Well, maybe they do it that way in England or wherever but I'm not rightly sure that's how it works here in America.

As aterpster says about that 30 day NTSB report:

Maybe Canada will issue a 30 day report, can you find an example of one issued by the NTSB?

To be clear on terms, if only for me, over shooting being the same as a go around and/or a missed approach?

Now that the NTSB has launched an investigation, the Canadian TSB's involvement will be as an accredited party to the investigation (as the domicile of the airline involved).

Protocol dictates that any further release of information will come from the NTSB.

Summing feueraxt's pictures (taxiway with no traffic) #131 and the mental imagery of hilliard's post #138 suggesting aircraft lights on the taxiway might make a difference, I think this is where the answer lies.

There has to be some reason that not one, but two experienced crew fell for this imagery. Some kind of visual psychological trap.

As I said,

No criticism from me either, but I do wonder whether "Go around" would have been a better response than "Yes you are still cleared" when the aircraft reported that they weren't seeing on the ground what the controller would expect them to see.

Could it have been a runway incursion?

"Maintain runway heading and climb X" would at least have allowed time to diagnose the discrepancy.

This controller, who isn't to blame, just failed an intuition test.

Is it at all possible they were just too darned busy to add any superior value, leaving them acting as nothing more than a slow computer?

Oh really now, Kal Niranjan. It would be easier just to say, when any particular "non Western" carrier you would care to name in particular, one which has in your view been subject to scorn, insinuations and so on (whether "thunderously deafening" or otherwise), compiles an overall safety record and a set of managerial and technical leadership qualities in the safety realm comparable to Air Canada, then maybe you could gripe. But that would be too easy; I like the challenge. When a "non Western" carrier fouls up, and it happens to be in a system, country or culture where substandard practices, lack of standard English, training and/or operational deficiencies, and other gross or significant deviations from SARPs are the norm, pointing these deviations out is not scornful or racism. If you think so, I certainly would enjoy learning about your educational background. Something clearly was missed. (I post this out of a sense of defending the forum, against your too-easily muttered bromides, which are nonsense - despite the stray or occasional off-point remark of a poster now or again.)

It would really do everyone a lot of good to read about visual perception and visual cognition.

I can understand PF becoming fixated on seeing what they wanted to see and not noticing 'the gorilla'. PM's brain is not so fixated and I'd expect more relaxed and neutral. PM is not being coached by PF into seeing the same thing. Therefore I'd expect PM to chirp up quite early on and challenge PF about where they were landing. But that brings the CVR back into the equation, and crew memory after the event.

There has to be some reason that not one, but two experienced crew fell for this imagery.

Indeed. That was also my curiosity, hence my comment above. There should have been 2 independent minds observing this event. I'm still curious whether they were in manual or autopilot flight down to e.g. 1000', and what guidance they were following. The report should discover that.

Now Captain Aimer says that AC 759 was 'less than a second from a disaster'. :eek:

The article linked below has a graphic showing UA 1 holding past the Cat I hold line :confused: and says 'the flight came within just 29 feet of one plane'.

Anyway, looks like this incident might not get swept under the rug with the media attention.

"Less than a second from disaster"; New details on near-collision at SFO - CBS News

Flew into KSFO last night. Taxiway C has really bright green centerline lights, they are probably LED, they can appear white from a distance. With 28L dark (no approach lights and no centerline lights) the visual illusion of 28R being 28L and C being the 28R is certainly possible as has been demonstrated.
I'm not saying that's what happened, just relating what it looks like.

Why was there no giant white flashing "X" at the threshold of 28L? I've seen these several times at various GA airports; do large international airports not use them?

