Abandoning a S/E Procedure
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.... "Old_smokey and J_T show us all how the OEI assessment should be conducted in an ideal world, however within airlines due to monetary constraints, attitudes or just a pure lack of knowledge, their ideal world doesn’t always exist."
.. except at the Inquiry ... how far one strays from the ideal is a matter for risk management and desire not to suffer legal penalty after the event ....
.. except at the Inquiry ... how far one strays from the ideal is a matter for risk management and desire not to suffer legal penalty after the event ....
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This was LOKE's thread, and I'm not trying to hijack it, nor trying to have the last word. I did, however, have a fair bit to say, and feel a professional responsibility to address a few remaining contentious points. There are literally thousands of pilots 'out there', who, due to no fault of their own, have little or minimal knowledge of safe flight following OEI at the Takeoff phase. Company culture is usually the culprit, much emphasis is placed upon engine failure manipulative skills, but all too often, little placed on obstacle management (and therefore survival) for continued flight. I was fortunate, I was raised in an airline where performance knowledge was not just well disciplined, but a religion.
We have people like Mutt, whom I percieve to be striving for the best possible levels of safety consistant with economic viability. But yet, to Mutt, for whom I have the highest respect, I say that the perfect world is possible, and does exist with some operators.
I work for a major airline as a Pilot / Performance Engineer, and have several performance sub-contracts with other operators. I RIGIDLY insist with all of my 'clients' (including my primary employer), that I have sole control over Operations Manual content in all matters related to Training for OEI procedures, Actual procedures for OEI, development of Specific Runway OEI Procedures, and RTOWs. It is not enough for the P/E department to hand the Airport Analyses to Flight Operations and leave it to them to use at their own discretion.
Several comments throughout this thread still disturb me, the worst being.....If no OEI procedure is laid down, then follow the SID..... One Major Major Airline who uses a contractor to provide airport analysis, only supplies crews with OEI procedures if a deviation from 'Straight Ahead Runway Track' for the next 25 miles is required. The 'Straight Ahead' runways therefore have no laid down OEI procedure, where, in many cases a simple 1.6% climb gradient (for a 2 engined aircraft) is available to a standard company acceleration altitude. No OEI has been laid down, so..... the proponent of no OEI so follow the SID takes up the SID where 3.3% is the minimum requirement, and heaven only knows what the required acceleration altitude would be. If you're going to do this, at least get out the AFM, and calculate for a 4.1% gradient (3.3%+0.8%) all of the way up to MSA. Of course, 3.3% is the minimum, it may be more, I've seen up to 5.2%. And again, if you're going to do this where the MSA is particularly high, what are you going to do about the 5/10 minute limit on Takeoff thrust?
Another concern that lingers is that pilots DO NOT HAVE the full range of obstacle data at their disposal to evaluate the most critical obstacles, this is simply not available in the 'public' Aeronautical forum, with limited exception in Australia via the published STOD/OCG system (and then only for 15000 M straight ahead). The Terminal Area Charts and Instrument Approach Charts show a good range of the major 'big' obstacles. In 36 years of doing SERIOUS Performance Engineering work and more runway analyses than I can remember, I can recall only 2 of the TAC/IAL obstacles as being the critical obstacles. The smaller less obvious ones will get you.
If this post sounds like self aggrandisement, then I apologise, it's not so. If 99.99% of the readers think of this as my ego trip, then so be it, but if it saves 1 life, then it has been worthwhile.
In my final words I refer to John Tullamarine's post immediately preceding this one. John is one more professional along with Mutt for whom I've developed the greatest respect. John T refers to the legal repercussions following 'straying' from the ideal, I tend to think more of blood, viscera, and human body parts strewn over the point of impact, and THAT's the bottom line.
Old Smokey
We have people like Mutt, whom I percieve to be striving for the best possible levels of safety consistant with economic viability. But yet, to Mutt, for whom I have the highest respect, I say that the perfect world is possible, and does exist with some operators.
