Is Safety Data Hidden from the FAA
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Is Safety Data Hidden from the FAA
FAA safety data kept hidden from inspectors - Washington Times
FAA safety data kept hidden
The Federal Aviation Administration is finally collecting a trove of confidential safety data from commercial airline operators, but the agency is still “years away” from analyzing the information to predict problems and doesn’t even allow its own inspectors to look at the data, according to an internal auditor’s report.
As a result, most inspectors and analysts don’t use the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system, the FAA’s inspector general concluded in one of three reports last week looking at safety, air traffic controller training and flight delays.
FAA officials keep delaying their target for being able to use the analysis system to predict and correct safety problems. The latest self-imposed deadline is five years away.
“Field-level inspectors may be missing important safety information applicable to their assigned air carrier,” the investigators wrote in their report about the safety analysis system, on which the government has spent tens of millions of dollars and for which it is requesting $15 million in 2014.
In terms of flights, the inspector general found that the number of delays and cancellations has dropped dramatically since 2000, thanks to airlines scheduling fewer flights, airports improving their own infrastructure and, perhaps most surprising, better all-around weather.
Although scientists warn that climate change could cause traumatic weather patterns, the government audit found improving skies for airlines in the past decade or so, leading to a drop in the number of weather-related flight delays.
Severe weather accounted for 30 percent of all flight delays in 2004, but that dipped to 24 percent in 2008 and 2009 and fell to 16 percent in 2012.
“Relatively favorable weather conditions over the last few years have contributed to the reduced number of delays across most of the country,” the audit said.
On the negative side of the ledger, airlines continue to overbook peak times at the most popular airports, despite the FAA’s effort to control the problem, and the government doesn’t have a good grasp on other structural reasons for delays, the inspector general said, pointing to more data that should be collected.
“Addressing these data problems would go far in giving key aviation stakeholders and the flying public a fuller understanding of air carrier flight delays and their causes,” the investigators said.
Still, delays have fallen by 33 percent since 2000, when the inspector general issued its first report on delays. The number of cancellations is down 56 percent at major airports.
The best improvement was in “extreme taxi times,” when a plane sits on the runway for at least three hours.
After the Transportation Department started imposing penalties in 2010, the number of extreme delays dropped from 1,630 in 2000 to 30 in 2012 — a 98 percent decrease.
Other major changes include airlines simply adding more time to the projects duration of each flight, which builds in extra room to accommodate problems.
The FAA, in its official response, said it also has improved air traffic control procedures and most other efficiency problems possible for now, and that a major upgrade of the system underway likely will take years.
“Improved causality data and ongoing schedule monitoring are useful for identifying systemic delays, but there will likely be diminishing opportunities for further reducing chronic delays until significant NextGen capacity enhancements begin to come online,” said Brodi Fontenot, assistant secretary for administration at the FAA.
As for the safety system, the FAA acknowledged that its hands are tied to some extent by the confidentiality agreements, but H. Clayton Foushee, director of the FAA’s office of audit and evaluation, said the secrecy is needed in order to get airlines to turn over information.
Even with those limitations, the system has helped officials adopt 16 major safety initiatives, Mr. Foushee wrote. He said officials are taking steps to try to get more data out the door.
“Over the next two years, the FAA will implement new initiatives to improve the communication of ASIAS identified risk factors with the inspector workforce. These new initiatives will provide actionable information that will enable FAA inspectors to focus their surveillance activities on higher priority risk areas,” Mr. Foushee wrote.
FAA safety data kept hidden
The Federal Aviation Administration is finally collecting a trove of confidential safety data from commercial airline operators, but the agency is still “years away” from analyzing the information to predict problems and doesn’t even allow its own inspectors to look at the data, according to an internal auditor’s report.
As a result, most inspectors and analysts don’t use the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system, the FAA’s inspector general concluded in one of three reports last week looking at safety, air traffic controller training and flight delays.
FAA officials keep delaying their target for being able to use the analysis system to predict and correct safety problems. The latest self-imposed deadline is five years away.
“Field-level inspectors may be missing important safety information applicable to their assigned air carrier,” the investigators wrote in their report about the safety analysis system, on which the government has spent tens of millions of dollars and for which it is requesting $15 million in 2014.
