Calling Malfunctions on Takeoff
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Hy LEM
They (APPOLO 12)would'rejected,if they could've shutdown the engines,or eject.
Or maybe ,not enaugh rwy available to reject safely. (Not so big TORA for a rocket ,I guess)
Maybe the lighting strike won't make you abort,but maybe the CB over the field (that created the lighting) or the 'windshear ahead ' will make you decide to reject (or even better,delay takeoff) .
Brgds Alex
They (APPOLO 12)would'rejected,if they could've shutdown the engines,or eject.
Or maybe ,not enaugh rwy available to reject safely. (Not so big TORA for a rocket ,I guess)
Maybe the lighting strike won't make you abort,but maybe the CB over the field (that created the lighting) or the 'windshear ahead ' will make you decide to reject (or even better,delay takeoff) .
Brgds Alex
I have always had grave reservations about who, other than the captain, can call an abort. Far better to make an appropriate call concerning the perceived problem, rather than putting one's total trust in the chap that decides an abort is warranted. As most people accept, it is the captain who should always make that critical call and subsequent actions to go or stop.
Some operators blithely state in their Operations Manual that any crew can call an abort. I wonder if they have ever had a long hard look at that statement to examine the potential for a complete stuff up at high speed?
Some years back I was talking to an old ex RAF flight engineer on Handley Page Hastings I think. When I met him he was now on the B727. He stated that in his squadron the flight engineer could call an abort (if he thought it was warranted, of course) and that it was mandatory for the captain to stop immediately an abort was called by the F/E.
This sounded dangerous to me especially as I think in the Hastings the F/E was seated sideways behind the two pilots faced sideways and did not have an immediate view through the front windows to see what runway was left in front.
On one occasion the F/E saw a flickering engine gauge and called "Abort" shortly before lift off. The startled captain immediately aborted the take off but managed to stop before running off the end. The captain then turned to the F/E and asked why he had called an abort. Just imagine nowadays a blind abort by a captain purely on a crew call without any idea of the problem. Yet the potential is there in some airline SOP's.
In this case the captain apparently chided the F/E for what he (the captain), saw as a wrong decision to call abort. The aircraft was then back-tracked for another take off, with my drinking friend the RAF F/E, smarting under the captain's remark.
Half way into the next take off run, the F/E hollered "ABORT" in a loud voice and true to RAF SOP the captain stood on the brakes and came to a smoking brake stop. Again he had no idea why the F/E had called the abort, so he turned slowly around in his seat and said what's the bloody problem now.
The F/E said that there was no engine or airframe problem captain, but that you violated SOP's by not taxiing right to the end of the runway before you started the take off run.
Now that might have been a slightly exaggerated tale of derring do by the F/E, but it had me worried. Sure, it was 25 years ago when he was a F/E on a Hastings , but now he was on the 727 and he firmly believed that as a crew member, he could call an abort and the captain would obey and sort things out after the event.
I am also surprised to read in this thread that the captain and first officer can "share" a rejected take off. I think the example given was the captain who was guarding the throttles simply closed the throttles as a sign that an abort was on, while the first officer (or PNF, whatever) selected speed brakes and applied reverse thrust. I don't recall who did the brakes.
What fantastic Torville and Dean synchronisation in a split second, that must have been demanded of the captain and first officer - or should I say the PNF and PF.
Talk about a recipe for potential confusion, I would have thought. Or is this just another example of the warm and fuzzy application of perceived CRM?
Thre is no doubt in my mind that the captain should always be the one to decide on, then initiate the abort, with all handling of brakes, speed brakes and reverse by the captain- particularly on a slippery runway abort where a cross wind might require judicious juggling of reverse thrust if the aircraft starts to weather-cock due wind and reverse thrust vectors.
Some operators blithely state in their Operations Manual that any crew can call an abort. I wonder if they have ever had a long hard look at that statement to examine the potential for a complete stuff up at high speed?
Some years back I was talking to an old ex RAF flight engineer on Handley Page Hastings I think. When I met him he was now on the B727. He stated that in his squadron the flight engineer could call an abort (if he thought it was warranted, of course) and that it was mandatory for the captain to stop immediately an abort was called by the F/E.
