The Atlantic Glider revisited
 

The authorized biography of Capt Robert Piche, who glided his Air Transat A330 to a landing in the Azores after running out of fuel last year, has just been published in French by a Quebec journalist. The book, by Pierre Cayoutte, is entitled "Robert Piche aux commandes du destin (Robert Piche at the controls of destiny). Apparently, Capt Piche has had great difficulty coming to terms with the accolades and hero worship showered on him since the incident. His latest award was a "Medal of Honour", conferred on him on 5 Nov by the Quebec provincial legislature. Capt Piche went on sick leave from Air Transat in March and underwent a seven-week treatment of therapy to help him deal with the intense emotions he experienced over the Atlantic that fateful night. According to Mr Cayoutte, Piche is a gut-level survivor, who sharpened his instincts during the time he spent in a tough Georgia (USA) jail on a drug-running charge in the early 1980's. It was this experience that helped him to save his, his crew's and his passengers' lives.
Portuguese-led authorities are currently completing the final report on the incident.
Rockhound

Piche's biographer's name should read Cayouette - apologies.
Rockhound

Interesting. I've always missed a more complete follow up of the crew's whereabouts after major incidents in most safety publications.

Where are this capt and the rest of his crew nowadays?

Pull off a save like that and you deserve to retire on full pay.

major restyling of pilot training
 

Already picked up rumours about respectable flying schools inroducing classes about drugrunning. This is expected to have several benefits: not only does the drugsrunning dramatically lower training costs, also does a possible subsequent jailterm enhance airmanship.
Other benefits include nitestops at some very nice caribbean destinations and it provides an immediate alternative should one drop out of flightschool.
:cool:

Hero to Zero??
 

Certainly, a fantastic bit of flying. Let's wait for the final report to find out what did happen to all that fuel, and why Land Recovery wasn't selected IAW procedures, causing all that nasty gear damage! What should have been a fairly routine precautionary shutdown/diversion followed by a short delay for maintenance to change a leaky fuel pipe turned into a major incident and subsequent recovery procedure!

TE RANGI,
I thought by now someone in the know would have told us what the present status of Capt Piche and his crew was but no. I was paraphrasing a story in the Canadian Globe and Mail newspaper, which made no mention of Piche's current status but, in the absence of anything to the contrary, I assume they continue as employees of Air Transat. But...is Piche back on the line? That's a good question.

Jetboy,
"Why wasn't Land Recovery selected IAW procedures?" Huh?? I thought Capt Piche "selected Land Recovery" rather well.
:confused:
Rockhound

He is reported to be back on duty.

"A superior pilot is one who uses his superior judgement in order to avoide using his superior skill!"

I also await with great interest the conclusion of the accident investigation, having seen the transcript of the events. Very happy end to the flight and land recovery switch or not, nice landing, they all walked away in one piece!

How can a single point fuel leak result in venting all the fuel from the aircraft? Something is very very wrong here. Either the Airbus' design is unsafe, there were multiple system failures, or our drug-running friend, Capt Piche turned a serious emergency into an almost catastrophic one.

What on earth is 'mechanical error'? Eh??

Word was that one engine was leaking, fuel imbalance was indicated and that, allegedly, they did not check for a leak before opening cross-feed. Remember the "allegedly".

Kinsman. Where's this "transcript of events" to be had, please?

There was no CVR, apparently, because it cut out with the main power and it isn't powered by the RAT.

Other question. Why the tyre-bursts? High VS or what?

Frangible

The transcript of events was used in a power point presentation for a tech' refresher course. I have a copy but cannot confirm it's source and would be loath to publish it here before the accident report is out. I can say the cross feed appears to have been opened very early in the chain of events! This certainly did not help matters.

The tyre burst's appear to be the result of heavy braking after a deep fast landing. Not surprising under the circumstances, as I said before they all walked away from it! Some interesting lessons to be learnt from this one I think.

The report should be interesting reading and make ALPA and a few others eat crow. Can you envision the lawyers lining up at the Airtransat cash window?

To say the least. Open the crossfeed so you can pump ALL the fuel overboard and turn a serious emergency into an almost fatal one. Basic airmanship.

Roadtrip

As the official report is not out and clearly the transcript I have seen does not seem to be on general release, I am not willing in the interests of the crew to state my points more strongly, as other information may come to light. But I am sure we can all read between the lines! But thanks for the pointing out the consequences of opening the cross feed we never thought of that !!!!!!!!