In terms of flights, the inspector general found that the number of delays and cancellations has dropped dramatically since 2000, thanks to airlines scheduling fewer flights, airports improving their own infrastructure and, perhaps most surprising, better all-around weather.
Although scientists warn that climate change could cause traumatic weather patterns, the government audit found improving skies for airlines in the past decade or so, leading to a drop in the number of weather-related flight delays.
Severe weather accounted for 30 percent of all flight delays in 2004, but that dipped to 24 percent in 2008 and 2009 and fell to 16 percent in 2012.
“Relatively favorable weather conditions over the last few years have contributed to the reduced number of delays across most of the country,” the audit said.
On the negative side of the ledger, airlines continue to overbook peak times at the most popular airports, despite the FAA’s effort to control the problem, and the government doesn’t have a good grasp on other structural reasons for delays, the inspector general said, pointing to more data that should be collected.
“Addressing these data problems would go far in giving key aviation stakeholders and the flying public a fuller understanding of air carrier flight delays and their causes,” the investigators said.
Still, delays have fallen by 33 percent since 2000, when the inspector general issued its first report on delays. The number of cancellations is down 56 percent at major airports.
The best improvement was in “extreme taxi times,” when a plane sits on the runway for at least three hours.
After the Transportation Department started imposing penalties in 2010, the number of extreme delays dropped from 1,630 in 2000 to 30 in 2012 — a 98 percent decrease.
Other major changes include airlines simply adding more time to the projects duration of each flight, which builds in extra room to accommodate problems.
The FAA, in its official response, said it also has improved air traffic control procedures and most other efficiency problems possible for now, and that a major upgrade of the system underway likely will take years.
“Improved causality data and ongoing schedule monitoring are useful for identifying systemic delays, but there will likely be diminishing opportunities for further reducing chronic delays until significant NextGen capacity enhancements begin to come online,” said Brodi Fontenot, assistant secretary for administration at the FAA.
As for the safety system, the FAA acknowledged that its hands are tied to some extent by the confidentiality agreements, but H. Clayton Foushee, director of the FAA’s office of audit and evaluation, said the secrecy is needed in order to get airlines to turn over information.
Even with those limitations, the system has helped officials adopt 16 major safety initiatives, Mr. Foushee wrote. He said officials are taking steps to try to get more data out the door.
“Over the next two years, the FAA will implement new initiatives to improve the communication of ASIAS identified risk factors with the inspector workforce. These new initiatives will provide actionable information that will enable FAA inspectors to focus their surveillance activities on higher priority risk areas,” Mr. Foushee wrote.
Paxing All Over The World
from the report, as quoted above, my emphasis;
Ahh, the wonders of 'light touch regulation'. When the end users and the govt still want to control the system as if it was the old days... 
Time to collect more data, make more reports and then head for the golf course with a job well done.
On the negative side of the ledger, airlines continue to overbook peak times at the most popular airports, despite the FAA’s effort to control the problem, and the government doesn’t have a good grasp on other structural reasons for delays, the inspector general said, pointing to more data that should be collected.
Time to collect more data, make more reports and then head for the golf course with a job well done.
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Oversight, data-protection, get-out-of-jail-free
The press story cited was from:
Stephen Dinan, "FAA safety data kept hidden from inspectors"
_The Washington Times_, December 26, 2013.
Edit: here's the source-rpt from the Dot-IG
DOT - FAA?s Safety Data Analysis and Sharing System Shows Progress, but More Advanced Capabilities and Inspector Access Remain Limited | Office of Inspector General
December 18, 2013
FAA’s Safety Data Analysis and Sharing System Shows Progress, but More Advanced Capabilities and Inspector Access Remain Limited
. . . Project ID: AV-2014-017
pdf is 28-pages: http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...t^12-18-13.pdf
Note FAA's expanded definition of "ASIAS" -- which now includes both FOQA and ASAP; the IG's report includes a nice history (post-fatal changes) to the FAA's ASIAS, and planned improvements.
This recent DoT-IG report of Dec'18th (incident-data hidden) echos findings of the Rand Report , Safety ... NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations.... pdf 72pgs,
[pg 40]
-- DoT's IG,
-- the FAA's Office of Audit and Evaluation
For mishap "investigators" working with USAF there is the critical review of the DoD's IG.
