RTO
Guest
Posts: n/a
RTO
There is no doubt that the captain is ultimately responsible for the go – nogo decision if anything happens during the take off. Then who should handle the throttles during take off when the co-pilot is pilot flying: the captain, the co-pilot or maybe the flight engineer? How is this done in the various companies and what is the logic behind it.
Guest
Posts: n/a
In the aircraft I fly, there is no flight engineer, so the Captain maintains his grip on the throttles until "GO", no matter who is flying.
I have heard that at Swissair, because of this the first officer never gets the aircraft until out of 400ft.
I have heard that at Swissair, because of this the first officer never gets the aircraft until out of 400ft.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I don't fly for SAA, but I seem to remember from jumpseat rides that FO, on his leg briefs "In the event of RTO, I will retard the throttles, apply maximum braking and use all available reverse thrust."
He does take power by himself and I think that the FO keeps hands on power levers to V1.
Captain can obviously still take control, but I have never heard it briefed that way.
He does take power by himself and I think that the FO keeps hands on power levers to V1.
Captain can obviously still take control, but I have never heard it briefed that way.
Guest
Posts: n/a
At my company (European major) capt controls the throttles on all takeoffs, and takes control of the aircraft entirely in the event of a reject.
And if I may, only a twisted mind would do oterwise, it's pure logic.
------------------
Smooth Trimmer
[This message has been edited by Streamline (edited 20 October 2000).]
And if I may, only a twisted mind would do oterwise, it's pure logic.
------------------
Smooth Trimmer
[This message has been edited by Streamline (edited 20 October 2000).]
In my company, on an FO's sector, the FO will set the power, then take hands of the power levers, and the Captain will place his or her hands on the levers until V1.
On a recent Boeing Audit, Boeing commented they weren't particularly happy with changing hands on the power levers.
On a recent Boeing Audit, Boeing commented they weren't particularly happy with changing hands on the power levers.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Thanks for all the info. The reason for the question is that I was brought up with the pilot flying handling the throttles, and in case of, does the complete reject after the captain has ordered this. Since there is a trend that we have to go back to industry standards (in my case Boeing 747 classic) I looked at the factory manuals. They say the PF should advance the throttles, the FE or autothrottle set take off thrust and from 80 kts onward the captain has his hands on the throttles, the way Checkboard describes. I’m glad to hear Boeing isn’t happy about this procedure as well, too many hands going around in a critical phase of flight.
Guest
Posts: n/a
SOP's will always vary between differing airlines. Hopefully the one that your company chooses to employ will result in the safe stopping of the aircraft on the runway.
My present employer (747 classic) has the Captain advance the thrust levers towards take-off setting assisted by Flight Engineer.
The Captain calls for, and carries out, any reject that is required. In my company the call of 'STOP' not only means stop but also, 'I HAVE CONTROL' so there is no doubt who is going to perform the RTO and it's associated actions.
------------------
My present employer (747 classic) has the Captain advance the thrust levers towards take-off setting assisted by Flight Engineer.
The Captain calls for, and carries out, any reject that is required. In my company the call of 'STOP' not only means stop but also, 'I HAVE CONTROL' so there is no doubt who is going to perform the RTO and it's associated actions.
------------------
Guest
Posts: n/a
Checkers,
Must be losing my ability to read between the lines...
Boeing audit of who (your company or someone else that you know)?
What was the procedure that generated the comment?
What form did their "unhappiness" take - recommended changes?
What was the "Boeing" preferred technique?
Was it consistent with the company's normal recommendations?
------------------
Stay Alive,
[email protected]
Must be losing my ability to read between the lines...
Boeing audit of who (your company or someone else that you know)?
What was the procedure that generated the comment?
What form did their "unhappiness" take - recommended changes?
What was the "Boeing" preferred technique?
Was it consistent with the company's normal recommendations?
------------------
Stay Alive,
[email protected]
The Audit was by Boeing, at my company's request, as the company is changing to the manufacturer's manuals where possible.
I don't know the specifics, what I reported was a repeat of an off hand comment by a manager. The Audit is above my level.
I don't know the specifics, what I reported was a repeat of an off hand comment by a manager. The Audit is above my level.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Let’s consider who SHOULD have their hands on the Thrust Levers during take-off.
First, do you believe that a correctly executed reject will result in the aircraft stopping safely within the EDA? Yes, you must, because otherwise you wouldn’t be flying. Your certificating Authority is happy about this too, as they have granted you an AOC.
Then, which is more dangerous – a late or incorrectly executed reject, or a reject which may have been unnecessary? Clearly, again, the former is likely to result in an accident. An unnecessary reject, but one which was for good cause at the time, will result in a delay for brake cooling, possible schedule disruption, and so forth, but no loss of life. We have to assume too that rejecting is preferable to taking certain problems into the air, such as engine malfunctions, fires, instrument failures and so on.
Now, why might a stop be executed incorrectly or late? One good reason is that, approaching V1, something goes wrong but the reject manoeuvre is not commenced immediately.
Let’s say, for example, one engine starts to run down. The FO is flying and the Captain is the only one with the authority to reject. The FO notices the problem first, and as the SOPs dictate, says something like ‘Engine failure’. He applies increasing amounts of rudder to keep straight, but is heading towards losing control as he is not allowed to react to the requirement to maintain directional control by retarding the thrust levers. This is problem number one. The Captain will respond to the ‘Engine failure’ call by examining the engine instruments, will take a small amount of time to gather the data displayed, and then to assess the data and make a decision to reject. This process will take a couple of seconds, and could take the aircraft past V1. However, the Captain is so occupied with this process, that V1 goes by unnoticed. Result, the reject above V1, and an accident. Even if the failure occurs well before V1, the Captain must then assume control of an aircraft in a highly unstable condition – yawing rapidly towards the edge of the runway – and without any idea of the force being applied by the FO in order to try to keep straight. However, if the FO has the ‘right’ to call ‘Stop’ then the aircraft is brought to a halt in a timely and ordered fashion. Moreover, if the problem is not easily expressed but is safety-critical, the FO must come up with a clear and concise form of words to explain it instantly in the heat of the moment. This is most difficult. If he is not happy, he should simply say ‘Stop’.
Only if you believe your FOs are not competent to stop the aircraft assuming the manoeuvre is commenced before V1 should your SOPs prevent their calling ‘Stop’. If you do believe they are not competent, then you’re training is below par.
After all, there are two pilots in the flight deck for a god reason – they are more able to carry out the task of operating the aircraft than one. To operate with only one authorised to make critical decisions is perhaps worse than operating single crew, because of the communication issues involved.
People often say that more lives are lost in late or incorrect rejects than in circumstances in which the aircraft is flown into the air with a problem. That is correct, but you must understand the emphasis is on ‘late or incorrect’.
How to operate safely in the environment discussed above – advice to Captains: If your company prevents the FO (or FE) calling ‘Stop’, then brief your crew as follows: ‘We will have a completely silent flight deck for take-off, except for the standard calls of… (V1, rotate, etc). Do not speak unless to draw my attention to an issue which affects the safe completion of the takeoff’. Then, the moment a word is spoken outside the standard calls, commence the reject actions immediately and very aggressively, without pausing for thought.
Persuade your flight operations department to reconsider their policy, or go and work for a carrier which uses a safe procedure.
Its worth mentioning that often, manufacturers are in favour of the unsafe procedure discussed. Bear in mind that they build the aircraft. Airlines and pilots operate them, and are better placed to work out safe operating procedures.
Regards again from all at Coconut Airways.
First, do you believe that a correctly executed reject will result in the aircraft stopping safely within the EDA? Yes, you must, because otherwise you wouldn’t be flying. Your certificating Authority is happy about this too, as they have granted you an AOC.
Then, which is more dangerous – a late or incorrectly executed reject, or a reject which may have been unnecessary? Clearly, again, the former is likely to result in an accident. An unnecessary reject, but one which was for good cause at the time, will result in a delay for brake cooling, possible schedule disruption, and so forth, but no loss of life. We have to assume too that rejecting is preferable to taking certain problems into the air, such as engine malfunctions, fires, instrument failures and so on.
Now, why might a stop be executed incorrectly or late? One good reason is that, approaching V1, something goes wrong but the reject manoeuvre is not commenced immediately.
