Adding flaps DURING takeoff roll on 737
 

Hi,

First to make it clear that I am not a professional pilot, albeit am an aerospace engineer, with over 2000 hrs of private, instrument and multi-engine time.

I was a passenger yesterday on a flight from Frankfurt to Belgrade on JAT Airways that left me very disturbed. The FP did not during taxing and runway positioning deploy flaps, rather decided to start extending them at the same time when he started adding power for take off. At the time that he nose wheel lifted off the runway the flaps were still in motion, and were fully extended at the moment the mains left the runway. The weather was MVFR and no particular cross wind existed.

I thought this is, based on all my eduction and training (both as an engineer and a pilot) to be a major breach of safety. The consequence of flaps not fully deploying or uneven deployment, could be fatal (isn't SpanAir accident of (similar cause??). I actually found it so disturbing that I alerted the cabin crew to this as we were lined up on the runway (and they did talk to the front of the plane, but have no idea if my intervention had any consequences). I don't even want to mention that the controls were never check for "free and correct" during preflight, cockpit door was open for half of the flight etc...

I am considering filing a formal complaint with the airline and the civil aviation authorities, since I believe this kind of behavior puts the flying public in danger. But before doing so, I would appreciate any input from professional flying community, if I am missing something or if there is a procedure that I am not aware of.

Thanks in advance.

Well, i recognize this wont answer your interesting questions, but as a mere example i've seen along all these years a quite handful of A300's and 767's taking off in Flapless config..:O (regarding trailing and not leading/slats)

Photos: Airbus A300B4-622R Aircraft Pictures | !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Photos: Boeing 767-201/ER Aircraft Pictures | !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (interesting comment)
Almost Flapless in this one:
Photos: Boeing 757-2G5 Aircraft Pictures | !!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Both of those Boeings have slats and flaps deployed.

Perhaps only the very first stage, but you can clearly see them in the pictures posted.

I suspect the OP's concerns lie more with the apparent selection during the roll rather than the setting per se.

The former observation, if correct, probably is a bit undesirable .... and, potentially, very fatal ...

Yeap Stansdead, you're right, in both Boeing pics we can see that...however in A300 climb we can only observe the Leading EF deployed while the Trailing EF remains fully null.

Dependant on type...
 

...but if you started the TO roll in my type without a correct flap setting, then you would get a config warning which is an instant RTO.

I'm being very picky here, and perhaps mis-intepreting the phrase, but:

Again, on my type, you would never see flaps fully extended for take off - that is for landing only.

A little bit of trolling perhaps?

The A300 is approved for takeoff with the following slat/flap configurations:. .. .15/0. .15/15. .15/20.

ASSUMING this is not a troll, the answer is most definitely yes, report if. Report it to the German authorities as well. IF it is as described it should be preserved on the Flight Data recorder. I do, however, have my doubts......................could we be confusing delayed flap extension in adverse weather?

As far as I know, JAT operates 737-300's and ATRs. Why are we talking about flapless take-off s in A300's?

To clarify...
 

Thanks for all the responses.

Just to clarify, I meant fully extended to the selected take-off position (which in this case was 10 I believe), not full possible deflection on-take off.

As somebody noted, my concern is that the flaps were being extended during the roll itself, and were still in motion at rotation, which is potentially a "deadly sin" imho.

I fully understand that anybody can make a mistake (less likely though if checklist are followed, and we are talking professional flying here), but continuing into a dangerous situation with disregard for safety is what left me beyond puzzled and frustrated...

Thanks again for feedback.

BOAC,

...could we be confusing delayed flap extension in adverse weather?

This is the METAR at the approximate time of departure, I doubt that it is considered adverse (from meteocentre.com)

EDDF 25/1420 6.2 1002.0 3/1 87% 110 2 -RA FEW007 SCT011 BKN018 TEMPO BKN010=
I am being extra cautious, and verifying information with the professional flying community since I do not want to put the crew in an uncomfortable position to answer questions on safety if it is any mistake in my observations. But, now, unfortunately it seems it's not...

Thx.

The flaps selected for takeoff have a direct influence on the V speeds (e.g. the rotation speed). If they don’t match with the flaps selected you can get into serious trouble. There have been a number of occurrences in which the pilots had forgotten to set the takeoff flaps correctly and decided to do so during the takeoff run (despite the takeoff config warning they got). The result was (in some of the cases I known of) that the stick shaker came on after lift-off.

decurion

I agree

The CRJ overrun at KCRW was caused when, the flaps incorrectly set on the taxi out, were reset during the roll at high speed, near V1. The take-off configuration warning sounded because the flaps were NOT in either if the two permitted settings, but in-transit. The captain then elected to stop, resulting in an overrun saved by EMAS.

