Boeing, and FAA oversight
 

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51058929
From previously redacted Boeing internal comms.
Would you put your family on a Max.......NO.
Designed by clowns overseen by monkeys...bit harsh.

I saw that BBC report too but thought it too risky to post because of........

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....84cf7e8724.jpg

Much the same on the FlightGlobal website, what a shame for such a great company:-
https://www.flightglobal.com/airfram...136078.article

Anyone who flew in the 1960's and 70's was very much aware of the efforts made on the BAC 1-11 to avoid stalls with its doubled up stick shake and aggressive stick push. As someone who flew many thousands of hours on that aircraft and the 737-200 it was obvious there was a difference in philosophy between the CAA and the FAA when it came to certification in the area of stalls. For years the ARB wouldn't certify the B727 because of that issue.

DP Davis' book Handling the Big Jets second edition published in 1968 by the British ARB explained what he referred to as a typical stick pusher installation on page 136 then went on to describe the BAC1-11 system with it 4 "stall warning sensors" (angle of attack indicators) that was fitted to the aircraft after its deep stall crashes during certification.

The best thing the FAA could do is get out their copy of the book read it then tell Boeing take out MCAS and fit an updated version of the BAC1-11 system on the Max.

On a personal note there was a major difference in handling pitch on the BAC1-11 and the B737. On the 1-11 pilots used the elevators to control pitch then trimmed out with the stabiliser trim. The 737 has a far larger stabiliser compared to its elevators and all pilots I ever flew with learned to fly the aircraft by blipping on the trim switch effectively using elevators almost exclusively only during take off approach and landing.

I've had a quick search but can't find the original messages, just the same Reuters story syndicated everywhere. Is is published anywhere?

Here's NYT's take on that same subject...

Boeing Employees Mocked F.A.A. and ‘Clowns’ Who Designed 737 Max

The company expressed regret at the embarrassing communications it sent to investigators on Thursday, which included a comment that “this airplane is designed by clowns, who are in turn supervised by monkeys.”

Boeing employees mocked federal rules, talked about deceiving regulators and joked about potential flaws in the 737 Max as it was being developed, according to over a hundred pages of internal messages delivered Thursday to congressional investigators.

“I still haven’t been forgiven by God for the covering up I did last year,” one of the employees said in messages from 2018, apparently in reference to interactions with the Federal Aviation Administration.

The most damaging messages included conversations among Boeing pilots and other employees about software issues and other problems with flight simulators for the Max, a plane later involved in two accidents, in late 2018 and early 2019, that killed 346 people and threw the company into chaos.

The employees appear to discuss instances in which the company concealed such problems from the F.A.A. during the regulator’s certification of the simulators, which were used in the development of the Max, as well as in training for pilots who had not previously flown a 737.


“Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn’t,” one employee said to a colleague in another exchange from 2018, before the first crash. “No,” the colleague responded.

In another set of messages, employees questioned the design of the Max and even denigrated their own colleagues. “This airplane is designed by clowns, who are in turn supervised by monkeys,” an employee wrote in an exchange from 2017.....

============

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/b...-messages.html

Have a look at this site where I found links to the Boeing employee messages:

https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/9/21...imulator-crash

Thanks very much. I've scanned the first 2 source documents. Pretty damning tone; repeatedly discussing how to deceive regulators, referring to them as stupid, some good people seeing the problems but no-one's listening.
Not really surprising given what's come out so far but this will be very damaging.

But WHY?! Just what drove him to say that? Re the 1-11. We had a week's differences course just between two very similar marks. The MAX possibly didn't need a full type rating course, but 90 on an iPad? What was in the minds of people that though that was a good idea?

It just keeps coming.

Having worked on a project involving the FAA - it all rings true. Management effort goes into "messaging" rather than fixing underlying problems. Business (i.e. profit) is the overriding concern. Employees know what is going on, and are not impressed with the approach. The line between normal, aggressive profit seeking tactics and unethical behavior gets quite blurred.

Just wow. Go/No Go meeting turning into a Go/Go meeting. Nine Project Managers involved in the sim process in Miami declare they are under budget and go sailing. Meeting the schedule had higher priority over meeting minimum quality. 777X suffering from the same "leadership" fate.