But let us not convict the crew until all the facts are in, and even if they did compound the problem we should all be more interested in why and learning from the incident than hanging the guy's. It may save one of us from making the same mistake.

Well said, Kinsman. We should focus on understanding the factors that led this crew to deal with this situation in the first place.

I'm much more interested to hear how a maintenance organisation can be allowed to slip to such a low standard, that an L1011 part was placed onto an A330 engine. :confused:

I know that the vast majority of engineers out there are decent, hard working individuals with very high standards. I just wish we could completely rid the industry of people who are more concerned with getting the aircraft out on time, than with getting it done safely and correctly the first time. I only wish the manager who ordered the installation of that part would have been riding in the back of the A330 that night. That would have given him a new perspective to be sure!

What I have a problem with Kinsman, is organizations like ALPA, the news media, and other pilots raising these guys to hero status before the facts are out . . . . . and the circumstances and facts so far indicate the possibility extremely serious and basic human failures. Everybody should have kept their public mouth SHUT so they wouldn't accidently put their foot there. Certainly the primary objective is education for the rest of the pilot community, but that doesn't relieve anybody of the responsibility of command. To do so cheapens the profession . . . . just like the PIC's federal conviction drug trafficing.

Roadtrip

I was indicating much the same but perhaps I was more subtle! The elevation to hero status has been premature.

I still hope this will not turn into a witch hunt, the guy at the pointy end may carry the ultimate responsibility but this entire incident has raised a lot of questions. Apportioning blame in my experience gets in the way of finding the real cause. Guess thats why AAIB never apportion blame but report the facts.

How did the L1011 bit get on an A330?

The bit from the L1011 that got on the 330, was a fuel pump. both aircrafts use RB211 engines. the new engine they put on the 330 is shared by two other owners.

The mechanics could not use the pump form the sent out engine because it was already shipped and the spare engine did not have a pump, so they fitted a pump from a L1011 and fabricated:confused: a piece of piping to fit in the connections on the 330; but ended up to close to somehing else and vibrations pierced the tubing some thirty od flight hours later, resulting in the now famous Atlantic Glider: :eek:

when i saw this post i initially thought it was about the waco glider that was towed across the atlantic by a dc3 during the war. but on the subject of canadian airliner gliders what happened to the crew of the gimli glider, and did they get any gongs? on a final note, the incident got very little coverage in the press in britain i dont think it even made the tv.

:D As to the other Canadian Glider the crew also got a standing ovation from ALPA, but got work suspention from Air Canada, and were reinstated when coworkers got angry with company.
I personnaly met with the first officer then who is now if I'm not mistaking since last spring a 767 retired captain of said AC ;)

A book and movi were made from that incident.

Roadtrip and Kinsman,
I don't think you're being entirely fair when you assert that Capt Piche was elevated to the status of a hero prematurely. While I agree that the desperate situation he found himself in was quite possibly of his own making and that he had a huge amount of luck, you cannot deny that, in gliding a heavy jet to a safe landing at an airfield, he pulled off an amazing feat of airmanship. The two other possible outcomes would have been a crash landing or a ditching. The chances of either of those being fatality-free are pretty well zero. For his seizing his one and only chance and making it, he surely deserves the accolades bestowed on him.
Rockhound

The rest of the story.
 

The Air Transat mechanics did not cannibalize a fuel pump and fuel duct from an L-1011. Rolls Royce shipped the new engine minus a fuel pump, a fuel duct and a support bracket. In order to get the aircraft back into the air they removed the pump and duct from the original engine. It was generally agreed that they would have no trouble for the short wait period for the new duct and bracket. Obviously they were wrong because without the bracket the duct rubbed against another piece of hardware and eventually developed a massive leak.

Regarding the actions taken by the pilot it was in direct accordance with the checklist provided for a situation where there was a fuel imbalance. In following the procedure when he received a warning about a fuel imbalance it was too late. It is my understanding that on Air Transat’s 757 Boeing provides a warning when there is a difference of about 1700 pounds. Airbus does not provide a warning until the difference is significantly higher than the warning provided on Boeing aircraft.

IMHO it was the maintenance department and Rolls Royce that should share the blame. I also believe that Airbus should accept some responsibility for the design of the engine installation.


