The Truth about the SilkAir MI 185 Disaster
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Well, northwinds, there's the rub...
Land reclaimation is continuing in Singapore with the ultimate goal of changing the shape of the island to a perfect square. Once this is accomplished, no one will have to think "outside the box"!
Cubs2jets
Land reclaimation is continuing in Singapore with the ultimate goal of changing the shape of the island to a perfect square. Once this is accomplished, no one will have to think "outside the box"!
Cubs2jets
Nortwinds, you seem to be at great pains to deflect blame from the Captain to the first officer. In the interests of balance could you possibly explain why you think it is not the captain but the first officer that is responsible?
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SilkAir MI 185
Not just a horse that is dead, Captain Wooblah, but over one hundred innocent people. However the mystery is not dead and, with the 12th anniversary approaching, I am just wondering if there have been any developments in resolving SilkAir MI 185 so we can learn from it and avoid anything similar happennig again.
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Dear Nortwinds,
I feel deeply saddened by the loss of life of all the passengers and crew. But I do have a big problem in believing that any pilot would intentionally murder his passengers and crew. I do understand that this has perhaps happened i.e. Egypt Air incident but then again do we really know if the FO did what he did on purpose or did something / malfunction cause him to action incorrectly. Was it poor systems knowledge / training etc. I remember the accident involving the A300-600 with the Russian crew that allowed the kids to occupy a flight deck seat and this resulted in a fatal accident.
I do not know of an accident (Except 9/11) That a pilot purposely flew his aircraft into the ground with the intent of murder that did not have some reasonable doubt attached to it.
I do know however that in initial investigations regarding rudder hard over in the B737 series the investigators had a hard time believing that such a control movement was possible. It really was a miracle that one of the crews survived, and it was this event that finally lead to the discovery of the effect of temperature and hydraulic lock commanded by the sequence valve. All due to the machining tolerances of the valve produced by Parker Hannifin.
My point here is could there have been such a problem the occurred on this fateful flight. Did the crew actually have to think out of the box to try and save the situation. Did control reversal and hard over lead them to use the engines to raise the nose. I don't have the answers to any of these questions. All I know is that there was millions of dollars at stake and that in circumstances like this all sorts of coverups and deals do get made.
Cheers,
Wooblah.
I feel deeply saddened by the loss of life of all the passengers and crew. But I do have a big problem in believing that any pilot would intentionally murder his passengers and crew. I do understand that this has perhaps happened i.e. Egypt Air incident but then again do we really know if the FO did what he did on purpose or did something / malfunction cause him to action incorrectly. Was it poor systems knowledge / training etc. I remember the accident involving the A300-600 with the Russian crew that allowed the kids to occupy a flight deck seat and this resulted in a fatal accident.
I do not know of an accident (Except 9/11) That a pilot purposely flew his aircraft into the ground with the intent of murder that did not have some reasonable doubt attached to it.
I do know however that in initial investigations regarding rudder hard over in the B737 series the investigators had a hard time believing that such a control movement was possible. It really was a miracle that one of the crews survived, and it was this event that finally lead to the discovery of the effect of temperature and hydraulic lock commanded by the sequence valve. All due to the machining tolerances of the valve produced by Parker Hannifin.
My point here is could there have been such a problem the occurred on this fateful flight. Did the crew actually have to think out of the box to try and save the situation. Did control reversal and hard over lead them to use the engines to raise the nose. I don't have the answers to any of these questions. All I know is that there was millions of dollars at stake and that in circumstances like this all sorts of coverups and deals do get made.
Cheers,
Wooblah.
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12 years on and still shrouded in controversy.
As others have mentioned, it's hard to believe that someone would dive an a/c into ground along with 100+ innocent souls.
Interesting fact is that MI sold off all their B737s, some a few months old, and turned their fleet into an all Airbus fleet after this incident.
As others have mentioned, it's hard to believe that someone would dive an a/c into ground along with 100+ innocent souls.
