Do-328 crosswind testing ends in excursion
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Do-328 crosswind testing ends in excursion
Just because you are a "Test Pilot" doesn't mean that having a grand total of 30 minutes on type makes it wise to attempt to expand the crosswind envelope to 36 knots.
"D-CTRJ touched down in a strong crosswind. The pilot applied full left rudder but the aircraft yawed right. During the rollout, power was increased momentarily and aileron deflection was reversed from a ‘roll right’ to a ‘roll left’ sense. The aircraft rolled left, the right main landing gear lifted off the runway and the aircraft yawed into wind. The pilots could not regain control before the aircraft left the right side of the runway and ran onto the grass."
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...328-120-d-ctrj
"D-CTRJ touched down in a strong crosswind. The pilot applied full left rudder but the aircraft yawed right. During the rollout, power was increased momentarily and aileron deflection was reversed from a ‘roll right’ to a ‘roll left’ sense. The aircraft rolled left, the right main landing gear lifted off the runway and the aircraft yawed into wind. The pilots could not regain control before the aircraft left the right side of the runway and ran onto the grass."
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...328-120-d-ctrj
Join Date: Apr 1999
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Yep, I read that with some incredulity too.
Does anyone know if that put an end to the attempts to increase the crosswind limit, or are they still going ahead?
Does anyone know if that put an end to the attempts to increase the crosswind limit, or are they still going ahead?
Why reposition this important safety issue in ‘Spotters Corner’. Mods ??
The link is to a reputable investigation report relating to a significant safety incident; a subject (runway overruns and excursions) ranking highly in international safety activities.
There are many aspects to be learnt or at least discussed arising from this ‘minor’ event.
Issues of test flights to assess or determine limiting conditions, subjective assessment, reliance on external data (wind reports) and their accuracy, the continuing debate about gust conditions.
How are the results reported and communicated to operators. A successful outcome might rate ‘max demonstrated’, but not limiting, yet this outcome may be worthy of an entry fight manual limitations section.
There is opportunity to review how close to ‘the edge’, either soft or hard safety boundaries, are managed every day. Particularly those involving conditions which require judgement, dependent on experience, and fundamental skill.
How do operators’ management review these risks, what is expected of pilots, how are maximums or limiting conditions interpreted - from the comfort of the office.
How do individual pilots manage these risks, what guidance do they have, knowledge of actual conditions, how conditions can vary with locations, etc - in real time and from a less comfortable office.
How might we measure ‘first time’ events and share experience. Not that something was done and survived, but how situations might be best managed, or that the simulator might not be very accurate.
How many of us have previous experience of being at the limit, or recognising that personal limits are only as good as the outcome on the particular day and not on what happened previously, or as expected by the book, or covered by an SOP.
This is an important subject worthy of at least an Accident or Safety forum. Even a Technical Forum (AFM limits, procedures and interpretation) to encourage professional debate on a subject, which many of us take for granted, yet always involves risk, and all to frequently are scattered across this forum as well as airfields .
P. S. My visit to the grass followed an RTO with a double brake failure, in conditions beyond certification limits. However it still involved assumptions and weaknesses in safety oversight.
The link is to a reputable investigation report relating to a significant safety incident; a subject (runway overruns and excursions) ranking highly in international safety activities.
There are many aspects to be learnt or at least discussed arising from this ‘minor’ event.
Issues of test flights to assess or determine limiting conditions, subjective assessment, reliance on external data (wind reports) and their accuracy, the continuing debate about gust conditions.
How are the results reported and communicated to operators. A successful outcome might rate ‘max demonstrated’, but not limiting, yet this outcome may be worthy of an entry fight manual limitations section.
There is opportunity to review how close to ‘the edge’, either soft or hard safety boundaries, are managed every day. Particularly those involving conditions which require judgement, dependent on experience, and fundamental skill.
How do operators’ management review these risks, what is expected of pilots, how are maximums or limiting conditions interpreted - from the comfort of the office.
How do individual pilots manage these risks, what guidance do they have, knowledge of actual conditions, how conditions can vary with locations, etc - in real time and from a less comfortable office.
How might we measure ‘first time’ events and share experience. Not that something was done and survived, but how situations might be best managed, or that the simulator might not be very accurate.
How many of us have previous experience of being at the limit, or recognising that personal limits are only as good as the outcome on the particular day and not on what happened previously, or as expected by the book, or covered by an SOP.
This is an important subject worthy of at least an Accident or Safety forum. Even a Technical Forum (AFM limits, procedures and interpretation) to encourage professional debate on a subject, which many of us take for granted, yet always involves risk, and all to frequently are scattered across this forum as well as airfields .
P. S. My visit to the grass followed an RTO with a double brake failure, in conditions beyond certification limits. However it still involved assumptions and weaknesses in safety oversight.
