Yes, its FBW. Apparently Liebherr, Honeywell & Thales supply the avionics & FBW stuff. Someplace it was mentioned that they were in "direct law" - no idea what that means on a SSJ100.

Not really benign, e.g.
https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/cras...ier-do228-bodoThat one blew ot an elevator control . Lightning protection is a dynamic subject with more electronic systems and new structural materils and methods.

Aftermath photos clearly show slats & flaps deployed (at about 25), by the look of it aircraft was configured for a normal landing.

Looks like one fire truck was there at about 2 mins, but then spent the next 30 secs wafting its cannon on the ground, up in the air and no-where near the front of the fire which is where the people might be. Very poor response in both time and capability.

There is video of people running to the hangars and fire trucks just setting off and driving past them. Sounds pretty poor. As usual it's always three things, initial problem, very poor (crash) landng ruptures fuel tanks, slow evacuation/poor fire response = deaths.

Assuming that the video starts about the same time as ATC would have raised the alarm, with a 5-10 second lag after the fire broke out, it took them 110 seconds for the first truck to reach the scene. While it is just within reccommended limits, this aircraft squawked 7700 for 6 minutes prior to landing, plenty of time for three units to have been positioned at each end and and abeam of the runway, like we see elsewhere at the slightest hint of any emergency (like chief purser chipping the varnish on a fingernail). In theory that positioning should permit reaching any position on or near the runway in maximum 30-40 seconds, and probably the first time in living memory it could have made a difference.

A luggage compartment BLOCKING would lead to the worst scenario of all: people INTENDING INSISTENTLY to open the lids with no result.
The collapse would be badder than now...

Bags on board
 

The implementation of locks would introduce a lot of extra weight, certification, extra SOPs and new procedures. It's a big rethink and redesign. I doubt this will happen in the next 10 or even 20 years.

The quick and simple solution is what Ryanair and Wizz did, but only partially. Stop people coming on board with huge bags. They only allow certain amount of tickets to be sold with onboard luggage.

​​​​​​If however, airlines would stop cashing in on these and ban massive bags on board it would certainly stop these unnecessary deaths.

However this will stop them selling priority and it's a massive cash cow.

andrasz: positioning a fire truck nearby landing runway, more significantly somewhere half-point abeam, with a partially uncontrollable aircraft approaching, does not sound like that much of a smart idea. I am not disputing your suspicion about the delay to start rescue efforts, just that the proposed could not have applied.

Hope to read your comments and account on the situation as more information unfolds, if you will have time later.

By abeam I meant at the appropriate position outsde the runway safety zone. All airports in their emergency response plans have such designated assembly positions for all runways (or they should), with what you say taken into consideration.

EDIT: Auxtank thanks for the video of the VS landing below, that is exactly how it should be done.

What about special seals for the baggage compartments? Similar to the ones used for catering trolleys, but much stronger? Mechanical locks would need approval, be expensive, etc, but this sort of seal would be very cheap and easy to approve.

The hat rack could have 2 holes (easy to add to existing AC) where the seals would go though, these seals would have a large band hanging from them with stripes on it or something signaling the hat rack is locked. Time-permitting, the pax could be allowed 2 mins before the cabin is secure to get their precious passports and Ipads from their bags and after that the bags would go to the luggage compartment that would be sealed straight away. So now everyone has their precious sh*t with them and they know that the compartments are sealed and not to be touched.

Plus if someone would try to force the compartment on ground, the guy standing behind would definitely push the idiot and no bag would be retrieved, the other pax wouldn't see any bags coming out and wouldn't try to get theirs.

Seriously, how difficult is this to implement?

Four fire trucks and support vehicles within feet of engines before the thing has even stopped moving...
Virgin Atlantic VS43 Boeing 747- 400 G-VROM Emergency Landing, Gatwick.

Never mind the apparently newsworthy symptoms of industry-wide poor evacuation strategies (strategies which result in easy trolley evacuation for those so disposed nearest the exits), I am becoming sick of repeated airings on Sky News at least of the apparent official Aeroflot statement claiming evacuation was achieved in 55 seconds and invitation to compare that to the "industry norm" of 90 seconds. Forty odd people (more than half) did not successfully evacuate and died, so the Aeroflot statement, if correctly reported, is perfunctorily abject nonsense. Notwithstanding their embarrassment, has the entire industry really learned so little about evacuation imperatives since 55 died in the fire at Manchester on British Airtours 28M in 1985?

... apart from Military equipment?

I think most agree from the footage - at 90 seconds many had perished, they already had I guess at 55 seconds.

I expect the bags issue was a small % of those that could have survived but did not.

If you were behind the wing your chances were low - all that smoke and flame that entered the cabin was going up hill toward the cockpit - you see several videos of it exiting the cockpit (the pilot and co-pilot had oxygen and smoke goggles).
That sort of smoke will take you down in just a few breaths.

For anything, the available video (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/621198-sheremetyevo-superjet-100-flames.html) clearly shows that it took 103 seconds from the time the door was opened till last person coming down the slide. It then took another 37 seconds till cockpit was evacuated using the ropes. A full minute later a crew member (probably cockpit) climbs back in, probably after having realised that there were still people inside.