Interesting fact is that MI sold off all their B737s, some a few months old, and turned their fleet into an all Airbus fleet after this incident.
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The post by Millers Court has been the most accurate so far on what actually happened on MI 185.The evidence gathered so far points very heavily towards the Captain deliberately diving the plane to kill himself and everyone else.I'm not sure if I'm correct but the FO who reported the unsafe approach that cost him his Training Captain status was the same FO that went down with him.For reasons that seemed beyond the scope of the investigation , the final verdict took quite sometime along with great hesitation in pointing fingers at the Captain and Silk Air.All this despite the initial reports by the Indonesians pointing towards pilot suicide...
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Duncan Ward was NOT the one who flew that plane into the ground.
Anyone who even tries to pass that one off as a theory worthy of serious speculation, is completely unfamiliar with the most basic facts of the case, and is slandering the memory of a damn fine young man who was tragically murdered just like everyone else on that flight.
Anyone who even tries to pass that one off as a theory worthy of serious speculation, is completely unfamiliar with the most basic facts of the case, and is slandering the memory of a damn fine young man who was tragically murdered just like everyone else on that flight.
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Wooblah, it does happen sometimes…
ASN Aircraft accident ATR-42-312 CN-CDT Tizounine
ASN Aircraft accident ATR-42-320 A2-ABB Gaborone-Sir Seretse Khama International Airport (GBE)
ASN Aircraft accident ATR-42-312 CN-CDT Tizounine
ASN Aircraft accident ATR-42-320 A2-ABB Gaborone-Sir Seretse Khama International Airport (GBE)
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The Truth about SilkAir MI 185
Thanks all who responded but replying to Luke Sky Toddler who was closest to what he correctly describes as mass murder.
I never mention the co-pilot by name and do not blame him for what was a systems failure where under the same conditions the same thing could have happened to many other young pilots.
Therefore unless the matter is resolved the same could happen again to any of us - and to our innocent passengers and cabin crew.
I appreciate the protectiveness Luke seeks for the co-pilot but far bigger issues are at stake and the same protectiveness was not given to the Captain, or to SilkAir, or to Boeing, or to Parker Hannifin, or to the State of Singapore, or to the Indonessian NTSC, or to anyone else. In fact, all the others involved have been openly criticised while all that is asked of the co-pilot is that he be included in the investigation which otherwise would remain unresolved.
I never mention the co-pilot by name and do not blame him for what was a systems failure where under the same conditions the same thing could have happened to many other young pilots.
Therefore unless the matter is resolved the same could happen again to any of us - and to our innocent passengers and cabin crew.
I appreciate the protectiveness Luke seeks for the co-pilot but far bigger issues are at stake and the same protectiveness was not given to the Captain, or to SilkAir, or to Boeing, or to Parker Hannifin, or to the State of Singapore, or to the Indonessian NTSC, or to anyone else. In fact, all the others involved have been openly criticised while all that is asked of the co-pilot is that he be included in the investigation which otherwise would remain unresolved.
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I never mention the co-pilot by name and do not blame him for what was a systems failure where under the same conditions the same thing could have happened to many other young pilots
To those of us who lived and worked, in aviation, in Singapore at the time the main failings, apart from the captain, were the Indonesian authorities to properly address the known facts and the Singaporean authorities collusion in this deliberate obfuscation.
Don't attempt to add an air of mystery to this event nortwinds, it was blatant mass murder.
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A Question: Why was one elevator found on the ground some distance back along the flight path, while the rest of the aircraft was in the river?
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A Question: Why was one elevator found on the ground some distance back along the flight path, while the rest of the aircraft was in the river?
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Yes it is true.Half of the stabiliser was found,along with parts of the vertical fin way upstream of the actual impact point along the projected flight path.The airplane had reached Vmo and then Vne within 15 seconds of the dive.Somewhere along the diving flight path,the weakest(or most stressed) link shears.This just happened to be the stabiliser(the sheared one) and part of the vertical fin.
