"On Aug 9th 2020 India's Aviation Ministry reported that according to testimony by the tower controller the aircraft did not touch down until abeam taxiway C (editorial note: about 1030 meters/3380 feet past the runway threshold)"

India Express B738 at Kozhikode on Aug 7th 2020, overran runway and fell into valley

You get no objections from me. Add autobrake max to your statement, and we would be happy working in the same cockpit.

I use the term 'PILOT TRAP' to describe the situation where the crew landed up. The weather was bad but well within the minima. So diversion would not have been the first choice. Approach is made in heavy rain vis. 2km (within minima). As the glide slope was US it was a non precision approach with higher MDA. AT MDA RW is not sighted hence a GA is made. Nothing seriously wrong till now. The decision is taken here to do a tear drop and land on R10 may be due to higher MDA for R10 or on the spot judgement that approach path to R10 could have been better. Here it must have been ascertained that there are no wind shear and no excessively turbulence (as far as control of ac is concerned). Second approach is made in vis 2000mts (within minima) with tail winds close to 10kts (within minima). With these two things and RW picked up close to MDA things are not all that bad especially since the RW is fairly long (9000feet) and it is at seal level temp too are not very high. Here things start converging . Landing in heavy rain with wind shield wipers at top gear and added noise and night time it would have been fairy easy to have a few knots extra speed. Depth perception is poor could result in long float and TD with excess speed and touch down at 3200 feet (about 1000 feet ahead of the designated touch down zone). Still about 6000 feet of RW is there. Situation is not all that good but not really out of hand. Only thing wrong is here that now the crew just can not afford any mistake which appears happened. Bounce, aquaplaning or any malfunction in brakes, reversers, spoilers would convert this into an accident. We will have to wait for CVR FDR to know for sure what happened. The various scenarios that could have happened (I write this knowing fully well that it might be countered by the findings, but my aim is to learn from this) are as follows 1. Aquaplaning or bounce eats up lot of RW and its an overrun. 2. Something wrong with brakes / reversers/spoilers resulting in overrun. 3. Pilots notices that they are running short of RW decides to go round which is a late call but since the call was made the crew must have assessed that it was possible to escape out. During the GA things have gone wrong may be normal delayed spool up or in such cases the engine (one or two) surges. To summarise there were many difficulties and issues in this very difficult approach which the pilots made. Singularly or even up to 3/4 issues would have resulted in no incident. Unfortunately all things just combined (all holes in the cheese aligned). And mind you I have not even touched on the fatigue factor and pressures that comes with such rescue flights which are in the glare of all top notch people. Combination of bad weather, ILS (wo glide slope), poor vis, heavy rain, water logging, tail winds, RW friction anomaly,long landing, excess speed and many other factors turned it into a lethal cocktail. RIP to the crew who did their best.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....55e541db7e.jpg
From AVHerald. Not on plan B myself, so don't want to guess what the pilots were doing based on this.

Speedbrake down, thrust levers up, fuel cutoffs idle, no reverse, flaps 1?

Yeah, that's what I thought....

Also (avherald)":
"Passenger testimonies

On Aug 9th 2020 a passenger seated in the aft cabin reported that following the go around the aircraft positioned for another approach and touched down, however, [
did not appear to slow down but to accelerate again. After touchdown the aircraft overshot the end of the runway and went down the cliff, all of that happened within 15 seconds."

Previous Flight
 

A previous flight 6E7129 took six attempts before landing as per FR24 few hours before unfateful event. Definitely the conditions were hostile.

Pilot decision
 

My guess: pilot tried RWY 28 in second attempt but cancelled as raindrops carrying into wind screen of plane causing poorer visibility overwhelmed advantages of Forward wind landing. Third attempt done at RWY10 but due to tail wind pushing the plane, it landed further down (1 kms) on the airstrip.

It's Not All Just Rumour
 

alf5071h, disclaimers first. As SLF (and worse, attorney) and a decade less time on the forum, perhaps I should call this post off. But understanding the near-future changes percolating into the aviation safety ecosystem is a professional (and academic) interest, so here it goes.

Last item you linked is about 15 pages, heavily referenced (though not with notes), 2007 (Errors and Failures: Towards a New Safety Paradigm - Journal of Risk Research); second to last item is about 8 pages, heavily footnoted (Errors in Aviation Decision-Making: A Factor in Accidents and Incidents), by NASA Ames authors 1998. Perhaps some forum members have familiarity with these works but I'll safely presume they're for members' learning and mind-expansion. In other words, I don't speed read, not scholarly stuff like those.

