for many years I think we have been doing checklists in the wrong manner.

Why, do we do the most important checklist while taxiing? Why not stop, set the brake and do the taxi/before takeoff checklist?

I like to do most of the descent/before landing cheklist before we leave FL180.

Only the most basic checklist for landing should be done around the outer marker.

And it is better to set some flaps, while waiting for takeoff data then not to have set anything. Most guys know their airports and planes well enough to have a good guess about flap settings.


We must go beyond human failings and make sure things work right (correctly)

Waste Lakes:

Very clever but no need. The lawyers will do this so we can save the cost of the mail. I would also take the bet offered in an earlier post that within 2 years, after the lawyers are done, MAD WILL change the terrain between the runways. Put it in Outlook and check back in 2010. Legacy fields such as LHR cannot realistically be changed in the light of unrealistic cost/benefit issues, but fields such as Barajas can and will. Lawyers will ensure that the cost/benefit calculations make it viable. Preliminary estimates of damages suggest it already is

Trims.Flaps.Spoillers
 

This seems to make total sense to me. I had suggested in an earlier post that this final check be formalised because, for reasons of good airmanship, many if not all experienced pilots do this final check of potential killers one last time for the wife and kids anyway.
PJ2, for whom I have great respect, argued convincingly, however, that the existing SOP's were already adequate. But it does still seem illogical to me that this check of potential killers is not the final pre-TO check, especially since the intuitive behaviour of experienced pilots (aka "airmanship") suggests it should be. Or, as another post has put it, why are the most important checks performed during taxi and not immediately before TO?

This caught my eye, The plane backed up from parking stand 11 to
proceed to the ramp. Did the plane engage reverse thrust to get out of the
parking stand??? or was it pushed back by a tug?? Most DC9 and MD80s can
actually back up from a gate or ramp by themselves using reverse thrust.
We know one of the thrusters was locked out, but it usually only takes one
to move the jet back from a gate area.

SFD

As far as I know, power-back is never used in Europe. In all my time here, it's always been done with a tug.

You should never say "never". I have done it 3 times in in the UK though it is not normal.

Here are more witnesses testimonials, of course all of them subjective and probably innacurate. This is my personnal summary of the most important bits of information, which pretty much corroborates other witnesses:

-Someone pulled weather info as soon as he found out about the accident
LEMD 201600Z 23004KT CAVOK 31/M00 Q1017 NOSIG=
METAR LEMD 201530Z 23005KT 180V340 CAVOK 31/M01 Q1017 NOSIG=
LEMD 201430Z 24006G19KT 170V340 CAVOK 30/02 Q1017 NOSIG=

-A worker claims to have been on north side of T4S, where the SAT building ends, aprox. near parking 512-516, on EPA north where the IB dollys/stairs/luggage trucks are. He says he thought it was weird the MD was using as much runaway as an A-340. Soon after it took off some 50m high, it rolled left, then corrected to the right, but it fell like if it had stalled, the wing touched the ground and it crawled for some 500m until it went into a (small) "forest" and exploded on a big fireball. Answering some questions he specifically says: I don't think any of the "turns" (rolls) were "brutal" (too excessive). They were smooth, but on the roll to the right, I saw that the right wing touched the ground 3-5 seconds and then it "stabilized" with the bottom touching the ground and crawling on it for that 500m. He had not been contacted by the investigation commission at the time of writing (2 days after the accident).


Another rescue worker said:

-First signs of impact at aprox. the same level as PAPI marks of 18R, about 30m away from the runaway, marks from back landing gear, marks of right wing touching the ground for some 10 meters, followed by front wheel gears that bounce some 2m to the front and from then on all wheels remain on the ground. For about 500m the plane seems to have rolled on the ground quite intact, with only the back part of the plane missing (the one that differenciates MD's from DC9's), an engine cover, and nothing else. Some 500m later it hits a barrier and leaves the ground, due to the gap in terrain level, another 400m aprox. and hits the "forest". I would guess by the location of the pieces that it finally landed "upside-down". On the terrain it was impressive that from the place where it touched ground at first until the final landing zone it was some 1km away. But I insist that the MD didn't start to break down until it hit the barrier after about 500m of uncontrolled rolling on the ground by the runaway. The engines were in the whereabouts of the rest of the parts, that is, they didn't detach much earlier on.

