Passenger pontification and pilot safety
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I thought it was about learning from the mistakes of the past and integrating them into training.
Pulling up incidents from 20 yeas ago does nothing for the state of the art. There exists processes to deal with these things, and training for when situations out of the ordinary occur.
Any aviation literature you read will tell you that lessons were learned from pretty much any incident you name. As with almost any incident involving large-scale passenger transportation, these things are combed over, the way the holes lined up are examined and the causes small and large are found.
These findings are then released and filter down into training, recommendations and the like.
Any aviation literature you read will tell you that lessons were learned from pretty much any incident you name. As with almost any incident involving large-scale passenger transportation, these things are combed over, the way the holes lined up are examined and the causes small and large are found.
These findings are then released and filter down into training, recommendations and the like.
http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf
Vigilance is useful, paranoia is not.
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Originally Posted by thePassenger
You are right. I, too, feel that this discussion serves no purpose any longer. I will leave you now and see my doctor to have my paranoia cured!
That's the best thing you have said in the entire thread. Good Bye.
‘thePassenger’ introduced safety statistics (Boeing data) into an interesting discussion that commenced with his/her concerns about the reduction of safety margins.
despegue defined safety as ‘a condition of a relative absence of danger’.
The Boeing data shows that over the last 40 years the level of safety (accident rate) has improved and the occurrence of any one accident would not significantly change the ‘level of safety’ with respect to previous years. However, the BA event was not an accident, but accepting that incidents are the precursors to accidents (Heinrich ratio), then a serious safety incident is something that we should pay attention to. But likewise this event was not even a serious safety incident or a precursor incident.
From the definition of safety the ‘condition’ (situation) that the aircraft was in had been specified by both the aircraft certification and the operational rules, thus the event was bounded by the ‘relative absence of danger’ as judged by the overseeing authorities.
One open issue is the perception of the reduction of safety.
Why should ‘Peter Passenger’ believe that the event reduced the level of safety?
First, there was the unusual, public reporting of the event, which in isolation provides no perspective with respect to any number of similar events or their outcomes.
Second, as debated at length above, there are mixed understandings of the basis of certification. It is difficult enough for line pilots to come to terms with all regulatory aspects, but the bottom line usually resides in situation awareness and procedures.
Thirdly, and perhaps most pertinent, is that with continually increasing operations and a constant accident rate, the actual number of accidents (precursor incidents) will increase, but again this was not an incident and thus the problem lies in the definition of the event, primarily because it was in the public domain.
Thus it should not be surprising for the public to side with a more comprehendible ‘media’ representation of the event, but what is surprising is the apparent differing regulatory views, especially where the industry depends on a positive public view of safety and that the regulators have a major role to play in maintaining this.
Therefore I believe that is it incorrect to aim safety concerns such as this, valid or otherwise, at a particular airline. This issue is more of regulatory culture and public perception than that of one airline being different to any other airline, whether they serve Bielefeld or anywhere else
despegue defined safety as ‘a condition of a relative absence of danger’.
The Boeing data shows that over the last 40 years the level of safety (accident rate) has improved and the occurrence of any one accident would not significantly change the ‘level of safety’ with respect to previous years. However, the BA event was not an accident, but accepting that incidents are the precursors to accidents (Heinrich ratio), then a serious safety incident is something that we should pay attention to. But likewise this event was not even a serious safety incident or a precursor incident.
From the definition of safety the ‘condition’ (situation) that the aircraft was in had been specified by both the aircraft certification and the operational rules, thus the event was bounded by the ‘relative absence of danger’ as judged by the overseeing authorities.
One open issue is the perception of the reduction of safety.
Why should ‘Peter Passenger’ believe that the event reduced the level of safety?
First, there was the unusual, public reporting of the event, which in isolation provides no perspective with respect to any number of similar events or their outcomes.
Second, as debated at length above, there are mixed understandings of the basis of certification. It is difficult enough for line pilots to come to terms with all regulatory aspects, but the bottom line usually resides in situation awareness and procedures.
Thirdly, and perhaps most pertinent, is that with continually increasing operations and a constant accident rate, the actual number of accidents (precursor incidents) will increase, but again this was not an incident and thus the problem lies in the definition of the event, primarily because it was in the public domain.
Thus it should not be surprising for the public to side with a more comprehendible ‘media’ representation of the event, but what is surprising is the apparent differing regulatory views, especially where the industry depends on a positive public view of safety and that the regulators have a major role to play in maintaining this.
Therefore I believe that is it incorrect to aim safety concerns such as this, valid or otherwise, at a particular airline. This issue is more of regulatory culture and public perception than that of one airline being different to any other airline, whether they serve Bielefeld or anywhere else
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alf5071h,
as you are one of the few here who dealt with this topic in a serious way, I´ d like to respond (for the last time, I hope!) to a few of your points:
- I can´t really make much of the phrase "relative absence of danger". Defining exactely WHEN "danger" starts to be present seems to be the problem and the controversial topic with slightly differing answers from different authorities.
