As SLF, I fear this precedent will encourage crews to sit tight and wait in other burning airplanes rather than to exit asap. That is a very damaging shift imho.
Will it take a planeload of dead people for the priorities to be reset?


As is, even though all went well, I would be more reluctant to use this carrier, because the safety of the passengers does not appear to have been the primary consideration.

1 + 1 = 2
2 + 2 = 4
FIRE = EVAC

Any other reasoning is illogical
and in the case of fire tempts fate.

This thread goes on and on
 

But, the right answer is staring you in the face if you have seen the vids, inside and outside.

Dont tell me the RFF said stay put, we will control it, when they were driving away from the burning a/c to stay on tarmac. No way.

The pilots can use the tail cam. Even the tower could see it from afar (hence the fire crew without request). And as the FC has legs, they can eyeball the situation any time they want to.

So sorry, no excuses. Bad call. Lucky escape.

I'm sorry
 

I truly am sorry. I clearly have been missing the facts.

So when were the flight crew aware of the state of their aeroplane?

The only reason I ask is I'm just trying to learn from the event.

Already tried to explain it to you once Julio747 but you seem impervious to anything except your own, totally fact free, assessment.


Once the a/c turned back the engineers would have been studying the telemetry from the aircraft and may well have advised fire and/or tower of a possible fuel leak. We have no idea at all of the communication between the aircraft and Singapore Ops/ATC/Fire services, from the time it turned back until it spoke to Singapore tower on arrival, none whatsoever.

Are they going to fix her, or is it a write-off?

i really expect that "captain" get his license cancelled with immediate effect...ZERO judgement

I can't say for certain...
 

But for sure the cc could see it before wheels stop. Are you suggesting they may not have informed the flight deck?

The RFF was on the move before wheels stop. Did they omit to tell anyone do you think?

Each of these is highly unlikely.

Even in the absence of any comms, the RFF racing past might have been a clue that something was awry.

And as at was twilight, the huge glow on the RHS might have been another clue.

The fact that they stopped on the runway and didn't taxi to gate suggests maybe they knew they had a fire before wheels stop. What do you think, GBD?

So you are right. I dont know for sure when they first learnt of the fire. I am making educated guesses and opining. I will be happy to admit I was wrong if it turns out the FD was blissfully unaware of the raging inferno because they were busy with other stuff and simply forgot to clear the runway....

Singapore AAIB released an interim statement (pdf)

AAIB:
3. The investigation is still in the preliminary stage. These are the key findings so
far:
• Fuel was found present in the oil system of the right engine, which is not a
normal condition. Investigators have determined that fuel entered the oil
system as a result of a crack in a tube in the engine’s main fuel oil heat
exchanger (MFOHE).
• GE Aviation had issued a Service Bulletin (SB) in December 2014 identifying
certain MFOHEs to be removed from the engines, inspected for cracks in the
fuel tubes, and for repair actions and improvement works to be undertaken.
GE Aviation had recommended that the actions called for by the SB be
carried out no later than the next occasion when the engine is sent for
maintenance work in an engine shop.
• The engine of flight SQ368 which had caught fire had last undergone an
engine shop visit in March 2014, just before the SB was issued.
4. The AAIB has issued interim safety recommendations to the following parties:
• GE Aviation, as the engine manufacturer and holder of the engine type
certificate, to review the need to accelerate the implementation of the
recommendations in its main fuel oil heat exchanger Service Bulletin of
December 2014, to prevent another fire or other hazardous incident from
arising as a result of fuel leakage into the engine oil system.
The information provided herein is of an interim nature. Readers are
advised that new information may become available that may alter this
interim statement prior to the publication of the Final report
• The Boeing Company, as the aircraft manufacturer, to review the need for
operational procedures in the event a flight crew encounters a similar fuel
leak situation in flight.
• US Federal Aviation Administration
o to require the Boeing Company to review the need for operational
procedures in the event a flight crew encounters a similar fuel leak
situation in flight; and
o to require GE Aviation to review the need to accelerate the implementation
of the recommendations in its main fuel oil heat exchanger Service
Bulletin of December 2014.