Justme69, check times on the METARs you give or collect from someone else... Again people mix up Z time with local time at Madrid. METAR should be from 1230z aprox.
The correct wx report was stated I think 1000 posts ago.

Saludos

JM

Final Checks
 

As 411a says:
Configuration check.
Flaps/slats
Stab trim
Speedbrake lever
Compasses compared and agree with the runway heading.

I normally followed this with "And what have we forgotten today, gentlemen?"

Correct weather info
 

JM340 and justme69,

For info, the correct weather information relevant to the accident was given in post #110:

"The METAR history leading up to the accident (1245z) as follows:

LEMD 201300Z 14004KT CAVOK 29/03 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEMD 201230Z 18007KT 090V240 CAVOK 28/02 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEMD 201200Z 35002KT CAVOK 28/06 Q1019 NOSIG=
LEMD 201130Z 16005KT CAVOK 27/08 Q1019 NOSIG=
LEMD 201100Z 17002KT CAVOK 26/09 Q1019 NOSIG="

The accident happened at 1245Z or 1445 local - reported in the official SAS Group statement (post#109).

I have to comment in support of Rainboe, 411a and Nigel on Draft. As carefully trained and checked professional airmen/women, we are given responsibility and the ability to safely operate our aircraft, on a daily basis, without technical input from the cabin. The ability to do that is at no time more evident than when just 2 pilots ferry an empty B744 around the skies for air-test or maintenance. Our ability to operate is not at all dependent upon input from the CC but, as indicated elsewhere, they are useful eyes and ears in the cabin and their concerns, even if unfounded, should not be ignored. However, the 2 posts from quartermilltopo and Desk Jockey only serve to show how flight regularity and even safety, due to distraction, might be compromised by false cries of alarm from untrained and ill-informed observers.
It seems that many posters here are unaware that it is the failure to set the SLATS for takeoff that is lethal.As observed, the A300 often uses no FLAP for takeoff, but I am not aware of any large commercial transport that does not deploy SLAT (or LE devices) for takeoff. It is extremely difficult, on some types, to determine by observation from the cabin if the slats or low angle flaps are selected, even in good viewing conditions.
At the end of the day, it is strict checklist discipline which will ensure that all is correctly set, particularly under stressful circumstances away from the norm, such as a taxi back and return for takeoff.
On my current type and with my current airline, but also with 2 previous operators, we are not permitted to commence taxy without the slats and flaps being selected first. They are selected as part of the 'after start' procedure, prior to brake release. Some operators even have a FDR 'event' marker triggered if this procedure is not followed. A further back-up is that the ECL ( electronic checklist, for SLF) will not allow the takeoff checklist to progress to completion until the takeoff configuration is correct. This is an excellent safety measure which prevents misconfiguration should the flap/slat deployment have to be delayed in icing conditions, or get forgotten for any reason. Perhaps all aircraft should have this technique and ECL as SOP.
The ultimate backstop is a check as suggested by 411A. We used to call it a 'seniority check'. Mine is flaps/slats, trim, power setting, speeds.

Please report further....
 

I take it you refer to Airbus T/O with flaps at 0 and not aircraft lining up with pitot cover on?;)

Desk Jockey: Read the posts. The Airbus can takeoff with FLAPS 0. The SLAT is what matters. The aircraft with the pitot cover on was not going for takeoff, it was an engineering ground positioning. Correct me if I am wrong, its been a long day........

Looks like the airline will turn turtle, unless Iberia comes to the rescue. News reporting bad day at black rock.

