That would depend on touchdown point ( in this case well past the runway threshold, around 4500 ft past, out of a total length of 11000), touchdown speed (presumably quite high) and breaking capacity ( no wheels, just the engine nacelles scraping the asphalt- probably deteriorating very fast, probably unable to deploy reversers). I’m quite sure deceleration seem very poor to the pilot, so his arse was yelling “go around or you’ll depart the end of the runway at a high speed and no control”

That looks like 210kts touchdown ! Unbelievable...

Careful...

The real problem in certain parts of the world and certain cultures, people are not selected on merit!!

Nepotism raises it's ugly head in all countries of course, somewhere along the line. There are other countries where nepotism is rife.

being in the know has it's advantages of course but does it weed out the undersirea6ble candidate?? I say not always.

I was going to say “arrival”, but yes, the almost inevitable end product of everything we have seen/heard all the way down from cruising FL.

The Airbus team is on the way to Karachi for the investigation.

https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/66...-investigation

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....658d27c781.jpg

Georg1na answer to your last question, I would say yes.


There is one other situation where manufacturers state to do what you have asked, once reverses are selected, do not go around.

Interresting choice of equipment for the team

Multiple news sources quote a PCAA document, such as, "according to an earlier report, prepared by the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA)..." While this doesn't sound like a grievance document from PIA, perhaps they are all just quoting each other.

And now they are all quoting an apparent report from air traffic control, "according to a report from air traffic control..."

Agree.

This is one way we learn. That is by the mistakes of others. If we are deprived of any of the information, gleaned from an investigation, we ALL loose out.

By with holding this information says a lot for the lack of safety culture of these countries.

Learn from the mistakes of others. This we must always try to achieve.

Interesting - that will certainly warrant further analysis.

One word of caution - the data from the 14 different receivers isn't synchronised, as they all seem to be running different clocks, hence there is a lot of spurious jitter when you try to plot timeseries. So you get, for example, TAS jumping from 374 kts to 400 kts with timestamps only half a second apart.

But that's not an insurmountable problem, it should be possible to deduce the relative time offsets that should be applied to the data from respective receivers and produce a more accurate plot.

agree, we should respect these lives voices abrubtly severed in a common uneventful friday.

Georgina's question:

I've not flown an Airbus, but I'd be very surprised if you didn't need the "weight-on-wheels" switch (air/ground logic) to be made before the reverse will deploy, most lilkely also thrust levers at idle. That switch would be on the wheels and hence not available in a gear-up touchdown.

Revert to previous advice - "close the thrust levers and hang on!"

absolutely right Siropalomar. in these situation (behind the plane) a training Captain told me that you forgot also your name and do not hear anything else. Tragic and true. we will know soon (CVR ) "low gear" "low gear" !!

With the best will in the world, the FCOM (or any other document, or group of documents even) cannot be a complete or perfect description of an aircraft's systems. There can be subtleties in any unusual condition which can make the necessarily general statements in something like an FCOM inapplicable, never mind that people can make minor errors in phrasing which might not be apparent except in an "edge case". Once you also get into the possibility of a non-normal condition, the FCOM description is a starting point but by no means the final word. Compare, for example, the amount of pages in an FCOM dealing with a given system to the number of pages in the full certification data set for that same system, and it's clear that there have to be things omitted or simplified.

That's not to say that I believe either the FCOM-described or FFS-experienced behaviour to be not representative - I just do not know that it necessarily is. And I would hope that if something like this behaviour is deemed potentially causal, or part of the "chain", that it would actually be verified by test (assuming test data doesn't actually already exist, of course)

As others have said, this accident is looking increasingly bizarre.

Yes, cognitive overload; yes, distraction; yes task fixation, but at some point self-preservation has to kick in, surely? Before they hit the ground the first time, it appears that the aircraft was serviceable, albeit on the receiving end of a bit of a beating. The report and CVR transcripts will be fascinating, although will there actually be anything to learn...?

Georgina
You won’t get reverse with no gear. But it’s a bit academic. Reverse was probably wrecked by the impact on the engines. If they had simply let it slide to a halt someone will one day work out that it would have gone off the end at 30’kts with little damage and no Loss of life. Or something like that. But they didn’t have a lot of time to ponder that one I suspect. If you are so overloaded as to land halfway down the runway with the gear up at high speed, I suggest that there wasn’t a lot of thinking space left?
The main issue here is why did the Crew of the plane not observe the landing gates which are there to force a go around long before it becomes a crash. Been an SOP for years and in well run airlines it’s mandatory and there’s a no blame culture for executing a go around at any stage when the approach is becoming too unstable to safely continue. Cheers Ret’d Guy

Thanks again Airbubba

took the liberty of highlighting a couple of key areas below, although it's comes as no surprise to most here.