Whats the angle anyways Blacksheep..??
Just curious..
Whats the angle anyways Blacksheep..??
Just curious..
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Whats the angle anyways Blacksheep..??
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I think the report stated that the aircraft descended at nearly full power so by the time bits fell off it was way above Vmo and Vne.
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I recall those on the ground living near the Musi River reported hearing a big boom which many now think was the sonic boom caused by the aircraft exceeding mach 1 on it's way down. It's therefore no wonder bits started peeling off the aircraft.
BTW, didn't the NTSB also conduct their own investigations due to the fact that the aircraft was manufactured in the USA? Unlike the NTSC's report, the NTSB did actually come to a conclusion which is in agreement with what most of us here on this thread are thinking. Hope someone can dig out the NTSB report and post the link here.
BTW, didn't the NTSB also conduct their own investigations due to the fact that the aircraft was manufactured in the USA? Unlike the NTSC's report, the NTSB did actually come to a conclusion which is in agreement with what most of us here on this thread are thinking. Hope someone can dig out the NTSB report and post the link here.
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Found this article published in Flight Safety Australia, a publication produced by Australia's CASA, which summarises the NTSB's criticism of the NTSC's report.
For the full article from Flight Safety Australia, click here.
Unprecedented criticism by NTSB
But the most damning criticism came from the American NTSB. Normally diplomatic about the findings of other nations’ investigations, the NTSB unambiguously declared: ‘Of greatest concern are the statements … that “the NTSC is unable to find the reasons for the departure of the aircraft from its cruising level of FL 350 and the reasons for the stoppage of the flight recorders” and that the “investigation has yielded no evidence to explain the cause of the accident.” ’The examination of all of the factual evidence is consistent with the conclusions that:
Throughout the report, the NTSB was repeatedly forced to take serious issue with wording and misleading inferences. The following paragraphs summarise the NTSB’s principal comments:
A significant amount of pertinent factual information developed during the three year investigation is either not discussed or not fully considered in analysing the cause of the accident.
There was no evidence of any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures. Further, the pilots did not report any problems or make any distress calls.
Finally, engineering simulations of flightpath data were conducted to determine the motion of the aircraft from the time it departed cruise flight until the end of recorded data.
No single mechanical failure of the aircraft structure or flight control systems would have resulted in movement of the aircraft through recorded radar data points. Further, there was no evidence of any combination of systems failures.
The flight profile is consistent with sustained nose-down manual flight control inputs. The horizontal stabiliser trim was set at the maximum nose-down main electric trim limit (2.5 units) at the time of impact.
On the basis of the engineering simulations, it is very likely from the time it departed from cruise flight until the end of the recorded data, that the aircraft was responding to sustained flight control inputs from the cockpit.
The NTSC report states that no reason could be found for the stoppage of the flight recorders and recommends that ‘a comprehensive review and analysis of [DFDR and CVR] systems design philosophy be undertaken to identify and rectify latent factors associated with the stoppage of the recorders in flight’.
This implies the NTSC believes the flight recorders stopped because of mechanical malfunction. This is not supported by evidence. Rather, the evidence suggests that the CVR was intentionally disconnected. There is also no evidence to indicate the DFDR stopped as a result of mechanical malfunction. The first indication of an anomaly in the flight occurred when the CVR ceased recording. The stoppage of the CVR was consistent with the removal of power to the unit through ‘pulling’ of the circuit breaker, rather than as a result of a mechanical malfunction or a short circuit.
Evidence from the last recorded minutes indicates that only the captain and first officer were present in the cockpit. The CVR also recorded sounds consistent with seat movement and removal of a seat belt. The sequence is consistent with the captain preparing to leave the cockpit.