Let’s say, for example, one engine starts to run down. The FO is flying and the Captain is the only one with the authority to reject. The FO notices the problem first, and as the SOPs dictate, says something like ‘Engine failure’. He applies increasing amounts of rudder to keep straight, but is heading towards losing control as he is not allowed to react to the requirement to maintain directional control by retarding the thrust levers. This is problem number one. The Captain will respond to the ‘Engine failure’ call by examining the engine instruments, will take a small amount of time to gather the data displayed, and then to assess the data and make a decision to reject. This process will take a couple of seconds, and could take the aircraft past V1. However, the Captain is so occupied with this process, that V1 goes by unnoticed. Result, the reject above V1, and an accident. Even if the failure occurs well before V1, the Captain must then assume control of an aircraft in a highly unstable condition – yawing rapidly towards the edge of the runway – and without any idea of the force being applied by the FO in order to try to keep straight. However, if the FO has the ‘right’ to call ‘Stop’ then the aircraft is brought to a halt in a timely and ordered fashion. Moreover, if the problem is not easily expressed but is safety-critical, the FO must come up with a clear and concise form of words to explain it instantly in the heat of the moment. This is most difficult. If he is not happy, he should simply say ‘Stop’.
Only if you believe your FOs are not competent to stop the aircraft assuming the manoeuvre is commenced before V1 should your SOPs prevent their calling ‘Stop’. If you do believe they are not competent, then you’re training is below par.
After all, there are two pilots in the flight deck for a god reason – they are more able to carry out the task of operating the aircraft than one. To operate with only one authorised to make critical decisions is perhaps worse than operating single crew, because of the communication issues involved.
People often say that more lives are lost in late or incorrect rejects than in circumstances in which the aircraft is flown into the air with a problem. That is correct, but you must understand the emphasis is on ‘late or incorrect’.
How to operate safely in the environment discussed above – advice to Captains: If your company prevents the FO (or FE) calling ‘Stop’, then brief your crew as follows: ‘We will have a completely silent flight deck for take-off, except for the standard calls of… (V1, rotate, etc). Do not speak unless to draw my attention to an issue which affects the safe completion of the takeoff’. Then, the moment a word is spoken outside the standard calls, commence the reject actions immediately and very aggressively, without pausing for thought.
Persuade your flight operations department to reconsider their policy, or go and work for a carrier which uses a safe procedure.
Its worth mentioning that often, manufacturers are in favour of the unsafe procedure discussed. Bear in mind that they build the aircraft. Airlines and pilots operate them, and are better placed to work out safe operating procedures.
Regards again from all at Coconut Airways.
The non flying pilot is more likely to notice and asses a problem than the flying pilot, and the V1 decision has a recognition buffer built in, so I don't think your particular scenario holds water.
Most Companies like the captain to operated the abort as they have the legal resposibility for the safety of flight under each countries various rules.
I shudder to think of an abort gone wrong, initiated by the FO.
Lawyer: "So Captain, would you have aborted under the same circumstances?"
Captain: (With the benefit of hindsight, knowing now that the abort was an incorrect decision) :Well....No, I wouldn't."
Lawyer: "So the FO acted without your permission in the abort, and you believe that the abort was an incompetent decision at the time..."
Most Companies like the captain to operated the abort as they have the legal resposibility for the safety of flight under each countries various rules.
I shudder to think of an abort gone wrong, initiated by the FO.
Lawyer: "So Captain, would you have aborted under the same circumstances?"
Captain: (With the benefit of hindsight, knowing now that the abort was an incorrect decision) :Well....No, I wouldn't."
Lawyer: "So the FO acted without your permission in the abort, and you believe that the abort was an incompetent decision at the time..."
Guest
Posts: n/a
I'm also in Europe were the lawyers don't dictate life just yet.
Either pilot in my outfit is trained to perform the task described.
So pilot flying controls pedals, yoke and thrust levers.
When either pilot see, hear or feel something unusual they yell "STOP".
Pilot flying than performs the RTO.
I'm happy with that procedure cause there is almost no delay and Pilot Flying can feel a yaw momentum better/faster. The assumption that a F.O. will screw it up and a P.I.C. won't makes me wonder who you guys have to fly with. From all the procedures we learn this is not the most difficult one. Sure it is critical, that's where training comes in play.
Airlines and/or people will always disagree and luckily we can discuss it at length. But in the end we will do what company procedures dictate. Cause a. they pay our bills but more importantly b. that's what the guy next to you expects you to do !!!
