JG,

I'd echo some of alf's responses to your post. First, CRM is not an 'object' or defined property of the operational environment. It's a broad spread of themes drawn from the social analysis of the conduct of work. The only attempt to define it (Lauber's) is plausible but unworkable. Training is driven by some recognition that something more than simple 'stick-and-rudder' and systems knowledge is needed. Because airlines, first, typically lack the skills of training analysis to work out their own solution and, second, do not want to do anything more than their competitors in order to meet a regulation we end up with the loose guidance we currently have in place. It is not the role of the regulator to tell an airline what the lesson objectives for a CRM class should be. The net result is as many trajectories and flavours as there are CRM facilitators. And you have to then think about local experience. The initial trigger for CRM was an aspect of civil aviation in the US (dominant captains, typically ex-military, who could not work as part of a team). In the early 1980's part of the debate was whether CRM was peculiar to the US experience and might not export. We can trace the problem right back to the failure to step back and take a broad view of the nature of aviation as a workplace. So, the CRM you have been exposed to is simply a product of the development of ideas.

As for measuring CRM, the problem here is that 'behaviour' is not a unit of output from a production process which can be checked against a standard. I can train and I can observe and I can give developmental feedback but we need to careful about expecting too much. So validation and repeatability are concepts that need to be handled with care in this context.

Your analysis of flight deck deviations merits more discussion than could be achieved in a single post but I'd take issue with your analysis. Skill-based errors might be increased through practice as I then place less attention on the task in question. I can execute the wrong skill because of a perceptual failure. Your decision-based error example is, in fact, a skill-based error. Decisions are all about selecting which skill sequence to use to get a job done. Violations are typically trade-offs between effort and risk. Interestingly, communication underpins all of this in that verbalisation of plans, current status, actual parameter values against expected values all can reduce deviations.

JG - I note that by PM you have declined to offer any idea of your 'experience' in our field, so respectfully I will bow out of this line of the current line of discussion. It might help if you could outline one or two examples where "to begin triaging your (in-flight) issue within a reasonable amount of time (3-5 minutes?) of your request. If your experience(s) during your event(s) was different than this, I sincerely hope the operator/union involved initiated an investigation to determine what could have been done differently to increase the likelihood the next crew who needs this level of assistance has ready access to these resources." would help me in the air with a problem. I am looking at situations which normally require fairly rapid decisions and there is no time or facility to gather those gems. Longer term problems can of course be resolved this way, mostly on the ground, although the BA 747 engine out from west coast USA bound for UK was a case where there was time to take all advice available, but again the IMMEDIATE actions (and decisions) were taken without that luxury. It is very rare for a short/medium haul crew to have this opportunity so until cockpit-ground comms improve dramatically I suspect your focus needs to be on long-haul?.

Like others here, I started in the "Captain is God" era and like others I see very little of that now - so, yes, all this 'CRM stuff' has been successful if that helps. Perhaps the answer to you is "you should have seen it all earlier".:)

Interesting to see no mention of NOTECHs in these pages (apologies if I've missed it...) NOTECHs (observable behaviours that enhance flight safety) are a powerful debriefing tool for line crews, are accessible and pragmatic.

Part of the problem for a perceived 'failure' in CRM training is instructors who are so bogged down in theory and TLAs that they cannot impart the practical skills to flight crew who need practical tools, not pseudo-science.

I'm a CRM instructor and Training Captain - sorry to say that I have seen a few CRM trainers who are a nightmare to fly with because they miss the point entirely.

Dunbar - Not just for line trainers either. I find that probably 90% of all safety-critical errors (or crashes) I see in the simulator can be traced back neatly to one of the NOTECHS categories: cooperation, leadership & management, decision-making or situational awareness. I continually find myself going back to NOTECHS to debrief these effors.
Fortunately, the majority of us on this thread at least have the luxury of some level of company SOPs, and crew who are trained and constituted to work together as a team. It is quite scary to find myself training so many crews from around the world who are out there flying every day, who have no SOPs, and little concept of MCC! Although I do my best with the crews I see to sow the seeds of CRM, :eek:I am continually updating my list of "operators never to fly with as a passenger"!!!

Notechs
 

Although not specifically mentioned, I did talk about observable, trainable skills in an earlier post. I didn't mention NOTECHS because it's not a perfect solution ... but it is a start. However, the real point comes back to Dunbar's comments about the gap between classroom theory and action. We have probably got things wrong in that we set the curriculum (JAR-OPS and the CAA Pink before that) and then set the exam (NOTECHS). Unfortunately, the 2 are not in synch. Add to that the fact that a significant number of facilitators cannot develop classroom events that generate changes in the behaviours captured through NOTECHS and you can see why there is some disillusionment. I've sometimes referred to CRM training as a cottage industry; lots of people beavering away in their own small world, happy with what they do. It can also be seen as the last refuge of the ungifted amateur ... but that is maybe too harsh in this season of goodwill.

On CRM as cottage-industry resource management:

And also is there not enougth emphasis in using the target audience to facilitate change themseleves at the espense of officially trained facilitators? I've seen several carriers where HR issues belong to the HF or CRM specialists who almost prefer to be seen as black-art gurus set apart from the rest of training and ops.

BOAC-
You had asked for an example of a telecon between crew and the factory. Here's an open source example:
FTW00LA153
The pilot further reported that... he was in contact with representatives from American Eurocopter during the flight to PTN.
Prior to the accident occurring, a local representative from American Eurocopter arrived at PTN to assist in trouble shooting a maintenance discrepancy on another aircraft. The local representative upon learning of the situation with N350JG, telephoned a test pilot at the American Eurocopter facility in Grand Prairie, Texas. The test pilot requested that the pilot conduct the emergency procedure for hydraulic failure of the tail rotor servo.
Jolly

Not really relevant to airline ops, JG. Fortunate conjunctions of test pilot 'presence', location and time etc make this a no-go. I'm not sure where you are 'working' but if it is in a commercial airline try reviewing the procedure for your crews to get rapid responses to emergencies from company resources. Ask THEM how confident they are that they will get an acceptable real-time answer from the company as to where to go/what to do with a hydraulic problem (for example) anywhere on their route structure before they have set off to their chosen airport. I am aware that sometimes there are opportunities - and gave you one example - but is NOT normal on short-haul ops and cannot be assumed to be part of any realistic process. Improve comms and company staffing levels (24/7 troubleshooters on instant voice) and now we can start looking at it.