From an earlier post on this thread, emphasis mine:

IAN W wrote a very good post # 167 about cognition experiment and Bergerie1 posted the video. Worth to see it, you’ll see the gorilla, but…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoK_ZfY

This incident must be related to visual perception and visual cognition.
The players start the passes:
altimeter set, speed brake armed, flaps position, lights on, so on…
They expect to see two runways, so from far they see two lines of lights as expected. Then oops!! PF see a gorilla, strobe lights stand out from the 28R runway. He talks to PM, but he sees three gorillas. They continue passing the ball: gear down, flaps full, but keep the eyes on the gorillas, the curtain color change from bright white light to green lights, the PAPI is leaving the scene but nobody notice. The gorillas are four now and the time of the game is running out fast: "Tower, just want to confirm [for you, because for us is pretty clear] This is Air Canada 759. We see lights on the runway there. Across the runway. Can you confirm are we cleared to land?” “Confirmed cleared to land. Runway 28 Right. There's no one on 2-8 Right but you." “OK, [if you insist, let’s buzz them a little], Air Canada 759”

Still?.... Eleven pages on this nearly non-incident.. Gawd! Get a life!!! Please move on train spotters...

Don't despair old boy, help is at hand. :O

http://www.avgen.com/Postsperpage.jpg

National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Incident Preliminary Report
Location:
Date & Time:
Aircraft:
Flight Conducted Under:
San Francisco, CA 07/07/2017, 2356 PDT AIRBUS 320
Part 129: Foreign
Incident Number: Registration: Injuries:
DCA17IA148 C-FKUK N/A
On July 7, 2017, about 2356 Pacific daylight time, Air Canada flight 759, an Airbus A-320, C- FKCK, was cleared to land on runway 28R at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California, but instead lined up on parallel taxiway C, which had four air carrier airplanes on it awaiting takeoff clearance (a Boeing 787 that was first in line followed by an Airbus A340, another Boeing 787, and a Boeing 737). The flight descended below 100 feet above the ground and initiated a go-around after overflying the first airplane on the taxiway. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 as an international scheduled passenger flight from Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport, (YYZ), Toronto, Canada. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident.
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Manufacturer: AIRBUS Registration: C-FKUK
Model/Series: 320 211 Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built: No
Operator: Air Canada Air Carrier Operating Foreign Air Carrier (129) Certificate:
Page 1 of 2 DCA17IA148
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Condition of Light:
Observation Facility, Elevation: Observation Time:
Distance from Accident Site: Temperature/Dew Point:
Lowest Cloud Condition: Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction:
Lowest Ceiling: Visibility:
Altimeter Setting: Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Departure Point: Toronto, FN (YYZ) Destination: San Francisco, CA (SFO)
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: N/A Aircraft Damage: None
Passenger Injuries: N/A Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: N/A Latitude, Longitude: 37.615278, -122.358056
Administrative Information
Investigator In Charge (IIC): John W Lovell
Additional Participating Persons:
Note: The NTSB traveled to the scene of this incident.
Page 2 of 2 DCA17IA148
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com...okes-adult.jpg


As Ian W has enlightened us, we do not always see the reality that is in front of our nose.

This incident must be related to visual perception and visual cognition.
They expect to see two runways, so from far they see two lines of lights as expected. Then oops!!

The official report will shed the light.

NTSB Preliminary Report in a somewhat more readable format:

Attachment 2572

Then you will be reading a thread about how someone lined up on the wrong runway. It doesn't really matter whether the other runway lights are on or off, just make sure the crews know the status so they can get the right picture in their head. And I don't mean a NOTAM, put it on the ATIS.

two important clarifications in one little phrase.

at 0.6nm out, it still could have been only that... at below 100ft AGL, with 55ft tails sticking out in rather close proximity, another qualification might be more appropriate.

Regarding LED lighting, it's not just the same light with low power consumption. No idea how these greens look like at a distance, but don't underestimate the side effects of LEDs

NTSB preliminary report
 

NTSB wording sounds like AC759 overflew UA1 below 100ft while descending or floating above the taxiway. And once UA1 was behind them they applied go-around.

What I can't grasp is that UA1 saw AC:
"He's [litterally] on the taxiway !"
But, until flying past UA1, AC didn't noticed that the lights on the "runway" were those of the 4 taxiing A/C ??

Hopefully CVR and FDR were downloaded in time by the authorities.

A pooched AR procedure by a foreign carrier, one would certianly hope so! Especially the AR part.

This 'near miss', 'almost the worst airline crash in history' kindof stories all over the press.