This sounded dangerous to me especially as I think in the Hastings the F/E was seated sideways behind the two pilots faced sideways and did not have an immediate view through the front windows to see what runway was left in front.
On one occasion the F/E saw a flickering engine gauge and called "Abort" shortly before lift off. The startled captain immediately aborted the take off but managed to stop before running off the end. The captain then turned to the F/E and asked why he had called an abort. Just imagine nowadays a blind abort by a captain purely on a crew call without any idea of the problem. Yet the potential is there in some airline SOP's.
In this case the captain apparently chided the F/E for what he (the captain), saw as a wrong decision to call abort. The aircraft was then back-tracked for another take off, with my drinking friend the RAF F/E, smarting under the captain's remark.
Half way into the next take off run, the F/E hollered "ABORT" in a loud voice and true to RAF SOP the captain stood on the brakes and came to a smoking brake stop. Again he had no idea why the F/E had called the abort, so he turned slowly around in his seat and said what's the bloody problem now.
The F/E said that there was no engine or airframe problem captain, but that you violated SOP's by not taxiing right to the end of the runway before you started the take off run.
Now that might have been a slightly exaggerated tale of derring do by the F/E, but it had me worried. Sure, it was 25 years ago when he was a F/E on a Hastings , but now he was on the 727 and he firmly believed that as a crew member, he could call an abort and the captain would obey and sort things out after the event.
I am also surprised to read in this thread that the captain and first officer can "share" a rejected take off. I think the example given was the captain who was guarding the throttles simply closed the throttles as a sign that an abort was on, while the first officer (or PNF, whatever) selected speed brakes and applied reverse thrust. I don't recall who did the brakes.
What fantastic Torville and Dean synchronisation in a split second, that must have been demanded of the captain and first officer - or should I say the PNF and PF.
Talk about a recipe for potential confusion, I would have thought. Or is this just another example of the warm and fuzzy application of perceived CRM?
Thre is no doubt in my mind that the captain should always be the one to decide on, then initiate the abort, with all handling of brakes, speed brakes and reverse by the captain- particularly on a slippery runway abort where a cross wind might require judicious juggling of reverse thrust if the aircraft starts to weather-cock due wind and reverse thrust vectors.
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I have always had grave reservations about who, other than the captain, can call an abort.
In BA:
- The (S)FO can call STOP, as PNF, for a specified list of items (e.g. the Eng Fail above)
- The (S)FO has a slightly extended list as PF (blocked Runway - Handling problem)
- The Division of duties (PF/PNF) means that for each reason to STOP, only one person is usually in a good position to call STOP (e.g. PNF for an indicated problem, PF for a handling problem)
- We all know STOP is only to be called below V1. Even if called erroneously (as decided by the Mgmt later), the STOP should still be safe.
- Captain only has an overall discretion
Thre is no doubt in my mind that the captain should always be the one to decide on, then initiate the abort, with all handling of brakes, speed brakes and reverse by the captain- particularly on a slippery runway abort where a cross wind might require judicious juggling of reverse thrust if the aircraft starts to weather-cock due wind and reverse thrust vectors
If your (S)FO is not up to calling STOP in clearly defined circumstances, and initiating an RTO, then the 2 crew concept in your airline is true Man & Dog.
And before you say "sounds confusing", the BA SOP, and the list of who can call STOP, and what for, and the drills for initiating the STOP, and when/if the Captain will take control is rehearsed before each Departure (LH) / 1st daily dperture (SH). And practiced X times each Sim...
I am not saying the BA system is perfect, but reading some of the opinions here, a lot better than others!
NoD
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On top of those examples... Incapacitation is the biggest reason an F/O can initiate an abort!!
As an S/O I would probably also answer the cabin interphone on takeoff... if something is considered serious enough to get called up in what is continuously stressed as a 'no-contact' period, then I want to know what it is! The others no doubt would too, and I'd tell them with something simple, like FIRE, or HIJACK. Or if there is no 1-word explanation and we're 3 knots below V1: STOP!
