The EASY button
Thread Starter
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 547
Likes: 1
From: the City by the Bay
The EASY button
You have perhaps seen the Staples commercial about the EASY button being used to make things easy and work out. Do you suppose we could have a similar "EASY" button or feature for transport aircraft in future?
Far as I know , pilots used to manually fly planes to cruise, then mainly monitor instruments until time for the approach and then hand fly the approach and landing. Nowadays , many planes are able to auto-land and thus are capable of taking over many functions that were in the past manually controlled.
However, we have had several notable crashes involving a loss of situational awareness between pilots and machine where pilots were not fully aware, at critical times what their machines will do or are doing.
There are many such examples with different causal factors but pointing to a man/machine interface problem. For example, but not limited, to China Airlines' incident in Nagoya where the co-pilot unknowingly put the plane on Go Around, TAM and Transasia landing incidents involving the non-retardation of T/L number two resulting in the planes full stopping ability not being realized, Turkish landing incident where a faulty RA led to the planes thrust being retarded at the wrong moment, etc.
I understand some advanced Russian fighter aircraft have a 'fail safe feature' where in very high G turns ,where the pilot could become unconscious, the plane is able to return to level flight on its own. Thus preserving the aircraft until the pilot is able to regain control.
Would it be possible to design into transport aircraft this ability? Where say, during the approach phase, if the aircraft is not being manually flown, the computers will recognize any abnormality between vital systems and automatically abandon the approach while announcing in no uncertain terms what is occuring. It could flash a Master Warning of some sort and return to level flight while announcing what system had failed or encountered an abnormality. I'm thinking about the recent Turkish airlines incident in Amsterdam where one RA apparently failed , ultimately leading to an untimely end to the aircraft and many peoples lives. Perhaps the pilots should not have been caught out by the issue at hand but being human we are capable of making even very simple mistakes leading to major consequences. IF the plane were able to buy time by returning to a safe mode of level flight while announcing the problems, this could give the crew a chance to re-assess the situation and return for a safe landing.
Obviously not an easy task to design as any solution to any one problem could involve many potential other problems and issues. But could this basic concept work? Automation isn't going away. Pilots are using many automated features during the approach, mostly in a safe manner and over-all the level of safety has increased. But it is troubling that having some systems on auto while the pilots are manually controlling other features have led to major incidents where life has been lost. Is it a good idea for a master over-ride capability by the machine where a serious anomaly between its systems would trigger an "auto-save" if you will, feature of the aircraft to return to safe and level flight. Giving its pilots information what has failed and the chance to rectify the situation and return to a safe landing after regaining control. Of course this feature would probably need the ability to be over-ridden if triggered because it may not be good to return to the skies at that very moment and a landing would be considered safe, etc.
Adding to this auto ability perhaps some sort of EASY button where if a system anomaly is encountered the pilots could push this "master re-set" button if you will to re-set all vital systems to safe and level cruise and then retake control as appropriate.
Totally unworkable you say? Hare-brained concepts? Too HAL like? Too many variables to implement? Or perhaps worth at least further study?
What say you?
Far as I know , pilots used to manually fly planes to cruise, then mainly monitor instruments until time for the approach and then hand fly the approach and landing. Nowadays , many planes are able to auto-land and thus are capable of taking over many functions that were in the past manually controlled.
However, we have had several notable crashes involving a loss of situational awareness between pilots and machine where pilots were not fully aware, at critical times what their machines will do or are doing.
There are many such examples with different causal factors but pointing to a man/machine interface problem. For example, but not limited, to China Airlines' incident in Nagoya where the co-pilot unknowingly put the plane on Go Around, TAM and Transasia landing incidents involving the non-retardation of T/L number two resulting in the planes full stopping ability not being realized, Turkish landing incident where a faulty RA led to the planes thrust being retarded at the wrong moment, etc.
I understand some advanced Russian fighter aircraft have a 'fail safe feature' where in very high G turns ,where the pilot could become unconscious, the plane is able to return to level flight on its own. Thus preserving the aircraft until the pilot is able to regain control.
