As I said waaayyy back somewhere, it appears that perhaps a more noticeable warning of RA failure would be a good idea in view of the effect this can have on an inattentive crew.

The place where I think Boeing ARE vulnerable is in not mandating the deselection of autothrottle in stall recovery. Something most of us would instinctively do, I'm sure, but this crew did not. It is pretty obvious that the combination of RA fail and autothrottle retention in a stall had not been fully thought out. Even with full and active monitoring of 'max thrust achieved' by PNF (or PF), once those T/Ls closed for the second time.................

Yup, couldn't agree more.
Even the 'ole L1011, which was the first airplane with true fail/operational performance with the autoflight/autothrust systems, every once in awhile does a hiccup...that is what the pilots are there for...to FLY the airplane.

What an absolute surprise...:rolleyes:

BOAC

The equipment I fly does not have an AT but it does have an AP which I can cancel out of in an instant with a handy disconnect switch on the yoke, right beneath my thumb. In addition to this switch I can also disconnect the AP by overpowering it with sufficient break out force on the yoke. Would it not be useful to have a similar capacity in respect to the AT, say based on PL position when manually commanding full power?

.....mmm not really 411A, a stall recovery is without doubt the time to get rid of the automatics and fly the thing. However, in many other "what is it doing now?" situations the correct response is rarely to click out the automatics and fly the aircraft Usually a far better response is to go down a level of automation....if the LNAV is taking you somewhere strange, then go into heading....but keep the autopilot - it's there to help you in high workload situations.....

Quite true, however, some less informed folks will just sit there and watch the accident happen.
Not good.

Don't think so! One I see (and do myself) not infrequently is descending on automatics to capture glideslope, with localiser captured and glideslope armed. Looks good, glideslope coming in, then disaster!- you forgot the altitude window is armed, and because that captures before the glideslope, aeroplane levels off and thrust goes up, glideslope now rapidly falling away. Hands flustered, what to do? To me, the ONLY response is to hit disconnect, change configuration and slam throttles closed, otherwise you have lost glideslope irretrievably. The automatics will not now get you out of that one, so the use of 'rarely' in a not unusual occurrence is not suitable!

Another one- you have been vectored at a large angle to the localiser and passing through it. But you have been dumb and selected LOC arm. Now your heading control is locked into automatics, and you start making bizarre attacks to the Localiser from the other side and not able to control it. What to do? Best answer is to disconnect and fly it sensibly yourself. Then instead of turning out of control back towards the localiser at a stupid attack, you can manually control to a sensible and gentle attack.

There's 2 scenarios that contradict ' you should rarely disconnect, rather move down a stage'. Unless you do it rapidly and sensibly yourself, manually, you will probably not be able to recover the situation satisfactorily. It's the younger pilots who let automatics fly a serviceable aeroplane into the ground while they faff around with the MCP. Us older experienced pilots know when we can do it better!

Absolutely, spot on!:)

Isn't that what we call situational awareness ?

I'll bet sim instructors around the world are duplicating the THY AMS situation now - if for no other reason than to gather statistics on crews' response to subtle system failures.

Rainboe....the two examples are exactly my point. They both stem from a miss managed situation. You should have spotted the fact that the thing would go into Alt - it's called mode awareness and SA....things which are very important when operating advanced glass. Unfortuanately rather than learning these important skills people would rather just screw up the automation and then click it all out.

Having said that in both cases a step down in automation level works ....you don't want ALT capture....well you can change the Alt sel and you have path or VS...if you had enough SA to see it coming. As for the LOC example ....it's the same argument as the LNAV example - take heading!

...and I think you'll find that when it comes to flying servicable jets into the ground it's statistically the experienced PIC who is flying at the time. Also having trained a large number of people moving from a 1960s explosion in a dial factory to state of the art EFIS flight deck, I would take issue with your assertion that the young wizz kids are less safe..quite the opposite in fact.

This is all thread drift of course....but I wonder if a lack of mode awareness and poor SA were contributing factors in this accident ... and how much was this emphasised in the crews training...

How old and experienced was the LTC commanding the 737 in question?

If it happens to one crew it could happen to many others - maybe even you Rainbow :eek:

No matter what your ego is telling you.

I agree with the considered thoughts of Taxi2parking.

The other large manufacturer's design does exactly that. Once TL are advanced beyond normal climb operating range the A/THR trips off. Other features of the design such as non moving throttles are sometimes not accepted with great enthusiasm. Like said above, the design and the time of design has its limits of complexity and reliability and even in the best possible situation will not be 100% proof. For instance the same failure of false RA1 0ft indication inflight would cascade larger effect on Airbus than on 737. Are the cues provided to crew strong enough? Is the crew trained to react? Is the crew proficient enough to execute the advised course of action correctly in timely manner? All valid.

FD (un-real)

Have we had the voice recorder readout yet or did I miss it?

how come "old experienced pilot" let ALT HOLD captured way above G/S ?

too much admiring his own left-hand on the yoke, failed to glance at the FMA?

In the days when training was not based on cost minimum, but on a quality minimum, I used to introduce these scenarios in the sim at the end of the official syllabus. Another way was to re-enforce it on line-training; i.e. show what can happen, but with pre-patter to avoid any hairy events. There are so many "what's it doing now?", and "AGH, how do I get out of this?" moments. Why not show these to new pilots in advance rather than sit back and say, "you jack ass. How did you let that happen." Where's the training and preventative action in that. Sadly, training, especially self funded, is driven down to bare minimum = lowest cost. There is not much time for this, certainly not in the sim. I wonder if the LTC's are even aware that this type of training is a good idea. They have a syllabus to sign off. Nothing more, nothing less. Captains can be processed out of a new airline with 3000hrs in the same pilot factory. They may never have seen these occurances, or been pre-warned of them. They then become LTC's. The knowledge base is diluted. Sh#t will continue to happen, and they will continue to wonder why. All so unavoidable, but sadly it will continue. Hopefully the automatics will save the day and none will be any the wiser, and everything will be cool until the next time. However, they may have been the root cause, and playing piano on the MCP ain't gonna make it better, probably worse. Then there will be a smoking hole and the questions will be asked again. And the answers will be the same; Pilot error! Hm?????

Not necessarily error...more like...never told nor shown.

A real shame.:uhoh:

Bealzebub, what say you regarding families of deceseed passengers on SilkAir successfully suing Parker Hannifin for the crash of SilkAir 185, in a Los Angeles County court no less. IMO, American jurisprudence at its worst.

For a citation, see:
Jones Day-Experience-Parker Hannifin settles during appeal claims filed in wake of SilkAir crash

None of the three successful plaintiffs were U.S. citizens. See:
http://www.kreindler.com/publication...aulEdelman.pdf

Also here:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/1...itigation.html

I'm sorry to butt in, but could someone link me to the report of the accident? Or even just tell me where I could find it.

I'm only a low hours PPL student so I don't know where these things are yet. Still learning.

I heard once that Eastern Airlines (US) had 13 major accidents in its lifetime. In each case, the FO was flying. They concluded the FOs were not so much to blame as the Captains who were lousy at the PNF duties.

GB

Ergo, for the First Officer, sitting on hands, is the safer alternative.
Makes perfect sense to me...:}

....and then you promote that f/o ,and now he is still doing what he has learned as a f/o. sitting on his hands.

Turkey accident stats
 

Subjectively, I believe I have heard of a higher proportion accidents with this country's carriers than with others. This is just my feeling, and not hard facts.

Where can one find a balanced major accident database with realistic comparisons between carriers and nations?

I guess the analysis I am seeking should stop at fatal accidents, as some 3rd world countries have very poor accident-recording databases for non-fatals. This is based on hard fact, incidentally, before the PC mob start wailing about unfair accusations.

You are probably right. But remember there are companies that actively discourage simulator instructors from teaching outside of the syllabus square. So despite being keen to act as you suggest, they are constrained not only by SOP but run the risk of the occasional "student" bitching behind his back and as a consequence the instructor gets a tea and bikkies session with a stern admonishment to stick to the syllabus.

But apart from that, instructors occasionally see some alarming events that leaves you knowing how some of these strange accidents start in the first place. For example: Crew were intercepting the localiser (in the sim) but one autothrottle developed a fault. As the thrust increased to hold the glide slope only one thrust lever moved up from idle. The other crept up steadily to 80 percent N1.

The crew simply were so engrossed with reading the landing checklist and monitoring the MCP that neither pilot saw the split throttles or the ever increasing wheel angle as the autopilot tried to hold the localiser. After 45 seconds or more, the first officer spotted the split levers motioned with one hand towards the offending thrust lever and you could almost hear the bemused captain muttering "Cor" WTF is going on 'ere"

The long suffering autopilot said stuff this for a joke and disconnected with loud wailing. Captain sees the closed throttle and calls for engine failure checklist. F/O is obedient to the bitter end and scrabbles on the floor for the QRH as the sim rolls into ever increasing bank angle beyond 55 degrees. We hit the ground just as the F/O (unaware of the flight path ) got to the page starting with Engine Failure and Shut Down checklist. And this from pilots with lots of time on the type.
Certainly head banging stuff in more ways than one..

regarding the third world airlines, turkish airlines have had alot of bad coverage in regards to accidents. I still don't know what happened to "TC-JGE" flight from Istanbul, according to the accident data base the resons have not yet been determined to the cause. I have been looking into this and cannot get a great lot of information, What i have is " The 737 was at about 400ft on the ILS approach when, for reasons yet to be determined, the airspeed decayed to the point that the stick shaker activated. Full power was applied, but the aircraft stalled, and fell into the ground with very little forward momentum "

I think that alot of assumptions are made regarding airlines and S/FO's and i believe not alot of data can stand people claims to what has happened, i don't work for the best airline but placing blame does not solve or prevent accident....

Why not start at post #975?

All crewmembers were out to lunch. Nobody minding the store. That's why the crew allowed jet to crash.

I think the Capt was out to lunch, and the subordinates (due to cultural factors) didn't like to mention that the lunch break was over.
Difficult to believe no-one saw anything.
Regretably, easier to believe they saw but didn't say. :ugh:

RoyHudd, try www.aviation-safety.net. . . but not if you want to sleep easily at night. It lists every accident from the dinosaurs up to now, by country of carrier, country of accident, carrier, A/C type, however you fancy. Harrowing stuff, lots in there I had forgotten/never heard of.

Very interesting story. I have once experienced a similar failure in an MD-11 after takeoff: when the autothrottle switched from takeoff thrust to climb thrust, the number 1 thrustlever didn't move, due to some misalignment in the thrustlever mechanism. In response, the number 2 and 3 thrustlevers retarded all the way to idle, the FMS popped up the ENGINE OUT climb performance page, and the EICAS issued an ENG FAIL warning. This all happened just as we were starting a turn to the right.

We were lucky enough to recognise the problem instantly, and the thrustlever could still be moved manually. But I always wondered what would have happened if one or both of us would have been preoccupied with other tasks, such as reading an After Takeoff checklist, at that precise moment. Perhaps we might have overlooked the asymmetric thrust altogether, given that we just entered a right turn, and we might have ended up in a sudden steep bank angle. Add some heads-down tasks into that equation, and there'd be a nice opportunity for spatial disorientation - and an exercise in unusual attitude recovery.

Reading your story, I now believe it is in fact possible to misdiagnose a stuck thrustlever for an engine failure (or even a dual engine failure in our scenario)...

One shortly after take off, one on the localiser (in the sim)

Does no-one keep their hand on the PLs at such times, anymore?

It seems probable that the THY crew didn't either.

The one thrust lever stuck scenario was the "cause" :hmm: of a fatal departure accident a long while back involving a Tarom A310 in Bucuresti.
Another one where it appears nobody was minding the shop at a critical phase of flight.

hand on Power Levers
 

I am fortunate enough to fly with a Captain who is so good he does not need to keep a hand on the power levers, cos he trusts the AT 100%.

rip

glf

I do, now more than ever. The captain (pilot flying), on our MD-11 flight did not, as he was dialing-in a new heading on the MCP just as the thrust reduction occurred. The guy had so many hours experience on the F27, DC8, and DC10 that I have no doubts about his basic flying skills and airmanship, but that doesn't alter the simple fact of having just two arms.