But that's all close to the realm of immediately life-threatening, where SOPs take second seat to saving everyone's life (including your own).
As an S/O I would probably also answer the cabin interphone on takeoff... if something is considered serious enough to get called up in what is continuously stressed as a 'no-contact' period, then I want to know what it is! The others no doubt would too, and I'd tell them with something simple, like FIRE, or HIJACK. Or if there is no 1-word explanation and we're 3 knots below V1: STOP!
But that's all close to the realm of immediately life-threatening, where SOPs take second seat to saving everyone's life (including your own).
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Lancer,
When most crew members get a bit more experience, they generally find that to answer the interphone in the middle of the takeoff run as really not all that useful.
When most crew members get a bit more experience, they generally find that to answer the interphone in the middle of the takeoff run as really not all that useful.
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NoD. I don't know what type of aircraft that you operate, but if it is a B737 series, have a glance at page 3.19 of the Boeing 737 FCTM.
Among other things it states: "The PNF should closely monitor essential instruments throughout the takeoff roll and immediately announce abnormalities such as Engine Failure or Engine Fire, or any adverse condition significantly affecting the safety of flight.
The decision to reject the take off is the responsibility of the captain. If the captain is the PNF, he should initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously".
Best of luck to your BA procedure, but I notice that there is no reference in the Boeing FCTM to sharing the decision to abort.
I would say that throughout the years of designing aeroplanes large and small, Boeing has done a great deal of research on the subject of abort processes - and along with many other operators has decided that in the best interests of flight safety, crew other than the captain are not in a position to decide an abort and execute it. Incapacitation excluded, of course.
If your sensibilities and pride are offended by the Boeing policy then perhaps you could arrange for some measured abort tests incorporating your ideas, then forward them to your CAA and the aircraft manufacturer to their consideration.
Who knows - you could even be the catalyst for changing 70 years of hard won experience of the role of the captain of the ship...
Among other things it states: "The PNF should closely monitor essential instruments throughout the takeoff roll and immediately announce abnormalities such as Engine Failure or Engine Fire, or any adverse condition significantly affecting the safety of flight.
The decision to reject the take off is the responsibility of the captain. If the captain is the PNF, he should initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously".
Best of luck to your BA procedure, but I notice that there is no reference in the Boeing FCTM to sharing the decision to abort.
I would say that throughout the years of designing aeroplanes large and small, Boeing has done a great deal of research on the subject of abort processes - and along with many other operators has decided that in the best interests of flight safety, crew other than the captain are not in a position to decide an abort and execute it. Incapacitation excluded, of course.
If your sensibilities and pride are offended by the Boeing policy then perhaps you could arrange for some measured abort tests incorporating your ideas, then forward them to your CAA and the aircraft manufacturer to their consideration.
Who knows - you could even be the catalyst for changing 70 years of hard won experience of the role of the captain of the ship...
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Menen...
That maybe what the Boeing FCTM says. However, I have never had anything to do with 737s, and the BA Manuals differ anyway. That is the privilege of the Operator (BA in this case) and Authority (JAA/CAA) to approve.
I am not saying which is best, or really care. All that matters is that whatever procedure is used is known and practiced by that airline.
In my previous airline, only the Captain could call and initiate a "STOP". 4 engine type. When an Outboard Engine failed, the Captain would call STOP, take control, and the PF would therefore release the controls. Result - if (as called above the Torville and Dean syncronisation!) was not perfect, the aircraft would be off the side of the runway? Hardly ideal...
I could add that manuals such as the Boeing and Airbus FCTM are designed, shall we say, for the lowest common denominator. BA have decided that the level of training and ability of theirs (S)FOs is sufficient to allow them to call STOP in clearly defined circumstances, particularly when they are in a better posiiton to determine the failure.
2 scenarios:[list=1][*]Capt = PF. Eng Fail near V1. PNF watching Eng Insts, sees Failure, calls "STOP". PF initiates RTO...[*]Capt = PF. Eng Fail near V1. PNF watching Eng Insts, sees Failure, calls "Engine Failure". PF either calls STOP immediately in response (hardly made a decision), or searches for some sign that this call is correct, and then calls STOP. PF initiates RTO...[/list=1]I know which one of these will use less distance.
