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LOT almost had a dual engine failure on a 788 last year (LO-6506 Cancun Warsaw on Mar 23rd 2018). Lost one engine SW of Bermuda, decided to divert to KJFK instead of KMIA due to operational reasons (passenger visa). 2nd engine surged during the diversion. After landing at KJFK both engines had to be changed. LOT internally clarified the definition of „nearest suitable airport“ afterwards. |
Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10548719)
LOT almost had a dual engine failure on a 788 last year (LO-6506 Cancun Warsaw on Mar 23rd 2018). Lost one engine SW of Bermuda, decided to divert to KJFK instead of KMIA due to operational reasons (passenger visa). 2nd engine surged during the diversion. After landing at KJFK both engines had to be changed. LOT internally clarified the definition of „nearest suitable airport“ afterwards. |
Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10548719)
LOT almost had a dual engine failure on a 788 last year (LO-6506 Cancun Warsaw on Mar 23rd 2018). Lost one engine SW of Bermuda, decided to divert to KJFK instead of KMIA due to operational reasons (passenger visa). 2nd engine surged during the diversion. After landing at KJFK both engines had to be changed. LOT internally clarified the definition of „nearest suitable airport“ afterwards. |
Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10548719)
LOT almost had a dual engine failure on a 788 last year (LO-6506 Cancun Warsaw on Mar 23rd 2018). Lost one engine SW of Bermuda, decided to divert to KJFK instead of KMIA due to operational reasons (passenger visa). 2nd engine surged during the diversion. After landing at KJFK both engines had to be changed. LOT internally clarified the definition of „nearest suitable airport“ afterwards. |
They had another 788 there that would have performed a scheduled flight JFK WAW. They cancelled that flight and transferred the pax on the Cancun flight airside to the other 788. The pax on the JFK flight where rebooked. Being already in the US they had visas. Operationally clever - safety wise very questionable. |
Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10549342)
They had another 788 there that would have performed a scheduled flight JFK WAW. They cancelled that flight and transferred the pax on the Cancun flight airside to the other 788. The pax on the JFK flight where rebooked. Being already in the US they had visas. Operationally clever - safety wise very questionable. |
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
(Post 10549309)
I would have thought Bermuda would be a better option than either JFK or MIA. Nice place to be stuck for a few days also! Anyway, JFK surely wasn’t the nearest suitable airport. |
LOT incident
Interesting quote, supposedly in a letter by the LOT Safety Pilot, according to AVHerald reporting on the LOT B787 incident From RR bulletins it is clear that the shut down of one engine dramatically increases the likelihood of the other engine failing. As we all know while analyzing our case with the engine shut down on our flight from Cancun to Warsaw we were very close to serious trouble. The "good" engine has experienced 3 seconds of "ENGINE SURGE" which could have led to its shut down. |
Originally Posted by golfyankeesierra
(Post 10549367)
The acronym ETOPS Engines Turning Or People Swimming, long used tongue in cheek, almost became reality�� |
An ANA 787 had a double engine shutdown on landing in January this year. The engines would not restart and the aircraft had to be towed from the runway. It was suspected to have been caused by a software issue triggered by the manner in which reverse was engaged but was still being investigated last I heard. With FADEC, shouldn't the engines be protected from inappropriate inputs?
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Originally Posted by Porrohman
(Post 10549772)
An ANA 787 had a double engine shutdown on landing in January this year. The engines would not restart and the aircraft had to be towed from the runway. It was suspected to have been caused by a software issue triggered by the manner in which reverse was engaged but was still being investigated last I heard. With FADEC, shouldn't the engines be protected from inappropriate inputs?
That is a different issue than being discussed. In the ANA case, the engines shutdown because of a software fault, not because they were damaged in any way |
Originally Posted by BleedingOn
(Post 10549779)
That is a different issue than being discussed. In the ANA case, the engines shutdown because of a software fault, not because they were damaged in any way |
Originally Posted by SMT Member
(Post 10549781)
I'll venture the proposition, that when you're halfway across the pacific it doesn't really matter whether it's mechanical, electronic or software - the end result will be equally wet.
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Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10549800)
This issue will never happen in flight. It is connected to a protection system (TCMA) that will disable the engines when high forward thrust settings are selected instead of reverse. This system is only active on the ground and when selecting reverse thrust.
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Originally Posted by atakacs
(Post 10546745)
Not a metallurgist by any means but I thought that sulfidation was actually a desired process? No, it's exactly the opposite, sulfidation is bad, nasty stuff. Unlike oxidation in aluminum that provides a protective coating and longer life, sulfidation in superalloys shortens life causing premature cracking and component failure. Protective coatings have been devised to guard against sulfidation, but there are other factors that contribute to premature sulfidation failures in turbine blades and vanes. Here is a photo of sufidation attack on a superalloy where a crack has developed. Add stress and cycles to the equation and the component will crack and fail prematurely... https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....5564c0ade.jpeg |
Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10549800)
This issue will never happen in flight. It is connected to a protection system (TCMA) that will disable the engines when high forward thrust settings are selected instead of reverse. This system is only active on the ground and when selecting reverse thrust.
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Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10549512)
Yes, that one was very close to a disaster. A week or two later the FAA and EASA restricted ETOPS for certain versions of the Trent 1000. |
Originally Posted by EDML
(Post 10549800)
This issue will never happen in flight. It is connected to a protection system (TCMA) that will disable the engines when high forward thrust settings are selected instead of reverse. This system is only active on the ground and when selecting reverse thrust.
Just like MCAS is only active at high AOA. Until the AOA sensor is kaput. So what happens when the WOW or RA or whatever single source B likes to use for critical systems breaks....... |
Originally Posted by Dave Therhino
(Post 10550267)
The ETOPS restrictions had already been in work for some time before that event happened, and were not driven by that event. The biggest concern about that flight was the crew's decision not to divert to the nearest suitable airport.
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Originally Posted by hans brinker
(Post 10550277)
Just like MCAS is only active at high AOA.
So what happens when the WOW or RA or whatever single source B likes to use for critical systems breaks....... I'm not familiar with the specifics of the 787 TCMA, but on the 747-8 TCMA uses three radio altimeter and two WOW signals. At least three signals must indicate ground, with at least one each from the Radio Altimiter and WOW. |
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