Would it be possible to design into transport aircraft this ability? Where say, during the approach phase, if the aircraft is not being manually flown, the computers will recognize any abnormality between vital systems and automatically abandon the approach while announcing in no uncertain terms what is occuring. It could flash a Master Warning of some sort and return to level flight while announcing what system had failed or encountered an abnormality. I'm thinking about the recent Turkish airlines incident in Amsterdam where one RA apparently failed , ultimately leading to an untimely end to the aircraft and many peoples lives. Perhaps the pilots should not have been caught out by the issue at hand but being human we are capable of making even very simple mistakes leading to major consequences. IF the plane were able to buy time by returning to a safe mode of level flight while announcing the problems, this could give the crew a chance to re-assess the situation and return for a safe landing.
Obviously not an easy task to design as any solution to any one problem could involve many potential other problems and issues. But could this basic concept work? Automation isn't going away. Pilots are using many automated features during the approach, mostly in a safe manner and over-all the level of safety has increased. But it is troubling that having some systems on auto while the pilots are manually controlling other features have led to major incidents where life has been lost. Is it a good idea for a master over-ride capability by the machine where a serious anomaly between its systems would trigger an "auto-save" if you will, feature of the aircraft to return to safe and level flight. Giving its pilots information what has failed and the chance to rectify the situation and return to a safe landing after regaining control. Of course this feature would probably need the ability to be over-ridden if triggered because it may not be good to return to the skies at that very moment and a landing would be considered safe, etc.
Adding to this auto ability perhaps some sort of EASY button where if a system anomaly is encountered the pilots could push this "master re-set" button if you will to re-set all vital systems to safe and level cruise and then retake control as appropriate.
Totally unworkable you say? Hare-brained concepts? Too HAL like? Too many variables to implement? Or perhaps worth at least further study?
What say you?
Joined: Apr 2006
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
From: Europe
a master over-ride capability by the machine where a serious anomaly between its systems would trigger an "auto-save" if you will, feature of the aircraft to return to safe and level flight
I think it goes in the same category as pilotless a/c. Great in theory, not so great in practice due to the number of non-normal situations that could occur that the cimputer would not be able to deal with.
the lunatic fringe
Joined: May 2001
Posts: 621
Likes: 5
From: Everywhere
What happens if the "a master over-ride capability" stops working? Do you then have a master master over-ride? And if that master over-ride had an error and tried to crash you into the middle of a large city. Would you have a master master master over-ride button for that ...?
The easy button. ! Lets hope the easy button can cope with a double hydraulic failure on a dark night in the pouring rain. And lets hope the easy button does not malfunction and do heavens knows what. Do you have a master over-ride button for an easy button malfunction?
Maybe a properly trained professional pilot would be safer?
The easy button. ! Lets hope the easy button can cope with a double hydraulic failure on a dark night in the pouring rain. And lets hope the easy button does not malfunction and do heavens knows what. Do you have a master over-ride button for an easy button malfunction?
Maybe a properly trained professional pilot would be safer?
Thread Starter
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 547
Likes: 1
From: the City by the Bay
You guys bought the HARD button
Looks like you guys bought the HARD button by mistake? Just kidding. FAct is automation has taken over many of the functions that used to be manual, flying wise. You use it everyday. There are designed parameters how your plane will respond when in such and such a mode, etc. There just has been some issues where pilots have not realized what mode they were in or at least some of the fine details while in that mode or in other ways were not in tune with the machine. Better training certainly is required. Better management of the machine certainly is. Better all around flying skills and recurrent training certainly is. But there still are the ones that got away. The machine can not replace the pilots in all scenarios and shouldnt be expected to or made to do so. But the machine can be made better at interacting with the pilots and supporting the pilots.
I believe it is possible to design computers on aircraft to recognize when there is a disparity in values read by redundant sensors. I am simply saying that pilots need a better way to know when there is an anomaly and in a very timely fashion. Especially one that is going to greatly affect major systems on the aircraft, or how the aircraft is going to respond.