Based on the FR24 CSV data
- (best approximation, due to periodicity and latency of recorded data)
-

• 251 IAS out of FL100
• 240 during descent, give or take
• 236 IAS at 2,000'
• ~215 IAS on tarmac, skipping down to 191 IAS
• recording a minimum of 173 IAS, 200' AGL into the GA

https://i.imgur.com/TQPbjjk.png

Come on guys. Select the G/L down on your next flight at 280 kts, decelerate below 260 kts and wait for the dunlops.

And then wait, without hope, for biscuits with that cup of tea when one next has a meeting with the chief pilot. I will venture a guess here: most companies have monitoring programs in place such that a gear extension at greater than the usual airspeed will attract some (unwanted) attention.

Another logical assumption emerged by a A320 pilot:
There was no issue of L/Gs, L/Gs were down during 1st attempt.
G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach leading the acft to 4500 ft from threshold.
Now this is the catch:- Probably Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early while engines still spooling up from approach Idle to TOGA,.
Too early retraction of Flaps caused loss of lift and acft sank while the Gears already retracted up and engines dragged along the runway 3 times( as witnessed on runway)
First mark : Eng 1
2nd mark: Eng 2
3rd mark: Both engines
Acft climbed with struggling engines to 3000 ft but couldn't hold the Alt and ATC warned the crew about this and crew asked for 2000 ft but due to complete loss of power acft kept on descending and crashed on to residential area.
Pic taken by plane spotter shows dragged engines with black marks and RAT auto deployed due to dual eng failure( AC Bus 1 & 2 being dead ).
Having lost G&B Hyd crew extended the Gears by Manual Gravity Extension, L/Gs extended can be seen in the video just before crash.
Aircraft was still maneourable as Flt Control being supplied by Blue Hyd circuit pressurised by RAT and Flight Control computers by Emergency Generator but no power to keep the acft up.

Human factors and may not be relevant here . In some countries there are ex military captains who where very high ranking officers while in the military, they still have many connections . The ATC officer might be a military employee . ATC can be very weary of being to forthright over the radio as a bit worried what might come back at them .

And then go home and wait for a call from the Safety folks when they see the FOQA/QAR data. ;)

I watched one of those Takbir One arrivals while I was on the ground at DXB waiting for pax boarding years ago. The controller repeatedly mentioned that the plane was high on path and offered vectors for another try. The plane touched down halfway down the runway but it was a long runway on a clear day so they got it stopped.

After landing the plane taxied to a stand. The pax got out and some, instead of heading for Dubai Duty Free, consulted each other for the Qibla and said a prayer on the ramp. And then they headed for Duty Free I would imagine.

The expat controller in the tower said 'glad you were able to get it on the ground'. The captain pitched a fit on the radio demanding 'explain comment, explain comment!'

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....9b5ed90df0.jpg


Very similar in some respects. Total disregard for the proper approach profile and stable approach criteria. The FO called for a go around at least three times. They crossed the marker at over 4000 feet and touched down 5200 feet down an 8000 foot runway. They attempted a go around after deploying the thrust reversers with 800 feet of runway remaining.

The CVR had the expat captain snoring for an hour and forty minutes before top of descent. The NTSB might blame the crash on sleep apnea these days, they analyzed the data from a pilot's CPAP machine in one recent report.

I'd like to think this sort of approach is becoming less acceptable in some parts of the world.

Without weight on wheels the ground spoilers won't deploy, as well as not having reverse thrust, wheel brakes or drag from the landing gear. Floating along at high speed in ground effect just above the runway there would have been little cause for the aircraft to slow down until the cowlings scraped the pavement, which was well down the runway. Do we have an indication of the flap setting on the first attempt as 236 kts (at 2000') is over limit for any flap stage ?

215 kts at touchdown is well in excess of the limit just for FLAPS 2 and when configuring in the air FLAPS 1 gives slats only, no trailing edge surfaces extend. With the engines being bumped up to approach idle, the first stage has very little effect on slowing down and is often more use in allowing greater speed brake extension due to a reduction in VLS.

Standard method for configuring an A320 for landing which I would give to a new F/O on the "do this and you won't get into trouble basis", with the appropriate speeds used. Some airlines may require the aircraft to be fully configured earlier, and some pilots might be happy to push it a bit further but this is pretty acceptable for general use.

3000' AGL FLAPS - 1
2500' AGL FLAPS - 2
2000' AGL GEAR DOWN - FLAPS 3
+ 1500' AGL FLAPS - FULL

That looks like a human factor to me, but perhaps my context is askew?

What, catching forty winks to make up for the fatigue-generation methods of the average ops department and crew scheduling practices? (I kid) :8

Another logical assumption emerged by a A320 pilot:
There was no issue of L/Gs, L/Gs were down during 1st attempt.
G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach leading the acft to 4500 ft from threshold.
Now this is the catch:- Probably Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early while engines still spooling up from approach Idle to TOGA,.
Too early retraction of Flaps caused loss of lift and acft sank while the Gears already retracted up and engines dragged along the runway 3 times( as witnessed on runway)
First mark : Eng 1
2nd mark: Eng 2
3rd mark: Both engines
Acft climbed with struggling engines to 3000 ft but couldn't hold the Alt and ATC warned the crew about this and crew asked for 2000 ft but due to complete loss of power acft kept on descending and crashed on to residential area.
Pic taken by plane spotter shows dragged engines with black marks and RAT auto deployed due to dual eng failure( AC Bus 1 & 2 being dead ).
Having lost G&B Hyd crew extended the Gears by Manual Gravity Extension, L/Gs extended can be seen in the video just before crash.
Aircraft was still maneourable as Flt Control being supplied by Blue Hyd circuit pressurised by RAT and Flight Control computers by Emergency Generator but no power to keep the acft up.

Wasn't there a CFIT accident when the last thing heard on the CVR was the sound of the warning horn and the Captain saying " Shut up, Gringo" as he cancelled the horn ?

https://www.avcom.co.za/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=55384

From a post I made a decade ago:

Wouldn't 210->192 KIAS over the runway provide enough energy to prevent ground contact even though the engines had not fully spooled up at the time? The airspeed information seems to point more to a gear up landing than a failed GA (unless the PF failed to pitch up enough during the GA).

The Rate of descent in the moments before they decked appears in excess of -500 fpm.

The final 30 sec segment down to flare alt equates to a rate of -1200 fpm. Approximation of course, but in keeping with the profile.

I don’t know if this will turn out to be the worst ever approach, but it is going to make the top 10.

Most probable:

Unstable approach due in part from lack of recency.

Gear was down.

CRC warnings were from flap overspeeds.

Improper go around. Selecting Flex/MCT instead of TOGA/GA or TOGA Tap. Recency issue again.

Gear selected up as aircraft was still pointing towards the runway.

Two impacts due to skip. TOGA finally selected or manual raising of the nose for go around.

Both engines fail on downwind due impact damage.

Its almost happened before.

I would be shocked to see a performance like this from a 200 hour first officer doing initial type rating training in the simulator, let alone two Captains in the aircraft. Any trainee who did this would be instantly flagged for closer investigation, the debriefing afterwards would be very interesting and likely to involve senior personnel from the training department.

Any instructor has had students mess things up with alarms going off, but anyone with a bare CPL should have known that continuing wasn't a good option.

Where is this assumption about two Captains coming from? A local news station has given the names. It was a normal crew pairing.

It might be a while before we see an accident report according to this editorial in the local paper The Dawn:

There is always a lot to learn. The more interesting part will be the first few holes of that cheese. What was their set of mind at FL350 to even try this? They started their descend late, but why keep an impossible straight path? What was the mindset behind this? Why did CRM not prevent this decision making process?

I doubt that you make it with this decision making to 17000h, so what was different this time?

Have you seen the speeds in the above charts? At 220 kts there will be no sink if you pull that nice little handle on the side panel (not with flaps in 3,2,1, or clean). That's so much energy that you don't need the engines at that moment to gain altitude. It's a mere question of where you point your nose....
(At 220 kts that would be sufficient to gain >2000ft until down to 130kts, assuming a glide ratio of 8 - 10)
The only little catch hindering you from leaviong the runway again might be the nose down momentum from the drag of the pods scratching the tarmac being significantly below your cg. That is where the engines might help you getting unstuck again. But for preventing contact with Terra Firma you wouldn't have needed them in that situation.

Unless I've missed something, no evidence has emerged yet that confirms the gear was lowered at all on the first approach.

Quite. Or indeed the original serviceability state of the aircraft.

I noticed exactly where. Many posts ago oribably on day one someone just threw it in as a question. The post literally read "Two captains?". It's incredible how quickly it got traction as a new piece of information. Fascinating to watch.