Boeing Postpones 787 First Flight
Good points John, but in this instance it appears that the problem has surfaced during structural testing after reworking the ‘fastener’ problems, i.e. the correction back to the original 'weak' design (pun intended).
Also, it has been reported that the first flight could have proceeded – presumable with more than the usual calculated risk, but in this instance, all test flying has been delayed. Presumably this is because little benefit could be gained from a flight (and risk) vs the grounding the first aircraft to fix it.
This hints at an interesting internal debate – why not fix the second aircraft etc vs getting a first flight (PR); was the first aircraft the only one configured for ‘structural’ / flight envelope testing, etc, etc.
Oh to be the carbon-fibre ‘fly on the wall’.
Also, it has been reported that the first flight could have proceeded – presumable with more than the usual calculated risk, but in this instance, all test flying has been delayed. Presumably this is because little benefit could be gained from a flight (and risk) vs the grounding the first aircraft to fix it.
This hints at an interesting internal debate – why not fix the second aircraft etc vs getting a first flight (PR); was the first aircraft the only one configured for ‘structural’ / flight envelope testing, etc, etc.
Oh to be the carbon-fibre ‘fly on the wall’.
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Oh to be the carbon-fibre ‘fly on the wall’.
The Boeing representative's answer was that of the consumate politician. He didn't answer the question.
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Its all very worrying not just for the future of the dreamliner
but the future of the company.
Surely a 'weakness' like this should have been picked up a long
time ago.If the fault was not predicted in the computer generated
model it makes me wonder if Boeing will find out other problems
a little too late next time.
Meanwhile the long gestation period for the A350 does not sound
so strange now.
MM
but the future of the company.
Surely a 'weakness' like this should have been picked up a long
time ago.If the fault was not predicted in the computer generated
model it makes me wonder if Boeing will find out other problems
a little too late next time.
Meanwhile the long gestation period for the A350 does not sound
so strange now.
MM
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Listening to the Q&A session I was struck at the apparent limited engineering common sense of most of the questioners. They were asking questions that THEY should have known it was not possible to answer simply.
Mind you deliberately asking questions that YOU know they cannot answer potentially makes for good headlines for disemination to the masses who know nothing about aircraft testing and development.
The original problem is that when Boeing (but it could just as well have been Airbus) announced the original programme schedule they did not say something on the lines of
"This programme is very provisional. Given the reality of the work that has to be completed before we can deliver a brand new certificated aircraft this X year programme must be assumed to have a worst case scatter of Y% of X. But then I am sure people in your position are bright enough to realise that anyhow. We shall inform potential customers of our progress in reducing Y to zero but if you leave your orders too late don't be surprised to find you are at the back of a very long queue"
Mind you deliberately asking questions that YOU know they cannot answer potentially makes for good headlines for disemination to the masses who know nothing about aircraft testing and development.
The original problem is that when Boeing (but it could just as well have been Airbus) announced the original programme schedule they did not say something on the lines of
"This programme is very provisional. Given the reality of the work that has to be completed before we can deliver a brand new certificated aircraft this X year programme must be assumed to have a worst case scatter of Y% of X. But then I am sure people in your position are bright enough to realise that anyhow. We shall inform potential customers of our progress in reducing Y to zero but if you leave your orders too late don't be surprised to find you are at the back of a very long queue"
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Michael Birbeck's comments
With respect to my comments Lonely Scientist PM'd me. I post his message to me (with his permission).
I don't endorse his thesis but am rereading it in the context of his book preparatory to responding to him personally.
@Lonely Scientist
Read this guy's take on the respective A380 and 787 programmes. It is an uneven read and I certainly don't agree with all his stuff but it is interesting.
Lonely Scientist
Lonely Scientist
I wish them the best. The 787 is brave step forward and I bet the programme will come to be seen to be ground breaking (not Boeing breaking) in years to come.
I don't endorse his thesis but am rereading it in the context of his book preparatory to responding to him personally.
@Lonely Scientist
I agree that it is still an uneven read - has yet to be edited - and of course I do not expect everyone to agree.
