agreed 100% ...... get away from the ground at least above MSA and the figure out the real problem and then think about continuing diverting or returning back to base !

There is clearly some finger trouble here. On the 777 the policy is to rotate towards 15 degrees and once airborne follow the flight director. After the Air France incident the software logic was changed so that the autopilot could not be accidentally engaged on the ground when moving. However the autopilot will engage in the air below 200 feet and if 0000 is in the MCP window then it will fly level and descend. However there should be a very distinct "Don't Sink" aural that repeats.

Additionally if the flaps are approaching flap limiting speed the thrust will reduce automatically from the derated takeoff thrust setting which will not help the situation when close to the ground.

The autopilot is normally engaged by the pilot flying, not the P2.

I await further details with interest.

In takeoff mode thrust should be in fixed or reference thrust(is that in 777). How will it reduce unless it's controlling speed? Many airlines it's the PM whose asked to engage the AP.

in EK PF turns on his or her AP

Good luck with that the reports normally only state 64hrs in last 28 days etc

Respectfully (I like your contributions which are usually very interesting, detailed and knowledgeable), I feel you have it wrong here.

If there is not something extremely weird and rare coming up as external factor, it just looks like this crew was unable to simply fly their aircraft, which means to steadily pitch up after lift-off to ~15° nose up attitude.

It is completely irrelevant what the MCP should have been set to, what the FD was supposed to indicate, what the PM was supposed to monitor or call out, etc. Once you are past v1 and runway end lights are coming closer, you just fly your aircraft into the air with one hand on the thustlever and the other on the yoke/sidestick.

Such "raw data skills" are absolute basics, which any pilot in a cockpit seat of an airliner needs to be capable of doing at any time, since you can never exclude complex-automation-induced errors. More automation is not the solution, no human being can fix such complex-automation-induced errors within the needed short time frame. Only "raw data skills" of keeping your airframe in a safe envelope by using pitch and power can solve such situations.

Spot on post there 1201alarm. This should be a basic instinct for a pilot. It reminds me of an incident a few years back... On a 787, I witnessed an occasion when a trainer decided to get all excited about a small insect sitting on the windshield which when projected through the HUD ended up becoming the proverbial "speed bug". He cracked the joke right at V1, completely omitting the rotate call. The PF, new to type (new to Boeings), rotated anyway. After clean up, the trainer apologised profusely and commended the FO.

I’ve worked for an airline where SOP was to zero everything on the MCP after landing. Courses, heading, altitude.
I have never used the FD during rotation. What would an EK crew do if they forgot to switch on the FDs? Abort after VR?
If there is one time where Speed/Pitch is key, it’s during and after rotation.
Most pilots can take a quick look at the MCP and see if it looks right. 4 pilots missed 0000 in the ALT window. This is just weird.

I agree with you 1201alarm, as long as you have a perfectly fine plane, with engines running normally and no flight control issues, there is no single excuse to not fly the airplane on the correct path. You're flying the plane, the plane is not flying you.

Automation is a nice tool and there to help you, but it's not the primary way to fly the plane.

A couple of comments:

I’ve only ever seen one pilot set 0000, pre-departure, as a “reminder”. I advised that this wasn’t a good idea…

Rotation is not trained or based on the FD, although most seem to to stop or pause around 10 degrees, and then fly V2 + 30ish. Rarely saw V2 + 15.

Nearly everyone (EK) rotates too quickly. This can result in an FD pitch down command, if the pitch continues towards 15 degrees. (Opposite case of above.)

If the rotation rate is correct (2 degrees/sec) then the FD provides accurate guidance earlier, with stabilisation around 15 degrees, at V2 + 15-25.

EK introduced with the -200, with a ‘slower’ rotation rate of 2.5 degrees/second, noted in the FCTM and generally achieved.

With the -300, the wording changed to 2-2.5 degrees/second, and slower for the longer body.

Some still seemed to think that implied a choice, regardless of the model…

It should also be considered that this might not have been ‘just an MCP error’, and that unreliable airspeed (ie a genuine failure) may have been root cause.

Agreed 100%

I find it hard to believe that there was any kind of failure other than the human kind. They flew all the way to the USA from Dubai after nearly not getting airborne; if there was anything wrong with the aircraft, like UAS, DXB was just behind them for return. Information about how to go about flying is all in the manuals (FCTM especially) and I would be of the opinion that by the end of the flight they knew exactly what they’d done (or failed to do).

At least they didn’t try and reject at 220kts+ with <100m remaining; that would have likely got them into the top ten all-time air disaster list...

There is no excuse for this. The fail safe automation has once again failed to recognize the fact there are no fail safe pilots.

I have never disputed anything that you have stated. Only thing is I don't consider rotating at Vr to takeoff attitude as a raw data or any skill. It's very basic and surely these pilots were not doing their first takeoff. They missed setting up the MCP, they didn't include it in the briefing, they didnt check the FMA(unless not required in B777), all this is done on every takeoff day in and day out. I am trying to figure out what distracted them from doing so this one time. This cannot be called a complex automation induced error since automation behaved as programmed but pilot induced error. Offcourse none of us know the details. So we will have to wait.

Don’t we do radial scan when keeping the cross on the box ?
simple to say from the ground though.

Y’all need to do more hand flying. the utter reliance on the A/P outside the US just baffles me. And this is the result

I routinely hand fly my 737 up to FL180, and click everything off (including FD, AP and AT) coming down through 10,000, at least a few times a month. Keeps me sharp. Should be standard SOPs worldwide, would reduce a lot of these events

It’s very easy to spin the altitude selector instead of the heading selector on a Boeing - an error I’ve made myself. Is it possible one of the pilots spun the wrong selector as they were lining up?

Initial climb altitude in Dubai is 4,000 ft, so if a pilot wants to set the altitude window to zero in just 4 clicks, the altitude selector must be positioned to 1,000 foot increments, otherwise it takes time to make such selection.

Surely any half decent professional pilot should be able to look through the FD if the commands are rubbish. This is basic stuff.