Garuda crash, copilot hours
Have just read the full report on the Garuda crash at Yogyakarta on 7th March. The copilot had 229 hours only before getting into the right hand seat of a 737. This does not warrant any further mention in the report.
In view of some criticism of his actions, it may be salutary to wonder whether he had sufficient prior experience before flying the line. This should give some food for thought before going too far with shortened aircraft training hours. |
and????????????
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Is there any difference between prior experience and post experience?
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HOW ARE your to get experiance when no-one is to give experiance. Catch 22 situation!
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Garuda crash, copilot hours
The F/o did have 1300 odd hours as copilot...
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yeap, fight for the controls at 50'. nice one.
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229 hours before getting the right hand seat of a 737. Seems the next 1000 didn't help much
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The hours are irrelevant. The culture of the flight deck more so. ie, in a non-subserviant culture the co-pilot would have been more forceful in action taken. Which leads me to -
Maggot. Not fight for the controls at 50' , but when it was 1427' too high and 90kts too fast at the IAF. Or if that wasn't enough then when they were still unable to extend landing flap. Or perhaps finally when the FIRST GPWS sounded (as opposed to the 14 others), by hitting the G/A switches and taking over. His hours on type had nothing(ok a little) to do with that - but the subserviant culture more so. M |
could someone provide a link to the report, please.
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Less background experience, more subservience
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Does anyone know where to downlod an english copy of the report, I can only find Indonesian. Thanks
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Yeah, I wouldn't mind reading it before I put my 2c worth in...
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MPL here we come.
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Conversely the Captain had how many hours and still tried to land??
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For the report:
Google on NTSC (National Transportation Safety Committee) then go Aviation Safety then Archives. All in English. |
The hours are irrelevant. The culture of the flight deck more so. ie, in a non-subserviant culture the co-pilot would have been more forceful in action taken. |
Does anyone really think the Captian would have given up control of the aircraft if the F/O said "Taking over Captian!"?? I can well imagine both pilots with their hands on the controls, fighting to over power each other.
As has been suggested here before on PPRuNe during discussions about other accidents involving fast approaches, all the F/O had to do was to select the gear UP. The Captain would then have no choice but to go around. I think personality, self confidence (which can vary from time to time), culture (both country and company), and experience can all have an influence on how pilots assert themselves on the flight deck. |
The Cost of Face. All too evident in that part of the world. And experience (or lack thereof) of the co-pilot has absolutely nothing to do with it. This is NOT a racist comment, simply a statement of fact - made after 15+ years experience in airline ops in the area.
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Total hours
In my opinion everyone starts with "0" at some point. Hours has nothing to do with corrective actions that needs to be taken during not normal situations. If only procedures were followed (by both high or low hour pilots), we would have had lot less accidents.
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Stop slagging the Co-pilot only. It was not his experience level that caused the accident. The Captain had many years of experience and still decided to continue. Does anyone understand the concepts of 'MULTICREW' and 'CRM'. Obviously serverely lacking in this incident.:ugh:
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This is a fundamental thread:
- In this world there are two basic concepts concerning the training/ Licensing of Pilot
And yes there is also another issue: CRM, MCC... "culture" as it is named which should be treated in the ab-Initio training (And which is done in the European system for low timer pilot) so that the First Officer can intervene without complex. Europe has learnt the lesson from Teneriffe accident.... |
Pax 07, sorry don't understand what you are saying..
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07Pax, Me either, sound university background???? My degree in history and business only proved that I could think. Experience is what the good employers in the US are looking for. Having dealt with both licensing systems I can tell you one wasn't much more difficult than the other.. BTW in the mid 60's the US airlines took hundreds of 200 hr pilots without degrees and 99% made fine Capt's in the end.:)
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Exactly your degree prove that you can think and you have some maturity which is not always the case for students just exiting high school
And sorry they may have some exceptions in the past, but MAJOR request some University background or a sound military training... Have you attend the JAA theoretical exams? Can you state there is no difference with the FAA one? What about the Instrument Rating Training? Ask to any school teaching on the 2 syllabus if there is no difference: 1000 hours of Ground School required against 300, 55 hours of training with tough performances required and a MCC topping ... |
Thankfullys the 'MAJOR' don't have a minimum standard for english grammars.
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Are you bringing up the copilot's hours in an attempt to save this captain?
This captain should be in jail. One lifetime sentence for each count of manslaugter would be appropriate. |
and which part of the world are you referring too?
OIC, you're correct, Oz is now part of Asia, so I guess QF in BKK did'nt go around cos real men don't! If that's all you've learnt after 15 years in this business, then no wonder we're where we are! |
4Greens,
I think report focused on where it matters, ie. he had not received GPWS training and IIRC, takeovers and incapacity training... I think that's where the problem is... not his total hours, but his training. Blip, Does anyone really think the Captian would have given up control of the aircraft if the F/O said "Taking over Captian!"?? I can well imagine both pilots with their hands on the controls, fighting to over power each other |
So the Captain has a long list of FOs having to intervene or takeover control from him? Now I'm particularly interested in his flying history...
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I would say rather than being sarcastic one would have to be realistic to see the breaks in the safety chain here.