However I am not in total agreement with your further remarks on the 787 and I do not bet - actually I am convinced - that the 787 and the A350 and the (wings of) the A400M will prove to be failures, sooner than later. I challenge ANYBODY to come forward with one single argument that justifies the application of composites in aircraft: In the way they are applied here for externally exposed primary structures. On the other hand there are numerous reasons not to apply composites for these purposes - as have been detailed in my book. Plain composites do not save any weight and have very low damage tolerance - these materials are just not suitable and there is nothing that can be done about that.
My involvement with this is only to save lives - a late wake up call may be, although my first reports are from January 2008; that was, when the first delay with the 787 was just announced.
As you stated in your comment - ‘stress concentrations that were not compatible with their computer model’ - and this is at the root of problems. The computer simulation programs that are in place don’t work. Engineers at Boeing are completely in the dark – may be difficult to believe for you, but true. Mind also that aircraft are dynamically loaded in flight and static testing that has been performed so far provides only an approach. A 150% safety margin is applied, similar to aluminum aircraft, but based on what?
The first six 787 test aircraft - four to fly - are heavily overweight, some 20,000 to 25,000 lbs, and were already patched up. The problem that now surfaced are not the first one. The centre wing box - the foundation of the aircraft - failed at an earlier bending test, actually before the plane was rolled out the first time July 2007. It took some two years to design and test a new wing box but the old planes were left with provisionally strengthened wing boxes. History is repeating itself, when two years later just before second roll problems were detected with static testing with again the centre wing box involved and now also the connection of the wings to the centre wing box has to be provisionally strengthened - but how to do this without reliable models - and than static tests have to be repeated. In the meantime another most worrisome development were the thousands of wrongly placed fasteners that were discovered during the blow test September 2008. No provisional strengthening this time: Boeing decided to replace these fasteners after test flight - which is both stupid and irresponsible, to say at least, given the circumstances.
What is the point of testing a plane for certification that is heavily overweight and is held together by a provisionally strengthened wingbox, a provisionally strengthened connection of the wings to the centre wing box and thousands of wrongly placed fasteners - to mention only a few of the structural problems.
What you see here is a pattern of failures each time when the structure is loaded. And these are still the least of problems. The main concern with composites is their very low damage tolerance. On impact the windows perform far better than the composite skin. Composites provide no protection again lighting strike and you are not going to believe that a couple of hundred pounds of wire mesh inserted in the composite skin are going to provide a Faraday cage as is obtained by some 25,000 pounds of solid aluminum with traditional aircraft. With fire the resin adds fuel to the flames – at the same time the carbon fibres break up producing large amounts of respirable fibrels probably more dangerous that asbestos. To mention only a few of the problems.
As I tried to point out in my book, the future is not to all-composite but to composed aircraft where aluminum reinforced composites, that are already successfully applied with the A380, will play an important role next to plain composites that can be used for parts that are not externally exposed (centre wing box, keel beam and so on) together with monolithic aluminum (aluminum lithium has very poor impact performance) and of course titanium.
However I am not in total agreement with your further remarks on the 787 and I do not bet - actually I am convinced - that the 787 and the A350 and the (wings of) the A400M will prove to be failures, sooner than later. I challenge ANYBODY to come forward with one single argument that justifies the application of composites in aircraft: In the way they are applied here for externally exposed primary structures. On the other hand there are numerous reasons not to apply composites for these purposes - as have been detailed in my book. Plain composites do not save any weight and have very low damage tolerance - these materials are just not suitable and there is nothing that can be done about that.
My involvement with this is only to save lives - a late wake up call may be, although my first reports are from January 2008; that was, when the first delay with the 787 was just announced.
As you stated in your comment - ‘stress concentrations that were not compatible with their computer model’ - and this is at the root of problems. The computer simulation programs that are in place don’t work. Engineers at Boeing are completely in the dark – may be difficult to believe for you, but true. Mind also that aircraft are dynamically loaded in flight and static testing that has been performed so far provides only an approach. A 150% safety margin is applied, similar to aluminum aircraft, but based on what?