The only potential hazard with the BA way is unnecessary, even hazardous, STOP calls being made. This does not appear in practice, so I am, for one, happy with the BA way. But as I say, it does not mean it is the "best", or only way. You seem set that the Boeing way is the "only" way...?
NoD
That maybe what the Boeing FCTM says. However, I have never had anything to do with 737s, and the BA Manuals differ anyway. That is the privilege of the Operator (BA in this case) and Authority (JAA/CAA) to approve.
I am not saying which is best, or really care. All that matters is that whatever procedure is used is known and practiced by that airline.
In my previous airline, only the Captain could call and initiate a "STOP". 4 engine type. When an Outboard Engine failed, the Captain would call STOP, take control, and the PF would therefore release the controls. Result - if (as called above the Torville and Dean syncronisation!) was not perfect, the aircraft would be off the side of the runway? Hardly ideal...
I could add that manuals such as the Boeing and Airbus FCTM are designed, shall we say, for the lowest common denominator. BA have decided that the level of training and ability of theirs (S)FOs is sufficient to allow them to call STOP in clearly defined circumstances, particularly when they are in a better posiiton to determine the failure.
then perhaps you could arrange for some measured abort tests incorporating your ideas
The only potential hazard with the BA way is unnecessary, even hazardous, STOP calls being made. This does not appear in practice, so I am, for one, happy with the BA way. But as I say, it does not mean it is the "best", or only way. You seem set that the Boeing way is the "only" way...?
NoD
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411A, why not? There are enough unannunciated, severe problems for it to be worth doing under certain circumstances. I'm not talking about the PNF answering it... just the person in the back sitting there waiting for something to happen. I don't think I could just sit there looking at a 'pilot priority' if we're accelerating through 60 knots.
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Problem is *Lancer*, many times the crew in back are not in a position to 'decide' anything, such is their recruitment and training with many airlines.
I'm sure you get the picture.
I'm sure you get the picture.
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Menen...
If you're going to quote me, please do not re-arrange the quote, leave bits out, and alter the meaning entirely!
My post makes it clear that BA determine their (S)FOs are able to call STOP in clearly defined circumstances, their Operating Authority (CAA, now JAA) are quite happy to approve that decision, and IMHO, it works well in practice.
So please can you say why a fully Licensed Pilot on that type, as P1, is unable to judge e.g. an Engine Failure and call STOP? Especially the one whose main task during the TO run is to scan the Engine Instruments... It is my option, of course, as Captain, to deny them that ability, but not only would it be highly irregular, I have never had the slightest reason to doubt any (S)FO I have flown with in this regard. And nor did any Captain during my time as (S)FO...
Any other opinions out there?
NoD
If you're going to quote me, please do not re-arrange the quote, leave bits out, and alter the meaning entirely!
My post makes it clear that BA determine their (S)FOs are able to call STOP in clearly defined circumstances, their Operating Authority (CAA, now JAA) are quite happy to approve that decision, and IMHO, it works well in practice.
So please can you say why a fully Licensed Pilot on that type, as P1, is unable to judge e.g. an Engine Failure and call STOP? Especially the one whose main task during the TO run is to scan the Engine Instruments... It is my option, of course, as Captain, to deny them that ability, but not only would it be highly irregular, I have never had the slightest reason to doubt any (S)FO I have flown with in this regard. And nor did any Captain during my time as (S)FO...
Any other opinions out there?
NoD
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No guesswork with no time to think...
We keep the go/no-go decision simple: For every takeoff only the captain's hand stays on the throttles until at (or just before) Vee One, whereupon the hand is removed and any event will be treated as an inflight problem... and only after reaching 1500 feet AGL, or obstacle clearance altitude, whichever is higher. When the captain's hand comes off the throttles it's an automatic and instinctive GO decision, even if it's 10 knots before Vee One!