But for some folks in mishap-investigation there is no oversight.
For the privileged staff at USA's "independent" NTSB there is NO audit permitted, NO IG review, NO Scientific Ombudsman, nor any means of congressional oversight (other than funding-$$); see the Ninth Circuit Court Decision, citing the NTSB staff's "unreviewable discretion":
FOQA? -- ASAP? _ EDIT_: See the IG's rpt, for a current update on FOQA and ASAP, and future plans, eg pgs 2-6.
If any pilot thinks that filing that ASAP report will solve a non-compliance-problem (with managers) at his airline, or at his airline's POI, then consider that your ASAP-notice just gave the airline & its faa-CMO a "get-out-of-jail-free".
Another fault of the ASAP (incident reporting) program was the "protection": conceived as protection for the reporting-pilot, the FAA and the Airline instead wanted that "protection" feature for the "product" of the ERC, thus suppressing the ERC's "review" rpt (completely defeating the purpose of ASAP as an organizational-corrective). For example, an ARC-incident & ASAP-reports reveal the company/FAA-CMO joint non-compliance with the "energy management element" of FAA's Stabilized Approach standard for TURBOJETs ("engines spooled-up") -- but the local-ERC (company & CMO-regulator) elects to not acknowledge their own non-compliance; and then that local-ERC close-out that ASAP-review, with no other oversight of their local ASAP-program: no lesson-learned, no corrective action at the operator, no err-recognition by the wider-FAA.
Stephen Dinan, "FAA safety data kept hidden from inspectors"
_The Washington Times_, December 26, 2013.
Edit: here's the source-rpt from the Dot-IG
DOT - FAA?s Safety Data Analysis and Sharing System Shows Progress, but More Advanced Capabilities and Inspector Access Remain Limited | Office of Inspector General
December 18, 2013
FAA’s Safety Data Analysis and Sharing System Shows Progress, but More Advanced Capabilities and Inspector Access Remain Limited
. . . Project ID: AV-2014-017
pdf is 28-pages: http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...t^12-18-13.pdf
Note FAA's expanded definition of "ASIAS" -- which now includes both FOQA and ASAP; the IG's report includes a nice history (post-fatal changes) to the FAA's ASIAS, and planned improvements.
This recent DoT-IG report of Dec'18th (incident-data hidden) echos findings of the Rand Report , Safety ... NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations.... pdf 72pgs,
[pg 40]
. . . resolving more complex accidents depends upon a thorough knowledge of prior incidents.... only a small portion of the NTSB’s aviation resources are focused on incident events. NTSB investigators rarely access outside data sources that describe incidents, and when a fatal accident occurs, NTSB’s staff is frequently unaware of previous significant events.... the historically light treatment of incidents means that important safety monitoring is not performed. Investigations are also hampered, because investigators are not up to speed when an accident occurs....
Layers of oversight, audit, ect, -- Note the mention of:-- DoT's IG,
-- the FAA's Office of Audit and Evaluation
For mishap "investigators" working with USAF there is the critical review of the DoD's IG.
But for some folks in mishap-investigation there is no oversight.
For the privileged staff at USA's "independent" NTSB there is NO audit permitted, NO IG review, NO Scientific Ombudsman, nor any means of congressional oversight (other than funding-$$); see the Ninth Circuit Court Decision, citing the NTSB staff's "unreviewable discretion":
"... the NTSB's complete discretion to conduct its investigations as it sees fit.... that unreviewable discretion...."
Hiding data -- that helps the airlines. FOQA? -- ASAP? _ EDIT_: See the IG's rpt, for a current update on FOQA and ASAP, and future plans, eg pgs 2-6.
If any pilot thinks that filing that ASAP report will solve a non-compliance-problem (with managers) at his airline, or at his airline's POI, then consider that your ASAP-notice just gave the airline & its faa-CMO a "get-out-of-jail-free".