Taking the Turkish crash. One RA mis-reporting actual height caused the engines to go to idle for a few crucial seconds because the plane was on A/T. The pilots should have been monitoring the T/L but werent apparently vigilant enough to have their hands on them for a few crucial seconds. What if their aircraft had an auto fly safe when such an anomaly is detected and is programmed to trim and power up and achieve level flight while announcing its intentions. The pilots could then inform tower of intent to go around and could take control of the aircraft while the aircraft could also announce the fault that it has detected. The aircraft announces its intention to go around, the pilots still have master over-ride at this point or at any point if they so choose. They can be made aware of the fault at hand and take corrective action. It would be better to be out of a crucially time sensitive phase of flight when there is an unknown anomaly present and into another phase where a game plan could be thought out and acted upon accordingly. If the plane was on course and at proper trim,speed etc for the approach the pilots could over-ride the plane's announced intent to abandon the approach and regain level flight and proceed with the landing.
IN other words, the Turkish 737 coming in on approach. Autothrust on. One RA reporting false info. The two RA dont have the same values. What if at this stage the plane sounds a master caution and powers up for go around , trims itself ,etc while announcing RA discrepancy. The pilots could then be made aware an unusual situation has developed and could then make themselves situationally aware and take over the aircraft at the appropriate time of their choosing. IN the meantime the aircraft has started to regain level flight. It will not be at stalling speed or be improperly trimmed.
If you are landing fully manually, this master system over-ride will be OFF. And if you are on cruise and a major system fault is detected the plane is already "defaulted" to safe and level flight anyway so no changes will be made, except that the fault will be announced for attention by crew.
In the Ci crash at Nagoya the copilot inadvertently and unknowingly caused the autopilot to go into GO AROUND mode. Neither pilots were aware the plane was in this mode for a few crucial moments. The plane trimmed itself to ascend while the copilot pushed the stick down. When the captain went to manual control the plane was completely out of trim (unknown to them) and led to a full stall and crash. The men were not in tune with the machine. What if that plane had announced that Go Around was activated and the pilots knew that in a timely fashion. They could then deselect that mode and re engage the machine to landing mode or take over full manual control.
I believe all planes should have full manual control at all times allowed to its pilots. Computers can be replaced, but not people. Pilots should have full manual control available at all times. The autopilot and other auto modes are there to ASSIST but in no way should they not be able to be over-ridden.
I , as SLF, certainly want to trust the piots that fly me around. I want them to have full manual control of the aircraft available in all phases of flight because I simply trust them more. I want them to have tools that are simple and work well in assisting them to fly and land safely. I want the planes automated features to be easily and well understood by the pilots that manage them and use them.
Planes are safer when their pilots know exactly what is going on with their systems at all times and are in tune with them. We cant have the machine working against the man.
I believe it is possible to design computers on aircraft to recognize when there is a disparity in values read by redundant sensors. I am simply saying that pilots need a better way to know when there is an anomaly and in a very timely fashion. Especially one that is going to greatly affect major systems on the aircraft, or how the aircraft is going to respond.
Taking the Turkish crash. One RA mis-reporting actual height caused the engines to go to idle for a few crucial seconds because the plane was on A/T. The pilots should have been monitoring the T/L but werent apparently vigilant enough to have their hands on them for a few crucial seconds. What if their aircraft had an auto fly safe when such an anomaly is detected and is programmed to trim and power up and achieve level flight while announcing its intentions. The pilots could then inform tower of intent to go around and could take control of the aircraft while the aircraft could also announce the fault that it has detected. The aircraft announces its intention to go around, the pilots still have master over-ride at this point or at any point if they so choose. They can be made aware of the fault at hand and take corrective action. It would be better to be out of a crucially time sensitive phase of flight when there is an unknown anomaly present and into another phase where a game plan could be thought out and acted upon accordingly. If the plane was on course and at proper trim,speed etc for the approach the pilots could over-ride the plane's announced intent to abandon the approach and regain level flight and proceed with the landing.
IN other words, the Turkish 737 coming in on approach. Autothrust on. One RA reporting false info. The two RA dont have the same values. What if at this stage the plane sounds a master caution and powers up for go around , trims itself ,etc while announcing RA discrepancy. The pilots could then be made aware an unusual situation has developed and could then make themselves situationally aware and take over the aircraft at the appropriate time of their choosing. IN the meantime the aircraft has started to regain level flight. It will not be at stalling speed or be improperly trimmed.
If you are landing fully manually, this master system over-ride will be OFF. And if you are on cruise and a major system fault is detected the plane is already "defaulted" to safe and level flight anyway so no changes will be made, except that the fault will be announced for attention by crew.