The first six 787 test aircraft - four to fly - are heavily overweight, some 20,000 to 25,000 lbs, and were already patched up. The problem that now surfaced are not the first one. The centre wing box - the foundation of the aircraft - failed at an earlier bending test, actually before the plane was rolled out the first time July 2007. It took some two years to design and test a new wing box but the old planes were left with provisionally strengthened wing boxes. History is repeating itself, when two years later just before second roll problems were detected with static testing with again the centre wing box involved and now also the connection of the wings to the centre wing box has to be provisionally strengthened - but how to do this without reliable models - and than static tests have to be repeated. In the meantime another most worrisome development were the thousands of wrongly placed fasteners that were discovered during the blow test September 2008. No provisional strengthening this time: Boeing decided to replace these fasteners after test flight - which is both stupid and irresponsible, to say at least, given the circumstances.
What is the point of testing a plane for certification that is heavily overweight and is held together by a provisionally strengthened wingbox, a provisionally strengthened connection of the wings to the centre wing box and thousands of wrongly placed fasteners - to mention only a few of the structural problems.
What you see here is a pattern of failures each time when the structure is loaded. And these are still the least of problems. The main concern with composites is their very low damage tolerance. On impact the windows perform far better than the composite skin. Composites provide no protection again lighting strike and you are not going to believe that a couple of hundred pounds of wire mesh inserted in the composite skin are going to provide a Faraday cage as is obtained by some 25,000 pounds of solid aluminum with traditional aircraft. With fire the resin adds fuel to the flames – at the same time the carbon fibres break up producing large amounts of respirable fibrels probably more dangerous that asbestos. To mention only a few of the problems.
As I tried to point out in my book, the future is not to all-composite but to composed aircraft where aluminum reinforced composites, that are already successfully applied with the A380, will play an important role next to plain composites that can be used for parts that are not externally exposed (centre wing box, keel beam and so on) together with monolithic aluminum (aluminum lithium has very poor impact performance) and of course titanium.
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Mind you deliberately asking questions that YOU know they cannot answer potentially makes for good headlines for disemination to the masses who know nothing about aircraft testing and development.
In theory these guys should know their stuff.
Their message is for those who are looking at exposure with respect to the financial positions held in Boeing and partners.
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hello.
Statement from "Lonely scientist" that:
The centre wing box - the foundation of the aircraft - failed at an earlier bending test, actually before the plane was rolled out the first time July 2007.
is pure and utter LIE. This guy is not on the stress team, not on the test team otherwise he would be braking the NDA (non-disclosure agreement) by this b/s he is spreading here.
He has the right to his opinion but to know what is really happening is too much. As for his theory on what will happen in due time - let us wait and see. Too many competent engineers were fooled by their knowledge, history shows us.
He is neither the first nor the last.
Cheers
Statement from "Lonely scientist" that:
The centre wing box - the foundation of the aircraft - failed at an earlier bending test, actually before the plane was rolled out the first time July 2007.
is pure and utter LIE. This guy is not on the stress team, not on the test team otherwise he would be braking the NDA (non-disclosure agreement) by this b/s he is spreading here.
He has the right to his opinion but to know what is really happening is too much. As for his theory on what will happen in due time - let us wait and see. Too many competent engineers were fooled by their knowledge, history shows us.
He is neither the first nor the last.
Cheers
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I blame the business schools (and their product), but that is a topic for somewhere else.
On the other hand, whoever said penny pinching has resulted in thinner composites than really required, has never worked in an aircraft design office..
And to XB70 being 600 mph faster than Concorde...
But it never carried or was certificated for 100+ pax
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@glad rag
There was no such test...that Lonely Scientist claims (allegedly) it was in 2007...
In addition: I assume he is heavily experienced in commercial (transport category) composites applications on structures
...with the knowledge of all the loads, flight profiles, loads spectra, specific design solutions, test methods etc.
it is easy to criticize (just look at film critics)...it is hard to work hard and make mistakes from which you learn...so easy to criticize...so easy...
