What do you think is the greatest hazard?
Join Date: May 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 176
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My worry, for not only safety but also the future expansion and prosperity of this industry is the wind of very unhealthy anti- management feelings amongst aircrew.
Take a glance at some of the posts and see how many lead to
management jibes, I think a high percentage of members of this
forum would actually like the whole "pilot error" theory renamed "management induced pilot error".
Come on guys knuckle down before this industry ends up like the rest of the public transport system in the UK.
RT
Take a glance at some of the posts and see how many lead to
management jibes, I think a high percentage of members of this
forum would actually like the whole "pilot error" theory renamed "management induced pilot error".
Come on guys knuckle down before this industry ends up like the rest of the public transport system in the UK.
RT
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Who can say?
Posts: 1,700
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
rupetime, since this is a Safety forum, I shall leave aside your comments on future expansion, as that is a discussion for elsewhere.
I don't believe in the concept of "pilot error" as such, so I don't feel there's much use in renaming it to anything - the entire concept is useless.
But please explain how anti-management feeling on the part of aircrews affects safety.
I don't believe in the concept of "pilot error" as such, so I don't feel there's much use in renaming it to anything - the entire concept is useless.
But please explain how anti-management feeling on the part of aircrews affects safety.
Join Date: Sep 1999
Location: UK
Posts: 116
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A closed safety and management communication line. A lack of "openness" brought about by crews feeling that they risk criticism or reduced promotion prospects through sharing their experiences within the company, or that management make them feel as if they are criticising the system by highlighting potential problems. Also, a frustration that inertia will succeed, and that their laudable attempts to highlight hazards will be filed in a circular out tray.
Efforts to make the operation safer do not produce fast efficiencies and savings; they will not lower the bottom line; they will only win the individual responsible praise and advancement if made in an organisation that has a healthy safety culture, not one which plays lip service to it.
The real bottom line (to steal the words from someone else on PRUNE) :
"if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident".
Efforts to make the operation safer do not produce fast efficiencies and savings; they will not lower the bottom line; they will only win the individual responsible praise and advancement if made in an organisation that has a healthy safety culture, not one which plays lip service to it.
The real bottom line (to steal the words from someone else on PRUNE) :
"if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident".
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Who can say?
Posts: 1,700
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Excellent answer, Mowgli.
And whatever the situation of the company, a very good argument for having the Flight Safety department completely independent of Management.
Of course, also a very good argument for having a company that actually values the input of its aircrew and not simply viewing them as "human resources".
Any member of staff (not only aircrew) must be able to raise safety concerns without fear of negative results for them personally. For this reason, Flight Safety Officers must have access to secure and private phones, email and letterboxes (an open pigeonhole in the crewroom is not sufficient). The company that does not have a fully private (and, if needs be, anonymous) method of raising security worries cannot be said to have any sort of safety culture.
The Flight Safety Officer cannot be held to be accountable to the Chief Pilot, the Flight Operations Director, the Chief Training Captain or anyone below the CEO.
There may be good reasons why a recommendation from him is not acted upon. However, a CEO should think very hard indeed before turning him down.
As Mowgli points out, the feedback loop must be closed. If precursors are not acted upon, then there may be a prima facie case for culpable negligence or, worse, corporate manslaughter in the event of any later accident.
Many, many Flight Safety Officers in the past have been hounded out of their jobs. It is not a popular position with management. Pressure has been put on many - perhaps their last base check was not all that satisfactory all of a sudden? Keep him occupied - put him in the sim for a couple of days. Suggest he's taking on too much responsibility. See if he resigns and appoint someone who may be a bit more malleable instead.
But for truly enlightened management, one surefire sign the FSO is doing his job is if he's being a PITA. If he's not a PITA, you can be sure he's ineffective as an FSO.
Why? Because Flight Safety is all about being proactive. You can never rest on your laurels. You always have to be examining the system, plugging possible holes in the cheese. As soon as you don't hace a load of recommendations for safety improvements, you need to ask "Why not?". Why are there not a load of suggested changes to SOP's, to the Ops Manual, to checklists, to crewing structures, to this that or the other form? Are the crews being kept informed of everything that is happening? If not, why not? Because if they're in the dark, they can't do a lot to improve their safety performance.
