747-200 cockpit checklist and takeoff proceedures?

[swr_e007]

Hi,

I'm interesting in the cockpit checklist and takeoff proceedures for this aircraft.

The reason why I'm asking is because I'm trying to understand the Dutch comments made after the release of the accident report into the Tenerife disaster in 1977.

I can imagine groans of 'Oh no, not Tenerife again...'

I don't want to start a thread to drag up all the usual...I'd be happy to just stick to 747-200 cockpit checklists, please.

As we all probably know, the Dutch Captain opened the throttles slightly before receiving take off clearance. This is usually interpreted as an attempt to take off.

In the Dutch comments to the report, released in 1979, it says:

"When the cockpit checklist had been completed the Captain, keeping the aircraft on the brakes, applied standard engine power i.e: 1.1EPR, this value being slightly higher than idle power. This is done to check the so called spin up of the engines prior to take off; it is normal practice and does not imply an indication of haste."

If there is anyone here with experience of 747-200s, I just like to know if that is indeed standard proceedure, or could it have been with KLM in 1977?

If anyone can point me to *real* 747 checklists and proceedures that would be great, too.

I've googled, but can only ever find ones written for flight simulators, not the genuine article.


Thanks

[Kempus]

Hi,

Dont fly the 747-4 myself but throttles are usually advanced to around
40% N2 (1.1EPR) to ensure stabilized egt and correct indications ie, N1 less than N2, normal oil pressure and temp but again this may be different for the 747 as I dont fly that type.

As for checklists I've had a search but most as you said are for flight sims or the 400 although they will be close enough to give you an idea!

http://www.curbe.com/QVA/qva/747check.pdf

Bear in mind tho that most operators will have thier own checklists based on Boeing recomendations so getting one exactly the same may be very difficult as accidents or incidents like the one mentioned can change checklists.

hope this helps,

Kemps

[I Love Midex]

Though it wasn't actually written as a checklist item at my company, the SOP as taught in the simulator was to "stand up" the throttles at the start of the takeoff roll (which generally equated to something near 1.1 EPR or 80-85% N1, depending on Pratt or GE engines), check the parameters of the engines, and then call for reduced or takeoff thrust from the F/E.

[Intruder]

We "stand up" the throttles to 70% N1 (GE engines) AFTER we're cleared for takeoff. The only time the power is advanced when holding in position BEFORE takeoff clearance is received is when using nacelle anti-icing. Then, the required 30 seconds at 60% N1 can be done prior to takeoff clearance; back to idle if still no clearance, or to 70% if clearance is received in the interim.

[betpump5]

Then, the required 30 seconds at 60% N1 can be done prior to takeoff clearance;

Providing the holding point is some way back (depending on airports) and other traffic and timing is all correct with a long enough runway, then you can begin the take off run whilst turning at 60% of N1 - which I love doing!

[virgo]

The whole point of "standing the thrust levers up" (to about 1.100 EPR) is to confirm that ALL engines have accelerated OK beyond ground idle and will therefore probably all accelerate to Take-off power.
In the old days - particularly with the JT 9-3 engines - it was quite common for an engine to "stall" on initial acceleration. If this wasn't recognised - especially if it was an outboard engine - and the other three were opened up to take-off power, the very large asymmetric thrust would spin the aircraft through as much as 180 degrees and certainly put you onto the grass travelling fairly fast before it was brought under control. (Because of the lack of airspeed the rudder was no good and the nose-wheel would simply slide across the ground)

At times this unexpected event was quite dangerous if other aircraft were around and at best extremely embarrassing for the crew/airline - observers seeing a 747 haring across the airfield or facing the wrong way at the end of the runway were never reluctant to make some witty comments !

[SNS3Guppy]

We only have a 15 second rule for the nacelle anti-ice when in use, at 45% N1. Our standard practice, and it's not going to be found on the checklist, is 1.1 EPR prior to advancing the power. Ordinarily after setting 1.1 EPR and allowing engines to stabilize, the levers will be turned over to the FE to set takeoff power with the call "Set Maximum Thrust," or "Set Reduced Thrust."

In our operation, if the F/O performs the takeoff, he places both hands on the control yoke when calling for the FE to set thrust. If the captain is performing the takeoff, he keeps his hand on the thrust lever and follows them up to takeoff power, until "V1 is called, then places both hands on the yoke. The FE continues to monitor power and tweak it as necessary.

