Flyers familiar w/ Reagan national - could Air Florida 90 have flown under the bridge
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Flyers familiar w/ Reagan national - could Air Florida 90 have flown under the bridge
I haven’t been to DC in a few years, so I don’t recall the layout of the bridges, pillars, etc, but hypothetically: had the f/o acted upon his mounting disquiet about the 737’s performance (or lack of it), and instead of following the captain’s instructions and company guidelines firewalled the throttles and maybe slammed LG lever up - could he have then maybe snaked his way between pillars of the few close-together bridges (one railroad, then several lanes of an interstate if I recall correctly) and accelerate thus enough to pull enough positive rate to clear the next bridge (about one mile northwest), or climb low over Potomac park (hopefully missing Lincoln memorial in the process).
After all he was a former f-15 pilot with almost 700 hrs to his name on the type, so he might have felt right at home with a maneuver like that…
After all he was a former f-15 pilot with almost 700 hrs to his name on the type, so he might have felt right at home with a maneuver like that…
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Nope, not a chance.
The bridges aren't like the ones in NY, SanFran (or insert city) they are way to low. Less than 50 feet clearance. Unfortunately, those guys were doomed from the start.
A lot of good things came out of that accident. Who here flying jets hasn't learned to back up your EPR gauges, especially when there is ice? Also, no one frets about getting deiced anymore, no matter the delay. And this was one of many accidents that taught us about CRM.
Unfortunately, a bunch of good people lost their lives to teach us these lessons. Pretty sad that it takes death for us to learn.
Steve
The bridges aren't like the ones in NY, SanFran (or insert city) they are way to low. Less than 50 feet clearance. Unfortunately, those guys were doomed from the start.
A lot of good things came out of that accident. Who here flying jets hasn't learned to back up your EPR gauges, especially when there is ice? Also, no one frets about getting deiced anymore, no matter the delay. And this was one of many accidents that taught us about CRM.
Unfortunately, a bunch of good people lost their lives to teach us these lessons. Pretty sad that it takes death for us to learn.
Steve
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beancounters to blame
ain't that the truth...except it takes death for the CORPORATE SCUM to learn and implement procedures/policies/etc that should have been in place long ago based upon tons of nasa/asrs reports - only dead pax floating in frozen river (in this case) or charred bodies on front pages move them to take measures that'll cost extra few cents a flight...
I agree with swiger. There is not a chance they could have flown under the bridge. The unnerving thing is how low the bridges are, and the plane hit anyway.
If anything (and this is pure speculation on my part), he was so low that perhaps it was just ground effect that was keeping him airborne.
Plus, the water was freezing, which limited the chances of survival in any case.
If anything (and this is pure speculation on my part), he was so low that perhaps it was just ground effect that was keeping him airborne.
Plus, the water was freezing, which limited the chances of survival in any case.
Last edited by visibility3miles; 12th Nov 2003 at 09:59.
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Also, bear in mind that the AOA was extremely high in the stall and they probably wouldn't have even seen the bridge until they were almost on it. Visibility was very poor at the time of the accident with snow showers and a ceiling of 400ft, although the aircraft never attained that height. Even in good conditions with a fully functioning aircraft and a previously studied plan to acheive this feat, it would be impossible, so the Palm 90 crew , who were low-hours younger guy's, never having flown in snow and heavy icing conditions, with a stalling aircraft in inclement weather with essentially no time to react to a worsening situation had absolutey no chance of doing anything. The transcript shows that the pnf repeatedly queries the take-off and obviously had serious doubts about it. The aircraft stalled as soon as it was rotated basically and pitched up sharply leading the pnf (i think) to exclaim something like "whoa easy , we only want 500" (fpm). It was a tragic accident that could have been easily averted, but then again they mostly all can be with the benefit of hind-sight.
Last edited by DanAir1-11; 12th Nov 2003 at 11:12.