Typical corporate flunkies produced by the so called modern school of business.

Wait till you get to the third document.

"Amazing what a brown envelope can achieve... FAA were neither thorough nor demanding..."
"Sometimes you just have to let things fail big so that everyone can identify a problem..."
"Best part is we are re-starting this whole thing with the 777X with the same supplier."

Oh dear.

Certainly does not bode well for the future, whether it is 737 NOT Max or 777X. The top of the slippery slope, the only way is downhill. That's what happens when "beancounters" who think they know better and overrule engineers and good management.

Here are the 117 pages of Boeing internal communications, in their public (redacted) form, with OCR to facilitate search.
There are more gems beyond the now famous one (on page 27)
I count 8 references to Jedi mind trick. Lucasfilm should sue!

I saw that and am still stunned by the implication.

Wasn't the British Midland crash at Kegworth a then new B737 model (the -400) where the crew had only had an OHP session to get to know the differences between the new -400 vs the -300, and it was the failure of this assumption that was one of the holes which drove the decision to shut down the wrong (working) engine? There's way less difference between a -300 and a -400 than between an NG and a MAX surely?

The topic caught my eye because of.....

However, I see there is a distinct important discussion point here, and have changed the thread title accordingly (I hope Blind Pew is okay with that!). So this topic is the certification relationship, between Boeing and the FAA, we're not going to drift off and repeat all the discussion about the MAX and MCAS.

The FAA acts on behalf of the US citizens, and because of reciprocal agreements, much of the world's aviation consumers. As such, all of those people have a right to expect an effective certification service. The FAA has delegated some of this service to specified employees of Boeing, who, in that role, act on behalf of the FAA. That topic merits discussion, as it is the basis of public confidence in an airplane which is compliant with the design standards.

Let's keep on topic please.....

Well, I think this just delayed RTS a bit more and delayed the 777X entry.

Certainly worth reading the whole of the internal Boeing email logs linked to above. Hard to shake the impression that the "unacceptable communications" were generally a direct result of technical staff blowing off steam in a situation where to keep their positions in a toxic management environment to get the MAX through, incremental and continuous indefensible compromises and short cuts were required. It's hard to accept the Boeing implied line that these guys are the problem.

This is the heart of it all. Governments establish regulators to ensure that their citizens have no more exposure to risk than is absolutely necessary. Companies buy aircraft on the basis that it will give them an economic advantage, and safety is central to that (or should be). Crews have every right to expect their company will give them a safe system of work within which to operate, and passengers expect to survive their travel experience.

We have certification, airworthiness and operating processes for good reasons, and there is inevitably an element of trust that runs throughout - trust that people will comply, for the benefit of all. The moment individuals or entities try to circumvent hurdles rather than clearing them, we are in trouble. And it is not just manufacturing in the frame here. How many times have we seen disasters where the investigation uncovers pilot training and qualifications that have been sharp-pencilled? People lie through laziness or self-interest but proper oversight should be a strong barrier against this. You could argue that the system failed to protect Lubitz and his Germanwings victims because there was inadequate oversight of his fitness to operate.

Add to this the global move towards Performance-Based Regulation and Oversight, with PBR/PBO being heralded as avoiding un-necessary costs to industry. The question is whether we have the balance right. If you subscribe to the argument that better oversight would have prevented the MAX scenario and the Germanwings event, it follows that you also agree the balance is not quite correct. I am not suggesting we should revert to the old compliance routine, but I think it is high time the aviation system took another look at PBO to ensure that 'Oversight' means appropriate 'Overwatch' rather than inappropriate 'Omission'.

The Boeing statement seems to be particularly peculiar, as if the management are still living in a cloud.

Unless something specific to an AoA sensor failure leading to a crash was being specifically discussed as a training item, MCAS-specific training is unlikely to have made any difference to the accident flights. There was no difference in concept for the behavior of trim runaway and no inkling about the potential adverse effect of MCAS on trim.

That seems to be the only significant difference to the handling of the plane and, if it wasn't discovered or appropriately evaluated before shipping the planes to customers, it would never be added to training.

I have worked with a management structure just like that; enough that it is an insult to both clowns and monkeys.

Is that because the simulator did not (still does not?) accurately reflect how the plane flies?