[SMOC]

it is normal practice and does not imply an indication of haste."

If there is anyone here with experience of 747-200s, I just like to know if that is indeed standard proceedure, or could it have been with KLM in 1977?

As said, the setting of 1.1 EPR amongst checking stable parameters is to ensure the engines accelerate evenly to the required thrust for take-off thrust.

This was particularly important with engines on the classic without FADEC or EECs, however I do believe he was setting thrust for take-off.

When the 400 came out in 89 with FADEC/EEC engines the procedure to set 1.1 was not required however it was quickly noticed that pushing the TOGA buttons from idle was a bad idea, the engines still accelerate slowly to approx 1.1 but then exponentially fast to TO thrust, crews who flew the 400 in '89 with CX (first type without a professional F/E) said you would do a rolling TO push the TOGA buttons the the thrust levers would move to the TO position but as you were in a turn lining up, the engines into wind would get to 1.1 first and the other two in the shadow of the fuselage would be slow to 1.1 so the into wind engines would be at take of thrust well before the other two, often requiring intervention, so it wasn't long before the the 1.1 was back prior to pushing the TOGAs.

Other carriers with FADEC/EEC aircraft may have learnt the lesson earlier.

[swr_e007]

Firstly, thanks very much for the replies, they were very useful and interesting.

So, it seems that setting 1.1EPR could well be part of the normal proceedure, particularly with JT 9-3 engines.

My next question would be at what point in the checklist would it occur?

Will this always be AFTER take-off clearance has been issued in every case (other than the exception given by Intruder of nacelle anti-icing)?

Is it possible that a 1977 KLM checklist could include (or permit) "standing the thrust levers up" at some point prior to take off clearance being issued?

Finally, after making this 'spin-up' check, could the thrust then be reduced to idle again? Or does that defeat the object?
Would the Captain or FE normally go straight from 1.1 EPR to whatever is required for take-off? The reason why I ask, obviously, is that in the Tenerife case the thrust levers were closed (according to the ALPA report) after the first officer's comment 'Wait a minute...'.

Thanks.

[SMOC]

For a run up during icing conditions you could reduce the thrust again, but the 1.1 prior to setting thrust is to ensure the thrust advances evenly to take-off thrust otherwise control could become an issue.

When I was on the classic with Rollers the procedure was to set 1.1 EPR check stable then advance to 1.4 and allow the F/E to set the final take-off thrust, with GE engines it was to set 60% N1 then to 10% short of take-off thrust and let the F/E set it. Now on the 400 with RR and P&W set 1.1 check stable push TOGA.

All of these done after being cleared for take-off, if doing a run up for icing we would just notify ATC that there would be a slight delay for a run up required so they could account for it before issuing a take-off clearance. Once the run up is complete we would continue to advance the thrust for take-off.

[SNS3Guppy]

My next question would be at what point in the checklist would it occur?

It doesn't occur on the checklist. When the before takeoff checklist, or line up checklist (depending on what the company is using) is complete and the takeoff is initiated, power is increased to a stable value at 1.1 EPR. This is part of the power increase for takeoff, though one might spool the engines up initially for several reasons...among them for the purpose of clearing ice.

Our checklist has a before takeoff procedure which is divided by a line. The checklist is completed as we taxi onto the runway, and stopped at the dashed line. When lined up with the runway, the checklist is completed below the line, with the final three items...body gear steering disarmed, flaps and runway verified, and warning lights checked.

After that, our volume 1 manual includes the takeoff procedure, covering standing the power up at 1.1 EPR to verify stable operation...but it's not part of a checklist. It's technique.

[Intruder]

Is it possible that a 1977 KLM checklist could include (or permit) "standing the thrust levers up" at some point prior to take off clearance being issued?

You'd have to find a 1977 KLM checklist, not to mention their Flight Handbook that has the detailed procedures that go along with the checklist.

Why does it matter today? That was 32 years ago!

[virgo]

SWR, there is a very distinct difference between a "check list" and a "procedure".

