Wizz Air A321 CG was off the chart
 

A Vr of 112 knots for a not fully loaded but well and by far not empty A321 should have rung a bell as early as at performance computation stage. The whole set of performance data was invalid.

Also, as people well acquainted with the matter say, Wizz air have a highly customised normal checklist which does not include an after takeoff checklist. Surely reading the standard Airbus checklist to the line after flaps retraction wouldn't have allowed them to climb to 5000 with the gear down?

Does an after takeoff checklist appear on what Airbus actually produces? Genuine question. At my large A320 operator we don't have one.

After takeoff/climb checklist:
Landing gear - up
Flaps - retracted
Packs - on
--------------------
Baro reference - STD set

That's the Airbus version of it, as far as I am aware. Everything else, including removing this section, is an airline-specific customisation. And that's the trap with deleting it - probably because whoever designed the SOP and checklist thought that raising the gear was too intuitive to forget.

320 to 321, always a trap
 

We have this situation a couple of times a month, and my first thought is always pax seating and underfloor loading. Followed by fuel required.

I always discuss the pax seating with the Cabin Manager and get them to check if it “looks ok” before we close the door. (Ie: pax distribution across all 3 zones.

My company has their own iPad based loading system, which is far from perfect and doesn’t populate any of the Airbus performance data.

So it is always a challenge, and requires extra vigilance for loading and operations.

That doesn’t stop these similar events from happening, but touch wood, I’ve managed it up to this point.

They were lucky this time, it could have been a lot worse.

Pretty sure there is no published after take off check list in the standard Airbus SOP. We used a customized one about 15 years ago, then ditched it to align more closely with the Airbus SOP. Seem to remember that the aircraft will warn you if you've left the packs off.

Airbus most definitely has an AFTER TAKE-OFF checklist. See Pilot LZ reply!

Airbus are currently revising many items of the normal SOP and I believe the AFTER TAKE-OFF checklist will be removed. These changes are delayed but due in the second half of next year.

As far as I know, this is the new CL, due to be released late next year. No after takeoff checklist.
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....c29cb4ac3.jpeg

Interesting. No more Autothrust on the landing checklist?

How does that old saying go?

You pay peanuts...

Apropos the above:

"Following the incident, the operator carried out an internal investigation. It identified safety actions it would take to prevent a reoccurrence, which were to:

... Improve Ground Handling Agents' awareness of the implications of a change in aircraft variant.

... Provide additional training for cabin crew on weight and balance distribution and its affects [sic]."

Macdo, TCX were operating a very slick and cut down Airbus SOP. Every other operator out there has an After TO and Approach checklist that is straight from the official Airbus books.

Indeed, the low V1/Vr of 112kts should have rung alarm bells! I seen to remember from my A320 days at LTN that the Vmcg/Vmca was around 115kts, but surely the giveaway should have been the aircraft registration on the load sheet handed to the captain. Yes, a good SCM should have flagged the unusual distribution to the pilots, but no more than that. I'm afraid the fault lies firmly with the dispatcher and the pilots.
a narrow squeak!

Airbus has an after takeoff/climb checklist definitely since my initial type rating in 1993 and I honestly do not understand why any operator would want to skip such an important part of the checklist. L/G left down is highly common for many distractions occurring during takeoff, including EFTO slightly mismanaged with some sweating where, once the a/c is under control, the crew focusses on the EFP and forgets the gear.
Rotating an A321 with 157 pax at 112 kt means a very very low understanding of basic aerodynamics...

10000hrs on type. Never seen an after T/O check list nor is there one anywhere in the manuals that I can see (worlds largest Airbus single aisle operator)

?? well that sounds awkward to say the less

The manuals for your operator have had a huge amount of Airbus material removed from them, not all of which has made it into the OMB.

PilotLZ

Cannot understand how this did happen...I mean you get a different aircraft, a 321 is different in everything in terms of ZFW, TOW, MLW; You have your FlySmart tool and Inflight performance application and do your loadsheet calculatioin, you insert your cargo and pax weights and distribution check the CG, the THS data, the TOW, the ZFW, double check with your colleague, insert in MCDU INIT page, then you do your TakeOff calculation, PERF page, then check again same distribution numbers with Ramp Agent, SCCM and so on and so forth.
Even if it was a manual calculation you would have immediately spotted the CG out of range.

Am i missing something ?

I think two reasons could lead to this (stand to be corrected): misloading of aircraft by loading staff and flight crew complacency entering and crosschecking perf.data.

Am i missing something ?

You are missing the fact that the loadsheet was generated external to the aircraft . I would imagine that it was probably just a print out on poor quality paper using a life expired print cartridge with no envelope depiction printed on it.
“When all the passengers have boarded, the Load and Trim Sheet is printed, and a copy is passed to the flight crew for them to complete their performance calculations.

So it wasn't the Flight Crew doing it ...and no quality/safety check done afterwards. They were lucky this time.

For those who are quick to jump the gun and blame the crew. If you care to read the actual AAIB report, you will find that:

- the crew was presented with a A321 loadsheet indicating a CG within limits. The loadsheet assumed even distribution of PAX throughout the cabin, whereas in reality everyone was seated in the front.