There was no such test...that Lonely Scientist claims (allegedly) it was in 2007...
In addition: I assume he is heavily experienced in commercial (transport category) composites applications on structures
...with the knowledge of all the loads, flight profiles, loads spectra, specific design solutions, test methods etc.it is easy to criticize (just look at film critics)...it is hard to work hard and make mistakes from which you learn...so easy to criticize...so easy...
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What if
Peicing together sound bytes, what if the flight test pilots suggested that they would be delighted to fly the plane if and when the engineering community could explain why the delamination at the bolt-holes (?) on the test specimen would not lead to a more significant failure if they approached the limit of the flight envelope or made a hard landing?
daikilo
Always interesting to read earth shaking news just before a major publicity coup (First Flight).
Stress analysis even in composites is not a black art conducted in dark rooms with sweaty half dressed engineers sitting at their consoles staring at their plasma screen monitors. The Boeing knowledge of this problem must have been known since the first finite element crashed into another over two years ago.
Their choices were obvious, fix it then or fix it later. Fixing it later probably meant that they could still meet the public milestones and visible measure of sucess, but then there are those pesky oversight problems with the test pilots who have to decide what additional risk they are taking, let alone the FAA types who decide that they haven't been satisfied with all the promises for the last three years.
Yes I know just more wild speculation suitable for Jet Blast, but then who does know what is behind all this?
What's Airbus saying about all this, they should really know?
Peicing together sound bytes, what if the flight test pilots suggested that they would be delighted to fly the plane if and when the engineering community could explain why the delamination at the bolt-holes (?) on the test specimen would not lead to a more significant failure if they approached the limit of the flight envelope or made a hard landing?
Stress analysis even in composites is not a black art conducted in dark rooms with sweaty half dressed engineers sitting at their consoles staring at their plasma screen monitors. The Boeing knowledge of this problem must have been known since the first finite element crashed into another over two years ago.
Their choices were obvious, fix it then or fix it later. Fixing it later probably meant that they could still meet the public milestones and visible measure of sucess, but then there are those pesky oversight problems with the test pilots who have to decide what additional risk they are taking, let alone the FAA types who decide that they haven't been satisfied with all the promises for the last three years.
Yes I know just more wild speculation suitable for Jet Blast, but then who does know what is behind all this?
What's Airbus saying about all this, they should really know?
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How on earth can this guy (in Lonely Scientist) say that composites are not working? They work all the time! There might be the fear that they are not maintenance friendly in a commercial environment, we don't know, he doesn't know. As far as I can see it (as an outsider like everyone here) all problems in the Dreamliner's case are not founded in the composite area. Of course, everything on that thing is composite, so it's easy to blame. We all know these scaremongers when new technology is involved. That wasn't different with the first jet, with the first hydraulics, with the first FBW, with the first rocket, with...
btw if this guy compares Boeing's composites with Airbus', I really don't know. Doesn't he know that 787 and 350 are two completly different cups of tea?
Dani
btw if this guy compares Boeing's composites with Airbus', I really don't know. Doesn't he know that 787 and 350 are two completly different cups of tea?
Dani
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well said mr John Farley
I agree with every thing you say but " one past shuttle launch for example" is a bit cutting for our US friends, they'll be line'n up the misslies on you home as we speak. But oh yes funny about all that Boeing said about the A380 and now its flying daily and more and more will be flying soon, Dear Mr Boeing what go's around come around
I agree with every thing you say but " one past shuttle launch for example" is a bit cutting for our US friends, they'll be line'n up the misslies on you home as we speak. But oh yes funny about all that Boeing said about the A380 and now its flying daily and more and more will be flying soon, Dear Mr Boeing what go's around come around
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Bean counters
I guess that the trouble encountered by both Boeing and Airbus on the 787 and the 380 (not to mention the Russians or the Chinese with their RJs that are also late) comes from the fact that bean counters and finance guys have taken over this industry. Every reasonable program manager knows that to develop a widebody a/c in less that 6 to 8 years is pure suicide. But the "finance analysts" that are counselling the shareholders (not ordinary guys like you and me but those big banks and finance outfits that ran into the wall lately) cannot bear that ! What ! Spending money for 6 to 8 years without revenue ? Where is the "creation of value" ??? So program managers bow their heads to the new gospel and propose irrealistic development schedules on 4 to 5 years. And in the end, the program is developed in 6 to 8 years and instead of costing 100, it costs 150, not to mention the bad press it is giving to our industry.