Obviously the FAA did not judge this "incident" the same way the British authorities did?
- "Normal people" (not aviation professionals) using some "common sense" - type of "perception of reduction of safety" would indeed feel that switching off one engine leads to a small reduction in safety margins. In fact safety margines will indeed be reduced, if only by a very small amount.
I remember D.P.Davies´ (then Chief Test Pilot of the UK Airworthiness Authority) comments on the stick pusher (which was a controversial subject with pilots at the time his book was written). He showed that the probability of the pusher failing to operate when required to operate so that the aeroplane possibly suffers a catastrophe was 1 in 10 million flights and concluded "however much you might object to this possiblity, it is an acceptable level (because it is extremly remote) and one on which is based a lot of the other risks which are run in civil airline operation."
The arguments for the 3-engines 747-flight would probably be very similar. Still this is an ADDITIONAL risk, the same way as the need for a stick-pusher was an ADDITIONAL risk.
Yes, it is an extremly small ADDITIONAL risk, one which seems to be well within the boundaries many (but not all) authorities obviously define as "relative absence of danger".
I am sure that the daily business of flying jets includes many similar actions of slightly reducing safety margins like taking off according to the MEL (otherwise the whole system would break down), only that in this case it had a rather negative impact on the public view and it is a good example that one should not overdo things.
However one question remains: would this flight have had the same fuel-problems if all 4 engines had been running all the time? If not, maybe the captain offered his passengers a first slice of Emmentaler after all by continuing with this flight?
Maybe you want to read what a US captain has to say about this "incident":
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/colum...-captain_x.htm
The bottom line is that our FAA does not consider it safe to continue a flight with any fewer than all engines operative.
as you are one of the few here who dealt with this topic in a serious way, I´ d like to respond (for the last time, I hope!) to a few of your points:
- I can´t really make much of the phrase "relative absence of danger". Defining exactely WHEN "danger" starts to be present seems to be the problem and the controversial topic with slightly differing answers from different authorities.
Obviously the FAA did not judge this "incident" the same way the British authorities did?
- "Normal people" (not aviation professionals) using some "common sense" - type of "perception of reduction of safety" would indeed feel that switching off one engine leads to a small reduction in safety margins. In fact safety margines will indeed be reduced, if only by a very small amount.
I remember D.P.Davies´ (then Chief Test Pilot of the UK Airworthiness Authority) comments on the stick pusher (which was a controversial subject with pilots at the time his book was written). He showed that the probability of the pusher failing to operate when required to operate so that the aeroplane possibly suffers a catastrophe was 1 in 10 million flights and concluded "however much you might object to this possiblity, it is an acceptable level (because it is extremly remote) and one on which is based a lot of the other risks which are run in civil airline operation."
The arguments for the 3-engines 747-flight would probably be very similar. Still this is an ADDITIONAL risk, the same way as the need for a stick-pusher was an ADDITIONAL risk.
Yes, it is an extremly small ADDITIONAL risk, one which seems to be well within the boundaries many (but not all) authorities obviously define as "relative absence of danger".
I am sure that the daily business of flying jets includes many similar actions of slightly reducing safety margins like taking off according to the MEL (otherwise the whole system would break down), only that in this case it had a rather negative impact on the public view and it is a good example that one should not overdo things.
However one question remains: would this flight have had the same fuel-problems if all 4 engines had been running all the time? If not, maybe the captain offered his passengers a first slice of Emmentaler after all by continuing with this flight?
Maybe you want to read what a US captain has to say about this "incident":
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/colum...-captain_x.htm
The bottom line is that our FAA does not consider it safe to continue a flight with any fewer than all engines operative.
Last edited by thePassenger; 12th Apr 2006 at 12:28.
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But as has been pointed out, the US FAA has a mandate to "promote the (US) aviation industry". If it can do it by cocking a snook at a foreign airline, it probably will.
The point is - were the passengers ever put in even an infinitessimal amount of danger by deciding to continue the flight over many alternate airports and a short leg over water? It sure doesn't look that way to me.
J.
The point is - were the passengers ever put in even an infinitessimal amount of danger by deciding to continue the flight over many alternate airports and a short leg over water? It sure doesn't look that way to me.
J.
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
The point is - were the passengers ever put in even an infinitessimal amount of danger by deciding to continue the flight over many alternate airports and a short leg over water?
J.
J.