And that's where the bottom line stands. Not on the balance sheet, but with the front-line troops.
And whatever the situation of the company, a very good argument for having the Flight Safety department completely independent of Management.
Of course, also a very good argument for having a company that actually values the input of its aircrew and not simply viewing them as "human resources".
Any member of staff (not only aircrew) must be able to raise safety concerns without fear of negative results for them personally. For this reason, Flight Safety Officers must have access to secure and private phones, email and letterboxes (an open pigeonhole in the crewroom is not sufficient). The company that does not have a fully private (and, if needs be, anonymous) method of raising security worries cannot be said to have any sort of safety culture.
The Flight Safety Officer cannot be held to be accountable to the Chief Pilot, the Flight Operations Director, the Chief Training Captain or anyone below the CEO.
There may be good reasons why a recommendation from him is not acted upon. However, a CEO should think very hard indeed before turning him down.
As Mowgli points out, the feedback loop must be closed. If precursors are not acted upon, then there may be a prima facie case for culpable negligence or, worse, corporate manslaughter in the event of any later accident.
Many, many Flight Safety Officers in the past have been hounded out of their jobs. It is not a popular position with management. Pressure has been put on many - perhaps their last base check was not all that satisfactory all of a sudden? Keep him occupied - put him in the sim for a couple of days. Suggest he's taking on too much responsibility. See if he resigns and appoint someone who may be a bit more malleable instead.
But for truly enlightened management, one surefire sign the FSO is doing his job is if he's being a PITA. If he's not a PITA, you can be sure he's ineffective as an FSO.
Why? Because Flight Safety is all about being proactive. You can never rest on your laurels. You always have to be examining the system, plugging possible holes in the cheese. As soon as you don't hace a load of recommendations for safety improvements, you need to ask "Why not?". Why are there not a load of suggested changes to SOP's, to the Ops Manual, to checklists, to crewing structures, to this that or the other form? Are the crews being kept informed of everything that is happening? If not, why not? Because if they're in the dark, they can't do a lot to improve their safety performance.
And that's where the bottom line stands. Not on the balance sheet, but with the front-line troops.
Moderator
.. and to add/emphasise a couple of points ..
The system safety boss, in the same way as the QA boss, must have direct access to the Board and CEO and be empowered by Board policy directive to bypass the administrative systems totally if that is required from time to time in order to get things done.
The Board/CEO must be committed to improving the operation in these areas ... otherwise it is all idle posturing. More importantly, that corporate level must be seen to be committed.
The operative sections have to be funded and resourced adequately and appropriately .. this infers that section heads budget and plan appropriately ... an unplanned safety related surprise cost might be acceptable the first time it arises .. but its causal cost factors must, subsequently, be addressed in budget processes.
The system safety boss, in the same way as the QA boss, must have direct access to the Board and CEO and be empowered by Board policy directive to bypass the administrative systems totally if that is required from time to time in order to get things done.
The Board/CEO must be committed to improving the operation in these areas ... otherwise it is all idle posturing. More importantly, that corporate level must be seen to be committed.
The operative sections have to be funded and resourced adequately and appropriately .. this infers that section heads budget and plan appropriately ... an unplanned safety related surprise cost might be acceptable the first time it arises .. but its causal cost factors must, subsequently, be addressed in budget processes.
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: HON121º/14 NM
Posts: 664
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
vff,
Should errors of that sort be reported via the ASR system?
I have encountered a number of occasions where a beacon has been out of use, and would have expected a NOTAM or AIS to have been published, but not found one. And a couple of occasions where NOTAM have not been passed to crew by our ops staff, even when they are obviously relevant.
I often find that our AERADS are either out of date, or have been damaged beyond use.
Our compnay has an internal system for reporting all manner of problems encountered during a duty, which is accountable. The person filingthe report is kept informed throughout, until a satisfactory conclusion is achieved. It's quite new, but seems to work well.
Should errors of that sort be reported via the ASR system?
I have encountered a number of occasions where a beacon has been out of use, and would have expected a NOTAM or AIS to have been published, but not found one. And a couple of occasions where NOTAM have not been passed to crew by our ops staff, even when they are obviously relevant.
I often find that our AERADS are either out of date, or have been damaged beyond use.