In the Ci crash at Nagoya the copilot inadvertently and unknowingly caused the autopilot to go into GO AROUND mode. Neither pilots were aware the plane was in this mode for a few crucial moments. The plane trimmed itself to ascend while the copilot pushed the stick down. When the captain went to manual control the plane was completely out of trim (unknown to them) and led to a full stall and crash. The men were not in tune with the machine. What if that plane had announced that Go Around was activated and the pilots knew that in a timely fashion. They could then deselect that mode and re engage the machine to landing mode or take over full manual control.
I believe all planes should have full manual control at all times allowed to its pilots. Computers can be replaced, but not people. Pilots should have full manual control available at all times. The autopilot and other auto modes are there to ASSIST but in no way should they not be able to be over-ridden.
I , as SLF, certainly want to trust the piots that fly me around. I want them to have full manual control of the aircraft available in all phases of flight because I simply trust them more. I want them to have tools that are simple and work well in assisting them to fly and land safely. I want the planes automated features to be easily and well understood by the pilots that manage them and use them.
Planes are safer when their pilots know exactly what is going on with their systems at all times and are in tune with them. We cant have the machine working against the man.
Joined: Apr 2006
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
From: Europe
Many of the points you've discussed I believe exist in some form in an airbus, they have some sort of alpha floor with autothrust protection that puts the aircraft into a climb with full GA thrust when the speed is too low, although you'll have to ask someone else for the details as I don't fly them. I also heard that this led to an airbus climbing upwards through one of the Heathrow holds as the pilots couldn't get it out of this mode, although again, I don’t know any specific details and it may have been just a rumour.
It’s my opinion that when the a/c starts doing things on its own (and it doesn't need to 'announce' it, it should be obvious by the Flight Mode Annunciations) there is a chance it will confuse the pilots. I'd rather it didn't do anything and let one of us handle it than start doing things that it thinks is right but may not be.
VNAV (in the 738) can do things like this from time to time, descending at idle thrust when you've got 30nm to descend 3000'... or trying to reduce the speed back to min clean 50nm from the airfield at FL150. At these times you put it in another mode as required to get the job done. I don’t want to be fiddling on with the autopilot at 500' if it suddenly decides, incorrectly, to start levelling out. This de-stabilises the approach, probably leading to an unnecessary go-around, as even if you disconnect straight away the a/c will probably be off the glide slope with too much thrust set for the approach.
I don't know anything about "the Ci crash at Nagoya", can you provide me with the flight number so I can read about it. But you will be able to hear the a/c trimming itself in a 737, if it goes on for too long I'd start to wonder what its doing and try and find out if it’s doing something I don’t want it to do. If you've got into a full nose up trim situation, you've not been paying enough attention to what was going on.
It’s my opinion that when the a/c starts doing things on its own (and it doesn't need to 'announce' it, it should be obvious by the Flight Mode Annunciations) there is a chance it will confuse the pilots. I'd rather it didn't do anything and let one of us handle it than start doing things that it thinks is right but may not be.
VNAV (in the 738) can do things like this from time to time, descending at idle thrust when you've got 30nm to descend 3000'... or trying to reduce the speed back to min clean 50nm from the airfield at FL150. At these times you put it in another mode as required to get the job done. I don’t want to be fiddling on with the autopilot at 500' if it suddenly decides, incorrectly, to start levelling out. This de-stabilises the approach, probably leading to an unnecessary go-around, as even if you disconnect straight away the a/c will probably be off the glide slope with too much thrust set for the approach.
I don't know anything about "the Ci crash at Nagoya", can you provide me with the flight number so I can read about it. But you will be able to hear the a/c trimming itself in a 737, if it goes on for too long I'd start to wonder what its doing and try and find out if it’s doing something I don’t want it to do. If you've got into a full nose up trim situation, you've not been paying enough attention to what was going on.
