Correct, it is written in the OM-A of every single operator as this statement comes from ICAO ANNEX 2.

About 4 minutes of approach time, about 1 minute 15 sec of G/A thrust. Minimum fuel for take-off A320 1500 kg. A simple and short circuit 600 kg.

If 200 after engine shutdown, most likely about 320 - 370 on landing. that's 70% more! Stranger than fiction anyway.

Avherald says they landed with 260kg. I'm sure they did a SE taxi!

An a recent sim session, we tried a manual 0/0 landing from a NPA. Not necessarily applicable to a real life scenario, but when out of options, the guidance is very accurate. Just saying.

Done in real life, survivable. https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20150304-0, The spin that the excursion was due to incorrect coordinates of RWY THR in FMS is priceless. Guess otherwise we might not have known at all.

Roughly five minutes at approach or cruise power. As FlightDetent mentioned it would be much less at high power, like during a go-around. If they'd attempted a go-around they probably would have run out of gas before they were able to retract the flaps and obtain a 'clean' configuration.
WIth fuel this low I have to wonder how they managed the drag (fuel flow) on the approach(s)? Normal configuration or delay gear extension? Land with Flaps 1 or 2 instead of F3 of FULL?

Grounding or more correctly derostering after an incident is a normal procedure to rule out it was not due to skill Defficiency because the incident may get repeated. In this incident the sudden deterioration of visibility in destination and alternate has provided prima facie some evidence that it wasn't so. It's a good move by the regulator not to penalize the crew till the finding is completed.

In India it will not work either.

I'm convinced I've seen a video (Australian crew maybe?) flying an Autoland off a GPS approach in an A320 in some sort of demonstration. I think it was posted on here. Ignoring actual programming, there is no technical reason though that one couldn't be accomplished as the automatic flare and kick straight (ignoring rollout later) is purely a numbers thing based on ILS CRS and rad alt, as far as I know.

Under normal circumstances Autoland's require 3x A's, namely:

• Aircraft is capable and airworthy to do it and the weather's is in-limits for the aircraft type.
• Airport is capable of providing a CAT II / IIIa/b approach (with all that that entails).
• Aircrew is capable, i.e. trained and in-check to do it.

Anyone of those not in place and the autoland game is up.

BUT... when the fuel's running out (i.e. it's not normal circumstances), the Commander is granted authority to throw the rule book out of the proverbial window and do whatever needs to be done.

Looking at the METAR's (for Luknow & Delhi... which all reported Cb's / TSRA and knowing the general pandemonium that can cause for the airports in that vicinity, i.e. everybody charging about trying to find somewhere to land) there's also maybe a question to be asked about their initial fuel planning and judgement thereof (i.e. from initially taking barely enough for Dehli, wherein they should be well aware that when Delhi's got Wx issues - and your primary alternate too - you need to be generous with tankering), i.e. they seemingly had loaded only 20-30 minutes of extra fuel (which they used when holding for Delhi, which somewhat proves my previous point about generous tankering required for Delhi when the Wx there is ****) before proceeding to their primary alternate, arriving there with only a smidgen more than 'Final Reserve' (then, having thrown away their 1st approach into Lucknow, declaring a Mayday because of their now parlous fuel state) and then trying to divert to some place else... well, you couldn't make it up.

And I highly suspect that, during their no doubt panicked attempt to divert to some place else (with barely ½ ton of fuel remaining in each wing) ATC then helped them out by providing a sudden 'improvement' in the Wx in Lucknow.

Imho, they should have declared their Mayday much sooner (which immediately has the effect of throwing the rule book out the window) and landed in Lucknow on the first attempt (or broke off, circled around pronto, and done it again); with Final Reserve fuel remaining (or bloody close to it) even if the tailwind was a tadge too much and / or the visibility was a tadge below system limits? well "oh dear, how sad, never mind". It's called airmanship. This debacle smacks of a complete lack of judgement, as well as blind obeisance to the rules at the expense of common sense, i.e. it's symptomatic of the sort of folks who would follow the rule book into a mountainside.

Yep, sorry, my bad, I misread Your post !

A few facts gathered through FR24 just to better understand what happened while waiting for an official report, so we can possibly discuss and keep learning.

UK944 holds for approximately 15 minutes before starting the approach for RWY 29. The approach starts at 11:30 Z.

METAR VIDP 151130Z 07009KT 2800 BR SCT030 FEW040CB OVC080 24/24 Q0999 TEMPO 28020G30KT 1500 TSRA=

The aircraft goes around at 11:50Z at approx 1500 ft, so approx 700 ft AAL or so, most likely due to tailwind. We don't know if the decision was taken according to a TWR wind check or the wind they read on the ND.

The crew starts immediately a diversion to VILK, at 11:55Z.

METAR VILK 151130Z 05004KT 4000 HZ SCT020 FEW030CB BKN100 34/26 Q0996 NOSIG=

Pretty decent weather. The routing is quite a bit of "zig zag", most likely because weather enroute, which may result in burning more than the planned alternate fuel. The crew reaches VILK and starts holding overhead at 12:45Z.

METAR VILK 151230Z 05004KT 3500 HZ SCT020 FEW030CB BKN100 33/26 Q0997 TEMPO 1500 RA TSRA=

It is likely they caught the heavy rain of the upcoming TS.
They immediately start a further diversion, but just 5 minutes later head back to VILK and land at 13:17 UTC.

That's what the DGCA reported (from AvH)


" At Lucknow while 17nm from the runway ATC informed the crew that the runway visibility had dropped to 475 meters RVR (600 meters required) and was further reducing to 275 meters, the crew discontinued the approach and climbed to 4000 feet. When the fuel remaining reached 1260kg/2775lbs the crew declared minimum fuel and at 1100kg/2423lbs declared emergency. The crew decided to divert to Kanpur but subsequently decided to divert to Allahabad due to enroute weather. The aircraft climbed to FL100 when ATC informed the crew Lucknow was now showing 600 meters RVR and a few seconds later the RVR had increased to 1000 meters. The aircraft was 37nm from Lucknow and 58nm from Allahabad at that time, the crew decided to return to Lucknow and landed on runway 27. The aircraft landed with 260kg/572lbs of fuel remaining on board. "

1.100kg fuel at 4.000ft and divert to Allahabad....!?

Technically speaking, if you start the diversion right at minimum diversion fuel, when reaching the alternate you are left with final reserve (single alternate scenario). If we add to that a possible extra fuel burn to reach the alternate due to some weather avoidance, we can easily end up with even less than reserve. This is why I have always thought that legal fuel planning must take into account some contingency even for the alternate routing, as it does for the destination trip fuel. The right amount of fuel to start the diversion is often left to crew assessment / experience and, in case some elements are not fully considered (ie. enroute weather, extra track miles, etc..) there is no safety net but infringing the reserve and therefore ending up in a mayday fuel.
If the crew started the diversion right at MDF with a pretty decent weather report for VILK, they were legally covered, only to find out that from an operational point of view they would be trapped shortly afterwards. We could also imagine a CAVOK weather at VILK and the crew having to go around because the preceding traffic went off the runway, hence ending up very close or at final reserve.
I believe we all put our personal safety nets in those kind of scenarios, to cope with a lack of regulation, like diverting at, let's say, minimum + 500 kg or so depending on the circumstances / experience, but a misjudgement in such a situation can very quickly end up in big problem.

Edit : we do not know how long it would have taken to change the runway in VIDP and re-accomodate all the traffic.

Can you imagine he landed after busting minimums. Probably instant dismissal with the half-witted Indian press lynching the crew in public.

Like has been said before, the entire system in India is broken. Idiots with violent tendencies (fighting with their colleagues) and clowns with no ability to fly (landing gear extended for 2 hours) make it to the top because of money and connections. Inevitably, this results in a system and environment where good people and their good decisions and judgement take a back seat.