The circuit breaker panel directly behind the captain’s seat contains the circuit breakers for both the CVR and DFDR. Thus it is evident that the captain would have been in the best position to manually pull the CVR circuit breaker at the time it stopped.
The DFDR stopped recording approximately six minutes after the CVR did so. There was no evidence of any malfunction of the DFDR until the moment it stopped … It can be concluded that the DFDR stoppage was not due to a loss of power. However, the stoppage could be explained by someone manually pulling the circuit breaker.
The NTSC suggests that the cessation of the CVR and FDR could in each case be explained by a broken wire. Although technically correct, the probability of two such unrelated wire breaks occurring several minutes apart and affecting only the CVR and DFDR is so highly improbable that it cannot be considered realistic.
But the most damning criticism came from the American NTSB. Normally diplomatic about the findings of other nations’ investigations, the NTSB unambiguously declared: ‘Of greatest concern are the statements … that “the NTSC is unable to find the reasons for the departure of the aircraft from its cruising level of FL 350 and the reasons for the stoppage of the flight recorders” and that the “investigation has yielded no evidence to explain the cause of the accident.” ’The examination of all of the factual evidence is consistent with the conclusions that:
Throughout the report, the NTSB was repeatedly forced to take serious issue with wording and misleading inferences. The following paragraphs summarise the NTSB’s principal comments:
A significant amount of pertinent factual information developed during the three year investigation is either not discussed or not fully considered in analysing the cause of the accident.
There was no evidence of any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures. Further, the pilots did not report any problems or make any distress calls.
Finally, engineering simulations of flightpath data were conducted to determine the motion of the aircraft from the time it departed cruise flight until the end of recorded data.
No single mechanical failure of the aircraft structure or flight control systems would have resulted in movement of the aircraft through recorded radar data points. Further, there was no evidence of any combination of systems failures.
The flight profile is consistent with sustained nose-down manual flight control inputs. The horizontal stabiliser trim was set at the maximum nose-down main electric trim limit (2.5 units) at the time of impact.
On the basis of the engineering simulations, it is very likely from the time it departed from cruise flight until the end of the recorded data, that the aircraft was responding to sustained flight control inputs from the cockpit.
The NTSC report states that no reason could be found for the stoppage of the flight recorders and recommends that ‘a comprehensive review and analysis of [DFDR and CVR] systems design philosophy be undertaken to identify and rectify latent factors associated with the stoppage of the recorders in flight’.
This implies the NTSC believes the flight recorders stopped because of mechanical malfunction. This is not supported by evidence. Rather, the evidence suggests that the CVR was intentionally disconnected. There is also no evidence to indicate the DFDR stopped as a result of mechanical malfunction. The first indication of an anomaly in the flight occurred when the CVR ceased recording. The stoppage of the CVR was consistent with the removal of power to the unit through ‘pulling’ of the circuit breaker, rather than as a result of a mechanical malfunction or a short circuit.
Evidence from the last recorded minutes indicates that only the captain and first officer were present in the cockpit. The CVR also recorded sounds consistent with seat movement and removal of a seat belt. The sequence is consistent with the captain preparing to leave the cockpit.
The circuit breaker panel directly behind the captain’s seat contains the circuit breakers for both the CVR and DFDR. Thus it is evident that the captain would have been in the best position to manually pull the CVR circuit breaker at the time it stopped.
The DFDR stopped recording approximately six minutes after the CVR did so. There was no evidence of any malfunction of the DFDR until the moment it stopped … It can be concluded that the DFDR stoppage was not due to a loss of power. However, the stoppage could be explained by someone manually pulling the circuit breaker.
The NTSC suggests that the cessation of the CVR and FDR could in each case be explained by a broken wire. Although technically correct, the probability of two such unrelated wire breaks occurring several minutes apart and affecting only the CVR and DFDR is so highly improbable that it cannot be considered realistic.
