Article about go-arounds after unstabilized approaches

[Cpt_Schmerzfrei]

Dear all,

May I solicit your help in finding an article? Earlier this year, there was an article (and an online survey) based on the Flight Safety Foundation's research that only a very low number of flights actually go-around when their approach becomes unstabilized - I think 3% was the number.

I would like to show the article (or any good article for that matter) to a colleague, but can't find it, even after some googling and digging in Flight Global's archives.

If you have any idea where to find more information, please point me in the right direction.

Thanks a lot,

Cpt.

[Armchairflyer]

The source I could quickly ferret out states 5% (p. 15); is this helpful to you?

http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homep...er.12.6.06.pdf

[IGh]

Plan Continuation Bias

Question, about prior research:

"... an article ... research that only a very low number of flights actually go-around when their approach ... unstabilized ... [?]"

Plan Continuation Bias, Snowballing Workload: reduced cognitive ability during the approach phase -- late cognitive demands may overwhelm the human’s capabilities, and then inhibit his decision for go-around.

Pressing the Approach 6 pages. [PDF 297K]
A NASA study of 19 recent accidents yields a new perspective on pilot error.

http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...d-trained.html

The Rare Go-Around | Flight Safety Foundation
AeroSafety World March 2012 -> The Rare Go-Around
"... only 2–3 percent of the unstablized approaches end in a go-around.... the Foundation ... launched a social network discussion on LinkedIn....
... discussion on this topic has been very good. These points have been raised:

• Whenever pilots fight through an unstabilized approach to a safe landing, unsafe behavior is reinforced.
• Pilots are motivated by pride or company pressure to “get the job done.”
• Reduced fuel loads arriving at destinations.
• The fatigue issue, which boosts the “need” to get down while diminishing the pilot tools available to achieve the desired outcome.
• Inadequate training on stabilized approaches and go-arounds, and on crew resource management, to avoid getting into situations where a go-around is necessary.
• Inadequate management response to evidence of high rates of unstabilized approaches and low rates of go-arounds.
• Inadequate management knowledge about the state of operations, i.e., no or poor monitoring programs in place.
• Both pilot flying and pilot monitoring must be empowered to call for a go-around. It should go without saying that airline policies do not penalize pilots who do go around.

Many real-world situations dirty the water when discussing clear guidelines for when a go-around is crucial.
= = = /\ end excerpt from FSF's Mar'2012 _ASW_ = = /\ = = =

Research following a fatal A&L accident:
Rhoda, D.A.; Pawlak, M.L. "An Assessment of Thunderstorm Penetrations and Deviations by Commercial Aircraft in the Terminal Area." Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory, Project Report NASA/A-2. (1999).

"... This research documented that pilots routinely penetrated thunderstorms ... rather than deviated around them, especially when approaching an airport to land. ... pilots penetrated the thunderstorms ... 67 percent ... The study concluded that pilots were more likely to penetrate a thunderstorm when they were flying after dark, flying within 10 to 16 miles of the airport, following another aircraft, or running behind schedule by more than 15 minutes...."

[Cpt_Schmerzfrei]

Hello Armchairflyer and IGh,

Thank you very much for your kind help - it is greatly appreciated!

After spending the day on looking for the article, I finally found what I was looking for:

Runway Excursions More Common, Says USAIG Safety Director | Aviation International News

Once again, thank you!