Our compnay has an internal system for reporting all manner of problems encountered during a duty, which is accountable. The person filingthe report is kept informed throughout, until a satisfactory conclusion is achieved. It's quite new, but seems to work well.
stilljustanothernumber
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: the night sky
Posts: 624
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Junk NOTAMS - You know, trench 10m from side of R/W, crane behind the terminal, ILS off in two weeks time - there could be something important lost amongst all that crap!
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Where ever boss send me
Posts: 93
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Does the word "assumptions" not spring to mind. I assumed he would do it. I assumed they knew I meant gallons not litres/pounds etc. I assumed the other engineer fixed it.there are loads more but it can kill all of us.
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: The Far Side
Posts: 94
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pilots themselves are the greatest hazard. the accident stats prove that. We all want to think we are a safe pilot, but this is not a constant truth. You are only as safe as your next choice in the next situation. There are alot of pilots flying right now for badly managed companies, in poorly maintained a/c, in adverse conditions, but doing it safely for themselves because they are making the right choices(delay the takeoff, divert, u/s the a/c, take a break, etc.). There are too many "drivers" out there. There are still many improvements to be made to aviation safety, but it will always be the kind of person who is PIC in the end who makes the biggest difference, good or bad, to safety. Medicine has "quacks", legal has "sharks" and aviation has "drivers".
As funny as it sounds...the hotel van ride
In the past two years as a pax I have been involved in 3 accidents, two minor, one somewhat more. None of us would think about flying with out the harness on, but many crew members think nothing of not wearing a seatbelt. The drivers are often doing double duty at the hotel and happen to be available when the crew arrives. The drivers are often very young with minimal training.
In the past two years as a pax I have been involved in 3 accidents, two minor, one somewhat more. None of us would think about flying with out the harness on, but many crew members think nothing of not wearing a seatbelt. The drivers are often doing double duty at the hotel and happen to be available when the crew arrives. The drivers are often very young with minimal training.
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: UK
Posts: 9
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
again - fatigue.
The low cost combination of some very long days with no breaks ( illegal anywhere else), max duty/ min rest rostering, constant body clock changes from earlies to lates to daytimes and back several times a week and a poor diet (if the airline doesn't provide meals then the crew tend to grab one of those very healthy and nutritious ready made meals) tend to send everyone a bit strange by day 6.
For a short while this is do able. Over the whole summer season, oh dear.....
maybe not an airline problem so much as an FCL problem?
The low cost combination of some very long days with no breaks ( illegal anywhere else), max duty/ min rest rostering, constant body clock changes from earlies to lates to daytimes and back several times a week and a poor diet (if the airline doesn't provide meals then the crew tend to grab one of those very healthy and nutritious ready made meals) tend to send everyone a bit strange by day 6.
For a short while this is do able. Over the whole summer season, oh dear.....
maybe not an airline problem so much as an FCL problem?
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Two hundred baro
Posts: 160
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bad CRM. I've seen crews operating together who are just not compatible, ie a domineering captain and a passive first officer (or a new one who doen't know the ropes yet). When you've got an overbearing captain who is a bit behind the drag curve, coupled with some bad weather at the end of a long night, it can become a major safety concern.
At the other end of the spectrum, I've met captains who appear to be totally lacking in self-confidence, not a good basis for engendering trust in the other crew members.
I agree with b55, there's a lot of "drivers" out there, a situation not helped in my view by basing promotion strictly on seniority, as all the American and a lot of European airlines do.
Bring back three crew aircraft!
At the other end of the spectrum, I've met captains who appear to be totally lacking in self-confidence, not a good basis for engendering trust in the other crew members.
I agree with b55, there's a lot of "drivers" out there, a situation not helped in my view by basing promotion strictly on seniority, as all the American and a lot of European airlines do.
Bring back three crew aircraft!
Last edited by CAT1; 10th Jun 2002 at 13:19.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Arabian Gulf
Posts: 53
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A CEO/PCE/(whatever) with a BAD/NO flight safety policy. It all stems from the top. If you haven't got the right man there, you've got an 'organizational accident waiting to happen'! That, IMHO is the greatest hazard.
After that is sorted out, hmmm, 'where do we go now sweet child of mine...'