- there is no mention of incorrect takeoff weight or performance calculations. By all indications the V-speeds were correct

​​​- forgetting to raise the gear after barely leaving the ground (mind you intersection t/o at LTN means around 1800m TORA) is a minor error, completely irrelevant to the incident

Don't most airlines include a final closing up cross check from the cabin crew confirming approximate passenger seating distribution? Mine does.

Sidestick_n_Rudder

Finally someone understanding English or actually taking time to read the report before calling the crews something connected with peanuts... Thank you Sir!

All those rows empty in the back should have prompted any properly trained cabin chief (who are there primarily for safety, not to serve passengers, as we are always reminded when their service attitude is questioned...) to pop their head in the cockpit and query whether that fits with the information at the pointy end. Of course, as someone above aptly said, if you pay peanuts...

‘By all indications the V-speeds were correct”

Have a look in the fcom and there are some speed tables based on VMU and VMCA and compare them to the figures given in the report.

Sidestick_n_Rudder

There is no way a Vr of 112kt on an A321 makes any sense unless You are ferrying the aircraft on a short sector (and also in that case probably with Conf 2 or 3).

Being a Captain means also having enough experience and gut feeling to understand that something’s definitely not right and you must break this Swiss cheese that is forming up just before your eyes. They were also very lucky they didn’t leave half of the tail on the runway.

tubby linton

Doesnt the departure system flag a warning if the aircraft is overloaded or out of trim? Could the load controller have changed the seating to free seating in order to produce the loadsheet - and forgotten to tell the cabin staff - or if he did they didnt action it?

Seems to be a very large split between the Vr and V2. A V1 speed of a 112 would not be uncommon in Ltn from the intersection but as you say a Vr speed of a 112 is virtually impossible unless it’s empty. Could there be some confusion in the report regarding V-speeds? Seems very odd to me.

You can make all the excuses that you want, but the fact that this happened to Wizz, as opposed to Ryan or Easy, doesn't surprise anyone.

Sure, at better, safer, more experienced 320 operaters things happen. But when it does, it's surprising, and dealt with.

With Wizz, nope, no way I'd put my family on there.

All euro-locos had their fair share of cockups without any serious outcome, fortunately. Just think about EZY's intersection incident in Portugal, or RYR's NDB approach in France. WZZ's recent stint in LTN is no different. However their EIN-SKP departure and continuation of flight, following a birdstrike causing temporary unreliable airspeed indication raises a few questions about the company culture...

For what it’s worth, I can see why the crew left the gear down. They were obviously distracted by what had just happened. That’s more or less inconsequential in the grand scheme (in my opinion).

I’m curious about the V speeds though, as they seem way too low. The report doesn’t mention anything though.

oooh yes thanks sonicbum

I don't have acess to A321 performance data, as I have only flown the A320, and that was some time ago. However:

- if anything, the Vmc speeds on the A321 should be lower than on the A320 due to longer fuselage. Correct me if I am wrong

- the takeoff was conducted with a light-ish airplane on a short, wet runway. It is very possible in such conditions to have the V-speeds limited by Vmca/Vmcg/Vmu and be lower than what we are normally used to see. On longer runways the V-speeds are usually higher in order to improve climb performance.

According to the report mentions V1 of 112kt and Vr of 123kt @68.6T. Does it really sound so low?

Can anyone post published Vmcg and Vmca for the A321 and stall speed in Conf3 for 68T? I remember there used to be a stall speed graph in the FCOM. Min V2 can be as low as 1.13*Vs1g

Or even better, do a calculation in FlySmart? The wx/rwy conditions are described in the report.

You know, you’re right. Avherald says V1/Vr were 112 and v2 was 123. The actual report says v1 was 112 and vr was 123. That’s more reasonable.

Several of the reader comments in the Avherald report also query the quoted Vr. Hopefully the article will be corrected in due course to use the figures from the AAIB report.

I believe they did correct it now.
Definitely a wrong Vr of 123 becomes tricky.

Never understood why it was there at the first place. Good thing they finally removed it. This aircraft can be flown entirely without checklist in my opinion especially the newer models where you have an Ecam warning for everything. All the important items are displayed on the Ecam memo. Gotta love Airbus for that.:)

So accounting for all the errors in the reporting, understanding this was a lightish A321 off a wet runway (therefore not totally unexpected speeds), we now have a situation where the only way this could've been trapped was by having knowledgeable and safety aware cabin crew. At Wizzair and most LCCs, this means you are expecting three 18 year olds and one 25 year old with barely any life experience, let alone aviation experience to speak up. At my previous legacy airline, at least 2 of the crew would've picked this up in a flash but they're in their 30s and 40s and cost far too much.

The first comment on the report in Avherald makes it very scary. It could have ended in disaster. The RW is short with no overrun the crew wouldn't consider abort takeoff. The aircraft which is in direct law on ground got airborne only because of the thrust/weight couple created by TOGA. Otherwise they would've overrun with takeoff thrust. Providential escape.