You could say passengers are ALWAYS put in an infinitesimal amount of danger as soon as the board an airplane (or bus, or train...) It is (to an infinitesimal degree) "dangerous" to cross a road. O.K. I am no "risk" - expert (I´m only the frightened passenger) but in my layman´ s view I would put it this way:
Flying in a new (but reliable, no "children´s diseases" etc) four-engined aircraft in perfect weather with a well-trained flight-crew, all systems working nicely, the pilots got a good night´ s sleep (not tired) and are not worried by personal problems, they are flying for a good, reliable airline with excellent maintenance etc etc - then I would say that this amounts to 100% of achievable safety.
Now if
- they have to land in less than optimal weather conditions
- they have to land at a "difficult" airport (e.g. LPMA???)
- some systems on the aircraft might not be working (MEL)
- the pilots have some private problems (the captain with his wife, the first officer perhaps with his bank account)
- both pilots may be tired, exhausted
- an engine failure may occur
- maybe even a drunken passenger has started some riot
etc etc
...then this 100% will not be achieved. Maybe only 80-90% depending on the situation (the case of landing a 767 at a difficult airport on only one engine has already been mentioned here).
I don´t know the numbers, but I would guess that hardly ever will a flight achieve this optimum of 100%. All other flights have a "reduced safety margin" compared to this optimal flight. So where does "danger" begin? I don´t know but one thing I do know: you cannot easily do anything about most of these factors (well, you could introduce higher landing minima for your airline and thereby give the competitors an advantage who do not adhere to your new landing-policy). You cannot prevent an engine-failure happening somewhere along the route, you cannot avoid flying/landing in bad weather, you cannot avoid being tired sometimes... BUT you can return to the departure-airport (or another more suitable airport nearby) if an engine-failure occurs shortly after take-off. This is the one thing you can influence! That´s the reason why it does not look right if you then decide to continue the flight.
Over and out.
Last edited by thePassenger; 12th Apr 2006 at 18:11.
'thePassenger'; 'danger, where does danger begin'; life itself is continually challenged by danger. Perhaps in many ways this is why humans have evolved as we have. The survivors are those who could best judge danger.
Stick pushers are a good example of differing ‘cultural’ viewpoints, but a very poor example of ‘additional danger’. The significant danger of a deep-stall in ‘T’ tail aircraft had been clearly established both in theory and in practice with flight testing and unfortunately in accidents. Thus the danger of a deep stall was something that required regulatory action; the initial cultural differences for solutions ranged between training and engineered defences.
Whereas a single engine failure on a four engine aircraft in no remote way adds the same level of danger as would a deep-stall, even if you wish to consider a range of consequential situations. Capt Getline overstates these consequential situations and the danger of continued flight; it appears that the operator in this event had considered them either by procedural guidance or with technical advice.
I think that you miss the point in your last post in that all of the ‘what if’s’ with respect to increased danger are independent of engine failure, and progressing this or a similar argument of engine failure you should consider which aircraft you fly in – 2,3, or 4 engines, and not the operator. You also cite aspects of operations (weather etc) that can be avoided, but these operations continue with some danger that is judged acceptable by the regulators.
This thread is based on a report that an element of the FAA has not judged the event in the same way as perhaps the UK CAA would have done (or more appropriately the European agency who now ‘own’ the regulations).
There are differences in interpreting regulations on both sides of the Atlantic. In my experience the FAA has a wider gap between what an aircraft is certificated to do (FAR25) and what it is authorised to do (FAR121) than do the authorities in Europe, but even in Europe the gap is still wide.
Add to this the apparent differing views of what foreign aircraft are or are not allowed to do when over flying another country then a range of outcomes can be expected. I am not deeply conversant with FAR 121 etc or the regulations on foreign commercial operations in the US, but previous posts in this and other threads have identified several interpretations, but the weight of argument suggests, as to be expected, that a major international airline was operating within the intent of the regulations.
However, your main point was the perceived decrease in the level of safety (more danger). I use 'perceived' as some statisticians (even regulators) might show that there was no change in ‘relative’ safety (no additional danger; risk ~ consequence x exposure) and thus your view of ‘less safe’ is a human quirk of understanding, which we all can suffer from – we misjudge risk.
I think that we can agree that ‘ultimate’ safety was not in question, thus the resulting difference in views is in the degree of additional danger that could make an operation less safe. This is a point of judgment, and as I have posted elsewhere, judgment is a decision based on facts.
To be valid a judgment needs to be reasonable.
Many judgements are based on the same facts, but not all of them are valid i.e. not all decisions are reasonable – the human factor.
In order to avoid many of the human weaknesses in judgment, those making judgments should be best qualified to judge in that area; thus in law we use a judge, in flight a professional pilot, in regulation the regulators.
It is my judgment, as an ill qualified observer of the interpretations placed on regulations and aviation safety, that the respective elements of the FAA and the European authorities need to harmonize their positions and, as necessary, amend or add interpretive guidance to the regulations.
