The 737Max saga - My 2 SLF c
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Join Date: Dec 2009
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The 737Max saga - My 2 SLF c
Been following the issue with great interest, few thoughts:
1. Convinced MCAS as originally implemented was unprecedented given no other accident scenario results in a subsystem which, given certain conditions, when operating as designed, can actively dive the aircraft into the ground, opposing pilot input and with greater authority than said pilot input. Plus, once not properly diagnosed and disabled, puts the aircraft in a state virtually impossible to recover with manual trim without sufficient altitude and time.
2. Despite the above, with sufficient/adequate existing training and/or experience (runaway trim in particular) any crew could likely either disable MCAS in time or possibly 'win' an MCAS fight and save the aircraft from itself. This is the view of many in the professional forum. Fully understood but respectfully - it is cold comfort knowing a potential killer system is on board in the overall aviation context of MANY accidents where trained/experienced crew were STILL overwhelmed even withOUT an 'MCAS' involved. Pilots are human, hence fallible. As such, and given the reality that green MPLs to uber talented ex military ATPLs are all human/fallible, prefer the aircraft NOT actively contribute to or compound an issue against your express input no matter how late thank you very much.
3. Whatever 'MCAS2.0' brings, the 737Max is still in effect a 1960s design, modded/patched/modded/patched for generations, culminating as someone said in a 'hotrod' of an aircraft with innate aerodynamic issues addressed and made certifiable only by modern software.
4. Why should I trust the aircraft is truly safe (in it's own unique context of 'safe') going forward?? I work in tech for a living - it's taught me 'software' is also fallible. What if MCAS 2.0 goes nuts and breaks it's bonds so to speak?
1. Convinced MCAS as originally implemented was unprecedented given no other accident scenario results in a subsystem which, given certain conditions, when operating as designed, can actively dive the aircraft into the ground, opposing pilot input and with greater authority than said pilot input. Plus, once not properly diagnosed and disabled, puts the aircraft in a state virtually impossible to recover with manual trim without sufficient altitude and time.
2. Despite the above, with sufficient/adequate existing training and/or experience (runaway trim in particular) any crew could likely either disable MCAS in time or possibly 'win' an MCAS fight and save the aircraft from itself. This is the view of many in the professional forum. Fully understood but respectfully - it is cold comfort knowing a potential killer system is on board in the overall aviation context of MANY accidents where trained/experienced crew were STILL overwhelmed even withOUT an 'MCAS' involved. Pilots are human, hence fallible. As such, and given the reality that green MPLs to uber talented ex military ATPLs are all human/fallible, prefer the aircraft NOT actively contribute to or compound an issue against your express input no matter how late thank you very much.
3. Whatever 'MCAS2.0' brings, the 737Max is still in effect a 1960s design, modded/patched/modded/patched for generations, culminating as someone said in a 'hotrod' of an aircraft with innate aerodynamic issues addressed and made certifiable only by modern software.
4. Why should I trust the aircraft is truly safe (in it's own unique context of 'safe') going forward?? I work in tech for a living - it's taught me 'software' is also fallible. What if MCAS 2.0 goes nuts and breaks it's bonds so to speak?
