Flight Annual Safety Review - amazing
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Flight Annual Safety Review - amazing
I don't know if you've seen it but last year showed an amazing improvement in losses on commercial, scheduled flights - almost twice as good as 2011 (and that was almost the best year ever)
of course it is probably a statistical outlier of some sort but even so.............
2012 -- 21 fatal accidents, 425 deaths, 1 accident per 2.3 million flights
2011 -- 32 accidents 514 deaths, 1 accident per 1.4 million flights
of course it is probably a statistical outlier of some sort but even so.............
2012 -- 21 fatal accidents, 425 deaths, 1 accident per 2.3 million flights
2011 -- 32 accidents 514 deaths, 1 accident per 1.4 million flights
With that improvement in the safety record it makes you wonder why the FAA have published a Safety Bulletin recommending operators to encourage their crews to fly manually where appropriate, in order to keep up their manual skills (now there's an oxymoron!)
Slight thread drift coming. There is little doubt that the emphasis by the major manufacturers on automatic flight has been a significant factor in reducing CFIT accidents. On the other hand Loss of Control has long since replaced CFIT in the accident stakes. Which is why one suspects that many of the older hands still in the left seat still have that nagging feeling that manual flying skills are equally as important as automation monitoring.
The newer generation of cadet pilots, including MPL holders, brought up on automation since their first introduction to simulators, may disagree with the perceived need to practice manual flying. Pity about that...
Slight thread drift coming. There is little doubt that the emphasis by the major manufacturers on automatic flight has been a significant factor in reducing CFIT accidents. On the other hand Loss of Control has long since replaced CFIT in the accident stakes. Which is why one suspects that many of the older hands still in the left seat still have that nagging feeling that manual flying skills are equally as important as automation monitoring.
The newer generation of cadet pilots, including MPL holders, brought up on automation since their first introduction to simulators, may disagree with the perceived need to practice manual flying. Pity about that...
Last edited by Centaurus; 19th Jan 2013 at 23:03.
A37575;
Re your statement, "Proving that lack of basic handling skills is worse than at first thought.", you might wish to read the FSF's November 2012 issue of AeroSafety World in which overrun accidents are discussed in detail, p.8-11 Overrun Breakdown, by Wayne Rosenkrans.
If three "causes" are summarized as "landing too fast", "landing too long" and "low achieved deceleration" the breakdown might be a little over 2/3 handling & a little under 1/3 physics, (with handling in terms of spoiler & reverse selection being mentioned in the article).
While I agree with the notion that aircraft handling is now a mainstream flight safety issue (something we as pilots said in 1992 and earlier was going to happen with increased use of automation...), most non-stabilized approaches do not result in either a CFIT (landing short) or an overrun and the pilot is psychologically "rewarded" because, despite an unstable approach, the landing was "successful", (ie., there was no overrun). Therefore a closer examination of the character of handling factors is required in overrun accidents. In many ways and not just the obvious ones, FOQA (FDA, FDM) can play a significant role in early detection and response to these handling issues in terms of training and checking.
Re your statement, "Proving that lack of basic handling skills is worse than at first thought.", you might wish to read the FSF's November 2012 issue of AeroSafety World in which overrun accidents are discussed in detail, p.8-11 Overrun Breakdown, by Wayne Rosenkrans.
If three "causes" are summarized as "landing too fast", "landing too long" and "low achieved deceleration" the breakdown might be a little over 2/3 handling & a little under 1/3 physics, (with handling in terms of spoiler & reverse selection being mentioned in the article).
While I agree with the notion that aircraft handling is now a mainstream flight safety issue (something we as pilots said in 1992 and earlier was going to happen with increased use of automation...), most non-stabilized approaches do not result in either a CFIT (landing short) or an overrun and the pilot is psychologically "rewarded" because, despite an unstable approach, the landing was "successful", (ie., there was no overrun). Therefore a closer examination of the character of handling factors is required in overrun accidents. In many ways and not just the obvious ones, FOQA (FDA, FDM) can play a significant role in early detection and response to these handling issues in terms of training and checking.
“Therefore a closer examination of the character of handling factors is required …”
As a starting point there are some interesting views in the presentation ‘Responding to Emergencies and Abnormal Situations’.
The first section reviews several themes contributing to events (albeit checklist related) and identifies the importance of linking knowledge through concepts to action (flying skills - expertise).
Slide 26 onwards presents a very interesting view of the domain of core operating skills – flying, operating, and managing; and that it is amongst these where problems of the higher level operational skills are seen.
The implication is that the perception of poor operational flying skills is actually a symptom of weak strategic management (Prioritisation, Anticipation, Planning, Recognition), and mental activity (Mental Flight Path Control, Rules of Thumb, Gates and Triggers, Event Flow Patterns, Generic Response Patterns, Situational Concepts, Time Management) slide 33.
And because this is where the “action takes place” – the mental activities, then “this is where problems are avoided” (slide 35)
The remainder of the presentation involves cogent argument as to what the specific issue are, and perhaps how they might be addressed with training.
As a starting point there are some interesting views in the presentation ‘Responding to Emergencies and Abnormal Situations’.
The first section reviews several themes contributing to events (albeit checklist related) and identifies the importance of linking knowledge through concepts to action (flying skills - expertise).
Slide 26 onwards presents a very interesting view of the domain of core operating skills – flying, operating, and managing; and that it is amongst these where problems of the higher level operational skills are seen.
The implication is that the perception of poor operational flying skills is actually a symptom of weak strategic management (Prioritisation, Anticipation, Planning, Recognition), and mental activity (Mental Flight Path Control, Rules of Thumb, Gates and Triggers, Event Flow Patterns, Generic Response Patterns, Situational Concepts, Time Management) slide 33.
And because this is where the “action takes place” – the mental activities, then “this is where problems are avoided” (slide 35)
The remainder of the presentation involves cogent argument as to what the specific issue are, and perhaps how they might be addressed with training.