I do not believe that the issue in your ‘bottom line’ has been established; in particular I refer you to the discussions on ETOPS which would indicate FAA’s acceptance of an engine failure as being ‘safe’.
As a tail piece to this thread, see the following quote; I suggest that this is suitable guidance for most people in our industry. It is not intend to reflect on ‘the passenger’’s point of view or imply a level of understanding:
Stick pushers are a good example of differing ‘cultural’ viewpoints, but a very poor example of ‘additional danger’. The significant danger of a deep-stall in ‘T’ tail aircraft had been clearly established both in theory and in practice with flight testing and unfortunately in accidents. Thus the danger of a deep stall was something that required regulatory action; the initial cultural differences for solutions ranged between training and engineered defences.
Whereas a single engine failure on a four engine aircraft in no remote way adds the same level of danger as would a deep-stall, even if you wish to consider a range of consequential situations. Capt Getline overstates these consequential situations and the danger of continued flight; it appears that the operator in this event had considered them either by procedural guidance or with technical advice.
I think that you miss the point in your last post in that all of the ‘what if’s’ with respect to increased danger are independent of engine failure, and progressing this or a similar argument of engine failure you should consider which aircraft you fly in – 2,3, or 4 engines, and not the operator. You also cite aspects of operations (weather etc) that can be avoided, but these operations continue with some danger that is judged acceptable by the regulators.
This thread is based on a report that an element of the FAA has not judged the event in the same way as perhaps the UK CAA would have done (or more appropriately the European agency who now ‘own’ the regulations).
There are differences in interpreting regulations on both sides of the Atlantic. In my experience the FAA has a wider gap between what an aircraft is certificated to do (FAR25) and what it is authorised to do (FAR121) than do the authorities in Europe, but even in Europe the gap is still wide.
Add to this the apparent differing views of what foreign aircraft are or are not allowed to do when over flying another country then a range of outcomes can be expected. I am not deeply conversant with FAR 121 etc or the regulations on foreign commercial operations in the US, but previous posts in this and other threads have identified several interpretations, but the weight of argument suggests, as to be expected, that a major international airline was operating within the intent of the regulations.
However, your main point was the perceived decrease in the level of safety (more danger). I use 'perceived' as some statisticians (even regulators) might show that there was no change in ‘relative’ safety (no additional danger; risk ~ consequence x exposure) and thus your view of ‘less safe’ is a human quirk of understanding, which we all can suffer from – we misjudge risk.
I think that we can agree that ‘ultimate’ safety was not in question, thus the resulting difference in views is in the degree of additional danger that could make an operation less safe. This is a point of judgment, and as I have posted elsewhere, judgment is a decision based on facts.
To be valid a judgment needs to be reasonable.
Many judgements are based on the same facts, but not all of them are valid i.e. not all decisions are reasonable – the human factor.
In order to avoid many of the human weaknesses in judgment, those making judgments should be best qualified to judge in that area; thus in law we use a judge, in flight a professional pilot, in regulation the regulators.
It is my judgment, as an ill qualified observer of the interpretations placed on regulations and aviation safety, that the respective elements of the FAA and the European authorities need to harmonize their positions and, as necessary, amend or add interpretive guidance to the regulations.
I do not believe that the issue in your ‘bottom line’ has been established; in particular I refer you to the discussions on ETOPS which would indicate FAA’s acceptance of an engine failure as being ‘safe’.
As a tail piece to this thread, see the following quote; I suggest that this is suitable guidance for most people in our industry. It is not intend to reflect on ‘the passenger’’s point of view or imply a level of understanding:
… we should not dismiss the reaction as the fears of an ill-informed and untrained public, but rather see it as the normal response of a community that measures risks according to different criteria. David Shaw via Bielefeld
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Originally Posted by alf5071h
I think that you miss the point in your last post in that all of the ‘what if’s’ with respect to increased danger are independent of engine failure,
You also cite aspects of operations (weather etc) that can be avoided, but these operations continue with some danger that is judged acceptable by the regulators.
However, your main point was the perceived decrease in the level of safety (more danger). I use 'perceived' as some statisticians (even regulators) might show that there was no change in ‘relative’ safety (no additional danger; risk ~ consequence x exposure) and thus your view of ‘less safe’ is a human quirk of understanding, which we all can suffer from – we misjudge risk.
Regarding EMR in this article, the funny thing is that even the experts do not know much about the danger/risks of it. Some claim that very low levels of EMR can even be more dangerous than higher levels of radiation, which means the experts cannot calculate the risk either (but this is completely off-topic: http://www.nzine.co.nz/features/emr_...1_revised.html).
