Ok, I don't see a chart for that one. Do you have a reference please?

Airbubba
I was referring to Triploss when I mentioned Taxi-F, who wrote:-
"When no construction was happening, I've only ever seen aircraft line up directly alongside 28L, which I believe is 28-F (for takeoff on both 28L and 28R), so multiple aircraft on 28-C would also match up with the construction theory. Then again I've never been at the airport around midnight."

Anyhow, a huge accident avoided.

You can hear AC 759 cleared for the FMS Bridge Visual at about 15:45 into this approach control clip (the time seems to be different depending on the .mp3 player used):

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/ks...2017-0630Z.mp3

This RNAV approach requires specific approval for each airline and is what I would call a 'company page' in the Jepps.

Thanks :ok:, I probably got lost with the mention of 28-C which must mean taxiway C, not a mythical center runway.

Would an airline's insurance policy cover destroying five planes and that many lives?

Neither do I!
19-1 Tipp Toe visual
19-2 Quiet Bridge visual.
Did the latter many times. The key is to have an FMS extended line from the runway to monitor when going visual from the bridge. 3 key strokes in the Honeywell FMS and there's both a lateral and vertical back-up.

folks, look at Quiet Bridge procedure, the offset is to threshold. Note the runway is at 284, while the approach is 275 until threshold.(not to 4nm as I have seen posted) As a reminder, it is a visual approach.
http://i63.tinypic.com/2who57s.jpg

Thus, you will be off on the PAPI until threshold if you follow the procedure. That being said, the ac in question offset to a point far out from that, and was aligned with the taxiway for an extended timeframe, even questioning lights on the runway. The ac never deviated from the alignment on the taxiway. (even when GA, and it is not clear if the ac initiated GA before it was instructed to)
What is apparent, at least to me, is that if the taxi had been clear of other ac lights, it is very, very likely the ac would have landed on it. TCH is 55 on 28R, so a GA at 100 (as reported) means that, well, as much as many want to say this was not an issue and the crew recognized and did a GA, well, damn, they were going to land, face it. (when you GA at 28R, you turn to 265 on GA...no deviation in that FP by the crew.

In regards to the visual comment at the beginning, SFO has and does use ADSB. Comments regarding ADSB use, and how it may have saved this are not accurate. Note that ADSB, (out and in) with latency, is about useless on final in this case. Also note, that many ATM systems, in order to remove clutter from the ATC screens, remove the ADSB data (due to clutter and accuracy issues at that point)

At least the approach had 'Bridge' and 'Visual' in the name. Don't think it was the Quiet Bridge Visual though... :=

Absolutely, this is the key point. I was reminded of Western DC-10 in Mexico City.

It is very fortunate that a happy end was had, and people need to look at this very, very hard.

Another example would be Comair in Lexington. Despite no runway lights, they initiated TO and were completely unaware until they ran out of runway. This is clearly a "thing", fixation on unreal situations despite the obvious evidence.

Could have been quite loud if things had run to an unpleasant conclusion.

umm..what procedure do you think they were cleared for? I did not notice the "FMS28R able" call for the ac? Where do you see cleared for Bridge visual, especially Air Canada in the US? Aside from that, it is the same procedure, just with waypoints.

Isnt 'visual' the operative word here?


The FMS Bridge Visual Approach 28R is a version of the Quiet Bridge Visual Approach 28R which is coded with GPS coordinates and can be included in an FMS database for approved operators. This allows the procedure to be used when the SFO VOR is out of service, and also gives ATC additional flexibility by allowing them to clear pilots direct to any of the fixes without needing to intercept the radial on the standard arrival.

Posted by deSitter: "Another example would be Comair in Lexington."


The Comair crash was the focus of a presentation recently, in Montreal (McGill), by an official (of the U.S. Justice Dep't) who had been involved in the litigation which resulted. Facts - meaning the official iteration of the relevant investigation-produced facts as recorded (or mostly recorded) in official reports - are not available, obviously (no kidding) yet, about the SFO "what did not happen" event. But even trying to think about the litigation that could have been a byproduct of a horrid conflagration - mind-boggling. I'll leave it to someone who pilots airliners (or who has) to note, or dismiss, irony in the Asiana incident at the same airport, the fire truck, the "ground getting bigger" amid silence . . . up front.

At the risk of beng picky, if you are going to overlay two images, you want to scale them the same first.

The (colour) image showing the actual flightpath from WebTrak has the San Mateo Bridge just visible in the bottom RH corner.

The (black and white) approach chart has the (same) bridge right in the centre.

Thanks underfire; however, further down the chart (not visible on your excerpt) it says:

So, presumably after this position they are free to align with the runway.

This is at SFO 6D, or 5nm from the threshold. My Lido chart shows an alignment manoeuvre with the runway at this point.

Good spot DaveReidUK. I think the two bridges at bottom RH corner are the Dumbarton Bridges.
The narrow white bridge is probably the San Mateo Bridge. If so, the northerly first track shows the aircraft lining up with the 'runway' at the correct point.