With the quoted 100' clearance, with accuracy/latency, wheels and tail down a bit..damn

Video from Youtube, not very good, but one can see the runway lights vs taxiway (green lights) pretty clearly at 3:44 This is on Quiet Bridge Visual.
https://youtu.be/O3LTYeZrzH8
http://i63.tinypic.com/1zldmwx.jpg

another night landing
http://i64.tinypic.com/1zc1kdu.jpg

Thanks Kal, not being kind - being realistic. Pilots should all learn from this incident because the same WILL happen to them at some time. Unfortunately, as you will have seen many of the posts on this thread have started with: cannot believe that it is possible for professional pilots etc etc

It is absolutely nothing to do with professionalism or capability it is all to do with cognition and perception - human factors experiments Repeatedly show the brain has limits and cannot work in some ways.

Try to read this post and recite a nursery rhyme and listen to what someone is saying and read it back you cannot. Your brain has only one verbal 'cognitive channel'. A huge amount of research has been carried out in visual perception yet that is all forgotten when airports are designed. Everyone gets a degree of cognitive tunneling (focusing on a problem) when doing something challenging and that is when mis-perception can occur. This has been repeatedly demonstrated in research and happens continually in real life.

Underfire, see the video in post here
I didn't see the curtain changing color (first time, while counting the passes). Second time I was amazed that I missed the curtain as big as the screen size. I'm sure that AC 759 pilots were amazed too during the second approach.

OK now put a line of widebodies onto that taxiway and you will have a set of wingtip lights that are all around 100ft either side of the center line at close to 300ft apart along the 'taxiway'. Not unlike runway lights on a 200ft wide runway at 300ft intervals......

That is enough to trigger the 'illusion' of it being a runway - then the anti-collision lights on the aircraft would look like someone on the 'runway'.

You are not comparing like with like.

Raw mode S data (available to NTSB) should have a resolution of 25ft

I'm pretty sure that being perfectly aligned with twy C, might result in a substantial difference in brightness of the green centerline.

a couple of reds & greens <-> rwy lights? Nah, don't think so.

This is what I've been trying to get across.

But apart from that hesitation in his voice when ATC told him they had the runway - he too seemed locked on to a false reality.

IMHO Those rows of aircraft lights fooled them both. Tiredness factor to add perhaps, but despite the magnitude of the incident, my heart goes out to those two guys.

Having studied workload, stress and visual illusions in aviation, I believe Ian W's posts are along the right lines. Under some conditions, human perception can be very fragile. Even the best professionals can be fooled.

Professional pilots tune the ILS and xcheck.
At 500`on loc on gs 2 white 2 read stabelized . PNF : "500 feet continue"
It is simple.
Positive identification, always! If not GA, try again.

I did not know this existed, thanks for finding this portmanteau. :ok:

Whether AC 759 initiated the go around before or after the ATC call, 100 feet AGL is way too low to figure out they were over the taxiway. :=

If the CVR wasn't impounded in time, maybe the FDR was. It should have radar altitude data to correlate the descent and go around profiles over the taxiway.

There seems to be a consensus that most A320 crews wouldn't tune the ILS for this RNAV approach and even if you did, the data would not be displayed unless you switched approach modes.

I'm guessing that the AC A320 may have had old style radio nav without GPS, does this sound right? You often get map shifts from what I've seen, especially down low in places with higher surrounding terrain like SFO and KIX.

Professional pilots tune the ILS and xcheck.
At 500`on loc on gs 2 white 2 read stabelized . PNF : "500 feet continue"
It is simple.
Positive identification, always! If not GA, try again.

are you familiar with an FMS approach?? it is also flown multiple times daily by many professional pilots

I flew only one airplane with an FMS, the 767 in its early days. We didn't have an FMS approach procedure at the time. We were required to bring up the ILS on a visual, no different than with the old round-dial airplanes.

In general terms how is an FMS approach set up?

an FMS approach is based on information in it's own database, some provide lateral and vertical guidance, others only lateral...the 767 was different as the ILS could be tuned independently with the tuner on the centre pedestal as I remember, since this particular approach is offset, manually tuning the ILS was probably not a part of their SOPs, it is possible in the Airbus, but generally only used during downgrading of the FMGS system...the FMS approach is displayed as an LNAV track on the nav display..

Iron butt
If you bother to read the thread , you would see I already covered this.
As for your condescending tone, please!
There is few types of approaches invented I have not flown.