GF

Not a METAR format that I am used to, but it appears to be adverse weather at 3 deg in the rain it certainly calls and engine run up and delayed flap extention. Also the METAR says nothing about the ground conditions. However, the engines should have been runup and the flaps extended and checked prior to the roll. I would imagine passengers may believe they have started to takeoff during the runup.

- where do you see that?

decurion:
I'll likely be sent to the woodshed for this: More than a few crews have forgotten to set the flaps for takeoff, then when the warning sounds off with application of takeoff power the crew wakes up and selects takeoff flaps and presses on with the takeoff.

One has to hope that most airlines now have an event monitoring system which would catch these cowboys?

FDM
 

These cases will show on the FDM system within an airline. Not many of them are reported by the pilots via an ASR.

BOAC:
Yes, more opportunity to catch the cowboys after a successful shoot-out at the OK Corral, so to speak.

If, as may appear to be the case, your "More than a few crews have forgotten to set the flaps for takeoff, then when the warning sounds off with application of takeoff power the crew wakes up and selects takeoff flaps and presses on with the takeoff." is correct, it appears that training and airmanship have failed - I have no other solution - do you? At least, stopping the 'cowboys', even AFTER a "a successful shoot-out" might prevent another from the same?

People make mistakes and pilots are people.

I can recall one or two occasions in years gone by when we have missed whatever. One stops, fixes it, if appropriate, or does whatever might be appropriate, and then continues .. even if that involves taxying back to the start position or having to eat a bit of umble pie.

Better embarrassed than dead.. if there is any need for embarrassment ...

No one quarrels with that John, but this was not a single error event but a complex, lengthy, considered and utterly deliberate series of inappropriate decisions that fly in the face of any kind of airmanship, sommon sense, fundamental safety judgement let alone SOP, and was emphatically NOT appropriate action. It's utterly beyond belief that someone would continue a take-off with the config warning howling and then start looking around to see what's wrong instead of concentrating on what they're supposed to be doing, ie the stop that's now mandated, and all the time accelerating towards, what? Then "ping", "Oh b&gger it's the flaps", "!!!!! Flaps five, now!" all the time with the horn blaring and the aircraft accelerating, then the doubt, "wonder how long it takes, is there enough time?", the horn still blaring and the aircraft approaching V1 by now with flaps still travelling and both white-knuckled crew with a death-grip on their seat cushions thinking "shiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiit!"... There is no way whatsoever but guesswork to tell if there is enough time to get enough flap to be safe. None whatever. Some professionalism, that!

Wilful, deliberate and repeated contempt for SOPs in this most dangerous of situations cannot be excusable beyond insanity or gross professional negligence, and would probably be called criminal today if it had resulted in an accident.

imho it's a summary hanging offense for both pilots. End of.

BOAC:

Because we had two terrible crashes in the U.S. due to this, it is a certainy there were "X" times more that caught it and got away with it. My view is, "thank God for the warning horn" and, further, that should be redundant with today's technology.

No doubt this "cowboy" act is really bad airmanship. But, there are a lot of other acts of poor airmanship that have resulted in flying into the ground or the side of a mountain far too often.

And, there are always shades of grade, such as a lightly loaded 727-100 taking off Day VFR on a long, dry runway, and the captain immediately figures out the problem as takeoff power is applied.

Not suggesting that one should go with the warning horn sounding and, certainly, not suggesting that those who might do so are doing the sensible thing.

Rather, mistakes are endemic and one needs to drill down a bit into the whys and wherefores.

Certainly, discipline is what saves the day for most of us, most of the time ...

- no, there should be none, assuming that the crew brief is to stop for a horn. If the brief does not say that it needs changing. As 'Ag B' puts it so neatly, V1 is not the time to be wondering.

When we crunched the risk, we found there was absolutely no justification for retracting the flaps beyond 5 on the 737 after landing. That said, the SOP didn't change...

- good to see someone has a brain! Ice/snow/birds nests/debris/engineers spanners/de-icing .. .. .. ..? It would not just be the risk you 'crunched'.:)

As the flaps were not in take off configuration, Take off warning came on when they pressed the TOGA switches to set take off power . Up to there, just a little crew mistake of having forgotten the flaps. That's why the take off warning is there. But to continue the take off is a foul play!!!
The QAR should have marked that even, and if the Company Flight Safety Officer did his job, they've been invited for "tea and biscuits" if not worse...

How about reading the checklist for starters? Before Take Off Checklist calls for "Flaps"..... :ugh: :ugh: