CRM - effective?
Thread Starter
CRM - effective?
A question if I may:
CRM training has been around for the last 20 years or so.
Accidents attributable to 'human factors' remain fixed in the 75-80% region.
Why are we not seeing a recognisable drop in this statistic due to the effectiveness of CRM training?
CRM training has been around for the last 20 years or so.
Accidents attributable to 'human factors' remain fixed in the 75-80% region.
Why are we not seeing a recognisable drop in this statistic due to the effectiveness of CRM training?
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I would contend that effectively 100% of accidents involve human factors, after all it is humans who design, build, maintain, manage, regulate and operate aircraft. I would also suggest that 100% of SAFETY is human created.
Back to the question
The moving average accident rate continues to decline, therefore more flights for the same number of accidents (or less accidents and the same number of flights) therefore the industry is getting safer (horrid word)
Therefore if you believe your 75% figure then that is 75 % of a declining number and thus HF related accidents are reducing and thus the suggestion that CRM training is ineffective may be false.
Citing my source....
Though it pains me to use single source data I'm too busy right now to drag more out so.... IATA numbers IATA
Interestingly as IATA claim 30 % of accidents were related to pilot handling, again I can't vouch for their methodology, but perhaps CRM can be thanked for us stopping punching each other but we've now just plain forgotten how to waggle the stick like thing.
Even more interestingly , IATA define a "hull loss" as
Now I've seen some fairly small dents that can exceed 1 mil USD or 10% of hull value but wouldn't have considered them a "hull loss"
Sorry I've drifted off thread and after only half of the first reply... what was the question again?
Back to the question
The moving average accident rate continues to decline, therefore more flights for the same number of accidents (or less accidents and the same number of flights) therefore the industry is getting safer (horrid word)
Therefore if you believe your 75% figure then that is 75 % of a declining number and thus HF related accidents are reducing and thus the suggestion that CRM training is ineffective may be false.
Citing my source....
Though it pains me to use single source data I'm too busy right now to drag more out so.... IATA numbers IATA
The 2009 global accident rate (measured in hull losses per million flights of Western-built jet aircraft) was 0.71. That is equal to one accident for every 1.4 million flights. This is a significant improvement of the 0.81 rate recorded in 2008 (one accident for 1.2 million flights). The 2009 rate was the second lowest in aviation history, just above the 2006 rate of 0.65. Compared to 10 years ago, the accident rate has been cut 36% from the rate recorded in 2000.
Interestingly as IATA claim 30 % of accidents were related to pilot handling, again I can't vouch for their methodology, but perhaps CRM can be thanked for us stopping punching each other but we've now just plain forgotten how to waggle the stick like thing.
Even more interestingly , IATA define a "hull loss" as
The aircraft has sustained major structural damage exceeding USD 1 million or 10% of
the aircraft's hull reserve value, whichever is lower, or has been declared a hull loss.
the aircraft's hull reserve value, whichever is lower, or has been declared a hull loss.
Sorry I've drifted off thread and after only half of the first reply... what was the question again?
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Why are we not seeing a recognisable drop in this statistic due to the effectiveness of CRM training?
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So lets review why a couple of incidents went "well"
Al Hayes DC10 Sioux City Iowa (Loss of all hydraulics)
Chesley Sullenberger Airbus A320 Hudson River NYC (Loss of power)
In both these cases
Someone took charge
Everyone did their jobs
There was clear communication internally and externally
This, to me, points to the highest levels of training and competency and all of the crews (FC and CC) should be commended for their exceptional professionalism. We should also commend the air traffickers, groundcrew and first responders for their part too.
Unfortunately no amount of HF/CRM training is going to overcome gross unprofessionalism on the part of Air Operators, Maintainers, FC and CC.
(Sorry, unprovoked and unnecessary rant over)
Hey tbc just put your backseaters in their place OK?
Al Hayes DC10 Sioux City Iowa (Loss of all hydraulics)
Chesley Sullenberger Airbus A320 Hudson River NYC (Loss of power)
In both these cases
Someone took charge
Everyone did their jobs
There was clear communication internally and externally
This, to me, points to the highest levels of training and competency and all of the crews (FC and CC) should be commended for their exceptional professionalism. We should also commend the air traffickers, groundcrew and first responders for their part too.
Unfortunately no amount of HF/CRM training is going to overcome gross unprofessionalism on the part of Air Operators, Maintainers, FC and CC.
(Sorry, unprovoked and unnecessary rant over)
Hey tbc just put your backseaters in their place OK?
I drafted this for the parallel thread “CRM Dead?”, but my thoughts probably have greater application here.
CRM is not so much dead as it exists in many different guises and thus the original concept has been weakened (ineffective). CRM’s roots in a Western culture (N. America) did not translate easily to other cultures, and thus there have been many adaptations, some better than others; opportunities for further weakness.
Also, perhaps an expectation that ‘effectiveness’ can be measured via accident rates is inappropriate for aspects involving human behaviour. There could be changes in safety statistics, e.g. the relative contribution of adverse human behaviour in accidents, but even this would depend on many other HF interactions and it could be difficult to separate cause from effect.
Many of the varied interpretations of what CRM entails focuses on the Human–Human (L-L) interface of SHELL. Quite often, this limited ‘social’ view excludes the other interfaces and overlooks the Human at the centre of all of the interfaces.
CRM has been overly presented as crew based (team), thus many training implementations attempt to create the team before considering the individual. Behavioural change is primarily an individual aspect, and this and other activities are driven by how an individual thinks – a cognitive issue.
Greater focus on cognition (thinking) should improve aspects of awareness and decision making which in many cases have been treated as add-ons to CRM.
More recently, new initiatives have been introduced to refresh CRM; TEM for example. In one guise TEM is part of CRM, in another, an independent programme, or even the basis of SMS. These aspects only serve to further weaken CRM, either spreading training more thinly or misallocating priorities.
One of the original intentions of CRM was that it should be integrated into everyday operations. In many cases this aspiration has not been achieved. An instructor qualification is essential for training, but overly specific CRM instructors detract from integration. All flight, simulator, or check pilots should be ‘CRM’ instructors; as should all Captains, for their crew.
CRM may not require resuscitating, but does require reinvigorating (a safety tonic in the current harsh commercial climate).
It would be unrealistic to expect a new named initiative to have the required success, nor to expect, or need the many cultural variations to be aligned.
Instead the industry should consider some of the latest views on human performance and safety systems. Within CRM the human should be seen as the source of safety, not the creator or purveyor of error. The best practice, coping mechanism, and success of everyday operations need to be captured, reinforced, and promoted. Take a positive view of the human; keep on doing what is done well, change what is not so good.
This view and associated activities should provide the ‘material’ of safety. Individual and team training should focus on using this material, how to think about situations, awareness, and decision making. None of this differs significantly from the ideals of CRM; it’s just an alternative view, changed priorities, and a focus on the positive and primary means of creating safety – people.
It would still be known as CRM, but hopefully more ‘alive’ and effective than some versions are today.
P.S. In order to improve safety statistics, many aspects in the outer arms of SHELL require improvement; until this occurs, any expectation that the central human will improve is misguided.
CRM is not so much dead as it exists in many different guises and thus the original concept has been weakened (ineffective). CRM’s roots in a Western culture (N. America) did not translate easily to other cultures, and thus there have been many adaptations, some better than others; opportunities for further weakness.
Also, perhaps an expectation that ‘effectiveness’ can be measured via accident rates is inappropriate for aspects involving human behaviour. There could be changes in safety statistics, e.g. the relative contribution of adverse human behaviour in accidents, but even this would depend on many other HF interactions and it could be difficult to separate cause from effect.
Many of the varied interpretations of what CRM entails focuses on the Human–Human (L-L) interface of SHELL. Quite often, this limited ‘social’ view excludes the other interfaces and overlooks the Human at the centre of all of the interfaces.
CRM has been overly presented as crew based (team), thus many training implementations attempt to create the team before considering the individual. Behavioural change is primarily an individual aspect, and this and other activities are driven by how an individual thinks – a cognitive issue.
Greater focus on cognition (thinking) should improve aspects of awareness and decision making which in many cases have been treated as add-ons to CRM.
More recently, new initiatives have been introduced to refresh CRM; TEM for example. In one guise TEM is part of CRM, in another, an independent programme, or even the basis of SMS. These aspects only serve to further weaken CRM, either spreading training more thinly or misallocating priorities.
One of the original intentions of CRM was that it should be integrated into everyday operations. In many cases this aspiration has not been achieved. An instructor qualification is essential for training, but overly specific CRM instructors detract from integration. All flight, simulator, or check pilots should be ‘CRM’ instructors; as should all Captains, for their crew.
CRM may not require resuscitating, but does require reinvigorating (a safety tonic in the current harsh commercial climate).
It would be unrealistic to expect a new named initiative to have the required success, nor to expect, or need the many cultural variations to be aligned.
Instead the industry should consider some of the latest views on human performance and safety systems. Within CRM the human should be seen as the source of safety, not the creator or purveyor of error. The best practice, coping mechanism, and success of everyday operations need to be captured, reinforced, and promoted. Take a positive view of the human; keep on doing what is done well, change what is not so good.
This view and associated activities should provide the ‘material’ of safety. Individual and team training should focus on using this material, how to think about situations, awareness, and decision making. None of this differs significantly from the ideals of CRM; it’s just an alternative view, changed priorities, and a focus on the positive and primary means of creating safety – people.
It would still be known as CRM, but hopefully more ‘alive’ and effective than some versions are today.
P.S. In order to improve safety statistics, many aspects in the outer arms of SHELL require improvement; until this occurs, any expectation that the central human will improve is misguided.
