CVR
 

Are there prior instances of an AAIB releasing an entire CVR transcript in the interests of safety improvements, for example to have as near a complete record of activities by the pilots as possible? - given the severe degree of deviations from SOP by the crew in this accident?

If I read the AIP correct, it's class C airspace, and there's no speed restriction in class C airspace. Reading a little more, it may seem as class B?

Intriguing indeed. Apparently Khan had listened to the voice recordings, and was able to draw his own conclusions based on that, while not adhering much to the actual contents of the report.

(1) CC should have promptly informed the flight crew of the scrape, but didn't.

As if they would not have figured it out themselves when observing the position of the L/G lever. So more likely perhaps:

(2) The flight crew were eagerly discussing covid-19 not only among themselves, but possibly also including visitors to the flight cabin during critical phases of flight.

I suspect there will be little new to be learned from the CVR after the commencement of the approach. If there are any clues at all they will be in the preceding portion - from the departure briefing onward.

Your link appears to be broken. Is this where it was supposed to go to?
https://historyofpia.com/forums/view...199464#p199464

We'll learn eventually, but that is my guess as well.

If true, it's a coarse play by Providence. The only thing that intersected that crew's universe with the world of normal piloting, is to call L/G down at 5 NM and they did. One of them moved the handle in the opposite direction and with that the one and only normal SOP call blew a hole below the waterline. Probably the F/O having had his brain squeezed out.

Sidenote: remarks had been made here that perhaps they saw the G/S upper false lobe, luring them to think the situation was manageable initially. If so, the confusion would double as that false G/S has an opposite polarity, i.e. the flight directors would be showing rubbish.

Thanks, I've edited the post.
I got a phone call while I was trying to compse it.

I'd say the strongly formulated opinion of x_man over there is rather accurate.

Sequence of events
 

The raising of the gear and stowing of the speedbrake comes shortly after the last 'offer' of an orbit by Approach Control - is there a possibility that one crew 'accepted' this and the other pressed on? How do you make sense of any of this?

If you need 3 terrified girls at their crew stations to inform you about 'scrapping' the engine then maybe...

When the Aviation Minister Mr Sarwar was briefing PM Imran ( a fantastic retired international cricketer) shortly after this tragic accident, he stated that 12 (TWELVE) crashes had occurred in our recent history.

There is psychologist as a member of the AAIB team. The human factors aspects, with the reported disregard for CRM etc will make interesting reading.
Hope they also consider the location of the VCR and whether the aerodrome controller should have used binoculars to check if the gear was down. Previous aspect raised by me earlier in this thread. My view as an ex ATCO is yes, especially as it was quiet.

Did they mistake the gear lever and the flap lever when the gear was selected UP?

The report mentions under 'The Way Forward':
(h) Assessment of preflight medical actions, and post-crash initial response by CAA, is also underway at AAIB.

I hope this includes a blood sugar analysis.

Interesting that the minister mentions the Cabin Crew. Was there a cabin crew member in the cockpit that 'needed to be impressed' by the Skygod? Or was the minister just talking without having the faintest clue what he was talking about?

A cabin crew member doesn’t need to be in the flightdeck to pass on important information to the pilots. CRM extends throughout the Crew, from most junior to the most Senior. Perhaps the Minister was alluding to the fact that the cabin crew didn’t communicate important information to the flightdeck after the gear up go around? On the other hand, perhaps you’re right..he doesn’t have a clue what he’s talking about.

From the Dawn article linked above:

We discussed the fake license problem in the region earlier on the thread and some of the posts by Fawad and others were modded out, perhaps they were considered irrelevant or culturally insensitive.

Missing the TOD is not an issue. It occured to me dozens of times within 35 years of flying, for many reasons (ATC, cockpit or cabin duties, or simply my own error, etc). Many ways of path recovering are available. Increasing speed, speedbrakes, thrust reverser (DC8), early extension of landing gear, etc.

And if nothing of the above works, one has to ask ATC for vectors or a 360° turn.

I can see no reason for such a ass over one’s head approach. Even a student pilot having his first lesson on a Cessna 172 would catch this. In my own case I’m still sticking to the idea that these guys were physically unfit for flying that day. Or only the captain was unfit, and the FO was a ‘‘yes sir’’ robotic monkey, which is often an occurence in this part of the world.

No firsthand knowledge of how Airbus does it, but on most Boeing aircraft the FDR data path is fairly complex, with several systems involved. In short, you don't need to just keep the FDR powered, you need to keep the entire data path powered or you'll simply be recording garbage (I spent plenty of time over the years reviewing FDR data as part of investigating various incidents - I could usually tell when the IDG dropped or came on-line because there would be a few frames of garbage data associated with the electrical power transfer). The CVR is straight forward - basically just the microphones and the recorder - so adding a separate battery to that system would be relatively simple.
BTW, again no first hand knowledge, but I'd be a bit surprised if the A320 RAT has electrical power generation capability (at most a simple PMA dedicated to the FBW). For all engine out, most aircraft depend entirely on the battery to power the critical electrical systems. Adding anything to the battery load pretty much requires an act of god - battery power is simply to precious.

Quick question to Airbus guys.

Flight crew applied reverse engine power and initiated a braking action

Don't you have to get WOW first to be able to do that?

My money is on an “abnormality of the mind” for the Captain caused by deficiencies in the chemical/electrical pathways.
As for the FO.......”Cultural compliance” with the SKYGOD.

The toxicology/ blood sugar / dehydration etc etc might prove interesting.

Joining some dots .. ... ...
 

Somewhere in the previous 67 or so pages, the question was asked whether the flight deck would have been aware of the runway scrape, perhaps this is not so far fetched as it may sound.
They are sitting a good distance ahead of the engines, they SHOULD be wearing headsets and the various audio warnings etc. have been widely referred to elsewhere.

Information such as this is not usually included in a preliminary report, or a brief pertaining to that report, unless there is a line of enquiry open.
Certainly, the cabin crew should be on the interphone pdq if they had heard the scrape, and or seen the sparks, on the flip side, they are trained to not be over insistent with the emergency call button at a time that they believe the flight crew may be extremely busy, perhaps dealing with the very thing they are about to report.
Perhaps the question is whether that call was actually made.

On the gear and speedbrake question: for that we will definitely have to await the CVR information, but it does seem to fit in terms of timeframe with the idea that one crew member had reason to believe that the approach was being discontinued.

Just observations obviously, and we await further.