Another fault of the ASAP (incident reporting) program was the "protection": conceived as protection for the reporting-pilot, the FAA and the Airline instead wanted that "protection" feature for the "product" of the ERC, thus suppressing the ERC's "review" rpt (completely defeating the purpose of ASAP as an organizational-corrective). For example, an ARC-incident & ASAP-reports reveal the company/FAA-CMO joint non-compliance with the "energy management element" of FAA's Stabilized Approach standard for TURBOJETs ("engines spooled-up") -- but the local-ERC (company & CMO-regulator) elects to not acknowledge their own non-compliance; and then that local-ERC close-out that ASAP-review, with no other oversight of their local ASAP-program: no lesson-learned, no corrective action at the operator, no err-recognition by the wider-FAA.
Last edited by IGh; 10th Jan 2014 at 17:17. Reason: added link to IG's rpt.
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My question would be … is this ASIAS system intended to provide information that will allow a reduction in the number of flight delays and cancellations … or is it intended to provide information that will allow an analysis of what airlines are doing that might contribute to a reduction in airline safety?? Of course, I’m not saying that delays and last minute cancellations cannot be terribly inconvenient or frustrating – probably both – but it is inconceivable that the missing fact is that all of the delays and cancellations in the world are not even close to the “inconvenience” or “frustration” resulting from having one (or all!) of your family killed in an airline accident! I happen to agree with the FAA’s Dr. Foushee in that the kinds of confidentiality agreements that are in place are likely to be one of the only reasons (if not THE only reason) that allows information on airline activities and associated and relevant information to be forwarded to the FAA – and I’m quite sure that such information is NOT limited to delays and cancellations. But I’m also aware that internal organizations, or even individual offices, within the FAA are not terribly interested in having “outside” criticisms of how they conduct their business – regardless of the nature of the specific issue being reported.
So when ASIAS “reports” are read, if any of them point to a safety related issue, any formalized questioning of an associated practice of the FAA (either formulated by or carried through by an organization within the FAA’s organizational structure), particularly if the questioner is someone like an Inspector General’s representative, or even one of Dr. Foushee’s staff, I have to wonder if anyone really finds it surprising that the FAA officials to whom such questions are posed immediately deny any legitimacy connected with that concern? If that “shoulder-shrug” or “bland/blank expression” is the result – and I’m highly suspicious that they ARE, at least at times, and perhaps ALL the time – any additional prodding and poking conducted by representatives of either of these offices, are likely to find employees who become even more reluctant to speak or deny having any informative or relevant information. If either of these offices were to pursue such questioning with the ASIAS information they have, I feel quite sure they legitimately fear seeing such information sources dry up and disappear. There are just too many instances where the “whistle blower” protection systems in place (at either the airline or at the FAA – or both) are either inadequate or are somehow circumvented. In fact, I know of some FAA inspectors who have been disciplined (i.e., given days off or have had their performance reports downgraded – or both) for initiating, echoing, or confirming similar kinds of safety concerns.
Is it possible that the published reports and associated comments that primarily address cancellations or delays are intended to deflect attention from the reality of the safety issues which I suspect was the original intent of the development of the AISAS in the first place??
So when ASIAS “reports” are read, if any of them point to a safety related issue, any formalized questioning of an associated practice of the FAA (either formulated by or carried through by an organization within the FAA’s organizational structure), particularly if the questioner is someone like an Inspector General’s representative, or even one of Dr. Foushee’s staff, I have to wonder if anyone really finds it surprising that the FAA officials to whom such questions are posed immediately deny any legitimacy connected with that concern? If that “shoulder-shrug” or “bland/blank expression” is the result – and I’m highly suspicious that they ARE, at least at times, and perhaps ALL the time – any additional prodding and poking conducted by representatives of either of these offices, are likely to find employees who become even more reluctant to speak or deny having any informative or relevant information. If either of these offices were to pursue such questioning with the ASIAS information they have, I feel quite sure they legitimately fear seeing such information sources dry up and disappear. There are just too many instances where the “whistle blower” protection systems in place (at either the airline or at the FAA – or both) are either inadequate or are somehow circumvented. In fact, I know of some FAA inspectors who have been disciplined (i.e., given days off or have had their performance reports downgraded – or both) for initiating, echoing, or confirming similar kinds of safety concerns.
Is it possible that the published reports and associated comments that primarily address cancellations or delays are intended to deflect attention from the reality of the safety issues which I suspect was the original intent of the development of the AISAS in the first place??