:eek:

"...let us not convict the crew..."
 

Kinsmen, I believe a jury south of the border beat us to it!!!

Rockhound

Do not mistake me, I think the crew did a great job in setting the aircraft down. I was alluding to the possible incorrect application of the fuel imbalance drill. As a trainer on the A330 I do find it difficult to reconcile the crews actions prior to the double engine flame out. But as I mentioned in an earlier post there may well be more information that may explain the crews actions.

As it would be very wrong to lay blame on the crew before the completion of a full investigation, it is also wrong to elevate a crew to the position of hero before all the facts are known. I am sure Captain Piche also feels uncomfortable with the accolade.

My point is even if it is proved the crew failed to deal correctly with a serious fuel leak, we as an industry need to move away from looking for some poor sod to blame and learn from the situation. After all a good crew that has made a serious mistake would be the last ones to do it again, at least that's the theory!

Lu Zuc

I stand corrected ! :eek: :eek: :eek:

Cheers. ;) ;) ;)

Atlantic Glider
 

Roadtrip: 'Everybody should have kept their public mouth shut...'
but not you, apparently

Lu Zuc

Thank you for your enlightened comment, it sure sets the maintenance facts straight...

As for the crew, since I personnally know both of them (I've flown with Capt. Piché on the 1011 as an f/o and with F/O DeJager as a Capt. on the 1011 as well), I will refrain from making any kind of comments before the report gets out. I think that anyone who does, is talking through the top of their heads (one way or the other), and like many have said here, instead of laying premature blame (if any), why not try to learn from it.

I've read somewhere that they had 7/1 000 000 000 chances of making somewhat a safe landing from it. Let's, at least, acknowledge that very impressive bit of handling/flying.

:)

Wasn't there a FMC warning that said "USING RESERVE FUEL" at a early stage of that flight ? Or is that only a feature in Boeing FMC's ?

Anyone who reads aviation accident reports quickly understands that most accidents evolve from a fateful sequence of circumstances and events which lead the participants to their fate. Those up front who share the consequences inevitably play some part in the chain of events.

What distinguishes these two pilots is that they broke the chain of bad luck, mistakes, carelessness, error, or whatever it was and, with considerable skill and really breathtaking coolness conducted that successful long glide to their hot landing on the runway at Lajes.

Sure it could have been better. Sure it could have been worse. The proof is the result - the passengers eventually reached their destination.

Like the rest of you, I don't know if the crew's decision process was right or wrong in managing the crossfeed, but I doubt they had any intention to do other than solve the problem confronting them in the best manner possible. They likely tried to use the best information that training, aircraft systems, and other resources could provide at the moment. If those resources failed - like the hardware - it was probably not primarily due to a character flaw on the crew's behalf, but to various defects in the suppport, training, and operations systems that were behind them.

Ultimately they did what pilots are really supposed to do: stay cool and focussed even when things have gotten way out of the
box; work the problem; steer past the adversity and put down as safely as possible. And they were lucky enough and skillful enough to get that part, the really important part, right.

Arcniz...

Great post, if english was my first language, that's probably what I would have written...

Sikorsky...

I fly the 310 and we don't have that message available on our FMC's, and I heard some pilots who fly the 757 at our company saying that they do have that message available... so I think it's only Boeing! If I'm not mistaken, the warning for fuel imbalance comes way late on the 330, anyone can comment?

Not wanting to cast blame (I'll leave that to the DGAC):
QUOTE
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
released by DIRECTION GENERALE DE L’AVIATION CIVILE
Inspection and/or modifications described below are mandatory. No person may operate a product to which this
Airworthiness Directive applies except in accordance with the requirements of this Airworthiness Directive.
Translation of ‘Consigne de Navigabilité’ ref. : 2002-549(B)
In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the French original issue.
November 13, 2002 AIRBUS
A340 aircraft 2002-549(B)
GSAC
AIRBUS
A340 aircraft
Fuel leak procedure (ATA 28)
1. APPLICABILITY:
AIRBUS A340 aircraft, models -211, -212, -213, -311, -312 and -313, all serial numbers.
2. REASONS:
! Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2001-440(B) has been released in order to introduce the fuel leak
procedure which required the monitoring of the fuel quantity located in the feed tanks of engines
2 and 3 in case of flight with the split valves closed, with or without fuel jettison (case where a fuel
leak is confirmed after an engine failure).
This monitoring was rendered mandatory to avoid a potentially catastrophic situation that is one
engine failed (No. 4 or No. 1) followed by two engine flame-outs (No. 2 and No. 3).
! In August 2001, an A330-200 equipped with Rolls-Royce engines was diverted following an
extensive fuel leak. During the diversion, the two engines shut down due to lack of fuel. An
emergency landing with all engines off was successfully achieved.