It's sounding like there's a culture of "make it work nicely in the sims", that the sims didn't need to know about MCAS.
(software engineer)

Hi Skipness
I flew both the B Midland display EIS and the newer display around the time of the BD Kegworth - for another airline. The differences were very small. The reason that the BD crashed was similar to what happened recently. Complete failure of crew CRM and standard procedures. The dead engine was not identified and the wrong one shut down, not because of display issues, nor has been quoted due to the design of the air conditioning system giving rise to fumes, but because there was a rush to identify the failed engine and the correct procedures were not followed. There was no double check by both pilots of the failed engine 1 or 2 . Left or Right.
The FO said when asked by P1 which engine was in trouble "Its the left.....its the right" from memory. The response was "shut it down". Not direct quotes but that was the sort or CRM at work that evening.
Just found actual CVR.....AAIB report
"From the CVR it was apparent that the first indication of any problem with the aircraft was as it approached its cleared flight level, when for a brief period, sounds of `vibration' or `rattling' could be heard on the flight deck. There was an exclamation and the first officer commented that they had 'GOT A FIRE', the autopilot disconnect audio warning was then heard, and the first officer stated 'ITS A FIRE COMING THROUGH'. The commander then asked 'WHIXH ONE IS IT?', to which the first officer replied, 'ITS THE LE..ITS THE RIGHT ONE'. The commander then said 'OKAY, THROTTLE >> IT << BACK'.

After that it was game over except that there were numerous further chances to save the day right up to short final when the mistake became apparent.
That's what I remember, but then I am an old timer retired guy.
R Guy

A very emotional response it seems. Its a slam on the many many engineers whose efforts got it into the sky in the first place. To me blame falls squarely on Boeing management. They failed in so many ways.

FAA OVERSIGHT
On this issue or lack of FAA oversight, it is important to remember that in general the manufacturer and good airlines have generally had higher standards than the regulator. Now I agree that there seems to be evidence that Boeing have dropped the ball here and moving HQ to Chicago was a defining moment.
But when I flew test flights at Boeing over many years on 737-400/ 757. / 767. /744 The Boeing company showed nothing but the highest regard for errors we would pick up and they would be fixed right away and the production line amended if necessary.
That was then - 1988 -2003 and yes, things seem to have changed , which if so, is massively regrettable.
In UK the CAA was our regulator and generally the company I flew for knew far more about the job of flying safely than the regulator for the obvious reason that we were all active training managers/pilots flying hundreds of hours per annum and setting the bar really high, while the regulators were generally retired pilots from a variety of airlines and different former types, with little recency (a few times per year was common). We also took the CAA requirements as a minimum standard and aimed far higher than that. As the man said "if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident or two!" So true as we now see with Boeing and two MAX down.
Now that only works of course if the company is setting standards way higher than those actually required as a minimum. If you become a rogue company or just simply, like some start-ups, completely ignorant of how to operate safely, then the regulator becomes your fallback. And that is very bad indeed because it assumes that the regulator is right up there with the best. And we see where our financial regulators got us in 2007-1010.
The worst case then is a poor airline being regulated by a poor regulator.
So the idea of the FAA delegating certain roles to the manufacture is not intrinsically flawed because it has always been there and worked. I have to agree with those here who say that the standards we are seeing do not appear to support a continuation of that sort of relationship and a lot has to change.
The regulator needs to get regulating and the company has to raise its own bar. Between the two, we achieve the best possible outcome.
R Guy

This is key. Indeed to quote the regulatory material of a regulator:

So yes, it is likely, and indeed intended, that the FAA delegates employed by Boeing (or any other delegate) could be more familiar with the details of design compliance within their specialty than the FAA oversight individuals. This is as it should be, as long as the delegate is free to exercise their delegation free of undue commercial influence or pressure. It would be common for the delegate to present the details of compliance to the FAA staff, through their normal interaction.

The taxpayer simply could not afford to employ enough FAA staff to carry out all of these duties, in the same way that the taxpayer or pilot community could not afford for the FAA to employ enough pilot examiners to examine every pilot candidate, the FAA delegates that to pilot examiners, whom they trust to exercise that delegation diligently. As in some many things in aviation, it's about trust.

IIRC the vibration gauges were placed one above the other instead of side by side. The side by side placement made it obvious which engine was vibrating the vertical placement not so.

AAIB Report on Kegworth Crash

I noted in those exchanges between Boeing employees that two of the authors names were not obscured.
I hope that because those documents have been published and are now publicly viewable that the two concerned do not suffer as a result, e.g. present or any future employment?

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....69b62e6c44.png

Prior to 1972 certification in the UK was delegated to the Air Registration Board that was independent of the Civil Aviation Authority. It could be the case that such a board needs to be set up again in the UK and probably in the USA as well.

The simulator would do whatever it was programmed to do. If no one thought it should do this it won't be programmed to do this.
There was some suggestion that the NG simulator cannot simulate an AoA sensor reporting an incorrect value. I expect it can simulate a case where it no longer provides any reading, but that wasn't the Max failure mode problem.

Sorry, but this pretty well informed SLF thinks that if you read only the exchange that starts on page 51 of the messages, about jammed elevator without DLC, ("you will crash 3-4 times until you kinda get the hang of it")- paraphrase-
Boeing people said this!!! And then go do all they can to prevent having FAA do any flight tests of the Level B training, so stuff like that would not get found out.

this is exactly why I came here in the first place, to find out, How bad is it (the MAX in general, not just MCAS). This is bad.

The plane should never fly again. Full stop. And a whole bunch of people should be in jail; this seems worse than VW.

Like I said, sorry, but I'm just quoting Boeing, and pointing out their own descriptions of their own actions.

Not sure that is correct (now), I believe that the FAA have delegated to Boeing that then nominated employee/s that report back to Boeing management, that then report to the FAA.

The previous method was FAA selected Boeing employees that reported directly to the FAA (an unfiltered system).

The infrastructure and processes for FAA oversight of manufacturers with organization designation authorization (ODA) is terribly flawed. Looks ok on paper, but the reality is much different. The evolution of delegated authority by rule and by legislation has stripped the FAA of effective independent technical oversight. The FAA at the engineering level does not have low standards, but is being held at arm’s length from performing the degree and nature of oversight activity it should be exercising. Furthermore, the prevailing philosophy of “stay out of the applicant’s way and let them do their business” has to be corrected. Properly done, effective regulation and independent oversight is good for safety and for business. We can readily see from current events how the lack of it has threatened irreparable harm to both. Boeing behaved as badly as they did for lack of being held accountable throughout the development and certification phases. The premise that their own ODA organization, Boeing employees and managers would hold them accountable is foolishness. First step should be to return to processes for delegation that existed in the 1990’s, and if that can be streamlined, over time, with improved processes that do not compromise independence and competent technical oversight, fine.

I remember discussions in one or more of the closed MAX threads, about Synthetic Airspeed, and how it could be used to supply a third airspeed reference for comparison. Well right here on the first page of the emails, we find that the technical pilots had a problem with that:

The second page shows that they are actually skirting FAA oversight, by planning to hide things from them.

How can the FAA provide oversight if Boeing is deliberately hiding things from them?

The FAA's type certification process is fundamentally dependent on the applicant not lying and not misleading the FAA's technical staff. It is not designed to, and is largely incapable of, dealing with a dishonest applicant. Trust once destroyed is not easily regained. Fool me once ...

This is going to have very far reaching repercussions in the industry.

It's things like this that mean I have no interest in signing any document other than as the author.

Well, here it is, 04.50 AM and I've read through the interchange of messages. Oh, MY!


I sensed, frustration, downright anger, bewilderment, logic at a brick wall and not least of all, tiredness. (goodness knows what he did to himself while off with family. )

Will big corporations never learn about tiredness? It cost American companies $117.000.000.000 in IIRC 2017 Big university studies. A lot of men denying themselves sleep WILL produce substandard results. I have the publication ISP. Fear and overwork will produce . . . well, a MAX? and a lot of other tidying up to do.

Treat tiredness with the mos routinely sold seeping aid in North America, and you'll start to kill people. It'll be hard to stop as the money involved is right up there in the big league. A different subject, but the death toll is stunning. I'll look up the data on the morrow. Not so dramatic as an aircrash, but a lot more consistent.