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lomapaseo
Well, it seems to me that you were hidden somewhere to see our little secret
In general, media hype about this mod is still the management failure - not the engineering failure. These types of modifications do happen very often and they are expected. in addition, pressure from the likes of Wall Street (or City, for that matter) is not helpful.
Shareholder value is so important that you end up with financial analysts asking technical questions in Boeing's news conference (like that matters!)
...
To add an answer to Daikilo:
it is up to Flight test pilot to make a final decision depending on Engineering briefing. Go-no go decision depends on his/hers final word and that can be just a "hunch", for that matter (I've already seen that!).
Cheers
Stress analysis even in composites is not a black art conducted in dark rooms with sweaty half dressed engineers sitting at their consoles staring at their plasma screen monitors.
In general, media hype about this mod is still the management failure - not the engineering failure. These types of modifications do happen very often and they are expected. in addition, pressure from the likes of Wall Street (or City, for that matter) is not helpful.
Shareholder value is so important that you end up with financial analysts asking technical questions in Boeing's news conference (like that matters!)
...To add an answer to Daikilo:
it is up to Flight test pilot to make a final decision depending on Engineering briefing. Go-no go decision depends on his/hers final word and that can be just a "hunch", for that matter (I've already seen that!).
Cheers
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The time to certification and then service of an airliner was about the same, sometimes more, way back when (70's)
What would worry me, was if we heard that the engineers were saying that these static load test results were invalidated somehow and based on best structural model design estimates (e.g. finite element analysis etc...) they would go ahead anyway...
Boeing (and others) learnt a helluva lot from the Brits pioneering efforts (e.g. Comet Disaster mistakes and enquiry findings) and subsequently Airbus' experiences as well as having kept a large foot in the military field.
In most respects they have always been if anything, conservative in approach (large less critical wings, more conservative flight control systems, noted for strong durable airframes ), always with the odd exception to the rule of course.
I cannot see them now stepping into the great void of 'not knowing what thoust does' just to get ahead... and am sure many of their major sub-structure contractors are as much risk sharers in all this, financialy as well as legally.
We've also all seen over the last few years in several aviation accidents, how catastrophically & demonstrably winged aluminium tin-cans can fall apart at the seams, either in the air or on the ground. For all we know, these new high composite content structures might well prove to be better in many useful respects than metal ones (Formula 1 cars are just one example). Any weaknesses should be known & mitigated - just as with fatigue in metal structures!
Boeing made the 747 as big a success as it ever could have been. Ditto the 777.
This is pioneering in the spirit of the aviation industry to always move forward... Boeing have surely earnt the right and respect to be allowed to take this on and set their own timeframe without undue or artificial (non commerical) pressures from external critics.
Its up to them to manage their customer and order base, and take whatever risks with that they see fit, but not to risk all by treating project timescales as overarching constraints .. taking a deep breath about now, for a final looksee, after what has been quite a rapid schedule for such a mammoth step forward - yup, they should be allowed that and respected for it. I'd say good luck to them too, but for the fact they are quite capable of making their own luck just by doing things the Boeing way...
What would worry me, was if we heard that the engineers were saying that these static load test results were invalidated somehow and based on best structural model design estimates (e.g. finite element analysis etc...) they would go ahead anyway...
Boeing (and others) learnt a helluva lot from the Brits pioneering efforts (e.g. Comet Disaster mistakes and enquiry findings) and subsequently Airbus' experiences as well as having kept a large foot in the military field.
In most respects they have always been if anything, conservative in approach (large less critical wings, more conservative flight control systems, noted for strong durable airframes ), always with the odd exception to the rule of course.
