Delta Airlines B777 Divert to Ascension
A Runyonesque Character
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: The South of France ... Not
Age: 74
Posts: 1,209
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Beeld reports that the Delta Airlines Boeing 777's most important engine failed, forcing the flight to make an emergency landing on Ascension Island,
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Sydney NSW
Posts: 513
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ian, they have been uplifted
Their stay was one day. If the reportedly rough landing means anything the unexpected upslope was probably a factor. It catches even the wary. By night you can expect a thump and it'd be a first-time for the crew. By day the non-standard lighting looks especially pink! Thump again.
The A330-200 and L-1011-500 do it well; the B747 not so dusty for a large dowager; the B777-200LR is not what I'd prefer but she'll do nicely.
The island exerts a strange magic as you can gather from the response. Once bitten... it is not half so basic as we kid on... it is merely a ruse to keep grackles at bay. Beer of choice is "Castle".
Normal pax load is 185 which is dictated by the "accommodation" on Long Beach in the Chapel of Rest aka the fridge! Up to 25 tourist pax can fly there with 27kg bags in addition to the miltary/contractors. Do not pack more than 18kg for the hold. UK mains. You need 3 weeks to do the walks justice. Sod the golf.
The A330-200 and L-1011-500 do it well; the B747 not so dusty for a large dowager; the B777-200LR is not what I'd prefer but she'll do nicely.
The island exerts a strange magic as you can gather from the response. Once bitten... it is not half so basic as we kid on... it is merely a ruse to keep grackles at bay. Beer of choice is "Castle".
Normal pax load is 185 which is dictated by the "accommodation" on Long Beach in the Chapel of Rest aka the fridge! Up to 25 tourist pax can fly there with 27kg bags in addition to the miltary/contractors. Do not pack more than 18kg for the hold. UK mains. You need 3 weeks to do the walks justice. Sod the golf.
Last edited by enicalyth; 11th Jan 2013 at 11:05. Reason: speeling
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Hoerikwaggo
Age: 88
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ETOPS?
SLF here -- a retired legal academic with some published research into criminal law aspects of flight safety and, I hope, enough understanding of the issues to ask a question which is not totally lacking in sense and relevance.
It appears to me that at one level of discourse this incident was only barely newsworthy because it was handled appropriately by a skilled crew which was trained for precisely such eventualities. It thus reflects the reason why flying by a scheduled carrier is safe.
However, it occurs to me to ask -- what would the situation have been had Ascension Island been unavailable for a diversion?
Of course, it hardly needs stating that if the other engine (ie, the one which was not the "main engine") had failed, then errrh.... well..... yes.....
!
It appears to me that at one level of discourse this incident was only barely newsworthy because it was handled appropriately by a skilled crew which was trained for precisely such eventualities. It thus reflects the reason why flying by a scheduled carrier is safe.
However, it occurs to me to ask -- what would the situation have been had Ascension Island been unavailable for a diversion?
Of course, it hardly needs stating that if the other engine (ie, the one which was not the "main engine") had failed, then errrh.... well..... yes.....
!
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Near the Thames
Age: 79
Posts: 61
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just thinking......
What was the route frm JB to Atlanta? Both are north of the equator - JB not much, Atlanta quite a lot - and the last time I was at ASI (25 years ago admittedly) it was south of the equator, not a lot but a bit.
Now, unless things have changed in the world of navigation, a great circle route - allowing for routing restrictions - would take you well north of the equator all the way...
Oh, I should add that I am aware of ETOPS requirements but I still have trouble seeing how ASI was in contention as an ETOPS en route alternate for this sector.
It obviously happened but I'm interested if anyone with more inside info can fill in the gaps.
Cheers
1106
What was the route frm JB to Atlanta? Both are north of the equator - JB not much, Atlanta quite a lot - and the last time I was at ASI (25 years ago admittedly) it was south of the equator, not a lot but a bit.
Now, unless things have changed in the world of navigation, a great circle route - allowing for routing restrictions - would take you well north of the equator all the way...