On the runway I was taught to say "OK-killer items again"

SAS
 

wes wall:

I agree with the conclusion, especially now that US lawyers are involved. Remember, however, that Spanair is controlled by SAS who have been trying to offload it for some time. Can't see that Iberia, which has its own issues and is the subject of attention from BA, would have any interest whatsoever. Especially in view of the potential liability and when the likely outcome for Spanair will result in less competition for Iberia.

I know a guy who farts, before take off.

F. Flaps

A. Airbrake

R. Runway

T. Trims

S. Speeds

To justme69 and NoD
 

Regarding your discussion about "failed attempt to takeoff" vs "aborted takeoff" vs "line up and vacate", for the purposes of clear-cut clarity, I suggest using the term which has already been mentioned somewhere in this thread and which seems more or less established - RTG = Return To Gate

Thx xolodenko and others for your comments.

Very few news these past days. An article describes the last minute inside the plane as recalled by the survivors and the moments right after the accident. Not much new to say on the probable causes, but could help someone studying the safety aspects.

-Everyone onboard was aware the plane was going to crash (i.e. panic screams, someone shouted to hunch down, someone screamed the wing was going to hit the ground). No PA, though.

-At least one survivor assumed a safety possition, head between his legs and he decided to firmly hold on to the head rest of the seat in front of him.

-Whole raws of passengers' seats detached and flew around inside the cabin, as did hand luggage, with each hit on the ground.

-One survivor hit his head on the ceiling.

-At least 3 injured owe their lifes to the extremely fast rescue effords (2 were rescued by firefighters right before they drown on the water, as they couldn't talk to ask for help as the water was at chin-level, were trapped and couldn't undo their safety belts). First pair of firefighters reached the scene in less than 4 minutes.
Sidenote: I was reading somewhere how at the "higher" airport management level there was some hesitation or small delay (say 1 minute) to start emergency protocol as the very first voices of alert may have not been "believed". May I suggest that those in charge do never hesitate upon declaring full emergencies and then looking like idiots for being a false alarm rather than the other way around. Always better safe than sorry, and speed is critical in increasing the chances of survivors. Even after seeing the smoke, many workers etc thought it was some training session going on, etc.

-The fire, as sadly expected, was a direct reason to raise the number of deceased that initially survived the impact itself. The water fully covered at least a few victims also, but most or perhaps all under the water were thought to have already passed away before that.

-Only one adult and two children survivors were really in a possition to walk on their own.

-Each time an injured minor was found, the rescue worker had to stop going back and continue effords since they couldn't be left alone. Eventually, two children were left by a firetruck at the care of the survivor women with minor injuries (she was fully mobile) while they resumed the rescue and fire extingusing. She was the one that helped them earlier on, taking one to the bank of the creek (water was shallow enough to walk above it) and pulling another who she left with her father, another survivor.

Out of the 11 survivors still receiving medical care, only 6 remain with medical issues of relevance, one of those still in serious condition, but all doing better. The other 7 (18 total) are already recovering at home or fully recovered by now.

And the last piece of news is that in some two days it is expected that the judge makes public to the families of victims that have requested it the whole (over 1000 pages) of the judiciary investigation proceedings so far, which probably will have more details about the accident and likely will leak to the press.

The Civil Aviation Accident Commission, of course, is not giving out the tiniest detail about the accident until their required factual report "suppossely" one month after the accident (they have a backlog of accidents for which they haven't even published that on time, against their own regulations). If it was up to them, they wouldn't publish anything at all for 3 years, I'm sure.

I realize that the above is only an opinion embedded in an otherwise clear factual personal report, but there are other opinions about this as well.

The CAA(sic) is no doubt constrained by the judicial enquiry in early news release to the public. However, any issues to do with the aircraft systems itself that would be appropriate for dessemination to prevent accidents would be available through the aviation community that needs it. In that case as factors are confirmed this information flows through a different pipeline and not always in the newspapers.