I agree that the superimposition seems to be not to scale.

As I've said repeatedly on this thread :ugh::

It is in the approach control audio clip I cited above, take a listen:

This is an 'unpublished' approach that requires specific operator approval. I agree that it mimics the Quiet Bridge but the fact that it is an FMS approach may be very pertinent to the nav setup on an early glass cockpit plane in my opinion.

I sheepishly admit to some Airbus time but I've never flown the A320. On some planes of that pre-GPS era you have to be creative to display raw data and the FMS picture at the same time. Sometimes you get a dotted line that you think may be raw data but in actuality the line is subject to a map shift.

Maybe some AC folks can verify that the FMS Bridge Visual to 28R is in their charts. Back during the glory days Air Canada did their own charts in-house, I don't know whom they use for a vendor these days.

Agreed and thanks for the clarification.

Sorry, I thought I had posted the correct image...thanks for spotting that.

http://i67.tinypic.com/2dvsvwk.jpg

The FMS Bridge Visual Approach 28R is an AR procedure, so without ref to that coding, not sure what procedure looks like. I would be curious as to why the FMS bridge visual, ie RNAV visual procedure does not overlay the Quiet bridge procedure.

Aside, from that, the crew lined it up visually, and with the taxiway. A bit surprised they had it, but good luck keeping the AR

Visual at night is not a good idea without a ILS or VNAV- PATH as primary and visual as backup.
This near disaster proves it.

At typical U.S. payouts for such an occurrence, my answer would be "only if the policy's liability limit approached $10 billion."

Anybody thought that fatigue may have played a part in this incident, who knows what these guys where rostered in the preceding duties?

Reasonable ? Just think about it:

T0 GA instruction given
T0+??s AC crew pushes throttles to TOGA
T0+?s A320 gets a positive climb rate
T0+ 10s (presumably): AC759 roars up 100ft above UA001
T0+ 13s: astonished UA001 reports the close call

According to the AVH quoting the Canadian TSB: AC-759 had already overflown taxiway C by about 0.25nm when ATC instructed the aircraft to go around !

Based on a quick calculation: when ATC instructs to abort landing, AC759 and UA001 are horizontally 8-10 seconds from each other (600-800m ie. less than 0.5 NM) with seriously converging altitudes. Tiny margin left at that point :sad:

And a 789 taxiing towards you followed by more airliners at night is a arguably a pretty visible sight. How could AC759 be so severely confused to the point to having to wait the ATC in extremis instruction ?

Looking forward to the full report.

Ground track suggests that's exactly what they were doing, the FMS Bridge visual approach which provides lateral and vertical guidance to touchdown.

I can't agree with this.

Ages ago, I was on a visual night approach to IAD from the southeast, runway 1C I think. When I didn't report the runway in sight, the control tower asked for that information. It wasn't that I didn't know where the runway was, but I did not have a direct view of the runway lights - so I responded "No". Shortly after that, they asked the question again. I was less than 3 miles from the runway threshold, but still didn't have the view I needed - so I said "No".

They're response surprised me. They turned on the approach lights. It looked like a huge bright ball heading straight for the runway - repeating its path every second or two. I can't image what the electric bill for that was. It certainly left no doubt about where the runway was. Anyway, I reported "Yes", thanked them, and landed as instructed.

There are certainly many more challenges in landing a large jet compared to my little Cessna 172. Then again, won't they always give an ATC flight a straight in approach?

At SFO, 28R has: ALSF2: standard 2,400 foot high intensity approach lighting system with centerline sequenced flashers (category II or III)

Who is going to do it? NTSB as the incident happened in the US or TSB Canada as the state of registry?

Of course, I'm dismayed by the reaction of many around the internet that this incident is either "nothing" or "something".
Technically, it's "not nothing". I say that as a qualified ontologist.

Here's the points to take home:
The crew's bodies were in that magic 2-4 AM zone, fatigued or fresh, they were at their circadian low.
Their call was classic cognitive dissonance: what they were seeing was not what they expected to see, and so they sought confirmation of what they expected to see.
They then went around successfully.

Here's what cannot be said at the moment:
*Whether the crew initiated a go-around of its own accord
The unidentified voice from UA1 cuts in immediately after AC's readback. There are three possibilities:
1. During the readback, the PF decided to go around. The information they were given did not match what they were seeing out the window.
2. When UA1 calls "They're on the taxiway", they hit that TOGA button right quick.
3. They waited for the GA instruction from the tower.

I can see any of the three scenarios happening.

*How high they were when they flew over UA1
They had to go around fairly close in, since UA1 would need to be able to recognize that they were lined up on the taxiway. UA1 would spot it before the tower did. I think I posted a few years ago when another flight finished its bad day by lining up on 28R instead of 28L, causing the aircraft about to line up on 28L to bail out onto C. In that case too, the aircraft at the end of the 28s saw it before the tower, and that makes intuitive sense.
In any case, it's not clear how high they were or where they were when this happened. Simon over at AvHerald says "100 ft and past the 'taxiway threshold'." Of course, it's his "journalistic" policy not to name sources, and he's been wrong with this fine-grained data before, so, in this case, I'll wait for the NTSB animation (since nobody's gonna be filming that).