After that is sorted out, hmmm, 'where do we go now sweet child of mine...'
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: The Far Side
Posts: 94
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Forget all the indirect, casual causes. There are hundreds of them in the accident stats and yes, they all are very real and yes, alot of them should be and can be eliminated by the industry, including BAD CEO's. But even in the best safety regulated country, in best safety managed airline, run by the most devoted safety people and pilots, there will always be choices left open to the individual pilot and that is where the most danger is. What YOU choose for whatever problem it is YOU need to make a choice. Why that 20,000 hour pilot, his fellow pilots thought of as a good pilot, with 10,000 hours on type, in a brand new a/c, working for a good company, that has an accident? Suddenly question, "No, he really was a marginal pilot." ?! We, the pilots, are the CEO's of our next flight. No one else. We make the choice, right or wrong. each time. Doctors, Judges, Pilots, making choices, life/death choices. every day.
For Safety-Worker, there are actually FOUR P's :
Philosophys, Policys, Procedures, and Practices(that's us!)
Safe flying!
For Safety-Worker, there are actually FOUR P's :
Philosophys, Policys, Procedures, and Practices(that's us!)
Safe flying!
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Australia
Posts: 811
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Biggest overall hazard to operations?
CHANGE
That's what I think anyway... A lot of people have difficulty in adapting to new requirements and procedures. Does anyone really know what's going on with all the new (and not standardised) security procedures at airports around the world? It takes time, and in that time, there is a lot of confusion.
CHANGE
That's what I think anyway... A lot of people have difficulty in adapting to new requirements and procedures. Does anyone really know what's going on with all the new (and not standardised) security procedures at airports around the world? It takes time, and in that time, there is a lot of confusion.
If I owned a £50 million pound machine capable of making me vast profits but equally capable of bankrupting me if poorly operated I would take every care to see that I employed the best and most experienced operators I could find, and I would ensure that they were happy with their renumeration and kept well fed and rested.
I am puzzled as to why many airline managers aim for the exact opposite.
I am puzzled as to why many airline managers aim for the exact opposite.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2001
Location: a fence in the sun
Posts: 182
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Colleagues,
Thanks for your excellent debate.
May I now throw in a few of my own:
(i) No minimum qualifications or standards for those involved in airport, air traffic service, and airline management and senior training positions. These people receive no more training and are checked no more often (indeed, often far less often) than those on the line. Those I work with are good people, elsewhere they're not.
(ii) Dangerous international 'standards'. We don't spend nearly enough time influencing proposed regulations before they become the rules which we fly by. Much of what ICAO puts forward is ill-considered and introduces or fails to address significant hazards.
(iii) Believe it or not, insufficient regulation. Look at the figures for errors caused by poor operational paperwork of all sorts, and then examine the regulations it must satisfy. There are almost none.
(iv) Insufficient standardisation. I'm not too worried which language I speak on the RTF, but I'd like everyone on the frequency to be sharing the same one. This is an international business, too often regulated on national lines.
(v) A very poor reporting system, industry-wide. The very presence of CHIRP, for example, shows that the operational world is failing in this respect. Everyone should have a voice - and use it with care and forethought.
I wonder if the ball will keep rolling...
Thanks for your excellent debate.
May I now throw in a few of my own:
(i) No minimum qualifications or standards for those involved in airport, air traffic service, and airline management and senior training positions. These people receive no more training and are checked no more often (indeed, often far less often) than those on the line. Those I work with are good people, elsewhere they're not.
(ii) Dangerous international 'standards'. We don't spend nearly enough time influencing proposed regulations before they become the rules which we fly by. Much of what ICAO puts forward is ill-considered and introduces or fails to address significant hazards.
(iii) Believe it or not, insufficient regulation. Look at the figures for errors caused by poor operational paperwork of all sorts, and then examine the regulations it must satisfy. There are almost none.
(iv) Insufficient standardisation. I'm not too worried which language I speak on the RTF, but I'd like everyone on the frequency to be sharing the same one. This is an international business, too often regulated on national lines.
(v) A very poor reporting system, industry-wide. The very presence of CHIRP, for example, shows that the operational world is failing in this respect. Everyone should have a voice - and use it with care and forethought.
I wonder if the ball will keep rolling...