Those present at the subsequent civil court case in Singapore will recall things given in evidence including, among other things:
The British expert witness giving his personal opinion that the first indications were that of a progressive electrical failure (his testimony). When asked to explain his theory he said the CVR circuit breaker popped first followed a few minutes later by the popping of both FDR circuit breakers.
He then theorised a crack appeared in the windscreen and alarmed one of the pilots so much that he put the aircraft into an emergency descent but forgot to make a radio call warning other aircraft of the emergency descent.
This pilot (no inference was made by this expert witness WHICH pilot was PF at the time) then in his panic to descend, not only forgot to extend the speed brakes but also omitted to close the thrust levers and omitted to recover as the overspeed warning sounded and in all probability inadvertently held his thumb on the stabiliser trim switch for 12 seconds so that when the wreckage was discovered the stabiliser trim jack-screw was found in the maximum full forward or down position.
Strangely enough, just before the FDR was disabled by the action of both circuit breakers popping, it took the reading of the position of the stabiliser position and recorded close to five units which equates to normal cruise. In the cruise flaps up configuration the stabiliser strim runs much more slowly than with flaps extended which is why it takes 12 seconds of continuous thumb switch depression to go from five units of stab trim to full nose down electrically.
This pilot regardless of his experience FORGOT to do an awful lot of things.
Later evidence from the Indonesian inquiry mentioned that it is technically possible to differentiate between a circuit breaker popping electrically or being pulled manually. As the circuit breakers were located in the wreckage it was stated the investigation confirmed the circuit breakers had been pulled - not popped. Also to inadvertently hold down the stabiliser trim switch for 12 seconds is quite unusual as most 737 pilots would probably agree.
Evidence was produced during the court case that the captain had on an earlier flight with a local first officer, deliberately conducted a take off by firewalling one throttle at the start of the take off run when the N1 on that engine was around five percent less than the serviceable other engine.
This split throttle take off was recorded in the technical log (maintenance release) by the captain who after take off decided to return and land. The cause of the defect was a leaking fuel control unit. It also came out in evidence that when the captain started the engine prior to taxiing it took a long time to light up - well beyond the maximum of 10 seconds limit stated in the 737 FCOM. Again this was the first sign that the engine had a problem - but it was ignored by both pilots of that particular trip. .
In evidence, an expert witness qualified as a 737 pilot and produced by Silk Air, was asked by the court whether he would have continued a take off with a split throttle at such a low speed at the start of the take off run. He replied he would have no problem with that action and that was why pilots were paid such high salaries because they needed to make split second decisions (I kid you not...)
When his evidence was completed he walked past the expert witnesses for the relatives of the deceased and leaning over quietly said "He should never have taken off - but I couldn't say that - I'm on the other side" - or similar phrased sentence. In other words, he quietly agreed with the opposition that the captain was capable of making an irrational action. The unusual actions by the captain on previous flights was brought out in evidence, with one Silk Air pilot called to the stand where he described some violent aircraft handling by the deceased captain. This violent handling included full range control wheel rolling on final approach in order to lose height quickly after the aircraft was deemed too high. The copilot was able to push open both throttles and force a go-around. It was this incident that resulted in the captain being demoted. A letter from another former Silk Air captain was produced in court and this stated he had elected not to renew his contract with the company because he feared for his safety after taking over from any aircraft flown by the deceased captain known for his irrational behaviour and high speed flight beyond the stated limitations.
Mention is made in an earlier post of the possibilty of a uncommanded rudder hard over during cruise. Simulator tests revealed that recovery from such an event at high altitude was easily attainable by a competent pilot. Both pilots involved in the crash had been certified competent to recover from unusual attitudes.
As someone said earlier, we are no closer to proving the truth of the matter. If the British expert witness is to be believed (the court accepted his evidence with apparently no reservations), a mysterious and unexplained series of electrical events caused such consternation on the flight deck that one or both of the crew lost the plot and placed the aircraft into a near vertical dive. The opposing point of view is well documented.