NateDog 77: Good observation, and how about the Fokker 28 crash at LaGuardia, where more people died- a while AFTER deicing? Those jets (and turboprops) with no leading-edge slats have very sensitive leading edge airflow, and after these people died (the captain drowned in his seat), the FAA finally studied various precip and temperatures and published the detailed requirements, forcing airlines to do what they should have all understood and done many years ago. We now have very detailed tables to look at in order to determine hold-over times for various de-icing fluid percentages.
We can sometimes choose between one or two-step de-icing, if either the thicker Type 2 or 4 fluids are available.
How about certain FAA 'Tombstone Agency' "scum" (to be polite), who knew about problems with some European ATR-42s in airborne icing conditions and still pretended that nothing could be wrong-until a plane with passengers rolled out of control over Indiana?
We can sometimes choose between one or two-step de-icing, if either the thicker Type 2 or 4 fluids are available.
How about certain FAA 'Tombstone Agency' "scum" (to be polite), who knew about problems with some European ATR-42s in airborne icing conditions and still pretended that nothing could be wrong-until a plane with passengers rolled out of control over Indiana?
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Ignition Override - this is off-topic, but I cannot let your comment about ATR's go unanswered.
There was very little wrong with ATR's performance in icing conditions. Almost any aircraft will misbehave if you don't treat it correctly, by which I mean in accordance with the FCOM.
In the Roselawn, Indiana accident, the Captain was out of the flight deck, down the back chatting up the cabin crew for half an hour while the aircraft was in the hold. Thereafter, a cabin crew member was on the flight deck, and he was chatting to her there, with almost no attention on the controls. The FO was very inexperienced, and should not have been left on his own in those conditions. They were holding for more than three quarters of an hour in icing conditions and did not ask for a change of level. They left the autopilot in, and flaps extended for almost the entire time, contrary to FCOM instructions. On the transcript of the CVR, the sound of the pitch trim whooler is heard five times, indicating that it is having severe trouble keeping the aircraft in trim and yet they still did nothing about it.
In the meantime, ice was building up and up on the airframe. Eventually it just threw up it's hands and gave up. Any aircraft will do that. I think it is quite a tribute to the design of the aircraft that it stood heavy ice accretion in that configuration for over 45 minutes.
The NTSB report afterwards was a total travesty, as was the treatment of ATR. Yet they still made modifications to make the aircraft even safer than it was, and paid for a very comprehensive series of icing tests - I've seen the videos of an airframe accepting huge quantities of ice and still flying.
Roselan, Indiana was a result of one thing and one thing only - thoroughly unprofessional performance by the flight crew. The NTSB report was a travesty, and an example of more unprofessionalism.
There was very little wrong with ATR's performance in icing conditions. Almost any aircraft will misbehave if you don't treat it correctly, by which I mean in accordance with the FCOM.
In the Roselawn, Indiana accident, the Captain was out of the flight deck, down the back chatting up the cabin crew for half an hour while the aircraft was in the hold. Thereafter, a cabin crew member was on the flight deck, and he was chatting to her there, with almost no attention on the controls. The FO was very inexperienced, and should not have been left on his own in those conditions. They were holding for more than three quarters of an hour in icing conditions and did not ask for a change of level. They left the autopilot in, and flaps extended for almost the entire time, contrary to FCOM instructions. On the transcript of the CVR, the sound of the pitch trim whooler is heard five times, indicating that it is having severe trouble keeping the aircraft in trim and yet they still did nothing about it.
In the meantime, ice was building up and up on the airframe. Eventually it just threw up it's hands and gave up. Any aircraft will do that. I think it is quite a tribute to the design of the aircraft that it stood heavy ice accretion in that configuration for over 45 minutes.
The NTSB report afterwards was a total travesty, as was the treatment of ATR. Yet they still made modifications to make the aircraft even safer than it was, and paid for a very comprehensive series of icing tests - I've seen the videos of an airframe accepting huge quantities of ice and still flying.
Roselan, Indiana was a result of one thing and one thing only - thoroughly unprofessional performance by the flight crew. The NTSB report was a travesty, and an example of more unprofessionalism.