In order to avoid many of the human weaknesses in judgment, those making judgments should be best qualified to judge in that area; thus in law we use a judge
I do not believe that the issue in your ‘bottom line’ has been established; in particular I refer you to the discussions on ETOPS which would indicate FAA’s acceptance of an engine failure as being ‘safe’.
I think we can end this discussion the way every discussion ends: all participants agree to disagree
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I think we can end this discussion the way every discussion ends: all participants agree to disagree
Perhaps there is a simpler way.
Would you answer the following:
1) if an aircraft is operated in accordance with its normal operating procedures, does this result in more danger?
2) if an aircraft is certified for normal operations, were the manufacturer, regulator (JAA) and airline too optimistic in certifying it?
3) if you believe the answers to the above are yes, should you really be flying as a passenger?
Please, no quotes from Bielefeld or American captains who do not apparently consider JAR Ops rules, just your own opinion.
Perhaps there is a simpler way.
Would you answer the following:
1) if an aircraft is operated in accordance with its normal operating procedures, does this result in more danger?
2) if an aircraft is certified for normal operations, were the manufacturer, regulator (JAA) and airline too optimistic in certifying it?
3) if you believe the answers to the above are yes, should you really be flying as a passenger?
Please, no quotes from Bielefeld or American captains who do not apparently consider JAR Ops rules, just your own opinion.
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Originally Posted by Final 3 Greens
3) if you believe the answers to the above are yes, should you really be flying as a passenger?
The problem is, that 1) + 2) can also be said about the "Titanic" (according to the authorities and laws at that time, the number of lifeboats was sufficient. It is often forgotten that the Board of Trade Regulations were such that a ship of the size of 'Olympic' or 'Titanic' was not intended to need as many lifeboats as she carried. At 20 lifeboats (16 rigid, 4 collapsible), she was 10% above the requirements! They did test the lifeboats and davits on 25th March as was required by law. The ship then went through tests of her equipment, including wireless. The speed and handling trials included various turning and stop-start manoeuvers.)
Oh...now I haven fallen back to VERY old stories...I really have to take my pills now...
I've been reading this thread with increasing disbelief at the arrogance one one side, and ignorance on both.
I once had a safety awareness course consisting of helping to pick up the bits of 111 passengers and crew after a pilot took a short cut against a strong warning on the approach plate (about relying on weather radar for positional guidance at this airport) and hit the side of a hill doing, at a guess, 400 Kts.
My phone has rung twice because a twin engine transport aircraft, with passengers, has suffered a double engine failure while operating properly under the precursor to JAR Ops 1/EASA Ops 1, and I was required to sort out the aftermath. The cause on both occasions was unpredictable and therefore not predicted, other than the general prediction called Murphy's law. Statistically, both accidents were impossible.
So don't lecture me, the passenger who pays your wages, about how I don't understand statistics, living in the past etc etc. I don't buy it.
Statisitics by definition predict the predictable. The unpredictable kills people.
The BA B744 operating on 3 engines from LAX to LHR (or MAN as it turned out) was in a condition that was less safe than if 4 were operating. Anyone who seeks to argue with that statement is a fool.
I am aware that the staistical probability of failure of another engine was so low as to be within the normal range of acceptable risk. Or was it? Who actually calculated the total risk, for that flight at that time. before the flight was attempted, and who asked the passengers if they accepted that level of risk?
No-one, obviously. It was a rhetorical question. And that's my point. I and other passengers accept the normal risks of a flight when we board. We know that things can go wrong. Those of us who have some aviation knowledge also knew (now it's only a hope) that when they do the ONLY consideration in the crew's mind is to MINIMISE the danger of the new situation.
And that does not mean deciding to undertake an unplanned 3-engine ferry over the Pole. Unplanned? of course it was. I once spent a lot of time flight planning BA aircraft operating through the Gulf; BA aircrew were far too grand to do it themselves, in those days. This included several 3-engine ferries , without passengers.
They were planned with as much, or more care, covering every eventuality including factors which would increase fuel consumption such as operating at a lower than planned level.
The BA flight was, obviously, not properly planned. If it had been it would not have had a fuel emergency in UK airspace. It could not have been in the time available.
Accidents result from a series of random and very unlikely events, more often than not. It is the 3rd event that often kills. The engine failure was the first, the higher than expected fuel burn was the second. What might the third have been? Overhoot and diversion from MAN? It happens.
So put away your computers, chaps, and think for a change. Which was the safer action for that BA flight at LAX; land as soon as practicable and accept the financial consequences, or continue over the Pole to London. It's a no-brainer, if you step back and look.
Murphy isn't dead, you know. He's just waiting to catch you out. And when he does, all the statistical probabilities in the world won't save you. Murphy was on that BMI flight at EMI, and Murphy killed the 111 people I helped put into small baskets.