The British expert witness giving his personal opinion that the first indications were that of a progressive electrical failure (his testimony). When asked to explain his theory he said the CVR circuit breaker popped first followed a few minutes later by the popping of both FDR circuit breakers.
He then theorised a crack appeared in the windscreen and alarmed one of the pilots so much that he put the aircraft into an emergency descent but forgot to make a radio call warning other aircraft of the emergency descent.
This pilot (no inference was made by this expert witness WHICH pilot was PF at the time) then in his panic to descend, not only forgot to extend the speed brakes but also omitted to close the thrust levers and omitted to recover as the overspeed warning sounded and in all probability inadvertently held his thumb on the stabiliser trim switch for 12 seconds so that when the wreckage was discovered the stabiliser trim jack-screw was found in the maximum full forward or down position.
Strangely enough, just before the FDR was disabled by the action of both circuit breakers popping, it took the reading of the position of the stabiliser position and recorded close to five units which equates to normal cruise. In the cruise flaps up configuration the stabiliser strim runs much more slowly than with flaps extended which is why it takes 12 seconds of continuous thumb switch depression to go from five units of stab trim to full nose down electrically.
This pilot regardless of his experience FORGOT to do an awful lot of things.
Later evidence from the Indonesian inquiry mentioned that it is technically possible to differentiate between a circuit breaker popping electrically or being pulled manually. As the circuit breakers were located in the wreckage it was stated the investigation confirmed the circuit breakers had been pulled - not popped. Also to inadvertently hold down the stabiliser trim switch for 12 seconds is quite unusual as most 737 pilots would probably agree.
Evidence was produced during the court case that the captain had on an earlier flight with a local first officer, deliberately conducted a take off by firewalling one throttle at the start of the take off run when the N1 on that engine was around five percent less than the serviceable other engine.
This split throttle take off was recorded in the technical log (maintenance release) by the captain who after take off decided to return and land. The cause of the defect was a leaking fuel control unit. It also came out in evidence that when the captain started the engine prior to taxiing it took a long time to light up - well beyond the maximum of 10 seconds limit stated in the 737 FCOM. Again this was the first sign that the engine had a problem - but it was ignored by both pilots of that particular trip. .
In evidence, an expert witness qualified as a 737 pilot and produced by Silk Air, was asked by the court whether he would have continued a take off with a split throttle at such a low speed at the start of the take off run. He replied he would have no problem with that action and that was why pilots were paid such high salaries because they needed to make split second decisions (I kid you not...)
When his evidence was completed he walked past the expert witnesses for the relatives of the deceased and leaning over quietly said "He should never have taken off - but I couldn't say that - I'm on the other side" - or similar phrased sentence. In other words, he quietly agreed with the opposition that the captain was capable of making an irrational action. The unusual actions by the captain on previous flights was brought out in evidence, with one Silk Air pilot called to the stand where he described some violent aircraft handling by the deceased captain. This violent handling included full range control wheel rolling on final approach in order to lose height quickly after the aircraft was deemed too high. The copilot was able to push open both throttles and force a go-around. It was this incident that resulted in the captain being demoted. A letter from another former Silk Air captain was produced in court and this stated he had elected not to renew his contract with the company because he feared for his safety after taking over from any aircraft flown by the deceased captain known for his irrational behaviour and high speed flight beyond the stated limitations.
Mention is made in an earlier post of the possibilty of a uncommanded rudder hard over during cruise. Simulator tests revealed that recovery from such an event at high altitude was easily attainable by a competent pilot. Both pilots involved in the crash had been certified competent to recover from unusual attitudes.
As someone said earlier, we are no closer to proving the truth of the matter. If the British expert witness is to be believed (the court accepted his evidence with apparently no reservations), a mysterious and unexplained series of electrical events caused such consternation on the flight deck that one or both of the crew lost the plot and placed the aircraft into a near vertical dive. The opposing point of view is well documented.