Oh, I should add that I am aware of ETOPS requirements but I still have trouble seeing how ASI was in contention as an ETOPS en route alternate for this sector.
It obviously happened but I'm interested if anyone with more inside info can fill in the gaps.
Cheers
1106
Last edited by Type1106; 11th Jan 2013 at 19:44. Reason: Added ETOPS comment
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Potomac Heights
Posts: 470
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
what would the situation have been had Ascension Island been unavailable for a diversion?
Last edited by SeenItAll; 11th Jan 2013 at 20:02.
Both are north of the equator - JB not much,
The point of departure was Johannesburg, which is definitely well south of the equator. ASI lies almost directly on the great circle route between Johannesburg and Houston.
Last edited by barry lloyd; 11th Jan 2013 at 20:58.
Join Date: May 2002
Location: MA
Posts: 300
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What a pity that the moderators have moved such an interesting thread. I guess if the plane didn't crash, then it is not newsworthy.
The rescue 777 carried mechanics down to Ascension. Apparently, DL has also chartered an Atlas 747 which will depart ATL with a 777 spare engine and whatever equipment needed to make the engine swap down on the island. There is also reportedly some damage from the plane clipping its wing after landing.
Good job by the DL crew... single engine landing at night, VOR/DME approach, no approach lights.
The rescue 777 carried mechanics down to Ascension. Apparently, DL has also chartered an Atlas 747 which will depart ATL with a 777 spare engine and whatever equipment needed to make the engine swap down on the island. There is also reportedly some damage from the plane clipping its wing after landing.
Good job by the DL crew... single engine landing at night, VOR/DME approach, no approach lights.
Connetts
A most worthy question. There is specific language that describes the process, but the first step is to divide the flight into the planning phase and the operational phase. During planning a number of factors govern the decision about which en-route divert fields to use. For a twin like the 777 one would consider the mechanical status of the aircraft and the weather and accessibility of the proposed divert field (Is the runway open? Can the aircraft be safely handled?). Other factors along with these determine whether the flight will be 60, 120, or 180 minutes from a suitable alternate. There is a special 204 minute etops used for North Pacific/Alaska but it is very much a case by case decision). I do not know of any operator of the 777 who has more than a 204 minute etops allowance. I know Lindbergh flew for hours on one motor over the water, I prefer not to...
Great. You launch off and now in operation before you enter the etops area you and the dispatcher make sure that the proposed alternates are still usable. If not, you make another plan.
If you are already in the etops area and one of the alternates becomes unusable, you again make a new plan. This of course raises the question of what to do if another suitable alternate is not available. Different companies have different language for this but the overarching intent of the rules is that the captain and dispatcher are required to determine if the flight can safely be continued on its current routing--a different track might be required.
Long answer I realize but it is something that crews and dispatchers pay particularly keen attention to during the planning and operational phase of the flight. Not only is it legally mandated to do so, but it has to already be in mind when dealing with an emergency.
Had Ascension not been available for the Delta diversion, the crew would have had another field in mind--Liberia etc. St. Helena does not yet have an airport.
Apparently there are statistics out that show that more diverts are caused by problems other than engine difficulties. Perhaps, but having shut an engine down in flight on a 777 I would prefer to review the mathematics from a nice comfortable chair on the ground.
A most worthy question. There is specific language that describes the process, but the first step is to divide the flight into the planning phase and the operational phase. During planning a number of factors govern the decision about which en-route divert fields to use. For a twin like the 777 one would consider the mechanical status of the aircraft and the weather and accessibility of the proposed divert field (Is the runway open? Can the aircraft be safely handled?). Other factors along with these determine whether the flight will be 60, 120, or 180 minutes from a suitable alternate. There is a special 204 minute etops used for North Pacific/Alaska but it is very much a case by case decision). I do not know of any operator of the 777 who has more than a 204 minute etops allowance. I know Lindbergh flew for hours on one motor over the water, I prefer not to...
Great. You launch off and now in operation before you enter the etops area you and the dispatcher make sure that the proposed alternates are still usable. If not, you make another plan.