And pilots don't always get it right. We, your SLF, rely on your skills and the knowledge that you instinctively select the safest option when things go pear-shaped, and that's the best we can hope for. We do not want to be carried along while you experiment with unquantified risks, and that's what the BA crew did. If they were operating in accordance with the Book, then, God help us, the Book is wrong. The Captains of old may have worn white gloves, had their flight plans done for them, and bullied their crews. But they knew how to tell right from wrong and make their own decisions.
End of rant.
I once had a safety awareness course consisting of helping to pick up the bits of 111 passengers and crew after a pilot took a short cut against a strong warning on the approach plate (about relying on weather radar for positional guidance at this airport) and hit the side of a hill doing, at a guess, 400 Kts.
My phone has rung twice because a twin engine transport aircraft, with passengers, has suffered a double engine failure while operating properly under the precursor to JAR Ops 1/EASA Ops 1, and I was required to sort out the aftermath. The cause on both occasions was unpredictable and therefore not predicted, other than the general prediction called Murphy's law. Statistically, both accidents were impossible.
So don't lecture me, the passenger who pays your wages, about how I don't understand statistics, living in the past etc etc. I don't buy it.
Statisitics by definition predict the predictable. The unpredictable kills people.
The BA B744 operating on 3 engines from LAX to LHR (or MAN as it turned out) was in a condition that was less safe than if 4 were operating. Anyone who seeks to argue with that statement is a fool.
I am aware that the staistical probability of failure of another engine was so low as to be within the normal range of acceptable risk. Or was it? Who actually calculated the total risk, for that flight at that time. before the flight was attempted, and who asked the passengers if they accepted that level of risk?
No-one, obviously. It was a rhetorical question. And that's my point. I and other passengers accept the normal risks of a flight when we board. We know that things can go wrong. Those of us who have some aviation knowledge also knew (now it's only a hope) that when they do the ONLY consideration in the crew's mind is to MINIMISE the danger of the new situation.
And that does not mean deciding to undertake an unplanned 3-engine ferry over the Pole. Unplanned? of course it was. I once spent a lot of time flight planning BA aircraft operating through the Gulf; BA aircrew were far too grand to do it themselves, in those days. This included several 3-engine ferries , without passengers.
They were planned with as much, or more care, covering every eventuality including factors which would increase fuel consumption such as operating at a lower than planned level.
The BA flight was, obviously, not properly planned. If it had been it would not have had a fuel emergency in UK airspace. It could not have been in the time available.
Accidents result from a series of random and very unlikely events, more often than not. It is the 3rd event that often kills. The engine failure was the first, the higher than expected fuel burn was the second. What might the third have been? Overhoot and diversion from MAN? It happens.
So put away your computers, chaps, and think for a change. Which was the safer action for that BA flight at LAX; land as soon as practicable and accept the financial consequences, or continue over the Pole to London. It's a no-brainer, if you step back and look.
Murphy isn't dead, you know. He's just waiting to catch you out. And when he does, all the statistical probabilities in the world won't save you. Murphy was on that BMI flight at EMI, and Murphy killed the 111 people I helped put into small baskets.
And pilots don't always get it right. We, your SLF, rely on your skills and the knowledge that you instinctively select the safest option when things go pear-shaped, and that's the best we can hope for. We do not want to be carried along while you experiment with unquantified risks, and that's what the BA crew did. If they were operating in accordance with the Book, then, God help us, the Book is wrong. The Captains of old may have worn white gloves, had their flight plans done for them, and bullied their crews. But they knew how to tell right from wrong and make their own decisions.
End of rant.
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That's it, I'm off to fly freight.
I wouldn't want to inconvenience anyone by leaving small bits of SLF all over the countryside due to my arrogance, ignorance, inability to think for myself.
Best you guys that are left start taking surveys of your pax as to what risks they are prepared to accept before you go to work.
Enjoy.
Now where are those white gloves?
I wouldn't want to inconvenience anyone by leaving small bits of SLF all over the countryside due to my arrogance, ignorance, inability to think for myself.
Best you guys that are left start taking surveys of your pax as to what risks they are prepared to accept before you go to work.
Enjoy.
Now where are those white gloves?
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The crew of that BA flight, specially its Captain, surely knew the rules by which they can operate, or not, that aircraft at the given circumstances. If those rules allow the Capt. to make the decision to carry on the flight, dump fuel and return to LAX or any other suitable airport, it is his call, and no one can say a single word about it. The rules suck? though luck, either change them or live by them. An airplane (or a boat for that matter) is not a democracy. If this Capt. elected to proceed as planned I would assume he did not made that decision on a ill informed way, and he knew the risks involved and came to the conclusion that the safety of this airplane would not be compromised. I’m almost certain of this because I know for a fact that no crew likes to die.
