Ajaccio MD-80 Crash
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http://aviation-safety.net/database/...?id=19811201-1
ASN is IMO the first and often best point to turn to - though there's no link to an official report on this one
ASN is IMO the first and often best point to turn to - though there's no link to an official report on this one
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thanks, hawk
I find it very strange that the French (crash site), nor the NTSB (manufacturer) have the report in public domain. Many things could be learnt from the report, yet it's not officially available.
For example: as the plane was sold as DC-9-80 the pilots only received "Differences course"; as the operator didn't have GPWS installed on the other machines (DC-9s) the pilots were not trained for it, as the Capt applied to become an instructor and not chosen he was given the consolation prize: the course in US, as the FO was chosen for command training (back on DC-9) after having flown the -80 for only few months his mind must have been distracted, to say the least (compounded by the fact that his teenager son was on the jump seat in the cockpit at the crash; etc, etc, etc...
I find it very strange that the French (crash site), nor the NTSB (manufacturer) have the report in public domain. Many things could be learnt from the report, yet it's not officially available.
For example: as the plane was sold as DC-9-80 the pilots only received "Differences course"; as the operator didn't have GPWS installed on the other machines (DC-9s) the pilots were not trained for it, as the Capt applied to become an instructor and not chosen he was given the consolation prize: the course in US, as the FO was chosen for command training (back on DC-9) after having flown the -80 for only few months his mind must have been distracted, to say the least (compounded by the fact that his teenager son was on the jump seat in the cockpit at the crash; etc, etc, etc...
Last edited by GEENY; 8th Oct 2005 at 10:20.
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Hi,
try the slovenian goverment. Slovenia was the origin state for the airline Inex Adria and the aviation authorties there has some reports and info about this airline avaiable.
I asked them a few years ago for a accident report of the Inex Adria accident on Corsica and get a hard copy in french language. 67 pages, orginal from BEA / France.
Furthermore, you can ask the french BEA per e-mail. If they had the report in their archive, they will send you the report. Maybe, if they had to make a hardcopy, they will put some fee on. Just ask, they are very helpfull.
With regards,
Stubenfliege
try the slovenian goverment. Slovenia was the origin state for the airline Inex Adria and the aviation authorties there has some reports and info about this airline avaiable.
I asked them a few years ago for a accident report of the Inex Adria accident on Corsica and get a hard copy in french language. 67 pages, orginal from BEA / France.
Furthermore, you can ask the french BEA per e-mail. If they had the report in their archive, they will send you the report. Maybe, if they had to make a hardcopy, they will put some fee on. Just ask, they are very helpfull.
With regards,
Stubenfliege
Hi GEENY
If you succeed in getting official report from any source you'll see there's one more thing to learn from it and that is how to twist factual information to get to politically acceptable conclusions.
Yugoslav side claimed that mistake was due to controller issuing imprecise holding instructions; JP crew arrived high and fast and ATCO instructed them to loose altitude in standard holding pattern. What he ment was "published" which was left turns, crew proceeded in right holding pattern and that eventually led to collision with mountain. French agreed, but anyway blamed the crew for not asking clarification, not consulting arrival and approach charts and in the atmosphere of mild disagreement, accident was swept under rug.
Couple of years ago, ex-Adria instructor showed me flight path diagram, derived from FDR data (surprise,surprise, it wasn't included in any accident report). Well, it shows nothing even remotely similar to holding entry. When the airplane hit the mountain they were far on the non-holding side, well bellow MHA and MSA. Probably capt had only vague idea of a/c and airport position and simply turned towards the airport, trying to get under clouds to make visual approach but sadly they entered cummulus granitus before runway could be seen.
It's hardly bellievable that FO was distracted during approach. It was early 80ies, CRM was far from even being concieved and Adria was (in)famous for trainning ex-mil pilots for direct entry captains. Atmosphere in JP's cockpits was one of absolute subordination to capt. Chances are FO has seen something like 100 downward cloud bustings that ended happily so he chose to endure another one, not knowing that one hundred and first will be his last.
If you succeed in getting official report from any source you'll see there's one more thing to learn from it and that is how to twist factual information to get to politically acceptable conclusions.
Yugoslav side claimed that mistake was due to controller issuing imprecise holding instructions; JP crew arrived high and fast and ATCO instructed them to loose altitude in standard holding pattern. What he ment was "published" which was left turns, crew proceeded in right holding pattern and that eventually led to collision with mountain. French agreed, but anyway blamed the crew for not asking clarification, not consulting arrival and approach charts and in the atmosphere of mild disagreement, accident was swept under rug.
Couple of years ago, ex-Adria instructor showed me flight path diagram, derived from FDR data (surprise,surprise, it wasn't included in any accident report). Well, it shows nothing even remotely similar to holding entry. When the airplane hit the mountain they were far on the non-holding side, well bellow MHA and MSA. Probably capt had only vague idea of a/c and airport position and simply turned towards the airport, trying to get under clouds to make visual approach but sadly they entered cummulus granitus before runway could be seen.
It's hardly bellievable that FO was distracted during approach. It was early 80ies, CRM was far from even being concieved and Adria was (in)famous for trainning ex-mil pilots for direct entry captains. Atmosphere in JP's cockpits was one of absolute subordination to capt. Chances are FO has seen something like 100 downward cloud bustings that ended happily so he chose to endure another one, not knowing that one hundred and first will be his last.