1) Culture. A military background with strong power distance. And a submissive First Officer. Actual experience of the Captain. 2) Training inclusive of CRM and the real application of it. 3) Company culture and the application of SOP's both on line and in the SIM. 4) The Line Culture with regard to maintenance and MEL's. Continual shortcuts can lead to an attitude of taking risks. I feel that the FO did his best considering his cultural and his perceived place in the flight deck. The Captain on the other hand exceeded his, the FO's and the aeroplanes capabilities. But I do not believe he set out to crash his aircraft. He was caught in a succession of errors and refused to abort his mission as he had a predetermined set of ideas in his mind. COMPLETE THE MISSION. Personally I have executed a go around when the FO called and I thought that all was within company limits. But, in my mind if a crew member calls G/A then it only costs fuel to execute such. Perhaps he has seen something I have not. I would much rather risk additional fuel burn off rather that a hull loss and heaven forbid loss of life. So my advice is. If the words G/A are called, execute it. We can always discuss it later when we are safely on the ground. Wooblah. |
i've taken over slight control from the captain before.. and i just have 1400 hrs as co pilot and 250 before that from flight school.His final approach was all over the place, spd and glideslope.but it was within company limits.After landing as i called out 100knots,80.... as it was approaching 60 there is no slight intention of the capt to stow the full reverse thrust he was having.i just slammed it down for him before he burned all 4 engines.after that he was appreciative for what i did.Of course working with a asian airlines and steep authority gradient, its good crm as a fo to apologize for doing that.we end up enjoying a good booze later.The moral of the stories is low hours doesn't mean incompetent.its the trainig and exposure. How to intervene with crm and take action if necessary.
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hi, been reading abt co-pilot having less and less hrs these days due to the balance of supply and demand..
wat do you guys think about co-pilots fresh out of flying sch joining the RHS of a plane? do u all think that as there is more and more demand for pilots due to the purchase of large numbers of aircraft, the trend that more co-pilots will start off in the RHS with lower hours in time to come? cheers... |
Not long history of takeover. But when something suggested by his f/o he's OK with it. Someone claimed to have taken over from him once and he has no problems. But since past 2 years he has tendency to be fast on approach but not as fast as his last one.
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The purpose of the original post was to investigate the possibility that the copilots lack of hours prior to flying in the right hand seat of a 737 contributed to his apparent lack of assertiveness in this accident.
This is becoming an important issue as the pilot shortage continues to bite. |
From 2 types to 4 types of pilots
I hear in GA, there are those captains who are "progressive" in CRM, which is good news, but some very harsh El Kapitano Supremos are still there and cause grief. Discussing with several guys in GA, the problem now seems to be F/Os who prefer to stay quiet and duck under instead of acting when they're needed, so that they can avoid being questioned to justify their actions. Some F/Os are quite frank in justifying takeovers/interventions, and hardly hear any lashback from the captains, but some F/Os use have the "I must be inferior to them" complex! THIS I see, as the current problems! In the past, we see 2 types of pilots:
1. el Kapitano supremo, and 2. il copilot inferior... Now we see 4 types of them... 1. el capitano supremo still exist, 2. il copilot inferior still exist, but now we also have 3. the cooperative captain, and 4. the assertive f/o. The huge problem is when you get the cooperative captain flying with il copiloto inferiori. BIG problems! Some say it's a bigger potential problem than the old classical steep authority curve. I've heard of captains complaining about the poor assertiveness of several F/Os. "Why does he think I'm going to pull a whip and whack his neck when I actually need his help and suggestion?" "Why does he complain about being viewed as a second rate pilot if he just stays quiet?" 4Greens, Hours may be a factor, for this "new" problem, but not always! GA's 737 fleet is the biggest in the company, and has the weirdest mix of crew. Junior captains with very senior f/os ex widebody F/E, captains from a bygone era flying with guys who seems to have a sore throat, and whatever else. CRM isn't just about the Captain not being a dictator, it's also about F/Os being part of the crew... I've seen too much posts on El Commandante Supremo syndrome, it's about time someone writes about il copiloto inferiori syndrome! The day when il copiloto inferiori become a captain is the day I choose who I fly with carefully, if not already! |
This is a fundamental thread:
- In this world there are two basic concepts concerning the training/ Licensing of Pilot
Your name suggests you only fly as a passenger yourself, but your comments show you to have a clearer view of things than those who might be too close to them. This thread identifies a number of the potential dangers of pilots who are both inexperienced and unselected. If you look at the MI 185 threads you will see the text book example of what can happen in those very circumstances. If MI 185 had been investigated unhindered, the lessons learned may well have prevented the GA 433 disaster. |
I apologise for any inappropriate language in that earlier post - blame it on jet lag.
What I meant to say was that I fully agreed with Passenger 07; and that careful selecton, training, and assessment can achieve the same standards as lots of experience can. Taking SI 185 as the textbook example, the captain had both the experience, and the selection and training. The FO, on the other hand, had neither the experience, nor the selection. Which brings us back to the big underlying question that has to be answered before the lessons of SI 185 can be used to prevent other disasters: Why was the Captain of SI 185 so immediately and so automaticaly blamed for the disaster, and yet no similar questions were asked of the FO? |
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