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Hi All,
Having operated both systems i.e. Boeing and a B.A. stylee, I belive that as long as the operating proceedure is approved by the "feds", and most importantly, the training is very good, then the guy in the right hand seat is just as able to evaluate the criteria in his or her remit for stopping as the guy in the left seat.
I know that when I changed from the B.A. to Boeing, I felt pretty under- utilised until I moved into the left seat, where I have now developed independently pointing eyeballs (can't spell chamelion!).
There are pro's and con's both ways, but I suppose that as long as the training is good, then they both work and stand the test of critisism.
cheers
Having operated both systems i.e. Boeing and a B.A. stylee, I belive that as long as the operating proceedure is approved by the "feds", and most importantly, the training is very good, then the guy in the right hand seat is just as able to evaluate the criteria in his or her remit for stopping as the guy in the left seat.
I know that when I changed from the B.A. to Boeing, I felt pretty under- utilised until I moved into the left seat, where I have now developed independently pointing eyeballs (can't spell chamelion!).
There are pro's and con's both ways, but I suppose that as long as the training is good, then they both work and stand the test of critisism.
cheers
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Go/No Go
Well, well, well. Such prose and self recommendation from our BA Nigel brother.
While the theory may seem fine and the approval of the Regulator is used as a pacifier, the reality in practice can be very different to the anticapted outcome.
And who says the regulator has the expertise to make such decisions when they are not the exposed ones and in fact may be wrong. That is not to say they are but.........they are not the repository if all avaion expertise in my view.
Gluepot has got it right and there are good reasons for his comments.
Apart from the practicalities (talk about that later).......who is responsible for the "safety of the aircraft and pax? The captain!
Who gets strung up if the call by the learned and highly skilled support person (F/E or PNF) calls a bad call. And don't think it can't happen no matter what the company says.
Wait until you are in the witness box in a private legal battle and see who your friends are then.
And are we really sugesting a contiuned take-off at 80 knots plus? Finer if you don't have a balanced field but how about the effects of using clearway and screen height.
And if the procedure is fine for the abort, do we use the support person to COMMAND an action over which the captain has not real control. Perhaps an emergency descent....or even an engine fire AT 1,000 FT AGL after takeoff.
..................."Fire No1" says the support person...... "SHUTDOWN NOW"......... and forget the extended second segment climb.
The difficulty in an these scenarios is that there are so many. And to write procedure after procedure......many different............in an attempt to cover all these scenarios is well nigh impossible.
So..........what is the solution. Accept the fact that the captain is the responsible pilot. He can get information from the tea lady if he likes...............but he makes the decision..........he executes the manoeuvre and then there is no fancy "I'll do this and you'll do that and by the way, if I forget you do this too".
And there is real handover required (although there is a defacto one) when the Captain is PNF. Gluepot said it right. Captain has his hand on the thrust levers until V1 and then on the wheel.
Simple.
If there is abort he slams the thrust levers shut, jumps on the brakes.......or (RTO is on) and grabs reverse in about 1second and if not automatic deployment, graps the spoiler handle.
There is one airline (almost the largest in the world) who call V1 at 5 knots before so that the real V1 is the one that is actioned. And thsi arile also considers a bias to go at 100 knots plus.
But that is only a bias and the final dession is with the captain.
One last thing.............and I can see the arrows being sharpened now................how about the abort on a real long runway above V1.........like what happened in the UK a few years back. Now that's for another time I suspect.
Happy flights
While the theory may seem fine and the approval of the Regulator is used as a pacifier, the reality in practice can be very different to the anticapted outcome.
And who says the regulator has the expertise to make such decisions when they are not the exposed ones and in fact may be wrong. That is not to say they are but.........they are not the repository if all avaion expertise in my view.
Gluepot has got it right and there are good reasons for his comments.
Apart from the practicalities (talk about that later).......who is responsible for the "safety of the aircraft and pax? The captain!
Who gets strung up if the call by the learned and highly skilled support person (F/E or PNF) calls a bad call. And don't think it can't happen no matter what the company says.
Wait until you are in the witness box in a private legal battle and see who your friends are then.