I work for a major airline as a Pilot / Performance Engineer, and have several performance sub-contracts with other operators. I RIGIDLY insist with all of my 'clients' (including my primary employer), that I have sole control over Operations Manual content in all matters related to Training for OEI procedures, Actual procedures for OEI, development of Specific Runway OEI Procedures, and RTOWs. It is not enough for the P/E department to hand the Airport Analyses to Flight Operations and leave it to them to use at their own discretion.
Several comments throughout this thread still disturb me, the worst being.....If no OEI procedure is laid down, then follow the SID..... One Major Major Airline who uses a contractor to provide airport analysis, only supplies crews with OEI procedures if a deviation from 'Straight Ahead Runway Track' for the next 25 miles is required. The 'Straight Ahead' runways therefore have no laid down OEI procedure, where, in many cases a simple 1.6% climb gradient (for a 2 engined aircraft) is available to a standard company acceleration altitude. No OEI has been laid down, so..... the proponent of no OEI so follow the SID takes up the SID where 3.3% is the minimum requirement, and heaven only knows what the required acceleration altitude would be. If you're going to do this, at least get out the AFM, and calculate for a 4.1% gradient (3.3%+0.8%) all of the way up to MSA. Of course, 3.3% is the minimum, it may be more, I've seen up to 5.2%. And again, if you're going to do this where the MSA is particularly high, what are you going to do about the 5/10 minute limit on Takeoff thrust?
Another concern that lingers is that pilots DO NOT HAVE the full range of obstacle data at their disposal to evaluate the most critical obstacles, this is simply not available in the 'public' Aeronautical forum, with limited exception in Australia via the published STOD/OCG system (and then only for 15000 M straight ahead). The Terminal Area Charts and Instrument Approach Charts show a good range of the major 'big' obstacles. In 36 years of doing SERIOUS Performance Engineering work and more runway analyses than I can remember, I can recall only 2 of the TAC/IAL obstacles as being the critical obstacles. The smaller less obvious ones will get you.
If this post sounds like self aggrandisement, then I apologise, it's not so. If 99.99% of the readers think of this as my ego trip, then so be it, but if it saves 1 life, then it has been worthwhile.
In my final words I refer to John Tullamarine's post immediately preceding this one. John is one more professional along with Mutt for whom I've developed the greatest respect. John T refers to the legal repercussions following 'straying' from the ideal, I tend to think more of blood, viscera, and human body parts strewn over the point of impact, and THAT's the bottom line.
Old Smokey
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Regarding Old Smokey’s post about this being my thread – I simply started it and am very pleased that it has gotten the response that it has – all of you own it more than I do. I hope that no one interpreted my last post as desiring to end it.
I don’t recall whether it was this topic or another, but John Tullamarine stated something to the effect that the regulations that we live with do not guarantee absolute safety in all circumstances – simply an increase in the odds. The safest aircraft never leaves the ground but this is not conducive to a profitable commercial airline operation. John – please correct me if I’ve miss interpreted your comments.
One of the concepts that has come out of this thread, in my opinion, is that a major section of the pilot population is not as knowledgeable of the details of engine out procedures as they should be, therefore, many are making decisions based on incorrect odds.
I recall a quote from Perry Mason which seems to apply:
“Sir – you are drawing conclusions from facts not yet in evidence.”
Loke
I don’t recall whether it was this topic or another, but John Tullamarine stated something to the effect that the regulations that we live with do not guarantee absolute safety in all circumstances – simply an increase in the odds. The safest aircraft never leaves the ground but this is not conducive to a profitable commercial airline operation. John – please correct me if I’ve miss interpreted your comments.
One of the concepts that has come out of this thread, in my opinion, is that a major section of the pilot population is not as knowledgeable of the details of engine out procedures as they should be, therefore, many are making decisions based on incorrect odds.
I recall a quote from Perry Mason which seems to apply:
“Sir – you are drawing conclusions from facts not yet in evidence.”
Loke
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At the risk of inflaming passions with the first point, there are a few underlying considerations ..