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I can't help but wonder at the hue and cry that would arise were I to suggest, in the face of a european accident board report, that the crew, and not the (say, boeing) equipment, was at fault in a terrible crash.
As to unprofessionalism, perhpas I missed something, but in the accident report that I read, the captain left the cockpit for less than five minutes (as opposed to your "half hour"), to use the restroom. Feel free to correct me on this point. If you'd like to actually read the accident report, rather than question the integrity of men ten years gone, it can be found at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/AAR9601.pdf
Relevant portions may be found on page 25.
As to the icing characteristics of the ATR series, a much more detailed treatment than I could possibly understand, yet alone construct, can be found in the above document. But it is my impression that transport category aircraft are meant not to have aileron hinge reversals under any circumstances, and that the NTSB's issue with the aircraft design had less to do with the amount of ice the ATR could carry than with the characteristics of the airframe's response to admittedly excessive ice buildup. I remain open to correction on this point as well.
I trust, sir, that you are not one to immediatly rise to the defense of "some" pilots, for example the the ill-fated British Chinook crew, who may or may not have been responsible for a tragic accident, but are (quite rightly, in my opinion) defended from unproven allegations of responsability, but to resoundingly damn those of an accident which even two national safety bodies cannot agree on the cause of.
Regards,
TRF
As to unprofessionalism, perhpas I missed something, but in the accident report that I read, the captain left the cockpit for less than five minutes (as opposed to your "half hour"), to use the restroom. Feel free to correct me on this point. If you'd like to actually read the accident report, rather than question the integrity of men ten years gone, it can be found at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/AAR9601.pdf
Relevant portions may be found on page 25.
As to the icing characteristics of the ATR series, a much more detailed treatment than I could possibly understand, yet alone construct, can be found in the above document. But it is my impression that transport category aircraft are meant not to have aileron hinge reversals under any circumstances, and that the NTSB's issue with the aircraft design had less to do with the amount of ice the ATR could carry than with the characteristics of the airframe's response to admittedly excessive ice buildup. I remain open to correction on this point as well.
I trust, sir, that you are not one to immediatly rise to the defense of "some" pilots, for example the the ill-fated British Chinook crew, who may or may not have been responsible for a tragic accident, but are (quite rightly, in my opinion) defended from unproven allegations of responsability, but to resoundingly damn those of an accident which even two national safety bodies cannot agree on the cause of.
Regards,
TRF
The FAA could put a de-icing bay on the departure end of every runway in the snow belt if the money that's gone into the Airways Improvement Fund was actually used for aviation purposes, instead of going into general accounting.
Captain Stable, agree 100% on your appraisal of the Roselawn accident.
Captain Stable, agree 100% on your appraisal of the Roselawn accident.
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TRF, my apologies - my memory of the CVR transcript was slightly faulty. The Flight Attendant was on the flight deck for in excess of half an hour, followed by the captain going aft to chat to her further. In fact, he made an intercom call to the flight deck, telling the FO to call him if he needed him, and admitting he was chatting rather than using the toilet.
Re-reading the accident report is educational. The pilots joke about their speed and the deck angle in the hold, about needing the stall procedure. There is the sound of music heard on the FO's headset. Eight minutes after selecting Level 3 deicing, the captain goes aft. In the descent they exceed flap limiting speed and the skipper says "I knew we'd do that".
As I said above, any aircraft will bite if you don't fly it in accordance with the FCOM. There was a very lazy, very unprofessional atmosphere on the flight deck of 4184. That, more than anything else, contributed to the accident.
Re-reading the accident report is educational. The pilots joke about their speed and the deck angle in the hold, about needing the stall procedure. There is the sound of music heard on the FO's headset. Eight minutes after selecting Level 3 deicing, the captain goes aft. In the descent they exceed flap limiting speed and the skipper says "I knew we'd do that".
As I said above, any aircraft will bite if you don't fly it in accordance with the FCOM. There was a very lazy, very unprofessional atmosphere on the flight deck of 4184. That, more than anything else, contributed to the accident.
