to wings1011
 

I,ve been a groung engineer for 3 years, a f/e 10 years and now a f/o (9 years)in a well known airline in Spain, and sadly i do agree very much with you. In my opinion this could be happen as you´ve said, word by word. A chain of mistakes is not as unlikely as it seems.
Congratulations for your commentaries.
Just one question. The Captain notes on the runway, when first attemp for takeoff that the Rat was very hight and then go back to the ramp. Why on the takeoff? it´s easier to note that on taxi, unless..Have the before takeoff checklist any item especifycal for that?
Regards

Would you like to crosscheck the weight and balance too? Just kiddin'.:ok:
There may be reasons the aircraft taxies to the rwy without flaps. For instance, if there is snow or slush on the taxiway some SOP's say leave the flaps in till at the runway. Or maybe the aircraft will be de-iced at a remote station.

Having said that, you have a point. I don't think there is a pilot here in the room that will not have a strong urge to shout something when they see the flaps are not set at all approaching the runway. Maybe the will then shrug it of thinking 'there goes the config warning'...

I have twice told the crew about something I thougt was wrong, both times I was wrong, but better safe than sorry. The other way around we've had a passenger telling us AFTER the flight that one of our speedbrake panels was fluttering. Of course we shrugged it off, but called for an engineer anyway just to be sure, who subsequently found a major rupture in the panel's hydraulic actuator, grounding the plane for the rest of the day. NOW I wish that pax had spoken up in flight! Of course you understand that it is a delicate balance. There would be a problem if passengers loose trust in the crew and start taking ACTION, like opening emergency exits the moment they think something is wrong (countless times on every flight). It might occasionally save one aircraft, but it would endanger thousands of other flights. But sure, if you think something is really wrong, think about it for a second and then speak up.

I always turn on the strobes when taking the runway, all other lights come on when cleared for take off.

If you don't like to look at the strobes then...don't :rolleyes:

Gosh! someone has invented a way of expressing Murphy's Law in a pseudo-scientific way. I think I prefer the original: "If it can go wrong it will go wrong."

Sod's corollary to Murphy's Law (with acknowledgments to Perry): "When it goes wrong it will be at the worst possible moment."

to PASSENGER in BACK
 

I was deadheading on a 737...short taxi, we were on the runway and the flaps were not set.

I knew that if I heard the takeoff warning, the pilots would catch it. BUT IF IT DIDN"T GO OFF, I was prepared to run to the cockpit door and bang on it like HELL.

OF course I was in my pilot uniform and that would have helped matters. The horn went off, the flaps came down and I yelled at the pilots at the destination. IDIOTS!

I know of one case in which the spoilers deployed on landing of a 737 and when the handle was moved to retract them, the cable broke...so the handle moved to the correct spot, the light that said the spoilers were extended went out BUT THE SPOILERS WERE STILL EXTENDED. It was missed onthe walk around...but some guys in back on the next flight, deadheading noticed and stopped the takeoff in time...THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO WARNING.

WHILE it takes bravery to speak up to avoid a disaster (capt. smith, don't you think these icebergs could pose a problem?), you must be brave and speak up if you :

1. know something about planes

2. see something wrong.

A passenger noted something wrong with our flaps on landing...we extended them at the gate and wow, was there something wrong!!! grounded!

There are some planes that don't use flaps for takeoff...so please know your stuff.

Right way up and Stilton.

Point taken w rgds to the strobes "on" on the runway!
I do though, fail to see how you think that this accident could've been prevented by having had the strobes modified:confused:

Rgds MDD

I think he may be assuming that the CB was tripped by a technician to use it as a "not in ground mode test" (i.e. to check for the strobes to come on properly) and then he forgot to set it back. If there would've been a "test" or "bypass" switch to make the lights turn on while on the ground, he would've used that instead.

And there would be our first hole on the cheese ... leading to the temperature probe "overheating" ... leading to going back to parking ... leading to forgetting to re-deploy flaps on second TO ... leading to the GRD mode CB being still off so the alarm didn't sound ...

It's more likely the CB tripped for other reasons, as the plane had already landed from another flight (from Barcelona, I think it was). At midday, it had not been their first flight of the day.

Hopefully the investigation will find out when (and "why") the ground mode (theoretically) was in the "off" mode. Anything from a true malfunction with the WOW sensor, to other problems with the front landing gear, to actual electrical malfunction, to simply just forgetting to reset a circuit breaker after voluntarily (or inadvertendly) tripping it (either by the crew or technicians) etc etc are all "equally" possible at this point.

Of course, it is not unreasonable to think that there was no actual malfunctions and someone tripped it and forgot to re-set it again, and the crew neither checked it nor checked the TO alarms prior to trying to take off with improper wing configuration. *IF* they also missed setting the flaps/slats (rather than any sort of malfunction), well, that would certainly be a very bad combination, as no last minute warning would've possibly allowed them to correct the situation on time.

