I have just watched a rather sobering reconstruction of the Swissair 111 fire and crash off Halifax Canada, and was just wondering if any of you have had any training on where and how to get access behind those cocpit panels if you really had the need to investigate ?

In addition, do you have any 'tools' that would help you to access them? Post September 11, I cannot carry my handy little 'multi-tool' with its phillips screwdriver, pliers, pen knife, etc. The only 'implement' left is the crash axe which would probably create more problems that it would solve.

Should our 'hands-on' training include such advice as well as the life rafts drill, emergency exit, slides etc .etc.

Any thoughts ?

Not sure with that one. Tricky. Maybe cabin crew would benefit more from such training. We can't train for every eventuality.

What I think would be appropriate training would be to carry out training for overweight landings, if not already carried out by operators. I am not implying for one minute it would have saved SR 111. I stand to be corrected, but I believe A/C are landed at MTOW during test quite successfully.

Some manufacturers checklists, seem to concentrate a lot on trouble shooting initially, then talk about landing at a later (too late?) stage.

If there is a fire, get the thing on the ground as quickly as possible, if near a suitable airport. That's what we are all taught in basic training are we not?

Souls maybe able to exit a wrecked A/C on or near a runway, but almost impossible in the air.

I'm not a pilot but I have to ask that they seriously don't train pilots regarding the operation of slides, doors and rifes? So bascially their operation is all F/A's job? After the 111 accident they installed video cams in that area so the pilots can see what's going on. I was surprise that the kill switch won't turn off the entertainment systems at all.

No, Koyo, I think you misunderstood what was posted.

Pilots most certainly are trained in the operation of slides, rafts, doors, all emergency equipment on board (including knowing the location of each item) as well as theoretical and practical training in fire and smoke.

Perhaps for a flight engineer. Who would have known beforehand anyway.

What I learned from the accident was (again) that's there's no such thing as emergency without urgency. I mean to say that all souls lost that night needed just a piece of time.

For a two-member crew the task of handling the complex systems (remember there's still the same amount of work to be done as 30 yrs ago, it is just that the computers make it faster for you and you watch, but it must be done) leaves only little spare capacity to be put in use in emergency.

If the post-111 airborne fire mantra is to land immediately, than the two of the crew need to put their best efforts in doing so.

My opinion.
FD.

Interesting feedback.

Koyo; I confirm that we most certainly do the 'hands on' training that I mentioned. I should have said 'in addition to' these exercises. The grammar could have implied we didn't do them, which is most definately NOT the case. Sorry about that.

It ( the open the panel option), came about from watching technicians swap, for eg, a DME receiver in troubleshooting a reception problem. With the right tools, usually just a screwdriver, the appropriate panel is open in a matter of seconds. Trying to fight a fire without realistic access to the source is virtually mission impossible.

Others; The overweight landing exercise sounds like a good one for the Sim. Interesting to calculate or appreciate the distances required etc but hopefully it would give you some insight into what it feels and performs like, especially when your already in a non standard situation with mask and goggles on etc.

I agree with the viewpoint land ASAP and with the two cocpit crew there isn't a great deal of spare time to persue investigations into whats going on behind 'this' or 'that' panel. I guess it's something I considered with the luxury of 20/20 hindsight.

It may come into play if
1) you are mid Atlantic or similar and
2) you do have a little time (?) prior to ditching

Something like being between a 'Rock' and a 'Hard Place' eh? Hopefully a situation we will not see again, but for the next few years at least there are still those aircraft around with thermal and electrical insulation that do not satisfy the 'new' standards.

Sobering thought, giving weight to the 'Land ASAP' plan.

No training required... you just land it "normally". Then becomes an engineers problem to do the required inspection... Invariably if you need to land overweight, this is the more pressing concern!

Ldg Distance reqd needs to be looked at, and some types have "checklists" (if you have time), but in essence nothing special

NoD

Have personally had dense smoke on the flight deck twice....so thick I lost sight of the First Officer within about seven seconds.
This was in Boeing 707 equipment.
Mask and goggles on of course...and interphone worked fine.
In both cases had a really helpful Flight Engineer, which made the job much easier.
First case,
On departure at max weight, the smell of the smoke indicated cabin airconditioning...so the Flight Engineer switched off the turbocompressors immediately, and the smoke disapated in about two minutes. By this time we were on two mile final for an overweight landing. Fuel dump was not completed as I wanted to get the aeroplane on the ground, ASAP.
When the fleet manager asked why, I indicated that...'that is what you pay me for...'
Expected an argument, but received none.
Case closed.
Second case,
electrical (odor) smoke over Danang at FL350, enroute BKK.
Masks and goggles as above.
The Flight Engineer was in the process of isolation when it got really dense, so he switched off all electrics (even the battery) and as we were daylight/clear of clouds, not a problem.
Turned out to be a seized radar cooling fan.
Faulty circuit isolated, flight continued to destination.

IF you have a problem, a properly trained Flight Engineer (not just a panel operator) is highly recommended.

More modern two crew cockpit are supposed to be automated (enough) for the F/E to be eliminated.
Suspect the SR111 crew would have wished for one...

all that we need tor remember is that on touch down on max take off weight the rod should be limited to 6ft per second. on max landing wt they are designed for 10ft per second. this is roughly ok for almost all modern jets.
just to answer that question on the training aspect of overweight landings.
if only capt zimmerman knew he is going to crash as we now know.................. they did.
god bless their souls

The following timings are taken from a revealing video reconstruction of the 111 accident (ABC documentary):-
At -17 mins before the crash the crew detects an unusual smell (hot?); P2 leaves seat to investigate; flight attendant states no smell in cabin, but when entering the flight deck definitely smells ‘smoke’
-14 mins smoke in the flight deck
-13 mins Pan broadcast
-11 mins crew don O2 masks
-6 mins Mayday – request immediate landing
-5.30 mins FCU problems, P2 insts fail
-5 mins FDR failure, no further communications
-0 mins aircraft hits sea

Lesson to be learnt (things to be remembered): The sense of smell quickly stabilises – readjusts to the ambient, thus the flight attendant’s observation was a valid independent opinion (CRM).

Prior to this accident many of us would have followed the same process of investigation, however once a Pan was declared the decision was (should) have been to divert. A possible future option was for an immediate landing. If the crew opt for an immediate landing, an overweight landing is a lesser issue. The aircraft structure and systems will accommodate a large amount of abuse.

Why the delay in the use of O2?

A sudden change of circumstances required a Mayday call, ‘immediate landing’. Did the crew consider ditching as a possible option at this time – forward thinking?

Who amongst us would ditch? We all talk about doing it, but what is the magic trigger that would convince a captain to put the aircraft down on the sea?
What was the magic issue that enable the captain of the Nimrod to decide to ditch; can we capture that and use it during training?

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and we have all learned now from this tragic accident.

It needs to be borne in mind that it takes around 20 minutes to get a cruising jet onto the ground at normal rates of descent.
Giving this crew extreme foresight, let's say that they could have known at T-15 that they needed to land asap?

There is not a lot of fat there. It is going to mean declaring a 'Mayday' and making an emergency landing at the nearest airfield at the first significant smoke EVERY TIME if you are going to get it done in the time they had. Is that feasible? How many incidents of 'smoke in the cockpit' do we get every year? Will we always get the c/crew to set-up for a ditching (if over water) EVERY TIME we have smoke? Will EVERY pilot scream 'Mayday' with smoke in the cockpit and elbow all others aside in a dash to a runway?

Was there an airfield within 15 minutes? As Alf says, the 'Ditch' decision is a big one, and probably only became a 'considered' option at T-5:30? From then on the flight deck would have been a horrendous place to be. How many people would survive a night ditching in Artic waters?

I understand that having panel access would not have helped as the power circuit concerned was not breakered and the extinguishers on board could not put out a fire of that intensity anyway.

I personally find reliving the incident minute by minute distressful and I think we just have to take away our own thoughts on what we would do - and sorrow for those who lost.

It makes ETOPS a sobering option.

Taking BOAC’s points to a higher level towards the extreme edges of probability, but for the purposes of this discussion it could be concluded that we would not expect any aircraft to ditch, either due to lack of time or lack of crew decision.

Thus, we must rely even more so on the certification requirements, sound installations, and good maintenance for our survival. In addition, we have to be fully prepared to fight an in-flight cabin fire; this is where the cabin crew play a vital role.

Some people may conclude that the industry will suffer another accident like Swissair 111, I hope not, but in-service incident reports indicate that there have been some narrow escapes. I hear rumour that an in-flight fire in a passenger O/H bin in a wide body aircraft was contained, but used up to 90% of the on board extinguishers

I don't think we can rule this out, alf - as I hinted, in ETOPS it would be the only option. Both time and 'crew decision' would allow.

Put crudely, there would be no more time and no other decision.

I am very uneasy at the lack of fire-fighting equipment on board modern a/c. I do not know about ETOPS, but does the extinguisher requirement leap dramatically?

On the original point, I think the seat of the fire on the SR111 MD11 was not obvious to the crew, and was too remote to be accessed with a "tool kit". Anyway, the morons in Security will already have removed your screwdriver!

The key problem is whether to dump the aircraft ASAP. With hindsight, probably yes. After all we do ditching drills often enough, we should be aware of it as an option. I once agonised about just that, because on a long Oceanic leg, and 2 hours from a suitable (i.e. any) airport, the fire warning came on in the aft hold. Fire drill carried out, no effect. Unable to check floor for heat due to main deck cargo. A check of cargo manifests did NOT show anything Class 3 (inflammable) in compartment, so decided to divert, but NOT to ditch. The thought of explaining myself to management long after the evidence had sunk was certainly a factor........

The MD11 aircraft pretty soon becomes quite difficult to fly as one progresses through the smoke checklist, and it ceases to be a two-man airplane. I agree that a flight engineer was useful for more than just buying the first beer!

see this link

It give some further examples of SR-111 recent near repeats.

On the topic of ditching or overweight landing, the latter was something we practiced regularly in the Nimrod Sim. Trouble was, following Art's successful ditching, everybody started opting to "put it in the water". We, the instructors, had quite a time persuading folk that Art's circumstances were ideal; the aircraft was light, the water was calm - and it still broke in half!

Art will know I'm not taking anything away from his outstanding job, but in anything other than ideal circumstances ditching is merely a form of crashing.

Can anyone here explain this, do you think the pilots messed up considering things went from bad to worse, could they have attempted it or not?

newscaster

I think that the answer to both of your questions has to be 'No'.

To attempt a landing in the North Atlantic at night would be difficult in even the most ideal circumstances. To do so with the cockpit full of smoke and with equipment failures would have very little chance of success.

Airclues

'news' - this question would do better where the topic has had a bit of discussion.


Edit - topics merged. Thanks BOAC!