(a) a successful pilot necessarily needs to have a strong ego to do the job. A consequent risk is that of believing excessively in one's inherent knowledge base and presuming technical competence where such a presumption is not entirely justified
(b) traditional pilot training regimes don't address all sorts of things - including obstacle performance strategies (although one readily can learn all about energy climbs, manoeuvring performance, etc. etc. ... )
(c) most airlines don't train beyond the generic (and some don't bother to train anything) so the old wives' tale network sometimes runs rife with various interesting beliefs coming to the surface
(d) as one very experienced ops engineer was fond of saying, when he was still with us, "why do they hassle us so much when the end result is the same if the wing falls off ... ?" (ie why don't pilots berate the structures people as well as ops engineering). I guess that, as pilots, we are much more interested in the rocky bits we see regularly during our flight operations... perhaps we should take as active an interest in many other areas of the technical aspects ..
(e) some airlines, in my view, don't address all reasonable considerations in analysing and determining RTOW and departure paths.
... and, it is a brave pilot who heads off down the runway, hoping that nothing untoward is going to happen ... and trusting to luck and good fortune to thread his way out of danger if something does go awry.
My views are aligned with Old Smokey's ... blood and guts on the ground is the end concern .. my one foray into accident investigation left me with a distaste for burnt bodies ... but the routine significant concern is the legal impact of poor decision-making at the inquiry. More disquieting is the oft-observed tendency for the operator to abandon the pilot to his/her own defence at said inquiry. Pilots who choose not to have a healthy respect for this aspect of the real world live in fairyland ...
And, certainly, there are no guarantees ... only probabilities and risk levels. Aim is to juggle the odds as much as one reasonably can to maximise the chances of survival.
(a) a successful pilot necessarily needs to have a strong ego to do the job. A consequent risk is that of believing excessively in one's inherent knowledge base and presuming technical competence where such a presumption is not entirely justified
(b) traditional pilot training regimes don't address all sorts of things - including obstacle performance strategies (although one readily can learn all about energy climbs, manoeuvring performance, etc. etc. ... )
(c) most airlines don't train beyond the generic (and some don't bother to train anything) so the old wives' tale network sometimes runs rife with various interesting beliefs coming to the surface
(d) as one very experienced ops engineer was fond of saying, when he was still with us, "why do they hassle us so much when the end result is the same if the wing falls off ... ?" (ie why don't pilots berate the structures people as well as ops engineering). I guess that, as pilots, we are much more interested in the rocky bits we see regularly during our flight operations... perhaps we should take as active an interest in many other areas of the technical aspects ..
(e) some airlines, in my view, don't address all reasonable considerations in analysing and determining RTOW and departure paths.
... and, it is a brave pilot who heads off down the runway, hoping that nothing untoward is going to happen ... and trusting to luck and good fortune to thread his way out of danger if something does go awry.
My views are aligned with Old Smokey's ... blood and guts on the ground is the end concern .. my one foray into accident investigation left me with a distaste for burnt bodies ... but the routine significant concern is the legal impact of poor decision-making at the inquiry. More disquieting is the oft-observed tendency for the operator to abandon the pilot to his/her own defence at said inquiry. Pilots who choose not to have a healthy respect for this aspect of the real world live in fairyland ...
And, certainly, there are no guarantees ... only probabilities and risk levels. Aim is to juggle the odds as much as one reasonably can to maximise the chances of survival.
Last edited by john_tullamarine; 16th Nov 2004 at 20:52.
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Smokey...
Why would one want to add another 0.8% to a net climb gradient that already provides for it?
If you're going to do this, at least get out the AFM, and calculate for a 4.1% gradient (3.3%+0.8%) all of the way up to MSA.
