Overrun

I will back up White Knight unequivocally. He is correct. The crew remained in Melbourne, pending arrival of EK Flight Safety personnel, and the EK the A340 Tech Pilot who will overlap with the Aussies to investigate.

The SQ 744 that scraped in Auckland had an extended stay at NZAA till its bum was tidied up. I believe they had to ship in special gear and erect a temporary hangar for the job to be done.

China Airlines Flight CI611, Boeing Model 747, B-18255
 

Link to FAA site on the structural repair of a China Airlines 747, as a result of a tail strike, that failed 22 years later.

Lessons Learned From Transport Airplane Accidents

Grunty,

The accident report you refer to also mentioned - at the risk of thread drift -that China Airlines maintenance planning/MRO had failed to address re-inspections of the repaired area and CPCP (inspections for corrosion) requirements. Typical chain.

Failures after tail scrapes
 

I am sure the lessons learnt following the loss of the JAL B747, as a result of an improper repair to the rear pressure bulkhead following a tailscrape, will be uppermost in the minds of those charged with repairing the Airbus.

Nah - I've seen a lot worse damage than that flying around. Bolt a big external patch over the damage and ferry it unpressurized to the heavy maintenance base.

An AA 767 in London landed on the nose gear and did a massive amount of damage to the fuselage - a few big plates bolted on externally and then ferried back to Mr Boeing in Seattle.

Sparks
 

Thanks for that Phoenix62 - nice contribution.

I've been curious about the sparks reported by other pax - seems clear that there were sparks of some sort. That was leading me to think about the engines, but you seem to suggest that what you saw was very late on in the take-off run - perhaps at the point of impact with whatever structure was hit? And perhaps due to that impact in fact?

34C?
Do you sit in the aisle?

Visible sparks seen through the window?
It is impossible to see the sparks of a tail strike through the window.

On the subject of sparks etc. At night any source of light will probably be visible from the passenger windows as a reflection from the aircraft, (White) and the ground, as with an engine surge, everything around the aircraft lights up at night but, from the cockpit, you don't actually see the flames. I suspect that what the pax saw was the reflected light caused by the sparks, not the sparks themselves?

IFP, Well spotted on 34C, which doesn't exist. However, tail strike sparks would probably reflect off the all white engine pods ........ so......

Its not that hard to get distracted during flight prep by pursers, redcaps, refuellers, engineers etc all sticking their heads into the cockpit, although MEL is probably not as manic as DXB. This was highlighted during the recent LOSA audit, but it seems nothing was done about it.

I have fallen prey to the "ZFW as TOW" gotcha and had it picked up by the FO or relief crew. Not only embarrassing but quite shocking when you consider the implications.

Now I estimate my Vref30 (Boeing) at preflight briefing based on the planned TOW. It's quieter and there are no distractions to mess with my already poor mathematical skills. I used to check my green dot speed (Airbus) as I recall we had a procedure to cross check it prior to entering the speeds in the FMGC. If my calculated speed is more than a few knots off the FMC/FMGC speed, I want to know why.

For A330 it was something like, Green dot = (TOWx0.6)+107 (This figure has to be increased one knot per thousand feet above FL200, but for takeoff this is obviously not necessary). It's quoted in Vol 3 from memory so you can check the reference.

e.g. TOW of 230t, green dot should be (230x.6)+107 = 245

For Boeing, Vref30 = (GW/3)+66 (this is accurate for the 777-300ER but will vary a few knots for other models).

e.g. TOW of 300t, Vref 30 should be (300/3)+66 = 166

Maybe not the sparks themselves, but...beacon flashes are quite easy to see against the ground during takeoff, and if the sparks off my grinder are anything to go by, dragging the bottom of the aeroplane along the runway would light up the surrounding area like (yellow) daylight. Maybe not see the sparks themselves, but the glow from them, you bet you'd see it.

I assume that Phoenix62 means 34B and not C as C doesn't exist!

34 is towards the back though.....

Emirates must use the same seating system as CX, the seats are all based on 3 - 4 - 3 seating system so ABC - DEFG - HJK however if you're on an Airbus where the layout is 2 - 4 - 2 in EY the seats go AC - DEFG - HK that way window and aisle seats are always the same, in all CX A/C A & K are window seats, CDGH are aisle seats, so 34C is the left widow group aisle seat, one seat from the window.

Edit: EK is not like CX though.

Not so.

See :

SeatGuru Seat Map Emirates Airbus A340-500 (345)

FWIW

I might have missed it, but does EK use TODC or books for take-off calculations?

The Seating Chart of Emitates Airbus A340-500 tells another story:
Emirates | Flying with Emirates | Our Fleet | Seating Chart

Sanity Check Required
 

That's why I brought up earlier that whoever is doing the calculations should have a gut feeling as to what the correct answer should be. Maybe these guys are flying too many types and can't remember what a reasonable answer should be. Did this crew fly this type plane to MEL? If so, they should have gotten something close to the same Vr that they got on that outbound leg. That in itself is a safety finding which should prompt a change in airline policy. Also, as previously discussed, some sort of acceleration check is certainly in order.

Did this crew fly this type plane to MEL? If so, they should have gotten something close to the same Vr that they got on that outbound leg

Not necessarily. Probably 2 of the crewmembers omboard had been on a "short" hop over to New Zealand between the outbound leg and the leg to DXB with a comparably light aircraft.

AA

Basic Airmanship
 

So, pulling numbers out of a warm spot, if they got a Vr=X for a lightly loaded aircraft for a short leg, then they should have expect to have X+15 for a heavy takeoff. Again, they should have a gut feeling about their results, and if it isn't in the ballpark, they should look at their input and try to figure out where the error lies. Just basic airmanship.