If you are already in the etops area and one of the alternates becomes unusable, you again make a new plan. This of course raises the question of what to do if another suitable alternate is not available. Different companies have different language for this but the overarching intent of the rules is that the captain and dispatcher are required to determine if the flight can safely be continued on its current routing--a different track might be required.
Long answer I realize but it is something that crews and dispatchers pay particularly keen attention to during the planning and operational phase of the flight. Not only is it legally mandated to do so, but it has to already be in mind when dealing with an emergency.
Had Ascension not been available for the Delta diversion, the crew would have had another field in mind--Liberia etc. St. Helena does not yet have an airport.
Apparently there are statistics out that show that more diverts are caused by problems other than engine difficulties. Perhaps, but having shut an engine down in flight on a 777 I would prefer to review the mathematics from a nice comfortable chair on the ground.
Last edited by Uncle Fred; 11th Jan 2013 at 23:48.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Hoerikwaggo
Age: 88
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thank you, Uncle Fred, for the patient, avuncular and informative reply. I am grateful. ETOPS regulations have long intrigued me.
It seems, if I understand Uncle Fred correctly, that the possible diversions must be the subject of at least two explicit conversations -- the first, before the engines are even started, and the second immediately before entering what Uncle Fred calls the ETOPS area. On both occasions the dispatcher and crew must bend their minds consciously to the status and availability of the designated diversions. Is that right?
SeenItAll (Post #27) writes: "The worst case scenario would have been a failure right over where ASI is located....."
This, and Uncle Fred's comments, put a further thought in my mind. Does it not follow that, as a matter of prudent planning when ETOPS is relevant, one would require a minimum of two suitable designated diversions? I ask this, because it seems to me that if one is obliged to divert then one has in effect a new destination which itself requires a diversion as a matter of normal planning.
With apologies for troubling busy people further, I would like to read comments on a thought that I've long had -- that the decision to build the 777 with two engines was taken by the actuaries and accountants.
The more engines one has the greater the operating costs. It is now more profitable to an operator, over the serviceable life of a modern jet aircraft, to pay higher premiums on a two-engined aircraft than on a three or four engined aircraft with a similar capacity and performance. This is because the modern jet engine is now so reliable and powerful that the risk of a loss due to the failure of one engine has become so low that it is commercially insurable. A loss due to the failure of more than one engine is so improbable that it is simply not even worth worrying about, so two engines will do.
But I wonder... if this is right, then surely the optimum number of engines, with an eye to ETOPS issues, is thus three?
There is some judicial recognition for the reliability of jet engines. I've lost my notes over the years, but I think I have this case right.......In the prosecution arising out of the incident involving Cessna 560 V-WCIN dealt with by the UK's AAIB (easily found), the pilot was charged with endangering etc etc etc. This, of course, does not appear in the report.
When taking off from Gibraltar one of the two jet engines was damaged but when the commander found that it would deliver reduced power he flew it to his destination (I think it was Bournemouth) for repair. There was defence evidence showing the astronomical number of hours over which identical engines had run faultlessly, and it was claimed that it was thus not an unreasonable risk to continue the flight relying on the remaining sound engine. The defence succeeded.
Still and all, we have the makings of a great disaster movie..... Our hero pilots set off in their 777 from JNB having done all the right planning, and in mid-Atlantic sustain engine failure. They divert to Ascension (making coolly frantic MAYDAY calls), dumping fuel to enable them to execute the difficult landing safely -- note what RobertS975 said (the posting immediately before Uncle Fred's): "......single engine landing at night, VOR/DME approach, no approach lights". But...... ! As they near Ascension someone makes a nasty mess on the runway they are about to use and the runway is closed.......... "Shirley, we have a problem...!"
Oh, I can see it all........
It seems, if I understand Uncle Fred correctly, that the possible diversions must be the subject of at least two explicit conversations -- the first, before the engines are even started, and the second immediately before entering what Uncle Fred calls the ETOPS area. On both occasions the dispatcher and crew must bend their minds consciously to the status and availability of the designated diversions. Is that right?
SeenItAll (Post #27) writes: "The worst case scenario would have been a failure right over where ASI is located....."