As for the specific selection on THIS AC A320 , I would be interested to know what AC mandate for a visual night approach.
I can not recall how any Lnav/vnav approaches are specifically entered and executed, as it is 13 years since I was qualified on A320.

But , any FMS based approach active, it will give you a strong full fly left FD at this point.

Another thing: Who has mapshift these days?

I say again: Visual Night , tune and follow approach aid for runway landing. AP on.

Aterpster asked, I answered, simple...take it as condescending, thats up to you..havent seen any pic of the MCDU of that approach..I can get one...it could well be the database ends prior to the runway...following the ILS for that runway may well put you outside the lateral path for the assigned approach, most likely they would have flown the assigned and published approach which is the "Quiet Bridge" fms approach...slightly offset over the bay for noise abatement procedures..in later stages of the approach it joins the ILS track, but not sure if that late portion is coded into the database, or it's flown "out the window" from that point, so being professional pilots, they did indeed fly their assigned, published approach...

I've only flown various Boeings, the latest being B738NG. LNAV/VNAV & RNAV approaches were authorised, BUT any ground based aids that helped confirm the FMS guided approach had to be tuned and monitored as back-up. Why would Airbus not tune and monitor a back-up aid, whether it be manually tuned or automatic? Is not a common standard in aviation to have back-up systems for most critical areas. If there are 2 fuel pumps, 2 hydraulic pumps, 2 braking systems, 2 gear & flap systems, 2 pilots......then why not have 2 independent NAV systems in use if they are available? Why rely on only 1 to bring you in close proximity with a concrete grave?

Honeywell "Smart Runway" ....

from this document: https://aerospace.honeywell.com/en/~...escription.pdf




4.3.8 Taxiway Landing
The purpose of the Taxiway Landing caution is to provide crew awareness that the aircraft is not lined up with a runway at low altitudes.
4.3.8.1 Annunciation Criteria
The caution is generated if:
Aircraft is airborne between 150 and 250 feet AGL (Radio Altitude), and Aircraft climb rate is less than 450 FPM, and
Aircraft is within 5 NM of a runway and is not lined-up with a runway.
NOTE: RAAS functions are based on a database of runway locations. The system does not have knowledge of the location of taxiways.
4.3.8.2 Message Content
The aural message string “Caution Taxiway, Caution Taxiway” is annunciated once each time the caution is generated. Refer to Figure 4-13.
4.3.8.3 Audio Level
The aural message is generated at the EGPWS Cautions and Warnings volume level.

SFO, two different incidents:
1) crew approaching a runway, something doesn't look right, they go along and are 30+ knots slow on final, crash, 3 dead, many injured, Asiana. GA decision too late.

2) Crew approaching runway, something looks wrong, someone speaks up, someone calls tower, and a GA decision is made in a timely fashion. Air Canada.

Cockpit culture and willingness to say "this doesn't look right" and speak up (confess to confusion) is to me a crucial difference, and why there is egg on face, and no dead bodies.

Granted, one would hope that all of the details and airmanship issues discussed for the last few hundred posts would prevent it getting that close.
I am glad someone spoke up and said "this doesn't look right" and then the GA happened in a timely fashion.(well, maybe not timely, given how close this was).
No approach is too beautiful to wave off.

This story was referenced on a Canadian (air cadet caliber) forum.......an interesting read (not previously mentioned here, afaik).........and, it features a not-unfamiliar actor !

Pilots mistake taxiway for runway at Sea-Tac | The Seattle Times

From.....2005 !

manually tuning the ILS was probably not a part of their SOPs, it is possible in the Airbus, but generally only used during downgrading of the FMGS system...the FMS approach is displayed as an LNAV track on the nav display..

I'm still waiting for an answer from the Airbus gurus: You've answered the lateral aspect of an FMS approach, if indeed they were doing one inside 4nm, but what were they using (what do you expect) for vertical guidance?

From a discussion on another thread about the Air Canada Halifax crash:

I'm wondering if the AC A320 at SFO was in this legacy no-GPS configuration.

Still, even if the setup is FMS with no raw data displayed, at the end of the day this is supposed to be a visual approach. Does AC turn off the flight directors on the visual segment of this approach?