risk by certification is important. A blow out before 80 kts, if confirmed beyond reasonable doubt, may warrant a stop, the event being less safe than continuing the takeoff. A tire blowout after 80 kts or the subsequent gear retraction after takeoff is not a significant risk, not enough to stop for i.e. the risk of stopping in this case is higher due to the unknowns about the braking capability as opposed to the lower risk of flying – ‘go-minded after 80 kts’
However there are many other statistically higher risks that need prompt RTO action and require both clear communications and understanding for the correct decision to be taken. Well defined procedures and clear calls are very necessary in time constrained events, but take care not to overstate the risk of apparently hazardous circumstances.
ALF
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GearDown&Locked wrote:
Can a lightning striking the a/c during TO be considered as a reason to abort ?
Can a lightning striking the a/c during TO be considered as a reason to abort ?
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The aircraft pulls unmistakably to the side (engine failure)
The best person to assess an Eng Fail is the PNF - he should be watching the indications. (S)FO can call stop with us in certain circs - one of which is the Eng Fail case. To assess an Eng Fail requires 2 indications, one of which must be "internal" i.e. indication.
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Being in a hurry now, I'd only like to ask intruder more details about " Tire blowout at 90 knots."... Does that make the airplane unable to fly?
On a 747, blowing 1 tire may not be felt at all. If you notice a tire blowing, it may well be more than 1. In a heavy airplane (we take off near MGTOW often) and near the runway limit, a couple blown tires may affect your ability to get airborne before the end. There is also a significant chance of structural damage to flaps and landing gear, so ability to safely retract gear and flaps is compromised.
OTOH, once above 100 Kt or so, the ability to stop is questionable, since the blown tires significantly reduce braking ability. A high-speed abort with less than 16 brakes will almost guarantee 16 blown tires after you're stopped.
Indeed, it's a lot to consider when accelerating through 90 Kt -- you have to make the decision NOW, and stick by it!
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Agree with NigelOnDraft about questioning why the aircraft is pulling to the side before giving "the engine failure diagnosis”.
We all know how little time we have to make good RTO decisions. My strategy is to be as prepared as possible by narrowing down the causes why I might consider a high speed RTO as I wrote earlier on this thread.
We all know how little time we have to make good RTO decisions. My strategy is to be as prepared as possible by narrowing down the causes why I might consider a high speed RTO as I wrote earlier on this thread.
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I would like to share some facts about tire problems and RTOs:
A DC-9 departed Portland in a crosswind, wet runway, and at balanced field maximum weight. Near 100 kts during the takeoff roll, the captain felt something strange and heard a noise similar to a deflated tire thump. Because he was not sure if a tire had blown or failed in another manner, he elected to continue takeoff.
The takeoff continued uneventfully. After landing, it was discovered that a tire had come apart and deflated.
Later studies revealed that this incident could have had other consequences had the captain attempted an RTO from high speed. Given the conditions of the runway, and the fact that the tire was deflated, the airplane could have been very difficult to stop on the available runway.
An industry study found that from 1964 through mid-1976, 171 RTOS resulted in accidents or incidents. Of the 171 RTOs, 149 were initiated, either wholly or in part, because of failures or malfunctions involving tires, wheels or brakes. Tire failures were a factor in 124 of the 149.
A DC-9 departed Portland in a crosswind, wet runway, and at balanced field maximum weight. Near 100 kts during the takeoff roll, the captain felt something strange and heard a noise similar to a deflated tire thump. Because he was not sure if a tire had blown or failed in another manner, he elected to continue takeoff.
The takeoff continued uneventfully. After landing, it was discovered that a tire had come apart and deflated.
Later studies revealed that this incident could have had other consequences had the captain attempted an RTO from high speed. Given the conditions of the runway, and the fact that the tire was deflated, the airplane could have been very difficult to stop on the available runway.
An industry study found that from 1964 through mid-1976, 171 RTOS resulted in accidents or incidents. Of the 171 RTOs, 149 were initiated, either wholly or in part, because of failures or malfunctions involving tires, wheels or brakes. Tire failures were a factor in 124 of the 149.