This, and Uncle Fred's comments, put a further thought in my mind. Does it not follow that, as a matter of prudent planning when ETOPS is relevant, one would require a minimum of two suitable designated diversions? I ask this, because it seems to me that if one is obliged to divert then one has in effect a new destination which itself requires a diversion as a matter of normal planning.
With apologies for troubling busy people further, I would like to read comments on a thought that I've long had -- that the decision to build the 777 with two engines was taken by the actuaries and accountants.
The more engines one has the greater the operating costs. It is now more profitable to an operator, over the serviceable life of a modern jet aircraft, to pay higher premiums on a two-engined aircraft than on a three or four engined aircraft with a similar capacity and performance. This is because the modern jet engine is now so reliable and powerful that the risk of a loss due to the failure of one engine has become so low that it is commercially insurable. A loss due to the failure of more than one engine is so improbable that it is simply not even worth worrying about, so two engines will do.
But I wonder... if this is right, then surely the optimum number of engines, with an eye to ETOPS issues, is thus three?
There is some judicial recognition for the reliability of jet engines. I've lost my notes over the years, but I think I have this case right.......In the prosecution arising out of the incident involving Cessna 560 V-WCIN dealt with by the UK's AAIB (easily found), the pilot was charged with endangering etc etc etc. This, of course, does not appear in the report.
When taking off from Gibraltar one of the two jet engines was damaged but when the commander found that it would deliver reduced power he flew it to his destination (I think it was Bournemouth) for repair. There was defence evidence showing the astronomical number of hours over which identical engines had run faultlessly, and it was claimed that it was thus not an unreasonable risk to continue the flight relying on the remaining sound engine. The defence succeeded.
Still and all, we have the makings of a great disaster movie..... Our hero pilots set off in their 777 from JNB having done all the right planning, and in mid-Atlantic sustain engine failure. They divert to Ascension (making coolly frantic MAYDAY calls), dumping fuel to enable them to execute the difficult landing safely -- note what RobertS975 said (the posting immediately before Uncle Fred's): "......single engine landing at night, VOR/DME approach, no approach lights". But...... ! As they near Ascension someone makes a nasty mess on the runway they are about to use and the runway is closed.......... "Shirley, we have a problem...!"
Oh, I can see it all........
Connetts
On the run at the moment so I will have to tuck into a couple of the your questions in the next few days. You did however, bring out a good point. Even with all the good planning and situational awareness of divert fields, if an ETOPS divert is made and at the last moment the chosen field comes to grief, then it will get very interesting...and that means problematic.
Say for instance that all was well with the Delta flight until such time that they had to shut down one of the engines. For discussion purposes (this real divert might have been very different) say they flew for two hours to Ascension, dumped fuel, and then prepared to land. Whist circling around, say our good friends from the RAF land and have a serious malfunction that closes the runway. Well, it would be too late for the Delta flight to pursue a course to another airport and thus the problematic nature of the planning.
Granted I doubt the tower would have allowed any movement whilst Delta was inbound with an emergency, but I use this only to show the thought that at some point during the divert other options will be closed for good.
ETOPS flights do, and should, require attention to detail as you never know when you are going to need a safe harbor.
The other point that you mentioned is a bit trickier and deserves some good input from those who fly under a lot of different governing authorities.
That point of course is what to do when you have to shut down an engine on a two engine transport. For U.S. air carriers we have to land at the nearest suitable airport in time. Now there is a lot of meat in the word "suitable" that is open to pilot and dispatcher discussion, but the idea is that one must land the airplane as soon as it is safe and reasonable to do so. If one overflies suitable airports there is going to be a tea and biscuit time in the office. This applies to ETOPS flights as well.
3 and 4 engine aircraft have different rules as do flights that are not "airline" (Part 121 in the U.S. for example) operations.
Yes, the ETOPS discussion is an interesting one and often teases out some very subtle points to consider.
On the run at the moment so I will have to tuck into a couple of the your questions in the next few days. You did however, bring out a good point. Even with all the good planning and situational awareness of divert fields, if an ETOPS divert is made and at the last moment the chosen field comes to grief, then it will get very interesting...and that means problematic.