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I am a B747-400 Captain with some 18,000hrs flying. I am frankly amazed at the content of some of the posts in this thread. BA is,I believe,the operator of the largest single fleet of 747-400s. The procedures they use are well understood by both the manufacturer and regulator.
I understand that the agitation surrounding this event has been started by several US aviation interested parties, mainly by monday morning quaterbackers in the popular press.
To say that the atlantic crossing part of the flight was not planned is just not true. The crew had complete accces to all of BA's resources during the time it took to cross the landmass of north america.
The FAA's own procedures allow the captains of quads to use their discression to continue in the event of the failure of one power unit. I suspect that there is a great deal of effort being applied to make the US courts apply the pressure that the FAA just cannnot.
On a personal note, as a captain I will fly my aircraft in such a manner that provides the highest level of safety and service to everyone on board. I am not constrained by the company that employes me nor will I be bullied by the ill informed.
I understand that the agitation surrounding this event has been started by several US aviation interested parties, mainly by monday morning quaterbackers in the popular press.
To say that the atlantic crossing part of the flight was not planned is just not true. The crew had complete accces to all of BA's resources during the time it took to cross the landmass of north america.
The FAA's own procedures allow the captains of quads to use their discression to continue in the event of the failure of one power unit. I suspect that there is a great deal of effort being applied to make the US courts apply the pressure that the FAA just cannnot.
On a personal note, as a captain I will fly my aircraft in such a manner that provides the highest level of safety and service to everyone on board. I am not constrained by the company that employes me nor will I be bullied by the ill informed.
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Originally Posted by sirfrancis
The FAA's own procedures allow the captains of quads to use their discression to continue in the event of the failure of one power unit.
"Because, the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's) state that in the event of an engine failure, the airplane will land at the "nearest suitable airport."
The number of engines an airplane has — two, three or four — is immaterial to the FAR. The regulation exists to address an engine failure, clearly requiring that the pilot choose an airport to land at. In this case, LAX was probably the best bet.
...
I can tell you one thing: Whether taking off from the United States or anywhere else, I can think of no situation where the "nearest suitable airport" would be across an ocean.
...
Was it unsafe to continue on three engines? The B-747 is quite capable of flying on three engines — even two — but that is not the point. When you're down to three engines, you can't fly as high as normal. You have less thrust on three engines. Flying at a lower altitude consumes more fuel. Flying lower may involve a stronger headwind. It could also result in less of a headwind or even a tailwind, but it's another factor that must be considered.
Another issue is that with two engines on one side and one on the other, the airplane won't fly straight without using the rudder. This will burn more fuel because of the extra drag caused by the rudder and because the aircraft is no longer streamlined. Many other factors must be considered as well, such as electrical and hydraulic issues.
If a second engine is lost, the airplane will still fly, but the problem of increased fuel burn is multiplied. In fact, to maintain flight on just two engines, the cruising altitude could be as low as a few thousand feet. Now the fuel burn is so high the situation has become critical.
The bottom line is that our FAA does not consider it safe to continue a flight with any fewer than all engines operative. "
(Captain Meryl Getline, United Airlines)
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/colum...-captain_x.htm
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I am a B747-400 Captain with some 18,000hrs flying. I am frankly amazed at the content of some of the posts in this thread. BA is,I believe,the operator of the largest single fleet of 747-400s. The procedures they use are well understood by both the manufacturer and regulator.
I understand that this event has been started by several US aviation interested parties, mainly by monday morning quaterbackers in the popular press.
To say that the atlantic crossing part of the flight was not planned is just not true. The crew had complete accces to all of BA's resources during the time it took to cross the landmass of north america.
The FAA's own procedures allow the captains of quads to use their discression to continue in the event of the failure of one power unit. I suspect that there is a great deal of effort being applied to make the US courts apply the pressure that the FAA just cannnot.
On a personal note, as a captain I will fly my aircraft in such a manner that provides the highest level of safety and service to everyone on board. I am not constrained by the company that employes me nor will I be bullied by the ill informed.
I understand that this event has been started by several US aviation interested parties, mainly by monday morning quaterbackers in the popular press.
To say that the atlantic crossing part of the flight was not planned is just not true. The crew had complete accces to all of BA's resources during the time it took to cross the landmass of north america.
The FAA's own procedures allow the captains of quads to use their discression to continue in the event of the failure of one power unit. I suspect that there is a great deal of effort being applied to make the US courts apply the pressure that the FAA just cannnot.
On a personal note, as a captain I will fly my aircraft in such a manner that provides the highest level of safety and service to everyone on board. I am not constrained by the company that employes me nor will I be bullied by the ill informed.