Taking off in a B737-800 a few years ago, we didn't get the chimes from the cabin to say that they were ready. I was listening on the flight interphone, so I knew that they were pushing the button. I assumed that there was a failure with the interphone system, confirmed verbally with the purser that they were ready & decided to investigate further once on the way.

At top of climb we didn't get the chimes with the secal check & it dawned on me that we had a 'aural warnings' problem. A quick check revealed that the aural warnings C/B was out. We had just taken off without a working Take-off Config warning! Fortunately the swiss cheese didn't line up that day & everything else had been done right.

The aircraft was fresh out of the hanger & the engineers had pulled the C/B & not reset it. Evidently it is common practice to pull the C/B to prevent annoying warnings while certain items are being worked on.

I filed a report, but the company didn't seem to be that interested & the information wasn't disseminated to the other pilots at the airline.

I don't know if the other guy checked the C/B's, but I found that my C/B preflight check was inadequate. The said C/B is behind the F/O, right beside the fire extingusher. If you don't move your head right over so you can look vertically down beside the fire extingusher, you can't see the first column of breakers, where it can be found.

Complacency can set in with time, particularly when "nothing is ever out of place". I have sat in a cockpit & heard a crew respond to a checklist with "down - 3 greens" when the nose gear light wasn't illuminated.

It taught me a good lesson & now I 'watch' myself more than I watch anyone else, particularly if I am tired or distracted.

I think the last page or two are full of lessons to a lot of us.

CBs after maint.
 

Unfortunately after maint, when you have tidied up the aircraft you drag the aircraft out to run the engines and as you advance the throttles, beep beep beep. No excuses but you reach back and pop the breaker.
Run finished and paperwork to do with everyone waiting. Last thing check round for loose articles and CB check.....but I guess we missed it too.
Why on earth isn't there a reset button that is out of reach of the crew seats?

"Belgrano's data unit"
 

Good question. I was only giving an e.g. of how Aviation's memory is preserved. The "Belgrano" is the offices of the UK's Safety Regulator, the CAA. Rather too well known to UK pilots, engineers, ATCOs and so on.
The data unit within it keeps all sorts of records of Aviation "incidents" around the world. As the UK operates a crude "freedom of information" regime, the info. held can be made available to Brit.s. The "Belgrano" tag comes from its looks - a hulk of a battleship-grey office block near LGW.

Not necessarily on the MD8x series, since leaving the flaps in flaps 11 will prevent ice and slush and other stuff from entering the engines. After landing moving flaps to flaps 11 will save you from lots of problems.

Do modern EICAS systems in any way warn you if a CB has been pulled?
Or do you still have to look over your shoulders to find out?

XPM

Question to Mad Dog pilots
 

Has there ever been a MD SB detailing this relay c/b,its function,and the implications if it is left tripped?Does your airline safety program monitor all type-related incidents/accidents and disseminate that info to you asap?
Accident investigation is supposed to eliminate the possibility of ascenario being repeated.Only way to do that is through data dissemination via AD's/SB's and company safety programs.

I see it all now..

English Translation
 

A37575:

In plain English: !!!! happens (AKA Murphey's Law)

Pulling CB's during ground activities...........

I absolutely agree with desk jockey. We do it so often.

Personally I take a piece of paper from my pocket or flight deck, write in big fat letters which CB(s) I have pulled and hang it off the glareshield.

Just a gentle reminder - belt and braces.

From my 1st post it could easily be construed that I believe the accident was due to a CB being pulled. That would be a very unfair assumption from my part. However from Wing1011s excellent post it seems there is a workaround to complete a daily which very nearly helped write off a serviceable aircraft with the loss of all onboard. Thats why those aircraft should be modified. In this accident my gut feeling is that there will be a lot of human factor issues involved. (I truely hope not). It is down to us & the authorities/manufacturers to learn & improve safety from them!

Why is the critical TOCW fed from a single point option – the one with the highest chance of failure?

The only reason I can think of is that this arrangement allows disabling of the TOCW audios (ground checks etc.) with the least affect on other systems. I’ll bet there’s an interesting design history on this; and I suspect the first DC9/MD80 TOCW was originally wired to the WOW switch.

If all the current assumption become confirmed, it will be interesting to see whether the Spanish Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation Commission (CIAIAC) will admit as an contributing factor, that an earlier release of the final report of the almost accident of OE-LMM (ACE June 07) may have found its way into Belgrano or an Alert SB or a Spanair company safety program, thus early enough to increase the chance to save JKK5022.

Though OE-LMM is registered in Austria the investigation is led and the final report is to be issued by ....Spanish Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation Commission (CIAIAC)