Say for instance that all was well with the Delta flight until such time that they had to shut down one of the engines. For discussion purposes (this real divert might have been very different) say they flew for two hours to Ascension, dumped fuel, and then prepared to land. Whist circling around, say our good friends from the RAF land and have a serious malfunction that closes the runway. Well, it would be too late for the Delta flight to pursue a course to another airport and thus the problematic nature of the planning.
Granted I doubt the tower would have allowed any movement whilst Delta was inbound with an emergency, but I use this only to show the thought that at some point during the divert other options will be closed for good.
ETOPS flights do, and should, require attention to detail as you never know when you are going to need a safe harbor.
The other point that you mentioned is a bit trickier and deserves some good input from those who fly under a lot of different governing authorities.
That point of course is what to do when you have to shut down an engine on a two engine transport. For U.S. air carriers we have to land at the nearest suitable airport in time. Now there is a lot of meat in the word "suitable" that is open to pilot and dispatcher discussion, but the idea is that one must land the airplane as soon as it is safe and reasonable to do so. If one overflies suitable airports there is going to be a tea and biscuit time in the office. This applies to ETOPS flights as well.
3 and 4 engine aircraft have different rules as do flights that are not "airline" (Part 121 in the U.S. for example) operations.
Yes, the ETOPS discussion is an interesting one and often teases out some very subtle points to consider.
Last edited by Uncle Fred; 12th Jan 2013 at 20:24.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Hoerikwaggo
Age: 88
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thank you again, Uncle Fred, for the instructive comments and the courtesy they came with.
On reflection, I think that I have probably been throwing dust in my own eyes by raising the hypothetical "worst case". I think that I displayed enough ignorance to mislead myself and to demonstrate that I have confused myself and misunderstood what little I do know.
The short point is that there are now so many two-engined aircraft flying under ETOPS rules (and the number is increasing), and they have been doing so for so many years, that the incident is scarcely merits the adjective "hypothetical" -- it would already have happened, and it would be common knowledge in your profession. Over time, the longer it hasn't happened has made it less likely that it might; what was planned to be unlikely eventually became wholly improbable, and is now for all practical purposes impossible.
Moreover, there is an absurdity: planning a diversion for a planned diversion leads logically to a regression ad infinitum which can be avoided only by deciding to stay on the ground: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. We have decided any flight such as the one we originally proposed to undertake is too dangerous. This aircraft is in perfect condition but will be dismantled and sent as deck cargo to Atlanta, and at your choice you will be issued with tickets either for the same voyage or for an exciting overland safari....."
Seriously, however, does anyone watching this topic know of a case where a flight was delayed, or re-routed before entering the ETOPS area, because a planned diversion had become unavailable? The mind boggles at how one would explain this over the PA!
On reflection, I think that I have probably been throwing dust in my own eyes by raising the hypothetical "worst case". I think that I displayed enough ignorance to mislead myself and to demonstrate that I have confused myself and misunderstood what little I do know.
The short point is that there are now so many two-engined aircraft flying under ETOPS rules (and the number is increasing), and they have been doing so for so many years, that the incident is scarcely merits the adjective "hypothetical" -- it would already have happened, and it would be common knowledge in your profession. Over time, the longer it hasn't happened has made it less likely that it might; what was planned to be unlikely eventually became wholly improbable, and is now for all practical purposes impossible.
Moreover, there is an absurdity: planning a diversion for a planned diversion leads logically to a regression ad infinitum which can be avoided only by deciding to stay on the ground: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. We have decided any flight such as the one we originally proposed to undertake is too dangerous. This aircraft is in perfect condition but will be dismantled and sent as deck cargo to Atlanta, and at your choice you will be issued with tickets either for the same voyage or for an exciting overland safari....."
Seriously, however, does anyone watching this topic know of a case where a flight was delayed, or re-routed before entering the ETOPS area, because a planned diversion had become unavailable? The mind boggles at how one would explain this over the PA!