And are we really sugesting a contiuned take-off at 80 knots plus? Finer if you don't have a balanced field but how about the effects of using clearway and screen height.
And if the procedure is fine for the abort, do we use the support person to COMMAND an action over which the captain has not real control. Perhaps an emergency descent....or even an engine fire AT 1,000 FT AGL after takeoff.
..................."Fire No1" says the support person...... "SHUTDOWN NOW"......... and forget the extended second segment climb.
The difficulty in an these scenarios is that there are so many. And to write procedure after procedure......many different............in an attempt to cover all these scenarios is well nigh impossible.
So..........what is the solution. Accept the fact that the captain is the responsible pilot. He can get information from the tea lady if he likes...............but he makes the decision..........he executes the manoeuvre and then there is no fancy "I'll do this and you'll do that and by the way, if I forget you do this too".
And there is real handover required (although there is a defacto one) when the Captain is PNF. Gluepot said it right. Captain has his hand on the thrust levers until V1 and then on the wheel.
Simple.
If there is abort he slams the thrust levers shut, jumps on the brakes.......or (RTO is on) and grabs reverse in about 1second and if not automatic deployment, graps the spoiler handle.
There is one airline (almost the largest in the world) who call V1 at 5 knots before so that the real V1 is the one that is actioned. And thsi arile also considers a bias to go at 100 knots plus.
But that is only a bias and the final dession is with the captain.
One last thing.............and I can see the arrows being sharpened now................how about the abort on a real long runway above V1.........like what happened in the UK a few years back. Now that's for another time I suspect.
Happy flights
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Gunshy67.
Interesting points you make regarding the perceived expertese of the Regulator's men. To this day, flying operations inspectors in Australia - and I am sure the same for UK - get precious little hands-on actual flying on the jet transport they are responsible for.
Even their annual simulator practice is less than the average airline pilot receives. Most of the time the larger the airline, the less importance is given to the opinions of a flight inspector. To trumpet that a procedure must be good if the flight inspector says it is, means SFA in the real world.
I am not dead sure of this, but I wager that during certification flight testing of transport types, the test pilot personally carries out all the handling required to initiate and complete a rejected take off.
I have not heard of this task being shared between the test pilot and his co-pilot - apart from monitoring duties by the co-pilot. Indeed, if the task was shared (as espoused by Nigel D), then the resulting FCTM would make it clear which specific handling of brakes and levers would be carried out by the PF and PNF (pilot monitoring).
Surely therefore, doesn't this tell you a story? That the most efficient and reliable method of executing a rejected take off is that the captain decides, initiates and executes the complete procedure with his own two hands and feet. To have the captain blindly initiating an abort purely on the basis of someone else on the flight deck yelling"STOP" is surely an abrogation of command responsibility. As Gunshy 67 attested, a court would rip the commander to pieces for accepting a subordinate's command to abort and if something went tragically wrong.
Despite Nigel D's assertion that his co-pilots are superbly trained - and I have no doubt that their training is excellent - co-pilots have been known to call the wrong call or make the wrong decision (haven't we all?)
Interesting points you make regarding the perceived expertese of the Regulator's men. To this day, flying operations inspectors in Australia - and I am sure the same for UK - get precious little hands-on actual flying on the jet transport they are responsible for.
Even their annual simulator practice is less than the average airline pilot receives. Most of the time the larger the airline, the less importance is given to the opinions of a flight inspector. To trumpet that a procedure must be good if the flight inspector says it is, means SFA in the real world.
I am not dead sure of this, but I wager that during certification flight testing of transport types, the test pilot personally carries out all the handling required to initiate and complete a rejected take off.
I have not heard of this task being shared between the test pilot and his co-pilot - apart from monitoring duties by the co-pilot. Indeed, if the task was shared (as espoused by Nigel D), then the resulting FCTM would make it clear which specific handling of brakes and levers would be carried out by the PF and PNF (pilot monitoring).