...and not a word about the non-evacuation.
 

But props to tdracer for correctly picking the heat exchanger as the culprit in post #229.

Old news
 

That report was issued long ago, 3rd august as I recall, and posted long ago...

And point 5 is missing, other factors related to the incident are still being investigated.

Please try to read the thread and keep up.

SIA --WING FIRE
 

They say the investigation will take months - download the engine data computer-- cvr -- the flight recorder-- or -----turn on the fuel boost pumps and see where the leak is ----

Any news yet about the investigation of this incident and the decision not to evacuate?

Any news yet about the investigation of this incident and the decision not to evacuate?

Probably plenty of "news" for those who really need to know ...

We discussed the Singapore368 incident in a recurrent CRM course last week in our company. All the crewmembers (cabin and cockpit) that were attending were amazed that there was no evacuation. I think this case will be interesting for all cabin and flight crews! Was there a good reason NOT to evacuate or were there mistakes made? (communication)

One could say that all crewmembers wordwide "really" needs to know!
The outcome and final report will become a very interesting CRM learning tool!

I agree. I'm glad they are taking their time though; as always, it would be too easy to just write it up as crew failure and not bother to dig any deeper.

Final Report out:

https://www.mot.gov.sg/uploadedFiles...l%20Report.pdf

final report
 

:rolleyes: up to page 17 good grief

as for page 18 - blimey


excuse me if you are told by ATC then again by the AFC that you have a big fire just as you are coming to a halt plus the CC are calling you like mad saying heat in the cabin but you have no fire warning in the cockpit do you still dither on an EVAC decision when you have already made your mind up it seems ?
then eventually taking instructions to not do so from the AFC who by the way have kept you hanging on for what seems an age

i knew this would be the outcome notwithstanding the RH offending engine was not shut down during the return to SIN despite showing several signs saying I'm not very well

SQ-368 (engine & wing on fire) final report out
 

https://www.mot.gov.sg/uploadedFiles...l%20Report.pdf

As expected the report delicately tiptoes around all the questions we have been asking, not offering too many answers.

I for one will not fly Singapore again based on this...

Excellent report in addressing lessons learned against the certification requirements.

I would trust the implementation across the world fleet and I would not hesitate to fly any aircraft that embraces these recommendations.

If the CAAM (continued airworthiness Assessment methodology) process really works the way it was intended then all other engine manufacturers and installers will have also taken a re-look for possible actions in their fleets

Somewhat of a paradox .... follow the procedures but think outside the box.
Not a strong point anywhere in Asia.

Why wouldn't you shut down an obviously unhealthy engine? Furthermore, why wasn't the failure to do so not discussed in the report? I don't get it..

Thanks for posting the report.


On first read I feel the report is ok. Sure it tiptoes but we shouldn't be here to throw stones.
I am a little concerned with the overriding reliance of the commander/crew on the fire chief's recommendations. I know in Singapore, ATC can be very disrupting in a non normal situation and that they have no knowledge of the term "standby". I can guess the fire crews are of probably the same ilk.
I know LHR has a discrete fire frequency but was not aware this was also the procedure at Changi.

Also assuming the augmenting crew were in the cockpit, perhaps they could be more involved with communications with the cabin. However this accident could easily have occurred with a 2 man crew and our drills should cover all situations.

I think I will stick with my training, use the fire chief to confirm the presence of the fire ( no fire warning in the aircraft ) and just evacuate.

If we could just take a minute before you run off for your pitchforks and torches, the mob might wish to know that there are no (NO) procedures for low oil quantity indication on the 777.