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Moreover, there is an absurdity: planning a diversion for a planned diversion leads logically to a regression ad infinitum
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Potomac Heights
Posts: 470
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
say they flew for two hours to Ascension, dumped fuel, and then prepared to land. Whist circling around, say our good friends from the RAF land and have a serious malfunction that closes the runway. Well, it would be too late for the Delta flight to pursue a course to another airport and thus the problematic nature of the planning.
Last edited by SeenItAll; 14th Jan 2013 at 18:19.
Is this reasonable? Under what conditions would a pilot choose to dump so much fuel that reaching an alternate would be impossible? Indeed, this scenario seems to raise the question of whether it is safer for a two-holer with one out ever to choose a dodgy land-ASAP location rather than continuing on on one engine to a far more assured airport.
Well presumably the choice was either dump to get below max landing weight or accept the possible consequences of making a landing above Maximum Landing weight. I'm not sure of the relevance of the two holer comment, seems to me you could get the same problem on a three/four holer if you were dealing with a diversion to a remote/isolated alternate.
Last edited by wiggy; 14th Jan 2013 at 18:50.
Good catch Wiggy. I did not mean to give the impression that the crew just shows up over the station and dumps fuel willy nilly. You aptly brought out the good point that this would be done only if the crew wished to bring the aircraft down to max landing weight. Even that assumes that the aircraft was still over MLW upon arrival at the ETOPS divert staion.
Wiggy also brings out the point that this would be a choice--some emergencies would not allow the luxury of dumping down to MLW. A post flight overweight landing might at that time be the very least of anyone's worries and so a beeline would be made for the approach and landing. Aircraft land just fine overweight.
What I was trying to bring out is the fine balance of communication between crew and dispatcher and the captain's judgement. Taking a course to one diversion field will, of course, close to the door to others.
I also agree with Wiggy that one should not get too drawn into this being solely a "two engine" issue. Diverts have occurred on all types of transports and it is the mindset that goes into this planning and, if need be, executing that is important. A 747-400 with a cargo fire that one suspects did not go out for example would require this type of planning/diversion.
I cannot speak for all ETOPS routes around the world, but yes, for flights over Alaska to Asia from the United States there are sometimes reroutes if one of the ETOPS alternates is not usable. We also see this on the Polar Routes (over the top of the world) but that is usually known ahead of time and allowance and planning is made before the flight even leaves the ground. In other words if Polar 1,2, and 3 are not looking good, it might just be a flight over Alaska and onward--adding a lot of time to the flight.
The North Atlantic planning can be stretched around before one enters the ETOPS area--particularly if one has the has the luxury of using 180 minute ETOPS so that something like Shannon and Goose Bay are all that is needed--with Kef being left out.
Also, for those who do not know--ETOPS is more that 60 minutes from a suitable so just because one is "feet wet" over the water does not mean that one is yet under ETOPS rules. I know the pilots all know this but it is a common misconception for our guests and interested parties. In fact, over the real far North Atlantic the actual time in ETOPS can be relatively short.
Wiggy also brings out the point that this would be a choice--some emergencies would not allow the luxury of dumping down to MLW. A post flight overweight landing might at that time be the very least of anyone's worries and so a beeline would be made for the approach and landing. Aircraft land just fine overweight.
What I was trying to bring out is the fine balance of communication between crew and dispatcher and the captain's judgement. Taking a course to one diversion field will, of course, close to the door to others.
I also agree with Wiggy that one should not get too drawn into this being solely a "two engine" issue. Diverts have occurred on all types of transports and it is the mindset that goes into this planning and, if need be, executing that is important. A 747-400 with a cargo fire that one suspects did not go out for example would require this type of planning/diversion.
I cannot speak for all ETOPS routes around the world, but yes, for flights over Alaska to Asia from the United States there are sometimes reroutes if one of the ETOPS alternates is not usable. We also see this on the Polar Routes (over the top of the world) but that is usually known ahead of time and allowance and planning is made before the flight even leaves the ground. In other words if Polar 1,2, and 3 are not looking good, it might just be a flight over Alaska and onward--adding a lot of time to the flight.