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OzExpat,
I WAS nervous about putting that one in without further explanation, and you caught me out, I should have been more specific. Yes, I concede that the SIDs already do have the Gross/Net factor built in, BUT, and it's a big BUT, simply applying AFM data to provide for a 3.3% climb gradient would not be enough because of the 1st segment. An aircraft just capable of complying with 3.3% with gear up (upon which 2nd segment is based), would fall below 3.3% in the first segment. TYPICALLY 1st Vs 2nd segment delta is about 0.8%, coincidently in line with the Gross Vs Net delta for the 2nd segment for a 2 engined aircraft. Crude - Yes!, but adding the 0.8% and taking advantage of the increased PANS-OPS clearances Vs the FAR25 clearances should come close to a reasonable compromise. Please remember the tone of my suggestion, i,e, at least if you're going to do this, then do SOMETHING about making provision for consequences of engine failure. Some 1st segments are very long, and some SIDs have their worst gradients close-in.
BTW, I sometimes use PANS-OPS data, reduce it to the actual obstacles that enforced the PANS-OPS requirements, and re-apply the FAR25 obstacle clearance criteria. A bit lazy, definately safe, and perfectly acceptable if the obstacles aren't too limiting.
Thanks for keeping me honest,
Old Smokey
I WAS nervous about putting that one in without further explanation, and you caught me out, I should have been more specific. Yes, I concede that the SIDs already do have the Gross/Net factor built in, BUT, and it's a big BUT, simply applying AFM data to provide for a 3.3% climb gradient would not be enough because of the 1st segment. An aircraft just capable of complying with 3.3% with gear up (upon which 2nd segment is based), would fall below 3.3% in the first segment. TYPICALLY 1st Vs 2nd segment delta is about 0.8%, coincidently in line with the Gross Vs Net delta for the 2nd segment for a 2 engined aircraft. Crude - Yes!, but adding the 0.8% and taking advantage of the increased PANS-OPS clearances Vs the FAR25 clearances should come close to a reasonable compromise. Please remember the tone of my suggestion, i,e, at least if you're going to do this, then do SOMETHING about making provision for consequences of engine failure. Some 1st segments are very long, and some SIDs have their worst gradients close-in.
BTW, I sometimes use PANS-OPS data, reduce it to the actual obstacles that enforced the PANS-OPS requirements, and re-apply the FAR25 obstacle clearance criteria. A bit lazy, definately safe, and perfectly acceptable if the obstacles aren't too limiting.
Thanks for keeping me honest,
Old Smokey
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Very interesting to see the lack harmonisation globally! No surprises here.
LAX has several completely unworkable SIDS, GA procedures and S/E procedures (S/E procedures should really be engine out procedures to cater for aircraft bigger than a twin)
Most of the unworkability stems from the floor of a VFR corridor that runs right over the airport, the traffic density at peak times and the tendency to use opposing runways in light wind conditions particularly for freight operations after midnight.
In an emergency, and a critical engine/system failure at V1 is an emergency in my book regardless of weight, the PIC has all the flexibility to do what ever he/she needs to do to maintain safe flight (Legal right).
However as we all know he/she also has the responibility to get it right (Legal responsibility under Duty of care- Negligence Law).
Generally speaking a pilot unfortunate to be in this situation (Emergency at V1) for real had better hope they are in an airspace that has civilised laws and their legal rights are protected otherwise they will find themselves in Jail for a very long time even if they got it right!
My secret to survival after over four decades of safe flying is a very large jar of vaselne that I keep in my flight bag!
LAX has several completely unworkable SIDS, GA procedures and S/E procedures (S/E procedures should really be engine out procedures to cater for aircraft bigger than a twin)
Most of the unworkability stems from the floor of a VFR corridor that runs right over the airport, the traffic density at peak times and the tendency to use opposing runways in light wind conditions particularly for freight operations after midnight.
In an emergency, and a critical engine/system failure at V1 is an emergency in my book regardless of weight, the PIC has all the flexibility to do what ever he/she needs to do to maintain safe flight (Legal right).
However as we all know he/she also has the responibility to get it right (Legal responsibility under Duty of care- Negligence Law).
Generally speaking a pilot unfortunate to be in this situation (Emergency at V1) for real had better hope they are in an airspace that has civilised laws and their legal rights are protected otherwise they will find themselves in Jail for a very long time even if they got it right!
My secret to survival after over four decades of safe flying is a very large jar of vaselne that I keep in my flight bag!