No procedure for low oil warning
Ignored fuel disagreement warning
Crew didn't have a clue
Ops told to proceed
Ops didn't want to shutdown engine
FC put PIC on standby for 4 minutes
FC says disembark, do not evacuate.

AAIB says, PIC shouldn't depend on FC.

Going forward every PIC has to make a judgement call on whether to trust FC or not.

Passengers should hug their loved ones again and celebrate their second chance.

FC is just one more bit of information. Probably quite good information but just another source to use to make your decision.

Agreed. But can we deduce from the conversation, as written on the report, that the Capt pretty much offloaded that decision to the FC?

I found this concerning:
Other than that, and points already mentioned, I think the "sniff test" is a cop-out, and that the MFOHE checks and replacements should be completed by "yesterday".

You should always be careful trusting the opinion of people with no skin in the game.

There is a very important link between crew and passengers, and that is being on the same boat. Instead of listening to so much advise from those safely on the ground, the crew should have listened to their instincts.

I can guarantee you their instincts where spot on and I am sure when the full CVR transcript is released (ha!) you will clearly see it.

Pilots are not Pilots anymore.

Now Flying Computer Managers.

Spot on. The FC is just one source of information.
He's not the source of a decision.

Andy - why?

A good reminder that your average jet engine pumps a lot more fuel around its internal plumbing than is actually metered and used. Consequently the fuel flow per hour indication is misleading for leak scenario purposes or checklists. And a massive leak source mask.

Allowing the engine to run with low oil Qty + reduced oil pressure + No Procedure + fumes + vibes + errant fuel status would worry me. Me + worry = Fuel off + land.

As an aside, sniffing used synthetic engine oil is a recommended practise for engineers, really?

I do think that PPRuNErs can pat themselves on the back. When the accident occured, the MFOHE was identified in here fairly quickly as a likely culprit. Also, I think, the cameras as a source of information.

Possible ETOPS fleet change if it was shut down, statistics rule?

:confused:

It is interesting how the report dances around the decision to evacuate or not but avoids reaching a conclusion on that.

It comments on the crew not getting as much info as they could have but holds back on the decision itself.

The transcript is interesting: fire commander reports that fire is pretty big and that he is attempting to control it. It is some time before it is reported under control. It is hard to believe that first transmission from the FC didn't lead to evac. Maybe the crew made the right call, but it must have taken extreme coolness to stay put at that point.

Perhaps because they had a Captain onboard who appears incapable of making any decision.

I read it differently. All the combined brains of the technical department failed to spot symptoms of a problem that had been known about for a couple of years. So, if they didn't spot it, what chance did the pilot have with his limited resources (while managing an ailing aircraft at the same time)?
The bloke in charge of the fire service was accurate and up to date with his updates and was obviously very sensitive to the possibility that an evacuation via slides may not have been the safest option for the passengers. Presumably, he was aware of the potential danger of pooled, unburned fuel on the ground below the aircraft.
At no stage were the cabin crew calling like mad, telling the pilot there was heat. The pilot was busy attending to all the other things going on so the CC told their boss who told the IFS who can't remember if he passed that on to the flight deck. I would take that to mean "No, I didn't pass it on".
As for "shutting down an unhealthy engine"; that is discussed in the report and the answer seems to be that there was only 1 indication that was anything wrong, a low oil quantity alert. Other indicators showed it may be a defective indication as temperatures and oil pressures were OK.
The bottom line is not some sort of failure on the part of either the crew, the fire service or anyone else. The real culprit is the engine manufacturer who continued using the same fuel cooling system that had been shown to have failed more than once in the past. They had acknowledged this and issued a bulletin saying it should be checked the next time the engine is for maintenance and this was issued after the engine's last maintenance was done..

KelvinD.
The cabin crew were trying to contact the flight deck:
During the initial stages of the fire, several cabin crew members tried to contact the flight crew through the cabin interphone. However, only one call was answered by a flight crew member and he informed the cabin crew that they were aware of the situation and were handling it.