Doesn't ring true. Newspapers massacre pretty much everyone, advertisers or not (glossy magazines are different). How many Emirates ads were there in your paper today? Much more likely explanation for the low media interest was the fact that nobody was hurt.

To a point, yes. However a few months ago during the latest QF feeding frenzy, technical delays somehow became major stories. A lot of it was due to the last vestiges of the engineers dispute... but it really got ridiculous.

Media? what Media
 

For those in the northern parts, anything concerning QF gets headlines in the Media here. The very interesting thing abount this accident is that bugga all has been said about the potential outcomes in the mainstream media, both press and TV.Not one report in the monday Melbourne press. The EK spindoctors either have worked very hard, or been very very lucky. When the report comes out we will watch with interest. In the meantime, lets wait for the report. Should not be long.

Spin? - what spin
 

And it is not just the well-oiled Australian Emirates PR team. The Emirates PPRUNE spin team are smoothly working away. I'm embarrassed to say that White Knight got me fooled

This topic came up in the Madrid Barajas t/o accident too, when it was intially stated an engine failure occurred... rule of thumb checks or stopwatch checks to a nominal 80 or 100kts have been proposed after many 'fail to accelerate properly' accidents/incidents

The procedure for the performances as you describe it looks pretty standard in the industry and effectively, it doesn’t take much for an error to enter the equation.
As earlier reminded by James7 MK Airlines flight 1602 tried to take off from Halifax with the figures for a 240 tonnes GW when actually the 747 was almost 50% FIFTY heavier !

So a mistake as Getzo put it is always possible :
“Could ZFW instead of TOW been used in LPC for the T/O performance calculations?”

Especially when, as reminded by fourgolds crews fly airplanes as different as the 332 and the 345 in weight perspective.

Could be we're looking at spectacular piloting, dealing with cargo shift that prevented proper rotation and landing configuration.

-drl

deSitter
 

I don't believe cargo shift. The hold is short anyway so not much effect.

Sounds like clutching at straws to defend a human crew.

I was on that plane on my way back to holland. Pretty scary experience I must say (allmost crapped myself). The pilot announced there was a "small technical problem". :suspect: Was glad to be back on the ground.:bored:

How far off would the weight have to be to only hit Vr at 12000' ?

Take Off Acceleration
 

This is an extract taken from the MK Airline flight 1602.

Quote:-
Also of interest was an incident that occurred on 18 July 2002, when an MK Airlines Limited B747-200 had a take-off performance incident in Sapporo, Japan. The first officer completed the take-off data card using the runway analysis charts for the applicable runway. The captain checked the card and found it to be correct. The take-off weight, as indicated on the card, was written as 258 000 kg, rather than the correct weight of 358 000 kg. Gross error check speeds had also been set using 258 000 kg. The loadmaster presented the load sheet to the captain for checking and he signed it. The load sheet indicated 358 000 kg, but the difference in weight was not detected. The airspeeds and EPRs were set for 258 000 kg. During the early stages of the take-off roll, the flight crew noted that the aircraft was not accelerating normally, and the take off was rejected at approximately 30 to 40 knots. On review of the take-off data card, the error was detected and a new take-off data card was completed using the correct weight. The subsequent take-off was uneventful." - end quote.

The report also believed that the crew of 1602 were sufficiently fatigued not to realise the lack of acceleration.

I am not suggesting in anyway that something similar happened here. I am a firm believer that the study of historical incidents and accidents enhances Flight Safety.

This is a link to the:- Boeing 747-412 9V-SMT, flight SQ286, tail strike during take-off, Auckland International Airport, 12 March 2003.

Tail strike due to fact that Vr was calculated 33 knots less than the required 163 kts.

Aviation Reports[G]skins%2ftaicAviation%2fskin_aviation


I would hope that some initial report would be out soon. Someone knows for sure.

It seems to me that someone should have noticed a 30 knot difference. After all, that's 20 percent of the correct number. Had they never flown that type of aircraft before that day? :=

A bit of media did get through
 

Captn Kremin,

I was surprised Crikey didn't have a go, but I see their usual aviation writer Ben Sandilands went for it in his Crikey blog. Interesting comment about the ATSB. Surely they know what really happened by now.

Emirates flight EK 407 was the most dangerous non fatal accident to a jet airliner in Australia - Plane Talking

Hmm...
Maybe one of the engines ingested a part of the ILS antenna structure, when it plowed through the grass beyond the runway.