A "Procedure" is a series of actions which must be performed to get the aircraft to do want you want it to do............for example, start the engines, accomplish anti-icing precautions, prepare for an Instrument Landing System guidance..............the list goes on and on. Practically EVERYTHING that is done on a modern aircraft flight-deck is governed by a procedure that is written down somewhere (Usually in the Flight Operations Manual)! SOME of the ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL actions MAY be extracted and entered onto a "Checklist" , for example a check on the landing-gear being "down and locked " is on the landing checklist but lots of other things may not be - like ensuring you've got the correct runway in sight or that you have correctly briefed for an overshoot (go-around).
There have been big changes over the last two or three decades in check-list philosophy, one being to go into print more and more regarding PROCEDURES leaving very little to the Captain's (Crew's) discretion and the other is to shorten and abbreviate CHECKLISTS on the assumption that the correct procedures have been properly accomplished.

The debate goes on !

[point8six]

"Standing the thrust levers up" before receiving Take-off clearance from ATC is not an indication of the crew's impatience to get under way.In Chicago (ORD) with it's intersecting runways, we were sometimes asked to come-up on the power by ATC to ensure a prompt start of the take-off roll when so cleared, thereby minimising the runway occupancy, especially with landing traffic close in. The RR RB211-D4 was quite notorious at spooling up at differing rates, producing quite a swing at very low speeds.
I haven't read the Tenerife report for many years, but we all learnt a great deal from the accident, especially CRM and low-visibilty operations.
Are you trying to open a cold-case for some reason?

[GK430]

[swr_e007]

Again,

Thanks very much for the replies.

Yes, I believe I understand the difference between a technique and a checklist. What I was getting at, in my badly expressed way perhaps, was whether the standing up of the thrust levers could be credibly interpreted, as a technique if you like, to achieve something in the checklist prior to take off clearance being issued? That is what the Dutch comments on the report claimed and from the answers I have recieved it seems it could be a reasonable claim.

The point being that many people interpret the opening up of the thrust leavers of solid evidence of an attempt at take-off without clearance.

I have been asked what does it matter after 32 years and do I want to open up a cold case?

Well, I know the discussing the Tenerife disaster does antagonise some people which is why in my initial question I suggested keeping the thread to take off proceedures.

However, sinced I have been asked the question directly, here are my reasons for asking:

Far from being cold - on a Youtube thread at this very moment someone may well be typing 'Van Zanten burn in hell' or some such carefully considered, balanced opinion . The NOVA documentary 'Crash of the Century' has been on youtube for a while, now, over a year or more. I personally dislike this video intensly as it sensationalises the death of nearly 600 people and turns Captain Van Zanten into a sort of a James Bond film bad guy: An arrogant disfunctional ego maniac with serious anger management issues. It conveiniently leaves out the radio heterodyne and the ATC errors. But, the 'Crash Of The Century' airs on network television worldwide very regularly, it has been seen by many millions of people.

Alas, the story has passed from reality into myth with the re-telling and the truth is being left behind, not that we neccesarily knew the whole story to begin with. It is becoming like another 'Mutiny on the Bounty' where everyone thinks they know exactly what happened when any research into the tale quickly shows the popular version of events to be total nonesense.

So, I am attempting to revisit and understand the crash from the original reports and transcripts without the 'assistance' of the efforts of certain film makers. There are many things I do not understand, not being an airline pilot, hence my reason for asking for help here - and I am grateful for the assistance.

I am happy to talk about the disaster, but these discussions predictably end up with two camps, one saying 'It was the classic Swiss cheese model, all the little failures had to line up' and the others saying 'No, it was 100% the Dutch Captain - if he hadn't ignored...". Well, you know how it is...
There is no new information available and probably never will be, so such discussions tell you mostly about the personality of the contributers (judgemental or empathetic, maybe?) and not much about the crash.

However, that doesn't mean a simple reading of the final report will give you all the answers, either. When Paul Roitch of the ALPA team wrote his report, he complained in two seperate places about how access to information was restricted to him and he described his report as 'a possible hypothesis'. I believe there is still much food for thought for those who are interested.

[SNS3Guppy]

The point being that many people interpret the opening up of the thrust leavers of solid evidence of an attempt at take-off without clearance.

In aviation, we deal in facts, not assumption. We do not guess at takeoff performance, fuel requirements, route to be flown, or landing distances. We need not guess at the intent of those who stood up the power levers, either. When we do not know, we do not guess. Assumption is an error.