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Old, not Bold - allow me the pleasure of banging my head against the wall once more to save you the effort of actually reading what knowledgable people have already posted.
but only in the loosest sense. You have no knowledge of the acual technical state of the aircraft you board. Can you tell if you're 747 has modified fuel pumps fitted to prevent a TWA800 style explosion? Would you get off the aircraft if it didn't? Do you know if your 747 has 400 outstanding ADDs like one operators did recently? Do you know if your Airbus has half the AC packs u/s? Of course you don't.
Get your map out. Or perhaps you meant the magnetic pole? I hope your flight planning was more accurate when you were at BA, would hate to be 700nm off track like you are!
These things were factored into the BA plan, as proven by the fact they reached the UK with plenty of fuel.
Please make at least a cursory attempt to understand the technicalites of why the emergeny was declared. For the 1000th time, they were not short of fuel. And don't say "but they declared an emergency...". Go back, read the posts, realise why you are wrong (yes it is you thats wrong, not us) then come back.
There was no second event here. Higher than expected fuel burn is a feature of flight on however many engines you care to fly on. Higher winds, lower than optimum levels, they are a fact of life, a routine occurence. These things did not sneak up on the crew. The only thing that might be categorised as a second event was the error in understanding the fuel situation, and even that wasn't a real event in that there was no fuel shortage. Overshoot from MAN? Plenty of fuelleft for a go-around and second approach. No fuel to divert? No different to a dozen other aircraft on any day at LHR with holding exceeding 30 minutes.
Well you have placed your trust in the wrong things. The only things anyone should be doing instinctively are avoiding mountains, CBs and flying into the ground. Everything should be well planned and subject to continuous review, as the flight in question was.
I belive this statement dates your most recent experience in the airline industry. The Captains of old may have taken what you consider to be the 'right' decision by landing ASAP but today that would be considered the 'easy' decision, which is not necessarily the 'best' or indeed the 'safest' decision. Captains today are perfectly capable of telling right from wrong and making their own decisions too.
I and other passengers accept the normal risks of a flight when we board
And that does not mean deciding to undertake an unplanned 3-engine ferry over the Pole
They were planned with as much, or more care, covering every eventuality including factors which would increase fuel consumption such as operating at a lower than planned level.
The BA flight was, obviously, not properly planned. If it had been it would not have had a fuel emergency in UK airspace. It could not have been in the time available
Accidents result from a series of random and very unlikely events, more often than not. It is the 3rd event that often kills. The engine failure was the first, the higher than expected fuel burn was the second. What might the third have been? Overhoot and diversion from MAN? It happens.
We, your SLF, rely on your skills and the knowledge that you instinctively select the safest option when things go pear-shaped, and that's the best we can hope for. We do not want to be carried along while you experiment with unquantified risks, and that's what the BA crew did
The Captains of old may have worn white gloves, had their flight plans done for them, and bullied their crews. But they knew how to tell right from wrong and make their own decisions.
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The Passenger
I note your answers.
So, are you prepared to pay a lot more for the cost of your ticket, so that airlines and regulators can engineer in a relatively higher level of safety? (note that absolute safety is unattainable.)
Sir Francis
As a frequent flier on BA airlines, I have faith in your judgement and that of your colleagues. Please keep on making the calls that you training and your experience qualifies you to make and I'll sit quietly in the back, knowing that I am in the hands of some of the best in the business.
I note your answers.
So, are you prepared to pay a lot more for the cost of your ticket, so that airlines and regulators can engineer in a relatively higher level of safety? (note that absolute safety is unattainable.)
Sir Francis
As a frequent flier on BA airlines, I have faith in your judgement and that of your colleagues. Please keep on making the calls that you training and your experience qualifies you to make and I'll sit quietly in the back, knowing that I am in the hands of some of the best in the business.
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The passenger does have one valid point. That is that professional pilots are a condescending bunch. They are on a pedestal in society due to the general ignorance of their trade by the masses and not as a result of superior evolution. A situation that in many cases gets muddled, and surfaces as superiority, arrogance and condescension for the ignorance of said masses. A bit more tolerance and humility , or normalness goes a long way when dealing with the punters. Ask any working type (and even many cabin crew)what their impression of a pilot is and invariably the stuffy bossy posh talking bloke is the norm. The less secure in our trade develop that stereo old raf or Ba type image to extreme to keep the masses from seeing thru the mist and seing a normal bloke or blokess with a couple of o levels and in many cases endowed with average ability and social skills. If it was any other way we wouldnt need CRM to get on efficiently and safely together now would we.Just look at any board on this site and the arrogance runs so freely that most topics descend into slagging off in seconds because the anonymity removes the constraint and the rest of the posters are subconciously allocated the equivalent status of an ignorant cyber passenger who dare to disagree.
Apart from that point he is talkin sh1te and in the days of cockpit vists would have treated politely and filed under "What a tw@ t"
Apart from that point he is talkin sh1te and in the days of cockpit vists would have treated politely and filed under "What a tw@ t"