Surely therefore, doesn't this tell you a story? That the most efficient and reliable method of executing a rejected take off is that the captain decides, initiates and executes the complete procedure with his own two hands and feet. To have the captain blindly initiating an abort purely on the basis of someone else on the flight deck yelling"STOP" is surely an abrogation of command responsibility. As Gunshy 67 attested, a court would rip the commander to pieces for accepting a subordinate's command to abort and if something went tragically wrong.
Despite Nigel D's assertion that his co-pilots are superbly trained - and I have no doubt that their training is excellent - co-pilots have been known to call the wrong call or make the wrong decision (haven't we all?)
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Worked for two airlines that had prior and present (seconded) BA co-pilots, and they all seemed superbly trained...if just slightly full of themselves, but hey, why not, BA has a pretty good record, overall.
They suggested in their 'new' company that the First Officer had the duty...actually the right, to call STOP at anytime, and the Captain should obey, period.
Oddly, the 'new' management didn't agree, and these guys were
told to keep their opinions to themselves, as in...our company way, or the highway.
So, they clammed up and did as they were told.
Having said this, they were pretty good stick and rudder guys/gals.
Also, very good technical knowledge about the equipment.
OTOH, the very best seconded First Officers that I have ever flown with came from...oddly enough QF, many years ago.
They suggested in their 'new' company that the First Officer had the duty...actually the right, to call STOP at anytime, and the Captain should obey, period.
Oddly, the 'new' management didn't agree, and these guys were
told to keep their opinions to themselves, as in...our company way, or the highway.
So, they clammed up and did as they were told.
Having said this, they were pretty good stick and rudder guys/gals.
Also, very good technical knowledge about the equipment.
OTOH, the very best seconded First Officers that I have ever flown with came from...oddly enough QF, many years ago.
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Everyone keeps mentioning 80 knots like it's some industry wide magic figure. I remember this figure from my Boeing days, but on Airbus the 'cut-off' figure is 100 knots. It seems to me that for commonality's sake, the industry should use one cut-off figure, one standard.
Somebody mentioned that they (would) shout "Abort". Again, for commonality, this was replaced by "Stop", on both fleets, long ago. "Overshoot" replaced by "Go-Around" etc.
Somebody mentioned that they (would) shout "Abort". Again, for commonality, this was replaced by "Stop", on both fleets, long ago. "Overshoot" replaced by "Go-Around" etc.
Question. Aircraft is belting down the runway and 20 knots below V1 on the wet runway the ever alert 500 hour first officer sees a flickering oil pressure gauge and because he is momentarily transfixed with doubt whether or not to bring it to the attention of the captain who is PF, decides to take what he judges as the safest action and that is when in doubt call STOP, STOP, STOP...
So he shouts out loud STOP, STOP, STOP.
The captain is instantly nonplussed. The first officer is obviously serious and the captain must decide either to give him the benefit of the doubt and STOPx3 - or, not having a clue what the first officer is on about, says ****** that - I am continuing the take off and sort out the "problem" in the air.
Who is right? And if you were the captain what would you do? Obey the first officers command? Or ignore it?
So he shouts out loud STOP, STOP, STOP.
The captain is instantly nonplussed. The first officer is obviously serious and the captain must decide either to give him the benefit of the doubt and STOPx3 - or, not having a clue what the first officer is on about, says ****** that - I am continuing the take off and sort out the "problem" in the air.
Who is right? And if you were the captain what would you do? Obey the first officers command? Or ignore it?
Join Date: May 2003
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Two cases: if the Captain realizes why the FO has called STOP he may reply CONTINUE or GO.
If he doesn't realize the reason, he better listen to the FO, who, don't forget, can also exercise his emergency authority.
FO are not monkeys, and sometimes much brighter than the Captain!
At the end of the fair, there will never be an absolute truth, as usual, and people capable of improvising, with good common sense, have got some more chanches to get it right, IMHO.
If he doesn't realize the reason, he better listen to the FO, who, don't forget, can also exercise his emergency authority.
FO are not monkeys, and sometimes much brighter than the Captain!
At the end of the fair, there will never be an absolute truth, as usual, and people capable of improvising, with good common sense, have got some more chanches to get it right, IMHO.