Without intending to exaggerate for effect, your overall point appears to be, "it's all relative". Which is different from saying, "it's all relevant." I think the second version is what you actually mean - but your posts proceed into what reads like a theoretical direction. That discourse and information is highly important and useful, to be sure but.....in a given accident situation, is it not more important, and by far, to unearth the facts as cold hard realities first? Again it's perhaps an attorney's mindset, but there is little if anything theoretical about facts.

Not long ago I attended a presentation by NTSB Chairman Sumwalt about aviation safety and how the system, in the U.S. anyway, moves forward and doesn't move forward. Someone asked a question* about the need for better regulatory rules about pilot duty time and commuting time and fatigue issues. "We've already had that accident - Colgan Air" or words to that effect, the Board Chairman responded. There wasn't any room or space in that answer, in my understanding, for theoretical factors. It was about facts, lessons extracted, and what can be done to help solve or reduce the problem going forward. I don't pretend to know what, exactly, the proper place is for matters of theoretical content, but I do contend that deploying such matters as a kind of interference to traditional and customary accident investigation, causal analysis and safety recommendations is not the proper place.

(*SLF that I am, I did ask a question, but the one referenced was not mine.)

Ok, I missed this. Thanks. Found the METAR stating this. And light rain (-RA). So it's not very likely that they faced highly unusual conditions (standing water, hydroplaning affecting braking action), but we don't know. METAR is generic info. Actual info from Tower would be welcomed: Actual wind, actual conditions.

I also read official statement they were NOT low on fuel, diversion was still possible (Minister of Aviation)

We can't rule out another unknown technical issue, we can't rule out human error, we don't know a lot yet.

My cousin knows a van driver who's talked with a pilot and he says that standing water and hydroplaning are common in the monsoon season in India. Do you have any experience flying there? Do you have any experience at all flying a plane? Aren't you the same guy who calls a runway change a sweepover? :ugh:

https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/...p-easyjet.html

Usual apologies for professional pilot talk on PPRuNE about the control positions on the throttle quadrant.

Well, as a PP on this Ne myself, I think the Ru would like to disagree

I saw another Photograph. The flaps were clearly at 40

it appears that the throttle quadrant was removed and replaced because as shown it is back to front. As viewed from the cockpit door the speed brake lever should be on the left and the flap lever on the right and of course the numbers 1&2 for eng. Reverses , thrust levers, and start levers should have # 1 next to the left hand seat. Lever position may have been compromised.

Look here....


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....570bee567e.jpg

Exactly. The fact the radio panels are in the background (towards the cockpit door) is the obvious confirmation. The previous deleted whole-cockpit picture showed the pedestal front was exposed by the massive disruption of the cockpit floor, panel and skin.

I won't repost it, but several variations showing the horrible damage, and displacement of the instrument panel and FMC keyboard and such, are on the Aviation Herald (link below). Apparently the nose hit and lodged in a heavy brick or stone wall - not pretty.

To me, the control positions in the picture (plus a survivor report that the plane accelerated after touchdown - make of that what you will, hydroplaning sometimes produces a similar sensation) suggests an attempt to reject the landing and get airborne, with insufficent time (~15 sec) and/or distance left.

Reported today (Sunday Aug. 9) on Aviation Herald (quoting Aviation Minister) that the aircraft still had sufficient diversion fuel on board.

Accident: India Express B738 at Kozhikode on Aug 7th 2020, overran runway and fell into valley

I found this photograph.
Not current on 738, so don't know what flap setting is shown.


https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....12b8817a6e.jpg

Thanks gearlever and others, it makes sense now. picture taken from MCP looking aft. Stand corrected.

Unless those photos were taken before the recovery of the crew (which I doubt) then you cant read anything into the position of the levers. the thrust levers and the speedbrake lever would have been disturbed during the recovery process so they probably don't reflect their positions at the time of the accident The FDR will be able to confirm the positions of the flight controls and thrust levers up until the time of impact.

topgunmaverick - with your two posts, you've highlighted one serious problem with Indian aviation!

If the previous flight had SIX attempts at landing, then it shows a huge failing in the system as well as a chronic lack of appreciation of current safety recommendations by all participants, and goes a long way to explaining the continuing appalling flight safety in that region.

It is well known that as crews attempt ever more approaches, the inherent human failings of frustration, pride, 'get-there-itis' and fear of employer-rebuke start to come into play. That's why every operator I've worked for in the last 15 to 20 years has mandated that after a second landing attempt, it is either an immediate diversion, or delay until there is NO doubt whatsoever as to the success of any third attempt.

In any case, more than three attempts were forbidden. Why, you might ask? The accident statistics have shown that the risk of something going very badly wrong increases dramatically after two attempts.

So, the Indian regulator (a disgusting cesspit of nepotism and cronyism that should instead be expending its limited abilities in encouraging or mandating that operators include such restrictions in the OM), the operators (for the most part money-hungry and unwilling to acknowledge that safety comes at a cost) and the pilots (who should know better, but to this day suffer from the clash between best-practise and outdated class / rank / age distinctions, as well as unjustifiable perception of greatness from some older left seat occupants) are all remiss.

As for the 1000m + float down the runway...in the conditions on the night, it is such a disgraceful example of pilotage that it needs to be treated with the contempt it deserves! Hero pilot? My 4rse!! How many fatal overruns does it take to convince these supposed 'top gun' pilots that the performance numbers don't lie. This captain was a class dux, a test pilot, had a great reputation. Yet on the night, it appears that he couldn't master the basics of landing in the TDZ (preferably on the aiming point) or, failing to have done that, to have made the timely decision to go around! Unbelievable.

Sadly, except for the brick wall that the cockpit hit, the pilots might have survived.

And except for the hill at the end of the runway everyone might have survived

The crash site photographs show speed brakes retracted.
This is starting to look more like an attempted go around..

You are correct. B737 800 is a stretched aircraft and to avoid tail strike on To and landing the speeds are higher than previous models. On MAX to fit bigger engines it even went to ridiculous length to raise the nose wheel by 9 inches and fitting engines further forward and upward shifting the thrust line. On MAX 900 that was also not enough so on takeoff run the main wheel extends during rotation. It's highly compromised aircraft to meet certification. In India all overruns are on B737.
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Top Gun , I suggest you stick to your F-15 or MSFS before posting such mis-information specially in light of what happened . Please go back to the playback of FR24 on 6E7129(ATR VOBL-VOCL) 07/08/2020 and watch the altitude and profile , they made a few holds/course reversals and did 2 approaches( including the successful landing) .

For those questioning the regulator/airlines on number of approach policies before a mandatory diversion , due to a fog related incident at an airline a few years ago, the regulator did come with guidance and I know the airline I worked at changed our OM policy to maximum 2 approaches/ go-arounds due to meteorological reasons before a mandatory diversion. I would expect AI/AIE to have something similar .
I'm waiting for something official from the investigators than depending on some photos/passenger reports to make an assessment of contributing factors , causal factors and recommendations and make my own lessons learnt so that it doesn't happen again .

I continue to be amazed that there is little attention or monitoring given to the fact that a large proportion of 737 pilots seem to chase the VApp bug after the threshold, even to the extent of adding thrust in the flare! - Instead of TLs closed and flaring to an attitude, touching down at~Vref.

This mishandling leads to long landings and high touch down speeds.

I think you are correct. I have had colleagues calling "speed" when the speed goes between Vref+5 and Vref.
I even had an instructor write up on a line check that I had allowed the FO to fly at Vref-5 when he meant Vref+5 minus 5!
In other words, not calling him out for applying the FCTM technique.

Not saying this applies here. Just sayin.

I think you can probably guarantee the aircraft was not at the correct speed. I’ve not flown the 737 for a bit, but I remember if you let the speed get below Vref in the flare, it would get on the back of the drag curve and crunch into the deck. This is why pilots would often fly (and justify flying) well above the command speed. Even worse, when increments were added to the command speed to account for the gust factor, they would fly well above that command speed. Throw in a long landing, wet runway and maybe a glitch with the spoilers or a reverser, then such pilots could find themselves in deep trouble.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....0fabfe7381.jpg


So I am a little confused. The opinion is that the crew had configured for a go around, boards are stowed, throttles forward and flaps 1 in the detent. At what point would this decision have been made I wonder? I mean surely not at 40 kts with the aircraft about to falloff the end of the runway? Yet the final resting place of the aircraft would suggest what ever forward momentum it had was effectively used up in the slide down the hill and the abrupt stop when it reached the pavement. The impact of course caused the forward fuselage section to buckle upwards and break off before sliding into the nearby wall. But none of this suggests the aircraft 'flew' off the end under T/O power as you might imagine say a failed launch off an aircraft carrier. If that had been the case, then the impact would have been some distance further on and of course casualties would have been much higher if not a complete disaster. Instead, this aircraft seems to have literally flopped off the end. I might hazard a guess that it wasn't the wall that caused the crew casualties but rather the impact with the pavement after the slide down the hill.


Just cant imagine the circumstances for all this to happen. How long does it take to spool up, how long does it take for the flaps to come up from 30 or 40 to 1 ? How close to the runway end do you have to be before you say, nah let's give this away. Or put another way, if you fall off the end at 40 kts or so, when did you make your go around decision with a 13 kt tail wind? I mean surely, before you commit to take the aircraft back into the air again, you have to have assessed there is a better that even chance the aircraft will in fact get airborne in the what's left of the runway?