*Whether any other action was taken to avoid collision.
I wouldn't condemn those stuck behind UA1; they had limited visibility, and there's only one Tower frequency at KSFO. The press likes to cite Tenerife, but instrumental in Tenerife was a blocked transmission. I'll also note that thankfully, everyone on frequency was more or less speaking the same language. But there's no saying from the evidence so far whether anyone did anything. Would you risk blinding the crew with your landing lights, for example?

Two other notes:

I believe that for a very brief period about a decade ago, 28R was 28C, and the taxiway was 28R for lighter aircraft.

KSFO has inaugurated a new tower since the Asiana incident, so they probably won't be operating the same old camera.

Did they not put a kink in the taxiway after the LGW incident, so as you could see it was not a straight runway?

Don't know about the TSB but the NTSB is certainly going to take a look:

https://twitter.com/NTSB_Newsroom/st...21284513959936

This would not happen if the crew use ILS or VNAV-PATH for cross reference to back up a visual at night.
My question is what strength was the Approach and RWY lights on. If low, and focused on the taxiway, I can see this developing. But to take it as far as they did is pure madness.
My guess is that AC needs to fire the chief pilot and the head of training and get some competent people that knows how modern aircraft works.
Or are they going to blame this one on Airbus as well?

I wonder were MOT is in all this and if they have AC under control.
Me thinks not.

Anyway , it ended well and we shall all take notes, Eh!

Circadian low
 

I would put my money on their circadian low being a factor in this incident.
Perhaps we should start adding "circadian" to our callsign if we are in it. Just like "heavy" or "super".

Something like this: "Air Canada 123 circadian, established on final runway 28R."

Google "Juliet Kink" (though it has since been straightened out).

Air Can(ada) We Blame Someone Else Please
 

Air Canada: isn't that the outfit that gave us the Gimli (I can't do simple arithmetic) Glider and the Let's Fly below the threshold in Halifax who-cares boyz and now Hope SFO ATC know where I am because I've not a clue. Long past time that TSB stopped covering up for their buddies.

Here's a couple of possibly pertinent SFO Notams in the traditional cryptic format:

From the Mercury News article "’11 seconds to impact’: Expert calculates how close SFO near-miss was to disaster" :eek::

SFO near-miss: Air Canada pulled up with 11 seconds to spare

Not a bad idea. Seriously. :cool:

I asked before but was ignored.

1/ was the 28R ILS switched on? If not why not?
2/ where the HIAL's and RTZL's switched on? If not why not?
3/ did the crew bother to tune the 28R ILS and check it.?

This should not happen, if a runway is equipped with an ILS and it's not U/S then it should be switched on by ATC and all landing A/C should tune it to use as a backup for just this very reason.
Especially at Airports like SFO with close spaced runways and taxiways.

It's should be common sense and airmanship.

1/. If the ILS was serviceable, yes, it was on. They don't just turn it off for no good reason.
2/. Approach lighting is set to an appropriate level for the prevailing conditions. If they are set to high and the vis is good, it can be distracting.
3/. In modern aircraft we don't "tune the ILS." That happens automatically. If they were going to land on 28R and the localizer was operating, I have no doubt that it was displayed in the cockpit. Being able to include that information in your scan when you are landing at 140 kias visually at night at 3 am against a confusing background is another thing altogether.

Good job to all those involved for averting what could have been a disaster.

if they were doing the Quiet Bridge Visual, just crossing the San Mateo bridge, the chart depicts joining the localizer...possibly there had visual contact and decided to continue visually..is this procedure in their FMGS database is an interesting question


update....if the Quiet Bridge is selected from the FMGS database and activated, the localizer is not tuned, and no ILS data will be displayed...

If you had seen the NOTAM several hours beforehand that the Approach Lighting System was out of service, even though it was for a runway one character different, would that be in your mind as you line up visually for what looks like the right hand of two parallel lit strips, knowing SFO has two parallel runways (it seems all the lighting for 28L had been turned off for works, not just the approach lights).

I also wonder why they were given this curved visual nighttime approach at a time of low traffic to a runway fully equipped with all the aids. I'll bet when they came back round again that was not done.

And you have to wonder how the Flight Radar 24 traces shown above, which is something put together by a bunch of enthusiast amateurs, can show quite clearly, based on real time information, that they were lined up on the taxiway, and not like the later parallel trace shows for the runway, yet with all the millions of dollars of kit the ATC staff in the tower didn't get to be aware of this.

This attached chart is dated, and not for use for navigation.

"I also wonder why they were given this curved visual nighttime approach at a time of low traffic to a runway fully equipped with all the aids. I'll bet when they came back round again that was not done."


This approach is used at this time of night because of the extreme noise sensitivity of the area. The folks on both sides of the bay have telephones and they use them.