It takes only seconds for such a split-throttle situation to develop, and there is an element of chance involved in such things as the timing of heading instructions by ATC. Perhaps I should rephrase my sentence about "being lucky", as it was mainly good monitoring by the whole crew and not mere luck that made us aware of the problem almost the instant it occurred. But the speed at which this situation could develop was a real eye-opener for both of us. As it was, undoubtedly, for the crew that crashed the simulator...

Whether any of this applies to the Turkish flight remains to be seen. I can only hope that the investigation report will be able to shed some light on the human factors that caused this crew to be unaware of their impending stall. But I think I have some idea about what happened once they discovered their error. I recently got an hands-on demonstration in a B737 simulator to experience the pitch-up effect that occurs when initiating a go-around from a deliberately induced extremely low-energy state. The scenario was set up like this: autopilot-coupled ILS approach, autothrottle off, thrustlevers idle, airspeed reducing until stick-shaker onset, disengaging the autopilot and setting go-around thrust a full 5 seconds later. Well - it can be done. Barely. And it requires both hands on the control column to arrest the pitch-up.

So here's a dilemma: had the captain of the accident flight had his right hand on the throttle after initiating the go-around, he would have noticed the subsequent inadvertent thrust reduction by the autothrottle. But, using just one arm for pitch control, he then wouldn't have been able to apply enough force to the control column to prevent the excessive pitch-up (*). He too had only two arms.

BTW: here's a report about a similar, almost fatal, incident: Air Accidents Investigation: 3/2009 G-THOF.


(*) Perhaps he might have, with a lot of left-hand arm-wrestling practice?

I am making assumptions here, but I believe they are fair enough. If a hand had been on the throttles when they went to 'retard' the first time and if that hand had stayed on the throttles, then the pilot concerned would surely have noticed that power was not being reapplied as the aircraft approached it's final approach speed. The aircraft could have then remained under control throughout and the second 'retard' would never have occurred.
If your hand is telling you the throttles are staying idle, I defy you not to check your speed - even if your main attention is elsewhere (which it shouldn't be!).

[/QUOTE]Aren't there four arms in the cockpit? (Maybe not in 411s case.)I would still like to know the situation with the voice recorder.

There has been no news since the preliminary findings came out on April 28.

Thanks Finn47.

411A has the pleasure of having six arms available.
Go-around.
Flying pilot calls for go-around thrust, advances the throttles to approximately the desired thrust setting, and the Flight Engineer trims the thrust, as required.
A tried and true technique...providing you have that professional Flight Engineer available.
Don't leave home without one.
Yes, I know, the two man crew is the norm these days, however, that third set of arms/eyes can be very valuable when it all goes pear-shaped.

With the crowd I fly for you have to have your hand on the thrust levers when the flaps are out of UP and any other time the autothrottle is commanding a large thrust change e.g. commencing descent.

I had one come back to idle when climb thrust was selected at night at Max AUW in a B767. The engine hadn't failed it was an autothrottle fault but it got my attention. :eek.

I personally adopted the above procedure quite some time before it became the rule.

Regards,
BH.

Bullethead,

Good idea. I've had the same philosophy, about guarding T/L's when large power changes are going on, even though it is not SOP in my airline. e.g levelling off from climb or descent. I've tried to educate cadets that not all airmanship is written in SOP's. Thus I encouraged them to follow through on the T/L's in such scenarios. They always asked Why? and didn't adopt it, saying the A/T was there to do that. Why then do you follow through on the T/L's when setting takeoff thrust with A/T engaged. OK, it is possible and correct that not both T/L's will reach calculated takeoff setting, hence hand at the ready. But a computer is a computer, and it can have a wobbly any time. The TMC is a fickle as any of them.

It shouldn't be too long now. There's a new report close to being finalized. Results in there might turn out to be surprising. I don't know the details myself but I did get this from a very reliable source.

Is the report done?