The flap handle was in the flap 1 detent and this is what flap 1 looks like on a B737-800 as far as I can ascertain:


https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....49da8d4095.jpg

But this what the flaps looked like on the accident aircraft where you can see the flaps appear to be extended much further. Note the trailing flap devices and how their hinges are visible whereas in the image above these cant be seen. So what does this suggest? Someone has played with flap lever perhaps as part of removing the crew? Or, were the flaps still travelling as the aircraft plunged off the end? In which case this go around must have been desperate affair.

I imagine the near destruction of the engines on the slide down the slope and possibly the lights going out gave rise to the reports of 'heroic' actions by the pilot in turning off the engines.
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....b6f9049e29.jpg

EDIT: Subsequent imagery makes it very clear the the flap lever is in the 40 deg detent.

Start levers in IDLE contradict that supposed ‘heroic’ last-seconds engine shutdown.

Normal go-around flap setting would be flaps 15, but the flap lever seems further aft.

Speed brakes not extended (and speed brake lever stowed) definitely could be a major contributing factor in the overrun!

Biggest load of garbage I've ever heard
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Exactly what I was thinking.

Calicut RWY 10 Disaster
 

I am an expat pilot and TRI and previously worked for AIX.. in the early days of their operation, and actually was based in Calicut from 2003-2005 before moving to the Gulf from where i continued to visit the field on a regular basis untill as recently as March 2020.

Over the years the approach to RWY 10 has always been "problematic" because of its visual and environmental "characteristics". In the early days it was a visual approach only. Then they put a VOR approach, then with in the last few years because of the Indian Airports "modernization" the upgraded to an ILS RW10 approach. However the Approach minimums though lower. Have been off set by the fact that the Landing distance beyond the glideslope is less. Also the visual appearance on breakout gives the appearance of a twisted runway. And following the Glideslope to touchdown puts you 1000 Meters beyond the touchdown point. Which on a dry day with Autobrake 3 or max braking takes you to the end!!

The ATC facility at the Airfield either do not know or haven't received proper training on how to use the radar. And either are not willing to or for some unexplained reason cant give proper assistance to pilots during times of Monsoonal weather in the area.They relay on Cochin approach to give the clearance to intercept the final track inbound then contact Calicut for the approach clearance for the approach to Rwy 10. Both the approach to RWY 28 and RW 10 start from over the CLC VOR. Where 90% of the weather always is. As clearly this was the situation on that night.

In September last year(2019) the Indian DGCA put out a notice that "When the Runway Visibility is less that 2000 metres that the runway will be closed for landings. However pilots can land at their Risk. So why didnt the Calicut ATC close the airport?
I personally have eaten alot of fire form my previous company for diverting to Cochin and TRV. because i in my judgment i felt that the attempt to land on RWY10 after considering the above mentioned issues with that runway in exactly the same weather was not worth it!.
I hope that the Minister of Transport and the Dir General of DGCA will make the necessary changes to reduce the risks for Indian passengers and crews!
This is a Sad Sad day for Indian Aviation!

The main problem with RW10 is tailwind landing in wet conditions. All things being what they are if the airline had forbidden tailwind landing on RW10 this accident would not have happened.

It appears you are not fond of reading.
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Re position of the throttles - anything is possible here as to why pedestal controls are in the position they are - it is possible that the separate of fuselage sections pulled the cables sufficiently to change throttle positions...
I don't think the aircraft "slid down the slope". There are no tell-tale tracks/ground damage* until much further down the slope. I think the aircraft "launched", not by much but enough to clear most of the slope in an arcing path until the tail hit pitching the nose down near/at the bottom of the slope.

Very sad, especially given the sense of deja-vu. A groundspeed of 176kts just prior to touchdown is significant no matter what wx conditions or runway contamination existed.

*there are two small indentations in what appears to be a "hedge-shaped" wall about half way down the slope - possible fuselage/left engine contact - hard to say.

​​​​​​​And this is not all. After th MAX fiasco had you kept yourself updated you wouldn't have made the ignorant comment.

Good informative video, but your negative personal comments diminish the technical messages

This guy has never seen a 737 upclose. "Boeing reduced the amount of flaps you can use for landing and takeoff when the 737 was stretched" Flaps 40 has been there since day 1 and unlike the 737-300/400/500, which can use 1 (not -400), 5 and 15 for takeoff, NG and MAX can also use 25.

A320, which is a much newer design that the 737, also proves very well that there's no problem having only four main gear wheels on a narrowbody aircraft even with much higher MTOWs than 737-800.

I can read, Just don't do BS. How much Boeing knowledge do you really have (not just the Wikipedia time). You are short of facts. But there again, an Airbus Fanboy wouldn't want to acquaint themselves with ACTUAL Boeing facts.