Interesting to note :

The tail scrape marks along the runway surface from 9V-SMT started at about 55% of the runway length and ended about 68% of its length (12000 feet)

In the EK407 case, we may assume the tail scrape marks are on the very last portion of the runway as the airplane was still rolling at this time, so probably no attempt here to rotate at a too low calculated Vr, but almost an obvious indication of some kind of thrust deficit.

Could it be justified by simply inverting 2 numbers and entering 72 when the appropriate calculated FLEX was in fact 27 ?

Again ... just a possible scenario ...

Not exactly NO, but ........ the Captain was recently off the A 340, so the incorrect numbers sounded familiar to him.

Not an excuse, but just one of the holes in the cheese.

putting asside the debate on the cause of this for a moment, how and where will the aircraft be repaired? Slow & low ferry back to DXB or fly in the specialist equipment and parts required to do this in MEL?

CX changed their ACARS RTOW input page after several reports of entering ZFW instead of TOW into the available field. I believe one A330 even got airborne, however the difference in ZFW and TOW was less than 20T and the resulting RTOW had the same max flex temp for both weights.

Because the FMS performance entry used ZFW crew became accustomed to using the ZFW figure when using the "box".

Also blasting around in light weight A330s all day and occasionally flying A340s and even less flying on A346s meant a typical A330 TOW was often similar to a 340 ZFW.

The ACARS RTOW now requires crew to enter both ZFW and TOW, the RTOW does a cross check, if the figures aren't reasonable you get a check data message.

Simply human factors, rubbish in the box you get rubbish out, you need well written SOPs to prevent the swiss cheese event.

How? Probably with a bit of difficulty by the looks of things, if the reports of the damage are correct. Getting a place to put it into to do the repairs will probably also be a fairly 'challenging' I'd imagine.

Where? Melbourne - the only way that aircraft will fly out of Melbourne is: a) after it's been repaired and signed-off as airworthy, or b) as cargo, once it's been disassembled.

The questions are good ones though. :ok:

I was a passenger on this flight,

I'm not a pilot but I have made moer than 100 flights in several types of aircraft as a passenger.

I was in the rear of the cabin at seat 34C and I watched the takeoff from the seat monitor via the forward camera. The aircraft seemed to rotate a very late and run out of runway. We did strike the end of the runway and there were visible sparks from the window near me. I did not see any engine issues from my side of the cabin.

The rate of climb once free flight was achieved seemed very low. There were some very distressed passengers and the crew didn't seem to be much better! I still have the fingernail marks in my arm from the lady sat next to me!

The captain admitted a technical fault after being in the air for 10 minutes and the flight over water to dump fuel seemed to take forever. I must admit I was more worried about landing as I thought the landing gear might have been damaged.

The landing happened without incident and the flight deck should be commended for that.

I must say it felt to me like there wasn't enough thrust to get the aircraft into the air. It took too long to get up to speed and then by the time we had got up to speed there was no runway left! The tail scrape as you call it did happened three times to my memory.

I must say I'm glad things happened they way they did and no injuries occurred. I am very interested in the investigation report. I don't think it was pilot error and more likely misinformation given or a technical fault with the aircraft. I wish the pilot could have slammed the brakes on before the point of no return but thats wishful thinking.

Overrun

I will back up White Knight unequivocally. He is correct. The crew remained in Melbourne, pending arrival of EK Flight Safety personnel, and the EK the A340 Tech Pilot who will overlap with the Aussies to investigate.

The SQ 744 that scraped in Auckland had an extended stay at NZAA till its bum was tidied up. I believe they had to ship in special gear and erect a temporary hangar for the job to be done.

China Airlines Flight CI611, Boeing Model 747, B-18255
 

Link to FAA site on the structural repair of a China Airlines 747, as a result of a tail strike, that failed 22 years later.

Lessons Learned From Transport Airplane Accidents

Grunty,

The accident report you refer to also mentioned - at the risk of thread drift -that China Airlines maintenance planning/MRO had failed to address re-inspections of the repaired area and CPCP (inspections for corrosion) requirements. Typical chain.

Failures after tail scrapes
 

I am sure the lessons learnt following the loss of the JAL B747, as a result of an improper repair to the rear pressure bulkhead following a tailscrape, will be uppermost in the minds of those charged with repairing the Airbus.

Nah - I've seen a lot worse damage than that flying around. Bolt a big external patch over the damage and ferry it unpressurized to the heavy maintenance base.

