- why? Denti/DC-ATE - HELP!! They are still doing it!:ugh:

Yet again - it does NOT appear there was any intention to autoland.

Apparently the turkish pilot union disagree with the first findings, logic, when last week the pilots got a "hero-funeral".

Sorry, only founded in a dutch news-paper: PAROOL: MEDIA - Kritiek piloten komt hard aan in Turkije

Never flown anything in my life ... but I do wonder whether it would be a sensible idea for there to be a spoken warning whenever the AP reduces the engines to idle? The root cause of the crash seems to be the pilots not noticing that the AP had done this, whereas if there was a simple spoken message "Engines idle" as the AP shut them down, then the situation may have been very different. Interested to hear from pilots as to whether this would be a workable solution? I appreciate you don't want to overload the pilots with verbal warnings, but engine shutdown seems pretty fundamental...

Autopilot or no autopilot ,,,,even failed R/A makes little difference.
Three sets of eyes did not see that they were far below VREF.
Cant blame this one on automation or equipment failure.

This isn't an Airbus... If the thrust levers are at idle, you'll see them there! Do we really need an additional aural warning (which are largely filtered out by the brain at times of heavy workload) to alert us that- lo and behold- the airplane is functioning?

Earl -
The advocates FOR automation might agree with you, but had there NOT been as MUCH automation, this accident might well have never happened now would it?

BOAC : At 27' RA normally if A/T is engaged, single or dual channel. FLARE is a separate function and nothing to do with the A/Throttles.

That's not true. In Dual Channel, Flare Retard occurs at 24' RA AFTER DFCS goes to FLARE mode. The DFCS sends a flare discrete to the autothrottle computer.

It's interesting to note that it appears that single channel A/P does not follow the same logic.

Believe me, as a pilot, NOTHING gets your attention more than the sound of that stick shaker.

Not only do you hear it, you also feel it. It instantly tells you that you are in a Life or Death situation.

There were three pilots in that flightdeck and yet not one of them was able to recognize the severity of their situation , and come up with a suitable response.

can I just ask this one again:

I'm rather sure that the PF would be required to have his hands on the throttle levers. I've always advocated the moving levers over the stationaries for the exact reason that they give you immediate tactile feedback of what the A/T is doing.

You think they would be flying an approach with their hands.. where exactly?

Not discussing the single radalt failure leading to mode confusion between the A/T and the A/P here, just the basic question: why has the human interface failed?

737Av - I'm in danger of being dragged off the centreline here! However, I bow to your knowledge. The Boeing 'drivers' handbook', 737 NG, states that retard starts at 'approximately 27 RA' - that's close enough for me!

Thats because it is considered so fundamentally important that one would hope you wouldn't need an idiot light to remind you of it.

Official Report I read this afternoon confirmed the Captain was sitting in the RH seat. The voice recorder showed he was going through pre-landing checks with trainee who was in LH seat. Safety pilot was in jump seat. The Captain immediately took control when shaker started - about 7 seconds before impact.

So the trainee was an upgrade trainee? That does not fill me with confidence right now.
I think you have your seats flipped. I hope you have your seats flipped.

FYI this NOTAM was issued this afternoon...

0903041732-0904041200EST EHAA A00210/09
REF ACCIDENT BOEING 737-800, TURKISH AIRLINES FLIGHT TK1951 AT FEB
25TH 2009 NEAR RWY 18R OF SCHIPHOL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THE CAA-THE NETHERLANDS WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO:
THE AUTOMATIC THROTTLE SYSTEM OF THE BOEING 737-800, AS A PART OF
THE AUTOMATIC STEERING SYSTEM, RECEIVED INCORRECT INFORMATION BECAUSE OF A MALFUNCTION IN THE LEFT RADIO ALTIMETER, WHILE THE PLANE WAS STILL AT AN ALTITUDE OF 1950FT, THE RADIO ALTIMETER REPORTED AN ALTITUDE OF -8FT, WHICH CAUSED THE AUTOMATIC THROTTLE SYSTEM TO REDUCE POWER AND CONFIGURATED THE REST OF THE SYSTEMS AS IF THE PLANE WAS ONLY A FEW METERS ABOVE THE RWY. WHEN THE CREW NOTICED WHAT WAS GOING ON, IT WAS
ALREADY TOO LATE T0 INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY.
ALL OPERATORS ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN
THEIR TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE SCHEMES.
THE FULL PUBLICATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE DUTCH SAFETY BOARD
CAN BE FOUND AT: De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid

At 50 RA' the automatic flare is initiated. Could this have contributed to a stall ?

Maybe this was already mentioned but the PF was on training and the jumpseater was an extra first officer. Still strange 3 sets of eyes didn't see it comin'...

BOAC - No worries, what's a few feet between friends? My intention was to point out that it appears that the logic in the autothrottle computer differs between single and dual channel A/P operation. Since we have been told that the CMD B was engaged and so far there is no mention of the DFCS being in the flare mode, I am assuming that the autothrottle computer treats a single channel A/P approach just like the DFCS is disengaged; i.e. the A/T goes into flare retard at 27' RA (there's the number you have) if on glideslope in MCP SPD mode and flaps are more than 12.5 degrees.

BOAC: whether there was the intention to autoland or not (and I agree, I doubt they would be able to engage the full CAT III) they had the AP following the glide and loc and the AT engaged and with full authority to act on the faulty RA data. If they knew they weren't going to autoland, why not monitor the AT very closely, since they'd have to take over very soon? Were they trying to stay in as much auto for as long as possible?

- where did you find that? Supposedly 'unqualified on type'.

- hmm! Have you been looking at 'the other thread'? What does shake, then?

Flyingvisit - if that is true it is interesting. As PNF he reportedly had his a/p engaged, which is not normal. Perhaps they had briefed the u/s radalt?

gegen - you should monitor the A/T ALWAYS! Cloudbase reported, I believe, at 700' so A/P and A/T would be 'in' until then, normally, and who knows, maybe they had briefed to look at the handling of the trim bias so to disconnect at 200', or even 50' RA?.

If, as the above NOTAM alludes the RA was faulty then Mr Boeing's programming of automatic thrust retardation to take place on the basis of a single RA reading is quite simply bad design but I suspect something like that could not get past the regs/testing, so there is a lot more to this.

a few thoughts
 

white knight...you are a master of understatement...instrument scan remiss!!!!!

in my old prehistoric 737 a radio altitude that low would also enable the thrust reversers, not that this is part of the crash,,but wonder if that is the case with NG.

May I suggest that everyone in the cockpit was trying to be the FIRST to spot the runway? (acquire visually that is) and no one was watching the store. After all, modern planes are fool proof aren't they?

at least one person in the cockpit should be on instruments until DH, or all visual cues are available...and at this point, the pilot flying should report "OUTSIDE, VISUAL REFERENCE" and the NFP should start monitoring the speed and glide slope etc.