Thread Starter
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 547
Likes: 1
From: the City by the Bay
Automation is here to stay, the only question is better management of it and relating to it at all times from the pilots point of view. If you are not on full manual your aircraft is operating under prescribed guidelines as dictated by its software and the control settings. And of course when something is faulty a situation develops that requires correct handling. Yes Airbus believes in Envelope Protection to keep pilots from doing silly things. The question is whether the pilots are taken out of the loop through insufficient knowledge of the aircrafts automated "intentions", or temporary human thinking incapacity while in tunnel vision mode when occupied with another issue at hand. I was with a good friend in his car and coming fast upon stopped traffic ahead on the freeway . His eyes were looking forward and yet he did not decrease his speed until I shouted STOP STOP STOP. And that awoke him from his stupor. He should've seen the cars stopped ahead but did not because his mind was focused on something else. We are humans, we do things like that once in a blue moon. And that is worrying. Thats why we have automation to help us. The only question is how much, when and how it should work, not whether automation is needed.
Yes an aircraft with "a mind of its own" may not be a good thing. And a sudden programmed mandate to climb while you are at 500 feet on final would necessitate a go around because the sudden power and trim movement,etc would take you out of your glide slope or at the very least unstablize your approach as you said.
Many crashes of recent years have underlined improper handling of aircraft at critical phases of flight due to lack of situational awareness as to what the aircraft was doing, its flight management systems and software, or simply being human beings and making a mistake.
What should pilots do? Practice and fly a lot of manual approaches as a matter of routine (practice makes perfect) and practice better skills at the monitoring of auto systems . Or reconfigure what the aircraft will do in a given situation and modify the parameters. Should pilots regain the ability to manually fly approaches and would it be safer over-all to manually fly approaches? Or is better system monitoring and response the way to go?
At any rate, seems a relook is necessary at the automated response from aircraft in any given stage of flight. And also what should happen when a major system anomaly occures , as it no doubt will. We don't want a flight to turn to fright of course.
some links to the Ci Nagoya incident:
Nagoya A300 Accident Report
The Nagoya A300-600 crash
CAL told to pay 5 billion yen for crash | The Japan Times Online
Yes an aircraft with "a mind of its own" may not be a good thing. And a sudden programmed mandate to climb while you are at 500 feet on final would necessitate a go around because the sudden power and trim movement,etc would take you out of your glide slope or at the very least unstablize your approach as you said.
Many crashes of recent years have underlined improper handling of aircraft at critical phases of flight due to lack of situational awareness as to what the aircraft was doing, its flight management systems and software, or simply being human beings and making a mistake.
What should pilots do? Practice and fly a lot of manual approaches as a matter of routine (practice makes perfect) and practice better skills at the monitoring of auto systems . Or reconfigure what the aircraft will do in a given situation and modify the parameters. Should pilots regain the ability to manually fly approaches and would it be safer over-all to manually fly approaches? Or is better system monitoring and response the way to go?
At any rate, seems a relook is necessary at the automated response from aircraft in any given stage of flight. And also what should happen when a major system anomaly occures , as it no doubt will. We don't want a flight to turn to fright of course.
some links to the Ci Nagoya incident:
Nagoya A300 Accident Report
The Nagoya A300-600 crash
CAL told to pay 5 billion yen for crash | The Japan Times Online
Last edited by armchairpilot94116; 19th March 2009 at 21:34.
Joined: Apr 2006
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
From: Europe
It's my opinions that automation to geal with automation failure is a dodgy area, also the a/c making judgements on my approach is fine, it already shouts 'monitor vertical speed'/'glideslope' etc, but to have it decide that what we're doing is unsafe and then take control from me and start doing its own thing just baffels me. Is that not why we have two pilots?
I don't think we'll ever agree on this so I'm gonna stop posting now.
I don't think we'll ever agree on this so I'm gonna stop posting now.
Thread Starter
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 547
Likes: 1
From: the City by the Bay
I agree that less is maybe more. So why not have the pilots fly approach and landings and not use so much automation. Or at least make the automation really fool proof and simple so mistakes have even less chance of happening.
the lunatic fringe
Joined: May 2001
Posts: 621
Likes: 5
From: Everywhere
why not have the pilots fly approach and landings and not use so much automation.
make the automation really fool proof
Nothing, but nothing is foolproof. Your trust in technology is touching, but technology is always a two edged sword. All machines will go wrong at sometime.
Thread Starter
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 547
Likes: 1
From: the City by the Bay
I am actually more in favor of manual approach and landing and use of automation with caution. Heres an example why good piloting makes a great deal of sense and automation can be wrong:
YouTube - Flight NZ-60 b767 incident
YouTube - Flight NZ-60 b767 incident