The inquiry revealed that fuel management by the crew directly contributed to the total loss of the fuel.

And a similar AD for the A330.

Looks like captain hero is not immume to bad airmanship.

Lady luck was on their side:eek:

Cover your ass
 

As I stated in a previous post on this subject the pilots when made aware of the fuel imbalance followed the applicable checklist to the letter.

In all programs that I have worked on all procedures relative to the operation of the aircraft are written by pilot / tech writers. It is obvious that these tech writers along with the reliability and safety engineers never conceived of this type of problem. If you were to check the Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) you would most likely find that the Rolls Royce RMS engineers never considered the catastrophic failure of the subject duct due to abrasion against another piece of hardware. If they did then the Airbus RMS engineers never carried the failure to the aircraft level.

Blaming the pilots for following Airbus instructions seems to me to be shifting the blame from the locals (Airbus Industrie) and Rolls Royce to the operators of the aircraft. So much for the DGCA analysis.


:cool:

Wonder how many Pilots/ Engineers would have diagnosed the leak from the first fault msges(Before any imbalance msg)

Low Oil Temp in cruise
High Oil pressure in cruise.

Apologies if the wording is not exactly as the ECAM.

Possibly you mean:

High oil temp. (due to lack of fuel to cool the oil due fuel leak)

Low oil press. (due to high oil temp)

One thing leads to many others in modern aircraft!

Possibly he means what he said.

The leaking fuel close to ambient temperature at cruising altitude would cool whatever it leaked/sprayed upon, be that the oil reservoir or other parts of the engine where oil flowed.

And the increased viscosity would result in increased oil pressure.

So very easy to see after the fact. Hands up everybody who would react to Low Oil Temperature by checking for a fuel leak, even before last August?

Tree, IcePack is correct. The first indication the flight crew had that something was amiss was low oil temperature and high oil pressure.

Great ball of fire.
 

It seems that some of you are overlooking one thing. There is a raging fire inside of the engine, which is constantly radiating heat into the surrounding area. The oil that flows through the engine and back to the tank is picking up heat and that heat is radiating from the oil tank into the surrounding area even if it has passed through a cooler. The ambient temperature of the surrounding air stream is around –45 C or thereabouts but it is doubtful if the fuel has cold soaked to that temperature. If the fuel were to impinge directly on the oil tank it could not generate enough cooling to overcome the heating generated by the engine and the oil to decrease the temperature of the oil to the point of raising the kinematic viscosity of the oil. If there were no heat present the surrounding ambient temperature would raise the viscosity to the point that the pump loads would go up along with the registered pressure. So, once the first engine stopped producing power but continued to aerodynamically spool and cold fuel sprayed on the tank along with a decreased temperature the viscosity would go up to the point of raising the oil pressure and the temperature would drop.

The kinematic viscosity for MIL-PRF-23699F turbine oil is:

@ 100 C 4.90 to 5.40
@ 40 C 23.0 Minimum
@ -40 C 13,000 Maximum

It is just pure luck that the leaking fuel did not ignite. If it did we would not be having this conversation.


:eek: :eek:

Not that I know alot,But I believe the leak was after the oil cooler.
Hence much fuel flow through the cooler so over cooling the Oil.
Just imagine trying to diagnose that, but I guess if I see those messages now I will take a carefull look at the fuel usage calculated to actual! My sympathies are with the crew.

The final accident report will make interesting reading & I guess will show much mitigating circumstances.

Lu, while your scenario when the fire goes out is reasonable, it seems that the first ECAM indications of Low Oil Temp and High Oil Pressure appeared when the engines were still running.

Now while the fuel temperature will be somewhere between ambient temperature at altitude and temperature at takeoff, the cooling effect from a dense fluid of higher temperature can be higher than that of a less dense fluid at lower temperature -- and the density of fuel is some thousands of times that of air.

And we haven't even worked in the heat of evaporation;)