I cannot see them now stepping into the great void of 'not knowing what thoust does' just to get ahead... and am sure many of their major sub-structure contractors are as much risk sharers in all this, financialy as well as legally.
We've also all seen over the last few years in several aviation accidents, how catastrophically & demonstrably winged aluminium tin-cans can fall apart at the seams, either in the air or on the ground. For all we know, these new high composite content structures might well prove to be better in many useful respects than metal ones (Formula 1 cars are just one example). Any weaknesses should be known & mitigated - just as with fatigue in metal structures!
Boeing made the 747 as big a success as it ever could have been. Ditto the 777.
This is pioneering in the spirit of the aviation industry to always move forward... Boeing have surely earnt the right and respect to be allowed to take this on and set their own timeframe without undue or artificial (non commerical) pressures from external critics.
Its up to them to manage their customer and order base, and take whatever risks with that they see fit, but not to risk all by treating project timescales as overarching constraints .. taking a deep breath about now, for a final looksee, after what has been quite a rapid schedule for such a mammoth step forward - yup, they should be allowed that and respected for it. I'd say good luck to them too, but for the fact they are quite capable of making their own luck just by doing things the Boeing way...
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Which Boeing?
I am rather confused.
Is this the same Boeing that bet the company on the 707, the 727 and the 747? The 747 nearly killed Boeing, but the company survivied through grit and determination.
Is this the same Boeing that has delivered more 737s than Airbus has aircraft?
Is this the same Boeing that developed the now old-school, but still widely used, and in demand, 767 and 757?
Is this the same Boeing that developed the 777, which made the A340 irrelevant?
Is this the same Boeing that can do endless development to an old design, and keep it fresh and competitive way past any reasonable lifespan (I'm thinking 747-400 and 737NG).
It's not as though Boeing has never developed a new type before.
What is going on with the 787?
Are the finance guys really running the show now, and ignoring the engineers?
Is this the same Boeing that bet the company on the 707, the 727 and the 747? The 747 nearly killed Boeing, but the company survivied through grit and determination.
Is this the same Boeing that has delivered more 737s than Airbus has aircraft?
Is this the same Boeing that developed the now old-school, but still widely used, and in demand, 767 and 757?
Is this the same Boeing that developed the 777, which made the A340 irrelevant?
Is this the same Boeing that can do endless development to an old design, and keep it fresh and competitive way past any reasonable lifespan (I'm thinking 747-400 and 737NG).
It's not as though Boeing has never developed a new type before.
What is going on with the 787?
Are the finance guys really running the show now, and ignoring the engineers?
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This 787 dreamliner has already made an unsuccesful name for itself, And it isn't even in service yet!!
Sorry, But I will stick with the 757 for another 15 years or so!!
I don't understand what all the excitement is about - Frankly!!
Sorry, But I will stick with the 757 for another 15 years or so!!
I don't understand what all the excitement is about - Frankly!!
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BYAlpha, HarryMann, et al
That appears to be the problem.
And it's been commented upon elsewhere in many different contexts, its the amazing ability of media, whether it be online, print, TV or whatever, to ratchet up interest/scares, & essentially a shallower understanding of complicated processes & their resolutions.
We are ( hopefully not ) looking at a paradigm shift - not in engineering, or Aviation, or the approaches to advances in these, but how much effect/power this mass media is apparently having upon business decisions, whether they be for Boeing ( I very much look forward to the day I take a sched flt on the 787 ), or witness the current attempt of the witless to make some sort of scare about the (possibly) safest airliner flying
That appears to be the problem.
And it's been commented upon elsewhere in many different contexts, its the amazing ability of media, whether it be online, print, TV or whatever, to ratchet up interest/scares, & essentially a shallower understanding of complicated processes & their resolutions.
We are ( hopefully not ) looking at a paradigm shift - not in engineering, or Aviation, or the approaches to advances in these, but how much effect/power this mass media is apparently having upon business decisions, whether they be for Boeing ( I very much look forward to the day I take a sched flt on the 787 ), or witness the current attempt of the witless to make some sort of scare about the (possibly) safest airliner flying