The North Atlantic planning can be stretched around before one enters the ETOPS area--particularly if one has the has the luxury of using 180 minute ETOPS so that something like Shannon and Goose Bay are all that is needed--with Kef being left out.
Also, for those who do not know--ETOPS is more that 60 minutes from a suitable so just because one is "feet wet" over the water does not mean that one is yet under ETOPS rules. I know the pilots all know this but it is a common misconception for our guests and interested parties. In fact, over the real far North Atlantic the actual time in ETOPS can be relatively short.
Last edited by Uncle Fred; 15th Jan 2013 at 04:04.
SeenItAll
Under a very good many (not all by any means) ETOPS diversons if one makes the choice of going to that field, then there are no other options. I will have to do the old string over the map to come up with an accurate example for you but parts of the Pacific see this.
If one loses an engine, has to descend to the single engine optimum or max range altitude (depending on how your company plans this out) and you fly for a three hours to the divert field, it very well might be the only option at that time. Just look at a place like Wake Island.
That is why so much planning is put into this--to ensure the best possible outcome.
Under a very good many (not all by any means) ETOPS diversons if one makes the choice of going to that field, then there are no other options. I will have to do the old string over the map to come up with an accurate example for you but parts of the Pacific see this.
If one loses an engine, has to descend to the single engine optimum or max range altitude (depending on how your company plans this out) and you fly for a three hours to the divert field, it very well might be the only option at that time. Just look at a place like Wake Island.
That is why so much planning is put into this--to ensure the best possible outcome.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Hoerikwaggo
Age: 88
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am watching this discussion with avid interest, and I'm grateful for the "company" of Uncle Fred, Wiggy, and SeenItAll..
It is now clear to me that my musings in #34 are -- not to put too fine a point on it! -- rubbish and reflect the depths of my naivete.
Something, however, that remains unclear to me is what the advantages are of a two-engined transport aircraft over one with three engines (or four, I suppose) of similar performance, when it comes to marketing an aircraft suitable for long oceanic or polar routes over barren terrain.
In the 1990s I was most courteously welcomed into the jump-seat on the flight deck of a British Airways 747 between Beijing and LHR. I had recently started my academic research into the criminal law aspects of safety and seized every opportunity to interview pilots. The 777 was either not yet or just recently in service -- I can't recall now.
I explained to the captain what I was doing and had already published. He was a large, tough-looking, good-natured bloke with hands the size of dinner-plates and as interested in my work as I was in his.
I asked him how he felt about crossing the Atlantic in a two-engined aircraft. His reaction is imprinted clearly on my memory still, for it was abrupt and forceful.
He lost his good humour in a flash, twisted himself around in his seat, jabbed at me with a finger the size of a substantial piece of good boerewors, and snarled, "When they invent a five-engined airplane I want an immediate transfer!"
Would he have been typical of the time, and would he still be?
It is now clear to me that my musings in #34 are -- not to put too fine a point on it! -- rubbish and reflect the depths of my naivete.
Something, however, that remains unclear to me is what the advantages are of a two-engined transport aircraft over one with three engines (or four, I suppose) of similar performance, when it comes to marketing an aircraft suitable for long oceanic or polar routes over barren terrain.
In the 1990s I was most courteously welcomed into the jump-seat on the flight deck of a British Airways 747 between Beijing and LHR. I had recently started my academic research into the criminal law aspects of safety and seized every opportunity to interview pilots. The 777 was either not yet or just recently in service -- I can't recall now.
I explained to the captain what I was doing and had already published. He was a large, tough-looking, good-natured bloke with hands the size of dinner-plates and as interested in my work as I was in his.
I asked him how he felt about crossing the Atlantic in a two-engined aircraft. His reaction is imprinted clearly on my memory still, for it was abrupt and forceful.
He lost his good humour in a flash, twisted himself around in his seat, jabbed at me with a finger the size of a substantial piece of good boerewors, and snarled, "When they invent a five-engined airplane I want an immediate transfer!"
Would he have been typical of the time, and would he still be?