An AA 767 in London landed on the nose gear and did a massive amount of damage to the fuselage - a few big plates bolted on externally and then ferried back to Mr Boeing in Seattle.

Sparks
 

Thanks for that Phoenix62 - nice contribution.

I've been curious about the sparks reported by other pax - seems clear that there were sparks of some sort. That was leading me to think about the engines, but you seem to suggest that what you saw was very late on in the take-off run - perhaps at the point of impact with whatever structure was hit? And perhaps due to that impact in fact?

34C?
Do you sit in the aisle?

Visible sparks seen through the window?
It is impossible to see the sparks of a tail strike through the window.

On the subject of sparks etc. At night any source of light will probably be visible from the passenger windows as a reflection from the aircraft, (White) and the ground, as with an engine surge, everything around the aircraft lights up at night but, from the cockpit, you don't actually see the flames. I suspect that what the pax saw was the reflected light caused by the sparks, not the sparks themselves?

IFP, Well spotted on 34C, which doesn't exist. However, tail strike sparks would probably reflect off the all white engine pods ........ so......

Its not that hard to get distracted during flight prep by pursers, redcaps, refuellers, engineers etc all sticking their heads into the cockpit, although MEL is probably not as manic as DXB. This was highlighted during the recent LOSA audit, but it seems nothing was done about it.

I have fallen prey to the "ZFW as TOW" gotcha and had it picked up by the FO or relief crew. Not only embarrassing but quite shocking when you consider the implications.

Now I estimate my Vref30 (Boeing) at preflight briefing based on the planned TOW. It's quieter and there are no distractions to mess with my already poor mathematical skills. I used to check my green dot speed (Airbus) as I recall we had a procedure to cross check it prior to entering the speeds in the FMGC. If my calculated speed is more than a few knots off the FMC/FMGC speed, I want to know why.

For A330 it was something like, Green dot = (TOWx0.6)+107 (This figure has to be increased one knot per thousand feet above FL200, but for takeoff this is obviously not necessary). It's quoted in Vol 3 from memory so you can check the reference.

e.g. TOW of 230t, green dot should be (230x.6)+107 = 245

For Boeing, Vref30 = (GW/3)+66 (this is accurate for the 777-300ER but will vary a few knots for other models).

e.g. TOW of 300t, Vref 30 should be (300/3)+66 = 166

Maybe not the sparks themselves, but...beacon flashes are quite easy to see against the ground during takeoff, and if the sparks off my grinder are anything to go by, dragging the bottom of the aeroplane along the runway would light up the surrounding area like (yellow) daylight. Maybe not see the sparks themselves, but the glow from them, you bet you'd see it.

I assume that Phoenix62 means 34B and not C as C doesn't exist!

34 is towards the back though.....

Emirates must use the same seating system as CX, the seats are all based on 3 - 4 - 3 seating system so ABC - DEFG - HJK however if you're on an Airbus where the layout is 2 - 4 - 2 in EY the seats go AC - DEFG - HK that way window and aisle seats are always the same, in all CX A/C A & K are window seats, CDGH are aisle seats, so 34C is the left widow group aisle seat, one seat from the window.

Edit: EK is not like CX though.

Not so.

See :

SeatGuru Seat Map Emirates Airbus A340-500 (345)

FWIW

I might have missed it, but does EK use TODC or books for take-off calculations?

The Seating Chart of Emitates Airbus A340-500 tells another story:
Emirates | Flying with Emirates | Our Fleet | Seating Chart

Sanity Check Required
 

That's why I brought up earlier that whoever is doing the calculations should have a gut feeling as to what the correct answer should be. Maybe these guys are flying too many types and can't remember what a reasonable answer should be. Did this crew fly this type plane to MEL? If so, they should have gotten something close to the same Vr that they got on that outbound leg. That in itself is a safety finding which should prompt a change in airline policy. Also, as previously discussed, some sort of acceleration check is certainly in order.

Did this crew fly this type plane to MEL? If so, they should have gotten something close to the same Vr that they got on that outbound leg

Not necessarily. Probably 2 of the crewmembers omboard had been on a "short" hop over to New Zealand between the outbound leg and the leg to DXB with a comparably light aircraft.

AA

Basic Airmanship
 

So, pulling numbers out of a warm spot, if they got a Vr=X for a lightly loaded aircraft for a short leg, then they should have expect to have X+15 for a heavy takeoff. Again, they should have a gut feeling about their results, and if it isn't in the ballpark, they should look at their input and try to figure out where the error lies. Just basic airmanship.