(P.S. I had an actual one two months ago and it worked fine.)
Either pilot in my outfit is trained to perform the task described.
So pilot flying controls pedals, yoke and thrust levers.
When either pilot see, hear or feel something unusual they yell "STOP".
Pilot flying than performs the RTO.
I'm happy with that procedure cause there is almost no delay and Pilot Flying can feel a yaw momentum better/faster. The assumption that a F.O. will screw it up and a P.I.C. won't makes me wonder who you guys have to fly with. From all the procedures we learn this is not the most difficult one. Sure it is critical, that's where training comes in play.
Airlines and/or people will always disagree and luckily we can discuss it at length. But in the end we will do what company procedures dictate. Cause a. they pay our bills but more importantly b. that's what the guy next to you expects you to do !!!
(P.S. I had an actual one two months ago and it worked fine.)
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Australia
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In our company the Captain controlls the power levers on all T/O's. The first pilot to see anything which will affect the safety of flight on T/O prior to V1 will call failure, the Captain calls stopping and does just that. After V1 an engine failure is called "power loss #1/2" to differentiate between stopping before V1 and continuing after. For the FO's T/O he says "call me V1 @ *** set the pwr.", the FO's concentration is on flying the aircraft he/she is not required to gaurd the power levers but to monitor the T/O power set by the Captain.
Checkboard's comment are very relevent re: lawyers. It is not a question of an FO's ability or competance to carry out a RTO but more a legal one. Good SOP's are designed not only to safely fly the A/C but to protect the crew/company as well in the unlikely event.
Checkboard's comment are very relevent re: lawyers. It is not a question of an FO's ability or competance to carry out a RTO but more a legal one. Good SOP's are designed not only to safely fly the A/C but to protect the crew/company as well in the unlikely event.
Guest
Posts: n/a
On the legal front, how will you feel in court when your FO criticises your failure to brief adequately and to react correctly in circumstances under which the aircraft should be garaunteed to be safe, according to its certification? The rules say any reject up to V1 is safe, so reject you should. He will sound even more convincing from a wheel-chair.
In answer to the point made above concerning the time allowed for the decision to reject, it is true that a certain amount of time is available (it used not to be, in the bad old days V1 was the speed by which you had to have started to reject). However, the time allowed is for taking action, not for considering the efficacy of the action and then taking it. Forgive my not having the figures to hand, but I'm down route and away from the necessary paperwork (an AIC, I think, discusses this at depth... anyone with access could post the relevant definition of V1 here, perhaps?).
In answer to the point made above concerning the time allowed for the decision to reject, it is true that a certain amount of time is available (it used not to be, in the bad old days V1 was the speed by which you had to have started to reject). However, the time allowed is for taking action, not for considering the efficacy of the action and then taking it. Forgive my not having the figures to hand, but I'm down route and away from the necessary paperwork (an AIC, I think, discusses this at depth... anyone with access could post the relevant definition of V1 here, perhaps?).
Guest
Posts: n/a
A full scale abort on a limited length runway is probably the most critical decision that any captain will make in a lifetime. It maybe a matter of life or death for a lot of people. A conversion course in a flight simulator does not necessarily prepare you for this decision because it is not the real thing. Basic abort skill - yes. But not the gut tearing decision that could cost or save lives.
While it might be a warm fuzzy feeling to completely trust the first officer to make a splendid well handled abort while the captain takes over at 70 knots, the widely varied past experience level of first officers from 500 hours TT to thousands of hours RH seat, makes it difficult for the captain to judge if he should do the abort himself or abbrogate that responsibility to his second in command.
There is probably no one right answer. For my part, it is no contest. The captain makes the abort decision and immediately takes over full handling control of the abort. The first officer takes up a support and monitoring role.
While it might be a warm fuzzy feeling to completely trust the first officer to make a splendid well handled abort while the captain takes over at 70 knots, the widely varied past experience level of first officers from 500 hours TT to thousands of hours RH seat, makes it difficult for the captain to judge if he should do the abort himself or abbrogate that responsibility to his second in command.
There is probably no one right answer. For my part, it is no contest. The captain makes the abort decision and immediately takes over full handling control of the abort. The first officer takes up a support and monitoring role.